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Independence Wars since the XVIII Century

XLVI International Congress of Military History

(29 August-3 September 2021, Athens)

Volume II

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21. THE 1876 APRIL UPRISING IN BULGARIA AND ITS REFLECTION ON EUROPE AND USA

Dimitre Minchev, Willard Snyder (Bulgaria)

We are holding our Congress at a historical moment, when the 200 year period of the Greek War of Independence was taking place! There is no question that this war influenced in one or another's Liberation movements in the neighboring Balkan nations: The First (1806-1812) and The Second (1815-1830) Serbian Uprisings, The Nis Bulgarian Uprisings of 1839-1841 [...]. Meanwhile in Bulgaria we, at this very 2021, are having our commemoration of 145 years of the 1876 April Uprising. The latter, due to the heroic struggle and sacrifice, together with cruelties, done to the Bulgarian population, led to a discontent in Europe. That allowed Russia to start the Russia-Turkish War of Liberation for Bulgaria 1877-1878.[1]

Creation of a separate own state unit is a dream of all nations. Its realization depends on many factors – international political situation, geopolitical dislocation, historical tradition, strength of the contradicting forces, etc. The most important factor, nevertheless, for creation of a national state is the civilization status of every nation. This is the condition, which is of most importance and significance.

During the years of the Bulgarian national Revival there were created an objective prerequisites, which revealed the rich possibilities for realizing the important purpose. During these years ripened the new chances for the restoration of the Bulgarian statehood matured. The full appearance and development of the roots for the creation of a new state are to be found in Panagiurishte and the surrounding region in April 1876. XIX Century is the century of the nations, while before the Bulgarians stayed the next step to self state life, i. e. an organized resistance against the Ottomans. Thus the spirit of Liberation of the citizens of the Panagiurishte district supported accepting the ideas of the revolutionary movement for reaching the political freedom.

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[1]   Zahari Stoyanov, *Zapiski po balgarskite vastanija (1870-1876)* [*Notes on the Bulgarian Uprisings (1870-1876)*], vol. I, (Plovdiv: [n.n.], 1884), vol. 2, chapter 1.

During the process of the preparation and in the course of the April Uprising in the Panagiurishte region was created the basis of realization of a true state power. As a result of a critical rethinking of the past and of its values, the leaders of April 1876 reached the idea of restoration and of the Bulgarian statehood. According to Georgi Benkovski "The state power will be the basis on which the belief of the nation in success will be built". Thus was created a Preparation Committee for building of a Revolutionary Army on the single commander principle. The Secret Police from the times of Vassil Levski were restored. In order to coordinate the level of preparation of the population for the uprising and to regulate the plans and missions for the struggle, a People's Assembly was gathered in the Oborishte field, where authorized delegates participated. This meeting turned to be a sacred place for the national democratic spirit. Military Council and a Temporary Government were formed, being the bases of the most important Governmental body. Together with that the apostles restarted the symbols and the rituals of the statehood. On Benkovski's order a state seal and a Main insurrection flag were created. After the beginning of the uprising, in connection with the ritual on sanctification of the flag, was organized a solemn state ceremonial was created. And –again– with the same purpose –to inspire in the nation trust in the strength of the Bulgarian power, were involved principles that are involved in every organized in a state society– hierarchy and social distances, as well as uniforms for the Army. In the system of the new Bulgarian state was included also the Bulgarian church, which was expected to influence and unite the people in the name of Liberty. With the National Church meeting in 1871 the Bulgarians showed before all in the Ottoman Empire and before the World that they were totally ready for a self organized state life. The proof of that was their recognition of a nation in the frames of the Empire. At Oborishte the spiritual institution was recognized as a representation in the People's Parliament.

The tolerant attitude towards the other nations we can see in the realization of the idea for liberty from April 1878. A special commission was elected, which was expected to give answers to a lot of questions, concerning the struggle. In the program of the latter, written in the form of questions and answers, one could see the deep

humanitarian and great tolerance, which the revolutionaries need to supported. The decisions reveal the exclusive tolerant attitude towards the other ethnicities; supporting the Islam, and all of this happens on the eve of a grand struggle for liberty.

The final aim of any European nation in the XIX century is building of its own state and modern statehood. The April epoch from 1878 is leading manifestation of the national revolution and an important moment in the efforts of the Bulgarians for liberation and for the creation of their own state. Through the revolution the Bulgarian struggle from a passive object of the great policy turns into an active subject. This in turn leads to a political solution of the Bulgarian question during the Eastern crisis of 1875-1878, which is 145 years from the glorious April epoch. Now is the time to remind ourselves about a number of people, who contributed to defending the population, who were suffering after the defeat of the uprising.

Members of the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee met at a meeting in the Romanian town of Giurgiu at the end of 1875 and they decided that the political situation was suitable for a General Uprising. It was scheduled for May 1876. The territory of the country used to be divided into five revolutionary districts with centers in Vratsa (leader – Stoyan Zaimov), Veliko Tarnovo (Stefan Stambolov), Sliven (Ilarion Dragostinov), Plovdiv, later moved to Panagiurishte (Panayot Volov, who later gave his position to his assistant Georgi Benkovski) and Sofia (Nikola Obretenov). The rebels had been hoarding arms and ammunition for some time and even constructed a makeshift cannon out of cherry-wood.

On 14 April 1876 a General meeting of the Committees from the 4th Revolutionary District was held in the Oborishte – a locality near Panagyurishte in order to discuss the proclamation of the insurrection. Ottoman counter intelligence was informed and on 20 April 1876, the police made an attempt to arrest the leader of the local revolutionary committee in Koprivshtitsa, who was Todor Kableshkov. In conformity with the decisions, taken at Oborishte this very day, the local rebel committee surrounded and attacked the Headquarters of the Ottoman police in Koprivshtitsa, commanded by Negib Aga. At least two Ottoman police officials were killed and

Negib Aga was forced to release the arrested Bulgarian rebel suspects. Negib Aga and his close officials managed to escape the siege. However, due to this incident the Bulgarian rebels had to proclaim the Insurrection two weeks in advance of the planned date. Within several days, the rebellion spread to the whole Sredna Gora and to a number of towns and villages in the northwestern Rhodopes. The insurrection broke out in the other revolutionary districts as well, although on a much smaller scale. The areas of Gabrovo, Tryavna, and Pavlikeni also revolted, as well as several villages north and south of Sliven and near Berovo (in the present-day North Macedonia).

The Ottoman powers mobilized detachments of regular troops, and also irregular bashi-bozouks. These forces attacked the first insurgent towns as early as on 25 April. The Turkish forces massacred civilian population, the principal places being Panagurishte, Perushtitza, Bratzigovo, and Batak. By mid-May the Insurrection was completely suppressed; one of the last sparks of resistance was poet Hristo Botev's attempt to come to the rebels rescue with a detachment of Bulgarian political émigrés resident in Romania, ending with the units rout and Botev's death.[2]

News of massacres of Bulgarians reached European embassies in Istanbul in May and June 1876 through Bulgarian students at Robert College, the American college in the city. Faculty members at Robert College wrote to the British Ambassador, as well as to the Istanbul correspondents of The Times and the Daily News. An article about the massacres in the Daily News on 23 June provoked a question in Parliament about Britain's support for Turkey, and demands for an investigation. Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli promised to conduct an investigation about what had really happened. In July, the British Embassy in Istanbul sent a Second Secretary Walter Baring to Bulgaria to investigate the stories of atrocities. Baring did not speak Bulgarian (although he did speak Turkish), and British policy was officially pro-Turkish, so the Bulgarian community in Istanbul feared he would not report the complete story. They asked the American Consul in Istanbul, Eugene Schuyler, to conduct his own investigation.

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[2]   Petar Nenkov, "139 Years from Batak", *Military newspaper* (2015).

Schuyler set off for Bulgaria on 23 July, four days after Baring. He was accompanied by a well-known American war correspondent, Januarius Mc Gahan, by a German correspondent, and by a Russian diplomat – Prince Aleksei Tseretelev. Schuyler's group spent three weeks visiting Batak and other villages, where massacres had taken place. Schuyler's official report, published in November 1876 said that fifty-eight villages in Bulgaria had been destroyed, five monasteries demolished, and fifteen thousand people in all massacred. The report was reprinted as a booklet and widely circulated in Europe. The suppression of the uprising led to interest and moral support in Europe. Diplomats and journalists expressed interest in the situation. The most detailed contemporaneous account was that of Eugene Schuyler – an American at British service. He was the Counsel General in the British Embassy in Istanbul. Together with the American journalist – Januarius Mc Gahan they started a search, concerning the results of the uprising. The American historian Richard Millman states that Schuyler personally visited only 11 of the villages he reported on. Schuyler, however certainly visited Batak and many other of the destroyed towns and villages, including Perushtitsa and Panagyurishte. Millman also claims that the accepted reality of the massacres is largely a myth. According to British and French figures 12–15,000 Bulgarian civilians were massacred during the uprising.

Meanwhile Mc Gahan's vivid articles from Bulgaria moved British public opinion against Turkey. He described in particular what he had seen in the town of Batak, where five thousand out of a total of seven thousand residents had been slaughtered, beheaded, or burned alive by Turkish irregulars and their bodies left in piles around the town square and the church. Mc Gahan was born on 12 June 1844 in New Lexington, Ohio state. His tombstone in New Lexington reads "MacGahan, Liberator of Bulgaria".

After the cruel suppression of the April Uprising by the Ottoman Powers in 1876 he did an enormous work in defense of the Bulgarian nation. In his capacity as correspondent for the Daily News he, together with the Secretary of the US Legation and General Counsel in Istanbul, Eugene Schuyler, visited the Bulgarian towns and villages

which had revolted. He precisely identified the exact number of the
killed Bulgarian victims and the number of the villages, churches and
monasteries set on fire. The results of his study he published in the
English newspaper *Daily News* and in the Russian news paper *Golos*
(*Voice*). At the end of July 1876 McGahan visited Plovdiv, and
beginning in August – the towns Peshtera and Pazardzjik. After that
he travelled to the village of Batak. He sent to his newspaper a clear
report of the massacre, done by the Bashibozouks of Ahmed Aga –
Barutanly. He exactly determined that from a seven thousand
population there were only two thousand survivors. He found with
horror that along the streets, in the churchyard and in the school of
this Rhodopi mountain village still were lying the bodies of thousands
of killed Batak inhabitants, while in the air was a terrifying stench
(stink) from the bodies. His report about the Batak repressions in the
London newspaper *Daily News* shook the sleeping conscience of
Europe He entitled it "Letters from Hell: Batak – The Valley of the
Death and of the People with no Tears", and follows: "They told us
that it is only (solely) in that little churchyard there are lying 3,000
people. That was a striking revelation, something that would be
following him all of his life. Little curly heads were shown here and
there, smashed under heavy stones; a little leg, in length like a finger,
little baby hands, expressed as if asking for help; babies that have
died, astonished by the shining of the sword; and children that have
died among cries of horror; young girls, who have died weeping
while praying for mercy; mothers, who died in an effort to save their
little children with their bodies. All of them are lying here
decomposing together in an awful mass. What we saw inside the
church is a horror even at a glance. Numerous decomposing bodies
filled half of the space of the very church. We wandered along the
village and we saw the same brutalities hundreds and hundreds
times. Everywhere – skeletons of men, together with the clothes and
the meat on them, sculls of women with hairs in the dust, bones of
children and babies. Everywhere – horrors and horrors. The Ottomans
bloodedly have taken babies from the cradles with the bayonets and

after throwing them a couple of times from bayonet to bayonet as a ball, they threw them in the faces of the mothers".[3]

Liberal Party leader William Gladstone published a pamphlet on 6 September 1876: "Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East" which attacked the Disraeli government for its indifference to the Ottoman Empire's violent repression of the April Uprising. Gladstone made clear that his hostility focused on the Turkish people rather than on the Muslim religion. The Ottomans, he said: were, upon the whole, from that black day when they first entered Europe, the one great anti-human specimen of humanity. Wherever they went, a broad line of blood marked the track behind them; and as far as their dominion reached, civilization disappeared from view. They represented everywhere government by force, as opposed to government by law. For a guide of this life they had a relentless fatalism: for its rewards in the hereafter, a sensual paradise.

The political impact of his reports was immediate and dramatic. As the leader of the opposition, Gladstone called upon the government to withdraw its support for Turkey; "I entreat my countrymen", he wrote, "upon whom far more than upon any other people in Europe it depends, to require and to insist that our government, which has been working in one direction, shall work in the other, and shall apply all its vigor to concur with the states of Europe in obtaining the extinction of the Turkish executive power in Bulgaria. Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible manner, namely, by carrying off themselves".[4]

Prominent Europeans, including Charles Darwin, Oscar Wilde, Victor Hugo, and Giuseppe Garibaldi, spoke against the Turkish behavior in Bulgaria. When war with Russia started in 1877, the Ottoman government asked Britain for help, but the British Government refused, citing public outrage, caused by the Bulgarian massacres as the reason.

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[3] Bernar Cook, David Moor, "The Americans and the April Uprising", paper, presented at the 4th National Discussions Forum Brod for Bulgaria, Sofia, 16 May 2017.
[4] Rumen Genov, *Gladston*, (Sofia: Otvoreno obshtestvo, 1996).

The April Uprising was a failure as a revolution, but due to the publicity given to the reprisals that followed, it led directly to European demands for reform of the Ottoman Empire –The Istanbul Conference of European Powers December 1876– January 1877, and the Russia-Turkish War for Liberation of Bulgaria 1877-1878, which ended in Turkish defeat, and the signing of the Treaty of San Stefano in 3 March 1878, followed in July the same year by the Treaty of Berlin. The Revolution thus ultimately achieved its original purpose, the Liberation of Bulgaria from the Ottoman Empire, and later of course – Its Independence.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Colonel (R) Dimitre Minchev is an Associate Professor.

Education, specialization and other activities:
• Organizer 38th (2012) and 40th (2014) and 42nd International Congresses of the International Commission of Military History in Bulgaria
• 2002-2004: Visiting Fulbright Scholar, Stanford University, and Loyola University, USA
• 1998 : Honorary Professor Russian Academy of Natural Sciences
• 1996-1997: Master in Science in National Resource Strategy, National Defense University (Industrial College of the Armed Forces), Washington, DC, USA
• 1984-1988: Ph. D., Institute of Military History MoD
• 1976-1969: Command and Staff Academy, Bulgaria
• 1964-1967: Military School (Artillery)

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Positions held:
• Currently: President Bulgarian Commission of Military History
• 2000-2002: Chief Military History Research Center
• 1997-2000: Senior Researcher Institute of Military History
• 1995-1996: Chief Institute of Military History (President Bulgarian CMH)

- 1992-1995: Deputy Chief Institute of Military History (Secretary General of the Bulgarian CMH)
- 1988-1992: Scientific Program Leader
- 1981-1988: Researcher Military History Institute
- 1979-1981: Battalion Commander
- 1974-1976: Military Interpreter in English, Serbo-Croatian and Russian languages in the General Staff of the BA
- 1969-1974: Secretary of the Defense Attache in Belgrade, Yugoslavia
- 1967-1969: Artillery Platoon Commander

List of edited books

- Military Revolutionary Activities of Petr Drvingov (1898-1918), Sofia, 1990, 200 p., Bulgarian Language Edition of the MoD
- Military Revolutionary Activities of Petr Drvingov (1898-1918), Sofia, 2014, 200 p., English Language Edition of the MoD
- Participation of the Macedonian Population in the Bulgarian army during the WWI 1914-1918, Sofia, 1994, 200 p., Bulgarian Language Edition of the MoD
- Participation of the Macedonian Population in the Bulgarian army during the WWI 1914-1918, Sofia, 1994, 200 p., English Language Edition of the MoD
- Bulgarian Campaign Committees in Macedonia 1941, Sofia, 1995, 200 p., Bulgarian Language Edition of the MoD
- Bulgarian Campaign Committees in Macedonia 1941, Sofia, 2001, 200 p., English Language Edition of the MoD.

CURRICULUM VITAE

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He is currently Pres. of the National Navy UDT-SEAL Museum in Fla. and is also a Bank Director of a major Independent bank in Missouri, a local University, and manages a private foundation as well as the family partnership. He was the Consul (H) for Germany for nearly 40 years. He is currently serving on the Board of the ICMH.

22. BEYOND THE "MASTER-NARRATIVE" OF DECOLONISATION: RECONSIDERING THE END OF EMPIRES IN THE 20th CENTURY

Nobuyoshi Ito (Japan)

Introduction

Since the 18th century, there have occurred a number of independence wars around the globe. These independence wars have had so many influences in the modern world as well, therefore they have been an object of historical research. Especially, in the latter part of the 20th century, due to the trend of decolonisation which reflected the dissolutions of European colonial empires, the independence movements and anti-colonial struggles intensified and became one of the most fundamental transitions of the international order. Therefore, historians have actively argued the end of empires after the World War II, often described as the era of decolonisation, and they have focused mainly on the process of independence wars and imperial retreats.

At the same time, one should take account of the impacts and influences of the decolonisation on the contemporary world, particularly when discussing the interrelationships between current situations and its historical backgrounds. Recently, there is a tendency to refer to the geopolitical thoughts from perspective of imperial legacy. However, the contribution to this tendency from imperial history is much less, notwithstanding its broad accumulation of knowledge of modern empires.

This paper will argue the end of colonial empires and anti-colonial torrents in the second half of the 20th century in connection with the post-colonial context. It will also reconsider the historical implications of independence wars and decolonisation in today's world, paying more attention to the significance of imperial legacies, mainly in political and security issues.

Overview of the (post-) imperial history

In the latest decade of the 21st century, the world has witnessed a lot of phenomena originated in the geopolitical rivalry, which can be seen

as the typical cases of power politics. Referring to those unconcealed hostilities, scholars have raised the reinstatement of geopolitics.[1] In itself, geopolitics in international relations have never been established as a specific discipline,[2] but the importance of geography has again come under the spotlight as the conflicts over "sphere of influence" between major powers have intensified.

Concurrently with these situations, interests in empires and their legacies have also increased. Recently, one scholar argues in his controversial monograph that the legacies of empires on today's world are significant and permanent, criticising that the well-known thesis of the "clash of civilizations" does not always explain the great power contests in the past and coming decades.[3] He then indicates that "civilizations do not animate and organize themselves to clash with each other – historically, it has been the role of empires to do so on their behalf, and today it is the after-images of empires that set the clashes in motion".[4]

Besides, connections between the modern world and empires can be seen everywhere. It is simply that today's international society is a product of Western modernity since the advance of European countries in the Age of Exploration. In other words, the modernisation of the world in itself originated from Europe. This historical development led to the colonial rule in the regions such as Latin America, Asia and Africa, and particularly in the 19th century, the power politics between the European colonial empires more and more intensified. As portrayed by a prominent historian as "the Age of

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[1]   As a typical argument of this, see Walter Russell Mead, "The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers", *Foreign Affairs* 93(3) (May/June 2014), 69-79.
[2]   In Japan, for example, due to the historical background that the military had used geopolitics arbitrarily until the Second World War, the term has often caused strong rejection.
[3]   Samir Puri, *The Great Imperial Hangover: How Empires Shaped the World*, (London: Atlantic Books, 2020). Regarding the "clash of civilizations," one of the most famous theses of the international relations after the Cold War, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
[4]   Puri, op.cit., 296.

Empire",[5] the imperialism among the European powers in this era symbolised a part of its *Zeitgeist*.

The ensuing 20th century again marked another historical turning-point, particularly after two world wars, under the worldwide circumstance of anti-colonialism. Then occurred were the independence movements in mainly Asian-African regions, many of which resulted in ghastly independence wars and conflicts. These phenomena led to historical upheavals such as the stream of decolonisation, the birth of the "Third World", and the North-South Problem under the rapid globalisation.

Therefore, as argued by the previously noted scholars, it can be said that the experience of imperial rules and their influences is in deep connection with contemporary issues in many ways.[6] In that sense, findings from the imperial history including not only anti-colonial struggles and independence wars but also imperial legacies and their relations with current circumstances could be accumulated. In reality, however, the imperial history, concerning the British Empire in particular, has not so much been interested in these interrelationships.[7] Discussions on the imperial legacies has just started, since imperial historians have placed a much greater

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[5] Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire: 1875-1914*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987).
[6] This consideration partially appears within some introductory texts. See Stephen Howe, *Empire: A Very Short Introduction*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Ashley Jackson, *The British Empire: A Very Short Introduction*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Dane Kennedy, *Decolonization: A Very Short Introduction*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
[7] As for representative contributions on the British imperial history and decolonisation, Robert F. Holland, *European Decolonization 1918-1981: An Introductory Survey*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985); John Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-war World*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988); John Darwin, *The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991); David George Boyce, *Decolonisation and the British Empire, 1775-1997*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); Judith M. Brown, Wm. Roger Louis (eds), *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume IV: The Twentieth Century*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Ronald Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Wm. Roger Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006); John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); John Darwin, *Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain*, (London: Allen Lane, 2012).

deal of weight on the empirical analyses of colonial rule and decolonisation than suggestions for their impacts on the contemporary world.[8] Especially, in regard to current security issues, there is even poorer contribution from imperial history.[9]

Decolonisation as the "master-narrative"?

Of course, it does not mean that there have been no interests at all in the imperial legacies or historic ties between Empires and contemporary world by imperial historians. Some scholars majoring in the imperial history have made introspective criticisms of the above situation. Over a decade ago, for example, one influential imperial historian proclaimed in his review article that the British imperial history was too concentrated on the study of decolonisation and the process of the dissolution of Empire.[10] The problem pointed out was that [the] focus on decolonisation as the master-narrative of twentieth-century imperial history has blinded us to the continuities in Britain's relations with the world and the many connections between the Britain of 2007 and the Britain of 1967, one of the favoured termination dates for those who seek to chalk an outline around the British empire's final resting place. Imperial historians, beguiled by the apparent finality of the lowering of the Union Flag in distant sunny places and the valedictory sail past of departing ships, have been doing themselves out of a job, earnestly seeking an end of empire rather than making sense of a twentieth century in which

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[8]   For example, see Sandra Halperin, Ronen Palan (eds), *Legacies of Empire: Imperial Roots of the Contemporary Global Order*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Martin Thomas, Andrew S. Thompson (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), Part IV.

[9]   Understandably, the disclosure of historical documents in archives and libraries has a considerable influence on the research by historians. In the case of the British imperial history, scholars have concentrated more and more on the process of decolonisation after the opening of new materials in past decades. Also see Richard Dunley, Jo Pugh, "Do Archive Catalogues Make History?: Exploring Interactions between Historians and Archives", *Twentieth Century British History* 32(4) (December 2021), 581-607.

[10]   Ashley Jackson, "Empire and Beyond: The Pursuit of Overseas National Interests in the Late Twentieth Century", *English Historical Review* 123(499) (December 2007), 1350-1366.

empire was just one facet of Britain's unique and constantly evolving interface with the world.[11]

Here, the indifference to the contemporary world after the dismantling of the empire was acutely criticised. Thus, it could be said that the problem surrounding the British imperial history, namely the underestimation of the connection with the modern world, has been at least understood by historians. Still, despite the criticism above, the situation seems hardly changed even today.[12]

As for the British imperial history, this tendency to focus on decolonisation as the "master-narrative" is remarkably typical when historians deal with the symbolic events of the dissolution of the British Empire. The most noticeable example is about the British decision to abandon its military commitment outside Europe in the late 1960s. The Labour government led by the Prime Minister Harold Wilson, after the confused decision-making process, announced in January 1968 that Britain would withdraw forces from "east of Suez" by the end of 1971, which meant that it would "not be maintaining military bases outside Europe and the Mediterranean".[13] This eventual announcement symbolised the decline of the Britain's world role and had certain impacts not only the British foreign policy but also broader international relations in those days. As a result, many historians have paid much attention to the retreat from "east of Suez" and their main interest has been the decision-making process toward the determination of the announcement.[14]

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11 Ibid., 1351.
12 Another scholar also indicates that events in the post-imperial era have received little attention from the British imperial history. Stephen Howe, "Decolonisation and imperial aftershocks: the Thatcher years", in Ben Jackson, Robert Saunders (eds), *Making Thatcher's Britain*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 234-235.
13 *Parliamentary Debate [Hansard]*, House of Commons, 5th Series, vol. 756, 16 January 1968, cols. 1580-1581.
14 There are rich accumulations of research on this topic, including such classic monographs as Phillip Darby, *British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947-1968*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); Jeffrey Picketing, *Britain's Withdrawal from East of Suez: The Politics of Retrenchment*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1998). As a masterpiece of the theme, see Saki Dockrill, *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World?*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). Furthermore, there are many other recent works, for example, P. L. Pham, *Ending 'East of Suez': The British Decision to Withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore 1964-1968*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

However, even if the centre of gravity of British military involvement moved from Empire to Europe, Britain at that time had many dependent territories and overseas military bases around the world. Under the context of the Cold War, Britain's world role, including the maintaining of Empire, was still directly linked to the interests of its allies and local authorities. Most crucially, as is preached down in the above-referenced review article, there is a "common historical misreading of the decolonisation period" among historians, since they "have overlooked the fact that, although close-down east of Suez was *announced*, it was never fully enacted".[15] In fact, even after the "east of Suez" decision, the British government maintained its option to redeploy armed forces beyond Europe in some time.[16] Thus, the more active studies on the British political and military commitment after the Empire are still much to be desired.

Britain and its imperial legacies

Based on above-mentioned backgrounds, in the following sections this paper tries to argue some cases of the independence and anti-colonial movements against British Empire, mainly in Southeast Asia, Middle East and Mediterranean, and influences of these movements on events in later years and on contemporary issues. Regarding the independence movements, this paper adopts wider and looser definition of "war", including such words as "revolt", "rebellion", "insurrection" or "insurgency", in order to make room for dealing with much more cases below.

Furthermore, on the one hand, for the local people their movements and struggles were justified as legitimate campaigns to gain their self-determination and therefore the expressions of nationalism. On reconsidering the matter from the perspectives of suzerain powers, on the other hand, these movements were nothing

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2010); Edward Hampshire, *From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic: British Naval Policy 1964-70*, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013).
[15] Jackson, "Empire and Beyond," 1360.
[16] Brief No 5, "General Capability for Operations outside Europe 1972/73," Five Power Conference on Far East Defence, Briefs for UK Delegation, attached in Minute from Nicholls (Treasury) to Bancroft (Treasury) and McDonnell (Treasury), "Briefs for Five Power Conference on Far East Defence," 29 May 1968, T 225/3408, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (hereafter: TNA), Kew, London.

but insurgencies or uprisings. For this reason, at the outset leastwise the colonial authorities determined to use such measures as counterinsurgency so as to deal with the situation easily and to suppress the local actions.[17] However, these coercive measures gradually reached a limit and the suzerain states were forced to change their imperial policy, bringing about the dissolution of the colonial empires in the end. Henceforth, this paper considers the independence "wars" within much more extended understandings and surveys the selected cases of decolonisation and imperial retreat, focusing upon British Empire and its demise in Eurasian continent.

Southeast Asia: From disturbance to detainment

As a first case, Southeast Asia was a region where Britain experienced harsh insurgencies and anti-colonial struggles after the World War II. Although other colonial empires, such as French and Dutch, had far more intense experiences of the independence wars,[18] Britain was neither extraneous to the stream of decolonisation in this region. During the World War II, the British Empire confronted the challenges from axis powers all over the world as well as Great Britain itself, and therefore its imperial defence was of vital importance.[19] In the Far East and Southeast Asia, military bases in Hong Kong and Singapore

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17 There are plentiful works on counterinsurgency. As examples of Britain, see Paul Dixon (ed.), *The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Aaron Edwards, *Defending the Realm? The Politics of Britain's Small Wars since 1945*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012); Rory Cormac, *Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency*, (London: Hurst, 2013); John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, 2nd ed., (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
18 On the one hand, France faced many difficulties during First Indochina War from 1946 to 1954, which came down to the independence of Vietnam and became one of the triggers of successive Vietnam War. On the other hand, soon after the Asia-Pacific War was over, Indonesian nationalists started continued fighting against returning Dutch colonial rule and British reinforcements, and finally gained independence from the Netherlands in 1949. Martin Thomas, Bob Moore, Larry J. Butler, *Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Europe's Imperial States*, 2nd ed., (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), chaps. 7, 12 and 13.
19 As for the aspects of British Empire in the World War II, see Ashley Jackson, "The British Empire, 1939-1945," in Richard Bosworth, Joseph Maiolo (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Volume II: Politics and Ideology*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 558-580.

exemplified the interests of British Empire, but these strategic bases were occupied by Japanese Imperial Army at the beginning of the War. Later the British recovered these territories but, for the local people, the colonial rule had become anachronism already. Just after the War, due to the rise of nationalism and anti-colonial sentiment, the law and order in the region deteriorated more and more.[20]

In British Malaya, on which the British direct and indirect influence continued from the 19th century, turned to be the place of disorder in the late 1940s. Although the British were able to reconquer its colony much more easily, due to successive economic and social problems the insurrection by communists erupted in June 1948 and Britain had to declare a state of emergency, which disturbed its intention to develop the region gradually. This situation led Britain to take far severer attitude to suppress the emergency. It is often described that Britain capitulated before the rise of Asian nationalism in the post-war era, but the case of Malaya could undermine this argument and the abandonment of the British rule was out of question at that stage.[21]

Besides, Malaya was strategically vital in the context of the East-West confrontation in Asia. The beginning of the Cold War forced the anti-colonial stance of the United States, the leader of the Western world, to become more and more complex. For Americans, the containment of the Soviet Union and communists' regime was to be by far the biggest object in their foreign policy. Therefore, in such cases as Malaya, where the British colonial rule had useful effects to refuse the communists, the US bolstered up Britain's efforts to maintain its Empire rather actively. This paradoxical "imperialism of decolonization" highlights the course of history in Malaya.[22]

From 1954, however, nationalism in the local authority progressively rose and demands for independence increased in Malaya. As a result, in 1958 the independence of Malayan Federation

[20] *British Documents on the End of Empire* (hereafter: *BDEE*), Series B, vol. 3: *Malaya, Part I: The Malayan Union Experiment 1942-1948*, No 65.
[21] Thomas, Moore, Butler, op.cit., 56-57. Also see *BDEE, Series A, vol. 2: The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945-1951, Part I: High Policy and Administration*, No 72.
[22] Regarding this argument, see Wm. Roger Louis, Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Decolonization", *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 22(3) (1994), 462-511.

achieved, but at that time the emergency was not over, continuing for another three years. In addition, Britain concluded a defence treaty with Malaya, which enabled the former to have a big strategic position in Southeast Asia continuously.[23] Nevertheless, this did not mean the completion of the decolonisation in the region. At first, Britain intended to "bring Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories into closer association", but the merger of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei in 1961, despite the British enthusiastic response, turned out to be a failure. The creation of Malaysia in 1963 brought about the Brunei's decision to opt out and Singapore's secession in 1965.[24] Britain had to back the new association with its continuing military commitment, mainly because of the escalated tensions between Malaysia and Indonesia, namely *Konfrontasi*, from 1963 to 1966.

   Konfrontasi was finally solved in 1966, which meant for Britain that its enormous burden for the defence of Malaysia and Singapore would also be reduced remarkably. In this sense, a series of events were the turning-point of the British policy in Southeast Asia.[25] Thereafter, Britain accelerated the force reduction in the region, which led to the "east of Suez" decision in January 1968. However, this did not bring about directly the demise of British military commitment, because the local governments still needed political, economic and security support from Britain.[26] At the height of the Vietnam War, other regional powers, such as the United States, Australia and New Zealand, also hoped for Britain's continuous military contribution.[27] Consequently, the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA),

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23 Thomas, Moore, Butler, op.cit., 74-75.
24 *BDEE, Series B, vol. 8: Malaysia*, No 194, 199; *BDEE, Series A, vol. 5: East of Suez and the Commonwealth 1964-1971, Part I: East of Suez*, No 98.
25 Minute, "British Policy in East Asia", Unnamed and Undated, FCO 15/4, TNA. See also Sue Thompson, "'The Greatest Success of British Diplomacy in East Asia in Recent Years?' British Diplomacy and the Ending of Confrontation, 1965-1966", *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 25(2) (2014), 285-302.
26 CC (68) 26th Conclusions, 9 April 1968, CAB 128/43, TNA; Message from Tunku Abdul Rahman (Prime Minister of Malaysia) to Wilson (Prime Minister of the United Kingdom), 14 June 1968, T 225/3409, TNA.
27 Regarding backgrounds of this issue, see such as Jeremy Fielding, "Coping with Decline: US Policy toward the British Defense Reviews of 1966", *Diplomatic History* 23(4) (October 1999), 633-656.

which originated in Malaya's independence, was to be reorganised to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) in April 1971 and the British politico-military commitment on Southeast Asia, although weakened, remained a foundation of the regional security and formed a legacy of the British imperial rule.[28]

In Brunei, Britain's continuing influence was much more typical. When Brunei, as a British protectorate, became a self-governing state in 1959, the latter had its responsibility for the foreign and defence affairs. Afterwards, the independence movement intensified in Brunei as well and a revolt erupted in 1962, only to be suppressed instantly. The insurrection, however, had broader impacts on British policy towards Southeast Asia, since the revolt was not only a reason why Brunei decided not to join Malaysia but also a part of the first stage of *Konfrontasi*.[29] Later then, in 1971 the renewed agreement provided Brunei with full self-government, while its foreign and defence policy were still shared with Britain. As regards the British military commitment, including Gurkha units stationed there, Brunei bore all costs, hoping strongly for them to continue stationing.[30]

Moreover, in the late 1970s, Britain tried to find a way to the complete withdrawal from Brunei, but as a result of sequential negotiation, the British forces had to agree to keep stationed in Brunei until 1983. At that time, it was Britain that feared the international criticism of the remaining colonial rule, but Brunei kept insisting on its strong demands for the British continuous presence. Accordingly, Britain again forced to retain its military commitment there, even after Brunei gained independence in 1984. In this sense, Brunei has presented us the very exceptional case of decolonisation and the end of British Empire in Southeast Asia.[31] Above all, the British army in

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[28] On FPDA, Andrea Benvenuti, "The Heath Government and British Defence Policy in Southeast Asia at the End of Empire (1970-71)", *Twentieth Century British History* 20(1) (January 2009), 53-73; Daniel Wei Boon Chua, "America's Role in the Five Power Defence Arrangements: Anglo-American Power Transition in South-East Asia, 1967-1971", *International History Review* 39(4) (2017), 615-637.

[29] Details of the revolt can be seen in *BDEE, Series B, vol. 8*, Appendix, Section XV.

[30] *BDEE, Series A, vol. 5, Part I*, No 113.

[31] Masao Shinozaki, *Empire Detained: Britain's Commitment outside Europe in Post-War British External Policy, 1968-1982*, (Tokyo: Yoshida Publishing, 2019), 133-136. See also *BDEE, Series A, vol. 5, Part I*, Iv.

Brunei, centred on a light infantry battalion of Royal Gurkha Rifles, have played an important role of its defence.[32]

Middle East and Mediterranean: Unintended retention?

In the Middle East, the impact of the dissolution of British Empire was much bigger than Southeast Asia. It is well known that historically Britain had wielded its power as the "Informal Empire" all over the world,[33] including the Middle East. However, in common with other areas, the British political and military influence in the Middle East drastically declined after the World War II. The prolonged Israel-Palestine Conflict originated from Britain's failure to manage the local order in its imperial context, and the rise of Arab Nationalism led to the Suez crisis in 1956 which symbolised the fall of British imperialism in the region.[34] Therefore, it might be anticipated that Britain would abandon its prestigious position in the Middle East sooner or later, although the local order was not ready for this situation at that time.

When the British government expressed its plan to withdraw from "east of Suez" in January 1968, the protectorates in the Persian Gulf, for example, were suddenly forced to be to stand on their own feet by 1971. At first, the "perception gap" between the British and local emirates brought about serious confusion and distrust.[35] But, once it became clear that Britain should no longer maintain its military commitment in the Middle East, the emirates quickly began seeking their way of survival, which in turn led to the foundation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[36] Thereafter, though the British political and economic relations with the region were maintained, its influence over such issues as military affairs diminished more and more. The

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[32] See the British Army Homepage, "Brunei", https://www.army.mod.uk/deployments/brunei/ [accessed on 13 August 2021].
[33] John Gallagher, Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade", *Economic History Review* New Series 6(1) (1953), 1-15; Peter J. Cain, Antony G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: 1688-2015*, 3rd ed., (London: Routledge, 2016).
[34] As a classic monograph, Keith Kyle, *Suez*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991). See also Simon C. Smith (ed.), *Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath*, (London: Routledge, 2008).
[35] *BDEE, Series A, vol. 5, Part I*, No 119.
[36] Shohei Sato, *Britain and the Formation of the Gulf States: Embers of Empire*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016).

transformation of the regional order would be not until the beginning of the direct commitment by the United States in the end of the 1970s.[37]

On the other hand, the Mediterranean remained one of the key points of Britain's military commitment in the post-imperial era. During the early years of the Cold War, the region was regarded as a hotspot of the East-West confrontation,[38] and the British contribution to the security of the Mediterranean was also indispensable for Western allies, especially North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Besides, in the history of British Empire, the region constituted of the important position leading to India, Britain's largest colony, and the "Empire Route" symbolised the British naval mastery in the late 19th and first half of the 20th centuries.[39]

The stream of decolonisation, however, spread over the Mediterranean as well as in the post-war world and forced Britain to deal with anti-colonial movements and insurgencies in the area severely. In Cyprus, for instance, the British authority had faced many difficulties with successive anti-imperial and independence struggle since the 1930s, and in the 1950s for Britain the situation worsened more and more. The revolt in the island caused much severer reactions by the British and brought about an infamous example of counterinsurgency,[40] exacerbating at the same time a serious ethnic conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Finally, as a result of

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[37] Simon C. Smith, "Power Transferred? Britain, the United States, and the Gulf, 1956-71", *Contemporary British History* 21(1) (2007), 15.

[38] Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 121-127, 142-146; Svetozar Rajak, "The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945-1956", in Melvyn P. Leffler, Odd Arne Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, vol. I: Origins*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 203-208.

[39] Robert Holland, *Blue-Water Empire: The British in the Mediterranean since 1800*, (London: Allen Lane, 2012). As for the historical overview of Britain's naval supremacy, see Jeremy Black, *The British Seaborne Empire*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, (London: Penguin, 2017).

[40] Cypriot independence struggle and British counterinsurgency have gained much interest among historians. See such as Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); David French, *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955-1959*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

compromises between each side, Cyprus gained independence as a sovereign state in 1960, but the dispute was never settled. Britain continued to bear its responsibility for the territorial integrity of the island as a guarantor together with Greece and Turkey.[41]

After the independence of Cyprus, the British political and military influence in the Mediterranean grew weaker and weaker. The Royal Navy's Mediterranean Fleet, which had been based in Malta and regarded as a long-time symbol of Britain's naval hegemony in the region, was dismantled in June 1967.[42] In Malta erupted fierce anti-British and anti-colonial movements as well, coming down to the independence in 1964 and later in the 1970s the Maltese government claimed for the complete withdrawal of the British forces. After a series of depressing negotiation, in 1972 Britain and its NATO allies had to admit that all forces stationing in Malta should be withdrawn within 7 years, which meant that the British military presence there would vanish in the near future.[43]

Despite this tendency, remnants of the British imperial rule persisted in Cyprus as the Sovereign Basa Areas (SBA) of Akrotiri and Dhekelia.[44] While there had been suspicions and controversies

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[41] Parliamentary Command Paper, Cmnd. 1253, *Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee*, 16 August 1960. The treaty is still valid today.

[42] On this, Nobuyoshi Ito, "Britain and the Dissolution of the Mediterranean Fleet: Convergence of the End of Empire and Alliance Management", *Briefing Memo*, National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), January 2021.

[43] *BDEE, Series B, Volume 11: Malta*, lvi-lxxii. Also see Simon C. Smith, "Conflict and Co-operation: Dom Mintoff, Giorgio Borg Olivier and the End of Empire in Malta", *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 17(1) (2007), 115-134; Simon C. Smith, "Dependence and Independence: Malta and the End of Empire", *Journal of Maltese History* 1(1) (2008), 33-47.

[44] Regarding the brief history of the SBAs, Costas M. Constantinou, Oliver P. Richmond, "The Long Mile of Empire: Power, Legitimation and the UK Bases in Cyprus," *Mediterranean Politics* 10(1) (March 2005), 65-84; Klearchos A. Kyriakides, "The Sovereign Base Areas and British Defence Policy Since 1960", in Hubert Faustmann, Nicos Peristianis (eds), *Britain in Cyprus: Colonialism and Post-Colonialism 1878-2006*, (Möhnesee-Wamel: Bibliopolis, 2006), 511-534; Andreas Constandinos, "Britain, America and the Sovereign Base Areas from 1960-1978", *Cyprus Review* 21(2) (Fall 2009), 13-36; Andreas Stergiou, "The Exceptional Case of the British Military Bases on Cyprus", *Middle Eastern Studies* 51(2) (2015), 285-300; Richard Clogg, "The Sovereign Base Areas: colonialism redivivus?", *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 39(1) (2015), 138-150.

constantly over the usefulness and capability of the bases,[45] two SBAs still embodied Britain's military presence in the eastern Mediterranean and its allies, especially the United States, made much account of the British continuing commitments through its military bases in the region. Although SBAs were assigned mainly to another alliance, Central Treaty Organization (CENTO),[46] their importance to NATO seemed clear as well. Therefore, in the mid-1970s, when the British government sought to abandon SBAs with the Cyprus conflict getting worse, the United States and NATO allies asserted enthusiastically that Britain should keep its military commitment in the island not only in the context of the Cold War but also from the perspective of conflict resolution.[47] Thus, under those pressures Britain had to retract its initial decision to withdraw all forces from SBAs and reluctantly admitted that it would continue to retain its military presence in Cyprus.[48]

In this manner, the British military commitment in the Mediterranean was partly maintained. For Britain, this result was rather unintended and unexpected one, but it accidentally enabled Britain to maintain its capability to pursue military operations outside Europe. After the end of the Cold War, for instance, Britain had many occasions to have joint military missions with the United States in the Middle East, such as the Gulf War and Iraq War. Besides, the SBAs were to be regarded as the remains of the imperial past but played an important and unexpected role for Britain, since Akrotiri was used as

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[45] Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, "Cold War Pressures, Regional Strategies, and Relative Decline: British Military and Strategic Planning for Cyprus, 1950-1960", *Journal of Military History* 73(4) (October 2009), 1143-1166.

[46] Panagiotis Dimitrakis, *Failed Alliances of the Cold War: Britain's Strategy and Ambitions in Asia and the Middle East*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), chaps. 3, 6.

[47] Letter from Kissinger (United States Secretary of State) to Callaghan (Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs), 16 November 1974, PREM 16/21, TNA.

[48] Message from Wilson to Ford (President of the United States), 20 November 1974, PREM 16/29, TNA; Ref. A08279, Minute from Hunt (Secretary of the Cabinet) to Arthur (Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), "Defence Review - Cyprus", 21 November 1974, DEFE 13/973, TNA; *Documents on the British Policy Overseas, Series III, vol. V: The Southern Flank in Crisis, 1973-1976*, No 101.

a frontline base of the air operation against Islamic State (IS) in 2011.[49] Therefore, the legacies of British Empire and its continuous politico-military role, though indirectly and partially, have had non-negligible influence on the broader regional order today.

Conclusion

This paper has tried to reconsider the importance of imperial legacies, mainly of British Empire, in the contemporary world. For Britain, the retention of forces outside Europe did not reflect its intension in the era of decolonisation, while this half-hearted presence had much impact on subsequent developments. From the geopolitical point of view, the politico-military legacies of British Empire have been always one of the key elements in considering the international order. The imperial history of the 20th century, which has concentrated its focal point on decolonisation itself too much and has regarded this as a "master-narrative", cannot always shed light on the broader implication of the end of colonial Empires. Thus, from the perspective of imperial history as well, more research and analyses on the interrelations between the process of decolonisation or independence movements and contemporary issues are required.

   Of course, the examples referred to within this paper are just single parts and a large number of other phenomena should be taken up as well. Comparative viewpoints among the cases within an empire may also be essential to the development of the accumulation of knowledge in the imperial history. For example, Britain experienced its decline from the dominant position in Africa, which this paper cannot cover. Besides, the comparison between colonial empires will give great result in the history of decolonisation. France, for instance, suffered from the independence wars not only in Indochina but also in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s, on which successive British governments keep a very close watch in the same period.[50] These

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[49] "UK launches first drone strike in Iraq against Isis militants; RAF Reaper drone fires Hellfire missile at Islamic State forces near site of Iraq's biggest oil refinery north of Baghdad," *Guardian*, 10 November 2014.
[50] Martin Thomas, "The Dilemmas of an Ally of France: Britain's Policy towards the Algerian Rebellion, 1954-62", *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 23(1) (1995), 129-154; Martin Thomas, "The British Government and the End of French Algeria,

comparative sights above will contribute to the future arguments
more and more.

The central focus on the British imperial retreat, its reaction to the
independence movement and the measures to deal with the
independence wars or "insurgencies" is still stronger than their
historical implication to the contemporary phenomena. Nevertheless,
the continuity between past events and today's situation would be
worth considering as well, especially in the context of the fluidised
world order nowadays and the consistent pursuit of national interests
overseas by each country.[51] The experiences of the British and other
colonial empires in the late 20th century will give us rich suggestion
to their past, present and future.

CURRICULUM VITAE

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Crisis: Caught between the 'Remnant of Empire' and the Western
Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean", in *Kokusai Seiji* [*International*

1958-62", *Journal of Strategic Studies* 25(2) (2002), 172-198; Christopher Goldsmith, "The
British Embassy in Paris and the Algerian War: An Uncomfortable Partner?", *Journal
of Strategic Studies* 25(2) (2002), 159-171.

[51] Today, for example, Britain's recurrence of the interest in the Asia-Pacific,
including Southeast Asia, can be understood within this context. See Ryosuke Tanaka,
"The UK's Military Commitment to the Indo-Pacific", *Briefing Memo*, NIDS, March
2020.

Relations] from Japanese Association of International Relations in March 2016; "Britain's Military Commitment and the Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean: Focusing upon the Contended Value of the Cyprus Sovereign Base Areas, 1968-74", in *Kokusai Anzen Hosho* [*The Journal of International Security*] from Japanese Association for International Security in March 2017; and "British Imperial Defense in the Mediterranean during the Second World War: Focusing on the Battle of Crete and the Siege of Malta", in *Anzenhosho Senryaku Kenkyu* [*Security and Strategy*] from NIDS in November 2021. His latest contribution in English, "Britain and the Dissolution of the Mediterranean Fleet: Convergence of the End of Empire and Alliance Management", can be seen in *Briefing Memo* from NIDS in January 2021.

WORKING SESSION IX

Chair: Oreste Foppiani (Switzerland)

23. DE SAINT-DOMINGUE À HAÏTI: LA PREMIÈRE RÉVOLUTION VICTORIEUSE D'ESCLAVES DU MONDE MODERNE, 1789-1804

Francine Saint-Ramond (France)

En 1905, lors de la guerre russo-japonaise, le monde occidental a été stupéfait d'apprendre la défaite russe de Tsushima face au Japon. Ce revers est considéré traditionnellement comme la première défaite militaire des blancs face à un peuple de couleur. Or, plus de cent ans auparavant, cette situation s'était déjà présentée lors de l'échec de la reconquête par les troupes de Bonaparte de la partie française de l'île de Saint-Domingue aux mains des révoltés. Le 1er janvier 1804, la première république noire libre du monde moderne succède ainsi à la colonie française dite de Saint Domingue, bien que la ville éponyme soit sur la partie espagnole, prenant le nom d'Haïti.

A la veille de la Révolution, L'île connaît une prospérité importante, son économie s'appuyant sur l'esclavage, pratique instituée dans tout l'archipel des Antilles par les Européens et présente aux Etats-Unis.

Regardons tout d'abord l'île en tant que terrain d'affrontement entre Européens.

Plusieurs aspects sont lisibles dans les évènements qui ont affecté Saint-Domingue qui comme l'écrit Victor Hugo à l'âge de seize ans dans son premier roman,[1] "ont été des luttes de géants, trois mondes intéressés, L'Europe et l'Afrique pour combattants, l'Amérique pour champ de bataille".

Il importe de rappeler la place de la France à Saint-Domingue avant la Révolution et de voir l'impact de cette dernière sur les voisins européens, en particulier l'Espagne et l'Angleterre qui sont des rivaux dans la course aux colonies sur la voie stratégique qui mène aux Amériques. Craignant une contagion révolutionnaire, ces états sont donc attentifs et actifs par rapport à la destinée de Saint Domingue. Nous verrons ainsi que contexte international et évènements dans l'île sont intimement mêlés.

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[1] Victor Hugo, *Bug Jargal*, (Paris: J. Hetzei, 1826).

Par rapport à l'Espagne, l'installation des Français sur l'île d'Hispaniola découverte par Christophe Colomb se régularise en 1697 lors du traité de Rijswijk qui concède à la France la partie occidentale, soit un tiers de la surface de l'île, avec pour chef-lieu Le Cap Français.

Au XVIII siècle, ce territoire est extrêmement prospère. Les tensions avec l'Espagne réapparaissent après l'exécution du roi Louis XVI, prétexte d'une déclaration de guerre à la France. Dans le cas de l'Angleterre, l'affrontement s'est manifesté lors de la Guerre de Sept Ans. La Révolution a ensuite un impact puisqu'en 1793, l'armée britannique débarque et occupe certaines parties du Sud-Est et de l'Ouest de l'île. Cette occupation de secteurs sur les côtes dure cinq ans.

La Révolution française bousculant l'ordre économique basé sur l'esclavage et l'enrichissement rapide, a donc déstabilisé les rapports entre Européens et réactivé les rivalités.

La difficile question d'Haïti renvoie également à la multiplicité des acteurs vivant sur place, aux intérêts contradictoires. Du côté des colonisateurs on distingue deux groups principaux:

Les colons-planteurs appelés "Grands-Blancs" à la tête de gros domains,[2] hostiles en majorité à la Révolution, ne voulant pas voir remettre en cause leurs privilèges. Beaucoup sont prêts à livrer la colonie aux Anglais et embarrassent le gouvernement.

On trouve aussi ce que l'on appelle les "Petits Blancs". Arrivés désargentés, ils sont sous la tutelle des colons. Possédant une dizaine d'esclaves, ils sont parfois moins aisés que les esclaves affranchis: certains vont se montrer peu enclins à une émancipation de ces derniers et d'autres vont épouser la cause des esclaves révoltés.

Les esclaves d'origine africaine sont au nombre de 500 à 600,000 au déclenchement de la Révolution. Ils travaillent dans les plantations de cultures tropicales ainsi qu'à l'exploitation de minéraux. Une proportion de plus en plus importante d'esclaves affranchis émerge.

Ces derniers sont de 30 à 40,000 et sont presque aussi nombreux que les blancs. A cheval sur les deux statuts, la plupart sont mulâtres, ils vont jouer un rôle important en jouant de leur influence pour

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2   La moyenne est de deux cents esclaves.

soutenir l'un ou l'autre camp. Etant eux-mêmes propriétaires terriens possédant en surface un quart de la surface cultivée dans la partie française à la Révolution, et utilisant des esclaves, ils mettent en cause la suprématie des blancs. Certains sont très aisés et envoient leurs enfants dans les écoles de métropole.

Une réflexion par rapport à l'esclavage est entamée bien avant la Révolution. Plus de cent ans auparavant, Colbert a institué le code noir. Une ordonnance royale de Louis XVI s'intéresse à leur sort. Un an avant la Révolution, est créée la société des amis des Noirs en France, pro-abolitionniste et libérale. La Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme a été évoquée par le professeur Klebanoff le premier jour de ce congrès.

Une révolte avait déjà eu lieu en 1758. En 1791, Dans la partie nord de l'île, se tient, une importante réunion d'esclaves au lieu-dit Bois Caïman. L'Angleterre et l'Espagne fournissent des fonds et des munitions aux insurgés qui s'emparent des principales villes. Inquiète, la nouvelle République envoie des commissaires deux ans pus tard,[3] lesquels rencontrent l'hostilité des planteurs entrés en pourparlers avec ces puissances rivales pour leur livrer la colonie. Les commissaires font avorter le complot et font appel aux esclaves pour soumettre les colons rebelles en leur promettant la liberté. Le 29 août 1793, le gouverneur Santhonax proclame la liberté générale des esclaves sur l'île.

Du côté des affranchis, de fortes personnalités émergent. La plupart de ces hommes sont métis, issus d'union de colons blancs avec des femmes affranchies ou esclaves. Ils ont reçu une éducation en France. Les gouvernements français ont tout intérêt à avoir le soutien de tels hommes. Les rapports se font toutefois sur fond d'intérêt et de méfiance dans les deux camps.

On observe une forte proportion de gens de couleur au sein des armées puisque l'on trouve de nombreux généraux. Une autre raison voit le jour pendant le conflit : c'est la nécessité de renouveler les cadres militaires en raison du manque de renforts et face aux pertes dues à la fièvre jaune.

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[3]   Sonthonax et Polvérel.

Concentrons-nous sur le personnage de Toussaint Louverture. Né en 1740 sur une plantation, ce personnage est le héros de la guerre de Libération. Il a la double expérience d'esclave et de maître. C'est un gros propriétaire foncier qui s'est mis dans un premier temps montré hostile à la Révolution. Il s'est mis au service des Espagnols qui l'ont promu général. Il rallie la République française en 1794 suite à la proclamation d'abolition de l'esclavage. Gagnant la confiance du gouvernement, il devient gouverneur de l'île, étend ses pouvoirs au point de renvoyer les émissaires de la République. Ces derniers tentent l'apaisement. Toussaint est nommé capitaine Général de la partie française de Saint-Domingue. Il militarise l'île et assure le contrôle des populations par l'armée pour favoriser la production et stimuler l'économie. Il est hostile au partage des terres et maintient les grandes propriétés ce qui déplait à ses rivaux. Il étend son pouvoir sur la partie espagnole de l'île.

Bonaparte se sent humilié par tant de hardiesse. Les liens se corrompent en 1801, lors de la promulgation par Toussaint d'une Constitution excluant la subordination à la métropole, sa nomination en tant que gouverneur à vie, se considérant comme l'égal de Bonaparte. Il forme une assemblée constituante avec 3 hommes de couleur et 7 blancs, tous anciens propriétaires d'esclaves. Aucun esclave n'est représenté.

Bonaparte a dès 1801 en tête une intervention pour régler le problème de Saint Domingue et réaffirmer l'autorité de la France. Il lance une importante expédition militaire pour reprendre le contrôle de l'île en profitant d'une période d'apaisement avec l'Angleterre. Il donne la responsabilité de l'expédition au général Leclerc, qui est son beau-frère par mariage avec sa sœur Pauline Bonaparte. Le père d'Alexandre Dumas avait été sollicité pour cette mission et l'avait refusée. Le plan de reprise en main de l'île prévoit une campagne de six mois selon les étapes suivantes: réappropriation du terrain, poursuite des insurgés, élimination des chefs rebelles, désarmement de la population.

En février 1802, la flotte française mouille dans les eaux de Saint Domingue et s'approche du Cap. 26 vaisseaux convoient environ 30,000 hommes. La tentative de reprise de l'île dure trois mois et

tourne au désastre pour les Français. Toussaint considère l'arrivée de cet important corps expéditionnaire comme un acte de guerre.

Le général Leclerc le met en garde:[4] "Vous avez à choisir citoyen général entre le titre de Pacificateur et celui de Dévastateur de la colonie de Saint-Domingue".

Le général Christophe, gouverneur du Cap, interdit le débarquement qui va se dérouler de vive force et amener à l'incendie de la ville.

Quelques mots sur la tactique utilisée par l'adversaire. La défense s'appuie sur les principes du marronnage: les indigènes évoluent en colonnes légères, sachant utiliser les moindres sentiers pour échapper à leurs adversaires ou pour les surprendre. Le corps expéditionnaire se déplace en terrain découvert sur de mauvais chemins dans des conditions épuisantes.[5]

Les affrontements sont caractérisés par des violences extrêmes dans les deux camps. Un intéressant débat sur la violence a eu lieu ausein de ce congrès il y a deux jours. "Dans cette insurrection, il y a un véritable fanatisme. Ces hommes se font tuer mais ils ne veulent pas se rendre" écrit Leclerc au Premier Consul.[6]

L'attitude des Français rappelle par certains procédés les excès de la guerre de Vendée. Dans l'autre camp, les massacres de blancs laissent craindre la volonté d'anéantissement des colons. Des recherches historiques jugées excessives par certains ont envisagé la thèse d'une visée génocidaire dans les deux camps.[7] Ce thème renvoie à l'intervention du collègue Marcel Berni.

La politique de Leclerc est de détacher Toussaint de ses généraux Dessalines, Christophe et Maurepas en profitant de leurs rivalités. Le 7 juin 1802, Toussaint est attiré dans un piège et arrêté. Le général Leclerc après consultation du premier Consul, écrit au ministre de la Marine à propos du sort du futur prisonnier: "Il faut, citoyen ministre,

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4   Service Historique de la Défense, 12 février 1802, carton GR 17.
5   Henri Mézière, *Le Général Leclerc et l'Expédition de Saint-Dominque*, (Paris: Tallandier, 1991).
6   Leclerc au Premier Consul, 6 août 1802.
7   Se référer aux travaux de Jean-Pierre le Glaunec, *L'Armée indigène, la défaite de Napoléon en Haïti*, (Québec: Lux Éditeur, 2014).

que le gouvernement le fasse mettre dans une place forte située au milieu de la France, afin que jamais il ne puisse avoir aucun moyen de s'échapper". Toussaint est conduit le 24 août au fort de Joux dans le froid Jura.

Peu à peu, toutes ses commodités lui sont retirées: départ de son domestique, interdiction de sortie, absence de nouvelles de sa famille, suppression de toute possibilité de lire ou d'écrire. Il décède de pneumonie associé au désespoir dans sa cellule en avril 1803.

Un de ses lieutenants, ancien esclave noir, le général Jean-Jacques Dessalines a repris le pouvoir. Il se rallie d'abord aux Français, puis se retourne contre ces derniers. Dessalines est soutenu financièrement et ravitaillé en armes par les Anglais et les Américains.

Sur place le général Leclerc découvre une situation différente de celle à laquelle il s'attendait. Il reconnait ne pas se sentir capable de rétablit l'esclavage. Les courriers adressés à Bonaparte en sont le témoignage. Il écrit ainsi le 25 août 1802 au Premier Consul: "Ce n'est pas le tout d'avoir enlevé Toussaint, il y a ici 2,000 chefs à faire enlever".[8] Les esclaves insurgés sont surnommés "brigands" sur tous les rapports écrits consultés, ce qui leur ôte toute légitimité. La France est en état de faiblesse, elle manque de renforts car la menace de la reprise d'une coalition est probable à la suite de la rupture de la paix d'Amiens en mai 1803.

La bataille décisive de Vertières le 18 novembre 1803 s'inscrit dans "l'attaque générale des lignes du Cap". Elle oppose les troupes commandées par le général de Rochambeau successeur de Leclerc, à celles du général Jean-Jacques Dessalines. Pour protéger le Cap Français, de nombreux block-houses ont été édifiés sur les hauteurs, sur le modèle britannique. A la fin de l'année 1802, le général Rochambeau accélère la construction de postes avancés sous la forme de tours fortifiées. Ces tours difficiles à escalader, et destinées à accueillir de l'artillerie possèdent un sous-bassement maçonné et d'une structure en bois épaisse pour résister au canon. Rochambeau souhaite multiplier ces constructions et envisage de passer des

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[8]   Service Historique de la Défense, Vincennes carton GR 17.

marchés avec les Américains pour une fabrication en série. Ces constructions ne se révèlent pas aussi sûres que prévu.

Le fort de Vertières est une simple habitation de colons aménagée défensivement: crénelage, haie impénétrable d'aloès et d'autres plantes épineuses entrelacées de fortes lianes. C'est le point névralgique de l'entrée sud de la ville du Cap. Ce lieu est protégé par plusieurs blockhaus. Dessalines fort de plus de 15,000 hommes exerce une forte pression sur les postes avancés. Le 16 novembre, il est devant les lignes du Cap et contraint Rochambeau à capituler le 19 novembre 1803. Cette bataille est absente des traités d'histoire militaire et même du fameux dictionnaire Napoléon. C'est une date symbole pour les Haïtiens. Il n'a pas été dit que Rochambeau avait été vaincu mais qu'il avait *conclu un accord*. Les raisons officielles invoquées pour l'échec ne sont pas la supériorité de l'adversaire, mais la maladie et le blocus anglais.

Cette défaite amène à la déclaration d'indépendance de la partie française de Saint-Domingue le 1er janvier 1804. Le général Dessalines devient gouverneur général à vie. Le 22 décembre il se désigne comme empereur sous le nom de Jacques 1er et suscite une rébellion qui entraînera son assassinat deux ans plus tard. La France reste présente à Saint-Domingue dans la partie espagnole, ne reconnaissant l'indépendance de son ancienne colonie qu'en 1925 en échange d'une importante somme destinée à indemniser les colons.

Il faut attendre 1848 en France pour que soit validée l'abolition définitive de l'esclavage, sur l'initiative de Victor Schoelcher, et 1926 pour que cette pratique soit abolie par la Communauté internationale.

En bref, une guerre d'Indépendance qui s'est déroulée sur 13 ans. Cette indépendance préfigure les guerres de décolonisation de l'époque contemporaine. C'est un échec considérable, la première grande défaite du futur empereur, bien avant Bailen en Espagne ou Moscou, et qui a été totalement occultée. Cette humiliation a été bien exprimée par l'ancien premier ministre Dominique de Villepin[9] qui affirme que "Haïti fait partie de l'histoire de la France, mais non de sa mémoire".

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9   Rapport au ministre des Affaires étrangères, Comité de réflexion sur les relations franco-haïtiennes, janvier 2004.

La guerre d'indépendance de Saint-Domingue ne peut être considérée comme une simple guerre de décolonisation. C'est une double guerre civile multiforme Ce fut enfin plus largement un conflit périphérique européen dont l'île fut l'enjeu et la victime.

L'assassinat récent du Président Jovenel Moïse nous a interpellés. Nous ne sommes pas insensibles aux maux de la République d'Haïti et à la peine de cet état à trouver une voie sereine.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Dr. Francine Saint-Ramond has a doctorate in history. Her research focuses mainly on distant conflicts in contemporary times. They propose to restore the life and the thoughts of the soldiers engaged in these military expeditions which constitute brutal breaks with their daily life.

24. GUERRES D'INDÉPENDANCE ET SÉPARATISME EN AFRIQUE: LE CAS PARTICULIER DU MAROC

Issa Babana El Alaoui (Morocco)

Indépendance et intégrité territoriale: les deux concepts inséparables de la souveraineté

La "Guerre du Rif" (1921-1926) représente le commencement des combats de libération [1] du Maroc, 9 ans après l'instauration du protectorat français.

La "Révolution du Roi et du Peuple", déclenchée le 20 août 1953, fut le deuxième épisode de la guerre d'indépendance marocaine. Elle survint en réaction populaire contre la déportation à Madagascar du souverain légitime, le Sultan Sidi Mohammed [2] (futur Mohammed V). L'exil du Sultan n'aura duré que 26 mois et quelques jours, pour aboutir à son retour triomphal à la patrie, le 16 novembre 1955. Trois mois plus tard, des accords (déclarations) d'indépendance franco-marocain et maroco-hispanique furent respectivement signés les 02 mars et 07 avril 1956.

Toutefois, le Maroc considérait sa liberté inachevée. Car si les Français libérèrent leurs zones d'influence, au centre et au sud du pays, les Espagnols refusaient encore de plier bagage dans le Sahara. Et c'est là où commença illico un nouveau combat de parachèvement territorial à l'encontre de l'Espagne.

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[1]   Signalons d'abord que le peuple marocain a célébré cette année, depuis quelques semaines, le 16 juillet dernier, le 100e anniversaire de la glorieuse bataille d'Anoual, lors de laquelle les valeureux résistants marocains avaient remporté une victoire décisive contre les forces d'occupation. Cette guerre fut menée sous la conduite du chef Mohammed Abdelkrim Al Khattabi, et sous l'approbation directe et indirecte du Sultan Moulay Youssef. Mais le Maroc avait connu auparavant tant de guerres victorieuses contre l'envahisseur pour défendre sa souveraineté dont la glorieuse bataille d'Oued El Makhazine, appelée également la Bataille des Trois Rois, en août 1578. Et c'était bien avant la conférence de Berlin (1884-1885) consacrée à la colonisation de l'Afrique. "La bataille des Trois Rois, bataille de Oued al-Makhazin ou bataille de l'Alcazar Kébir a été, en effet, une bataille décisive ayant mis fin au projet d'invasion du Maroc du roi portugais Sébastien I. Elle eut lieu sur les rives du fleuve Oued al-Makhazin, affluent du Loukos arrosant Ksar El Kébir dans la province de Larache".

[2]   Une déportation suivie d'un exil arbitraire, maladroitement décidée par la France, sous la Résidence générale du général Guillaume.

Par conséquent, les terminologies "guerre d'indépendance" et "guerre de separatism" ne sont pas associées au hasard dans notre thématique. La logique de leur liaison repose d'abord sur une philosophie politique, selon laquelle *le recouvrement de l'indépendance et le parachèvement de l'unité territoriale sont deux composantes inséparables de la souveraineté dont le territoire national est le socle commun.*

En effet, pour le Maroc, depuis le 18 novembre 1943, au zénith de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale,[3] où il revendiqua, pour la première fois, la libération totale de son territoire national, et jusqu'à la conclusion de l'accord tripartite de Madrid, le 14 novembre 1975, au zénith de la Guerre froide; aucun nouvel Etat artificiel ou fantoche ne devrait se greffer entre le Maroc et la Mauritanie, dans leurs frontières communes post-coloniales. Même si la guerre, en ultime recours, devait en être l'inévitable assurance. Et c'est justement cette profonde conviction qui incita le Royaume à insister sur les anciennes puissances coloniales, l'Espagne et la France, pour qu'elles promissent officiellement –au moment même de leur simultané départ– de respecter l'intégrité territoriale du Royaume.[4] C'est encore dans cette

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[3]   En effet, le Sultan Sidi Mohammed (futur Roi du Maroc Mohammed V) fut, concrètement, le concepteur-pionnier du Manifeste de l'Indépendance en parfaite coordination avec le parti de l'Istiqlal, au zénith de la Seconde Guerre. Le Souverain fut ainsi un bulldozer politique qui aplanira le chemin de l'indépendance. Car la proclamation du Manifeste de l'Indépendance par le parti de l'Istiqlal, le 11 janvier 1944, a été précédée d'une déclaration royale inédite dans le discours du Trône du 18 novembre 1943 (soit 54 jours auparavant) où, pour la première fois –dans une allocution officielle adressée à la fois au peuple marocain et à l'Etat protecteur– Mohammed V "employait le mot de siada (souveraineté) en appelant autant à la grandeur, à l'autorité, qu'à la Souveraineté du Maroc". *Cf.* Damien Heurtebise, "Les relations franco-marocaines à la lumière des archives diplomatiques françaises (3 septembre 1939–18 juin 1940)", *communication à la Journée d'étude "Mohammed V-De Gaulle: d'un Appel à l'Autre", organisée à Rabat, à la Bibliothèque Nationale du Royaume du Maroc, le 02 juin 2010*, (Marocco: Editions CMHM, 2010). Ce fut d'ailleurs une grande surprise, surtout pour la Résidence qui en percevait "une ambiguïté" pour l' "absence de toute allusion à l'action de la France". Mais n'était-ce pas l'expression de la "volonté du Sultan de faire évoluer son pays dans la paix vers une complète liberté"[3] dont nous parlera Jean Lacouture, quatre ans plus tard, en 1947. *Cf.* Jean Lacouture, *Cinq hommes et la France*, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1961), 202.
[4]   Ainsi, dans la Déclaration commune franco-marocaine du 2 mars 1956 mettant fin au traité de protectorat, la France s'est "engagée à respecter et faire respecter l'intégrité du territoire marocain". Le 7 avril de la même année, l'Espagne "affirmait sa volonté de respecter l'unité territoriale du Royaume du Maroc que garantissent les

"foi nationaliste intégrale" que le Maroc récupérera de l'Espagne les deux villes méridionales de Tarfaya (1958) et de Sidi Ifni (1969).

Mais il n'y avait pas que l'Espagne à affronter. Car la France avait laissé derrière elle des facteurs de tensions au Maghreb qui, conduisant à l'usage des armes entre les Etats algérien et marocain, ne faciliteront pas le parachèvement de l'unité territoriale du Royaume, donc de son indépendance intégrale.

Toutefois, c'est "la politique, cause initiale du conflit et de la décision ayant initié l'emploi de la force, qui définit son objet, son but et sa résolution finale" disait J. C. Barry.[5] Une pensée reposant sur la vision classique de Clausewitz selon laquelle "la guerre est une simple continuation de la politique par d'autres moyens", estimant que "les guerres [en général] ne sont rien d'autre que l'expression de la politique". Dans ce sens, Mao-Tsé-Toung avait une pensée culte: "la politique est une guerre sans effusion de sang et la guerre une politique avec effusion de sang".[6]

Si donc la politique et la guerre sont tellement fusionnées au point que chacune constitue la continuation de l'autre en l'expliquant, comment pourrions-nous échapper à l'impératif d'expliquer, politiquement, les mobiles des guerres d'indépendance et de parachèvement territorial indissociables à la faveur de la résistance, avec les actions politico-diplomatiques marocaines post-protectorat qui les accompagneront, bien après la *Guerre du Rif* et la *Révolution du Roi et du Peuple*, évoquées en prélude.

Recourons donc à l'histoire en revenant au printemps 1956, puisque "nulle chose n'est compréhensible que par son histoire",[7] comme disait Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.

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traités internationaux et s'engageait à prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour la rendre effective".

[5]   Pire, "nous risquons, si nous ne faisons pas un sérieux effort d'analyse, qu'un jour proche ou lointain la guerre nous trouve impuissants, non seulement à agir, mais même à juger" comme disait Simone Weil (Simone Weil, "Réflexions sur la guerre", *La Critique sociale* 10 (novembre 1933).

[6]   Mao-Tsé-Toung, *De la guerre prolongée*, (Yenan: [n.n.], mai 1938).

[7]   https://citations.ouest-france.fr/citations-pierre-teilhard-de-chardin-837.html.

De l'indépendance du Maroc en mars 1956, à la signature des Accords tripartites de Madrid en novembre 1975

La création de deux Etats indépendants: la Mauritanie et l'Algérie, respectivement en 1960 et 1962, à la suite du découpage territorial opéré par l'Etat français dans l'espace géographique colonial qu'elle avait dénommé "Sahara occidental"[8] depuis 1850, attisera deux conflits intra-maghrébins: territorial entre le Maroc et la Mauritanie (déclenché quatre ans plus tôt) et frontalier entre le Maroc et l'Algérie (qui couvait avant même le retour du général de Gaulle, en 1958). A la proposition réitérée du gouvernement français de négocier discrètement les frontières algéro-marocaines sous l'occupation française, le Maroc refusera, à sept reprises -entre l'automne 1955 et le printemps 1962, soit sous la IVème et Vème République– sous peine de paraître asséner un coup de poignard dans le dos des frères algériens.[9] Le roi Hassan II avait même signé entre-temps, le 06 juillet

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[8]   Il s'agissait notamment des régions territoriales sahariennes méridionales et orientales, relevant de l'autorité impériale marocaine selon la pratique politico-économico-fiscale et anthropologique du pouvoir, depuis particulièrement le 9ᵉ siècle; c'est-à-dire dans le cadre du système socio-culturel nomade dont les historiens occidentaux ne tiennent pas toujours compte, en voulant lui appliquer des critères d'analyse et d'évaluation contemporains, ne cadrant nullement avec le contexte historique de l'époque. On était alors, (au Sahara marocain) sous les règnes des dynasties des Almoravides, des Almohades, des Saadiens jusqu'aux Alaouites, à la fin du 19ᵉ siècle, soit au lendemain du début de l'occupation de Chenghit par la France.
[9]   En effet, c'est avant même son retour d'exil, que "le Roi Mohammed V opposait une fin de non-recevoir catégorique aux autorités françaises qui, lors des négociations de la Celle-Saint-Cloud à l'automne 1955, lui proposaient de fixer lui-même le tracé des frontières aux confins sahariens, de manière à trancher définitivement le nœud gordien et éviter toute contestation ultérieure. Il s'agissait de restituer un chapelet de territoires du sud-est que le Maroc revendiquait avec insistance des années durant avant que l'Algérie ne devînt Etat, quand elle n'était encore que département français, au même titre que la Martinique et la Guadeloupe", Hassan Alaoui, *Guerre secrète au Sahara occidental*, (Paris: Éditions Encre d'Orient, 2010), 85-86. En réalité, c'était la première offre française sur la question des frontières avec l'Algérie, rejetée par Mohammed V. Mais ce refus, catégorique et permanent, sera effectivement réitéré sept fois, successivement sous les IVᵉ et Vème République et sous les règnes de Mohammed V et Hassan II, soit entre l'automne 1955 et le printemps 1962, à la veille des réunions d'Evian. Par conséquent, dès son retour d'exil, en novembre 1955, le Souverain "ajourna le débat avec les combattants et frères algériens sur les frontières du sud-est, en attendant la libération de l'Algérie". Une décision spontanée et lucide. Mais aussi une attitude de magnanimité et de noblesse, jaillissant de la conscience du Souverain, de sa moralité en politique, avant toute initiative ou suggestion en provenance de Paris. Ensuite, après l'indépendance du Maroc en 1956 par l'abolition

du protectorat français qui régnait notamment dans le centre du pays et le départ des espagnols du Nord du Maroc, il fut "porté à la connaissance de la Commission Nationale des Frontières, que la France avait sollicité dès le mois d'avril 1956 (sous le mandat présidentiel de René Coty) d'entamer des négociations avec le Gouvernement marocain sur le problème des frontières et notamment Tindouf", Mohammed Maazouzi, "Un demi-siècle pour l'intégrité territoriale", in Imprimerie El-Maârif Al-jadida (ed.), *Oufkir et les dessous du tracé frontalier du 15 juin 1972*, (Rabat: [n.n.], 2004), 88-89. La réponse du regretté Mohammed V fut la suivante: "Toute négociation qui s'engagerait avec le Gouvernement français actuellement, en ce qui concerne les prétentions et les droits du Maroc, sera considérée comme un coup de poignard dans le dos de nos amis algériens qui combattent. Je préfère donc attendre l'indépendance de l'Algérie pour poser à mes frères algériens le contentieux frontalier", Maazouzi, "Un demi-siècle pour l'intégrité territoriale", 89. C'était la deuxième offre française. Le Maroc était encore sous la gestion de son premier gouvernement, créé suite à la proclamation d'indépendance, décrétée par le Sultan; sans ministère des Affaires étrangères, sans ministère de la défense nationale et sans Forces armées. M. El Bakkaï Ben M'Barek était Président du Conseil. La "demande française fut renouvelée l'année suivante, en 1957", Mohammed Maazouzi, "Un demi-siècle pour l'intégrité territoriale", 89) la réponse du Roi fut la même, cohérente et invariable. D'autant que le détournement sur Alger de l'avion de Ben Bella et de ses compagnons (22 octobre 1956) était bien présent dans sa mémoire. C'était donc la troisième offre française. Il est vrai que le fait d'avoir assuré un transfert normal de la souveraineté marocaine – avec le moins de dégâts possibles dans des circonstances politico-sécuritaires assez tendue– avait rassuré la France. Mais celle-ci estimait, néanmoins, que l'enjeu et le défi algériens étaient désormais éminemment imminents, et ne pouvaient souffrir d'aucun relâchement ni ajournement avec les Marocains. Il fallait s'en expliquer en "mettant les points sur les <i>". Paris approcha Rabat, discrètement, pour éviter les yeux et les oreilles du FLN. On était à l'été 1957. La tentative française était infructueuse, puisque Mohammed V, rejetant l'idée d'une neutralité que lui demandait Paris, demeura inflexible sur sa position. Il refusait catégoriquement de se désolidariser de l'Algérie comme il le fit envers l'Istiqlal, sous le protectorat, lorsque le général Juin essayait de l'y contraindre. La réaction des Français fut assez rapide. Trois mois plus tard, en effet, le gouvernement qui venait de créer l'*Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes* (O.C.R.S –dans la même année 1957– invita le Maroc à y participer. Elle englobait notamment le <Sahara français> (devenu aujourd'hui sous domination algérienne). Voici, à ce propos, le témoignage de l'une des personnalités politiques marocaines les plus marquantes de l'histoire contemporaine du Maroc (leader et opposant socialiste) M. Abderrahim Bouabid: "À la demande des frères algériens, nous avons décliné l'offre de Paris, mais nous avons dit aux Algériens: <vous savez bien que Tindouf a été annexé en 1934 au territoire algérien parce que l'Administration française pensait à l'époque qu'elle resterait éternellement en Algérie. Vous savez qu'il y a aussi le problème de Béchar...etc. A l'époque le journal algérien *El Moujahid* ne parlait que du "Sahara maghrébin" et non pas du "Sahara algérien". C'est dans ce contexte que l'Accord du 6 juillet 1961 a été signé" (Abderrahim Bouabid (ancien chef de l'USFP), *Jeune Afrique* du 11 juin 1976). C'était la quatrième offre française. Rappelons que l'O.C.R.S (collectivité territoriale) créée par la France au Sahara de 1957 à 1963, avait comme objectif "la mise en valeur, l'expansion économique et la promotion sociale des zones sahariennes de la

1961, à la demande des Algériens, un protocole d'accord bilatéral, décidant que "la question des frontières serait examinée dès l'indépendance de l'Algérie dans un esprit de fraternité".[10] Il démontra ainsi la bonne foi des Marocains. Hélas, la réalité démentira, 26 mois plus tard, l'engagement des Algériens, par le déclenchement de la "Guerre des sables", en octobre 1963, après tergiversations.[11]

République française et à la gestion de laquelle participent l'Algérie, la Mauritanie, le Soudan (Mali), le Niger et le Tchad".

[10] En effet, c'est précisément le 6 juillet 1961 que le Maroc (incarné par son Souverain, Hassan II) et l'Algérie (représentée par le chef du Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne, Ferhat Abbas) concluront un Protocole d'Accord qui, se référant à "l'esprit de la conférence de Tanger du mois d'avril 1958" souligne la fidélité des deux gouvernements signataires qui les y attache et les "sentiments de solidarité et de fraternité maghrébines qui les animent" pour accomplir un tel protocole. Nous expliquerons, dans la dernière partie, les causes, les conditions et les circonstances politiques de la conclusion de cet accord. Mais nous en aurons illustré –dans la prochaine partie– l'aspect juridico-politique de ce protocole d'accord. Les deux parties signataires –affirmant être "conscients de leur destin africain et désireux de concrétiser les aspirations communes de leurs peuples"– ont décidé que "la question des frontières serait examinée dès l'indépendance de l'Algérie dans un esprit de fraternité". "De ce fait –précise l'Accord– le Gouvernement provisoire de la république algérienne réaffirme que les accords qui pourront intervenir à la suite des négociations franco-algériennes ne sauraient être opposables au Maroc quant aux délimitations territoriales algéro-marocaines".

[11] En effet, après une année et huit mois passés depuis la signature de l'accord algéro-marocain du 6 juillet 1961, et lors d'une visite officielle à Alger en mars 1963, le Roi Hassan II rappela à son homologue, Ahmed Ben Bella, l'engagement de l'État algérien sur la question frontalière, en vertu des termes du Protocole d'Accord signalé plus haut. Que fut la réponse du Président algérien? Le Souverain marocain la révélera également: "Au cours de la longue et cordiale conversation que nous avons, en mars 1963, avec le président Ben Bella, ce dernier me déclare: Je demande à Votre Majesté de me laisser le temps de mettre en place en Algérie les nouvelles institutions. Lorsqu'en septembre ou en octobre ce sera fait, alors nous ouvrirons ensemble ce dossier des frontières. Il va sans dire que l'Algérie indépendante se saura être l'héritière de la France en ce qui concerne les frontières algériennes". Cette visite d'État, historique à maints égards, aurait dû favoriser le règlement de la question frontalière algéro-marocaine. Et parmi l'une des principales causes que nous pouvons évoquer c'est le fait que le Roi Hassan II fut "le premier chef d'État à effectuer un voyage officiel en Algérie", depuis l'indépendance de celle-ci (5 juillet 1962). Le Souverain en révélera, succinctement, les circonstances: "Ben Bella m'avait envoyé son ministre des Affaires Étrangères, le pauvre Khemisti, qui a été abattu quelques semaines plus tard, pour me transmettre l'invitation. J'ai immédiatement accepté et j'ai fait paraître un communiqué. Je dois dire que jamais voyage n'a autant inquiété les Marocains, qu'ils soient au gouvernement, dans l'opposition, penseurs, écrivains ou hommes de la rue. On me disait: <Mais qu'allez-vous faire là-bas? Rien n'est

Résultat: 13 ans de stagnation régionale socio-économique entre les trois Etats maghrébins, durant lesquels le Maroc était simultanément affronté à quatre Etats, tous hostiles à la récupération de ses frontières impériales précoloniales. [12] Quatre Etats souverains dont deux puissances coloniales: la France (pour la Mauritanie) et la Mauritanie pour elle-même, ainsi que l'Espagne (pour le Sahara dit "espagnol") et l'Algérie (pour le Sahara dit français qu'elle ne voudra pas rendre au Maroc, contrairement aux engagements du GPRA).[13]

C'était trop, pour le Maroc. Fallait-il donc raison garder, en bannissant toute rêverie nostalgique du passé.

Alors, dans un esprit aussi pragmatique que proactif, le Roi Hassan II, prit l'initiative de régler, quasi simultanément, les conflits territoriaux maroco-algéro-mauritaniens.[14]

Le premier grand pas qu'il avait accompli fut sa déclaration historique délivrée en Algérie, en septembre 1968, reconnaissant que "les revendications territoriales sur la Mauritanie et certaines parties de l'Algérie étaient utopiques".[15] Tout était dit. Ce fut le point de départ d'un processus de réunions de réconciliation et de coopération entre les trois Etats, en vue de libérer et réintégrer le Sahara au Maroc

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encore en place, il n'y a aucun ordre, aucune sécurité>. Cf. Hassan II, *Le Défi*, (Paris: Éditions Albin Michel, 1976), 91.

[12] Cette politique territoriale marocaine revendicative se justifiait par une ambition impériale authentique et légitime, conforme à la logique de l'histoire, chez les Etats séculaires. Le Maroc n'était ni le premier ni le dernier empire à en tenter l'expérience.

[13] Par conséquent, et puisque la France n'aura plus un bout de territoire à restituer directement au Maroc, toutes les formes d'actions postérieures de résistance armée ou de revendication politico-diplomatique s'adresseront exclusivement à l'Espagne, à la Mauritanie et à l'Algérie, en portant exclusivement sur l'intégrité territoriale. Aussi, cette approche marocaine triangulaire de réintégration territoriale, sera accompagnée d'une démarche marocaine onusienne similaire. Car c'est quelques semaines plus tard, au mois de juin 1956, que la *première expression gouvernementale officielle et écrite, au niveau international*, concernant la réunification marocaine sur la Mauritanie fut enregistrée, au niveau international, quand "le Maroc demanda à l'ONU d'inscrire dans son ordre du jour la question du Sahara, de la Mauritanie et de Sidi Ifni, sous document No A/C.4/SR – 1046".

[14] Persuadé que sans une telle normalisation tripartite, le Maroc perdrait le reste de ses provinces sahariennes sous occupation espagnole, situées au-dessous de Tarfaya, avec une Espagne dirigée par un généralissime Caudillo "dur comme un roc", insensible à la décolonisation.

[15] Hassan II, septembre 1968. Source: voir l'ouvrage de Khadija Mohsen-Finan, *Sahara occidental, les enjeux d'un conflit régional*, (Paris: CNRS Editions, 1997), 32.

et à la Mauritanie[16], tout en réglant le conflit frontalier algéro-
marocain. A ces fins, les rencontres entre les trois chefs d'Etat
maghrébins se succéderont mais sans résoudre totalement et
simultanément les trois formes de conflits au niveau inter-maghrébin.
Car si, dans la même année 1972, à l'occasion de la tenue du sommet
de l'OUA, la Mauritanie et l'Algérie parvinrent à mettre effectivement
fin à leurs litiges territoriaux avec le Maroc, l'Algérie fera volte-face à
l'égard du Maroc, trois ans plus tard, en refusant de reconnaître
l'Accord tripartite de Madrid, du 14 novembre 1975, en vertu duquel
l'Espagne restituait aux Marocains le Sahara qu'il occupait, sur la base
du compromis maroco-mauritanien.

Signalons que l'Accord de Madrid précité avait été précédé, huit
jours plus tôt, le 06 novembre 1975, de la célèbre "Marche Verte"[17] de
350.000 Marocains,[18] conçue et décidée par le Roi Hassan II, avec le
soutien unanime de la nation (société civile et partis politiques), suite

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[16] Dans cette perspective, deux rencontres algéro-marocaines au sommet eurent
d'abord lieu: l'une à Ifrane en janvier 1969 aboutissant au Traité portant le nom de
cette ville marocaine, et l'autre à Tlemcen en Algérie, en mai 1970. Entre les deux
événements, fut organisé le premier sommet islamique, à Rabat, en septembre 1969,
auquel assista le Président mauritanien Mokhtar Ould Daddah, sur invitation de Sa
Majesté le Roi Hassan II. Ce fut donc une reconnaissance de facto, de l'Etat
mauritanien, de la part du Maroc. Les trois rencontres précitées seront suivies de trois
sommets tripartites maghrébins maroco-algéro-mauritaniens Trois rencontres
réunissant les chefs d'Etat Hassan II, Boumediene et Ould Daddah. Le premier
sommet à Nouadhibou en septembre 1970, le second à Alger en janvier 1972 et le
troisième à Agadir en juillet 1973. S'y ajoutaient parallèlement un sommet de l'OUA à
Rabat en juin 1972 et un sommet de la Ligue Arabe en octobre 1974. Dans toutes ces
rencontres de chefs d'Etats, la question de la décolonisation du Sahara marocain dit
"Sahara espagnol" constituait quasiment l'objet de débat principal, lors desquelles,
par diverses formulations, le même président algérien Houari Boumediene,
s'engageait solennellement devant ses homologues à soutenir le Maroc,
politiquement, diplomatiquement, et même militairement s'il le fallait, pour la
libération du Sahara marocain en question, en vue de son retour à la mère patrie.
[17] Une Marche-Manifestation de 350.000 Marocains sans armes, portant seulement le
Coran et le drapeau national, dont des femmes, des enfants et des vieillards, forcent la
frontière et pénètrent dans le territoire convoité. Placée devant ce fait accompli auquel
il lui est difficile de répondre –comment prendre le risque de tirer sur une foule
désarmée?–, l'Espagne cède aux demandes de Rabat et de son allié de Nouakchott.
C'était l'épopée du siècle, le génie d'un Roi nommé Hassan II.
[18] D'ailleurs, auparavant, "l'Algérie officielle prit position contre la Marche Verte"
Voir Ouvrage collectif Maurice Druon, Geneviève Moll, Rachid Lazrak (…), *La Marche
Verte, philosophie de Hassan II*, (Paris: Éditions PAC, 1977), 41.

à l'avis consultatif de la Cour Internationale de Justice,[19] émis le 16 octobre 1975, reconnaissant en substance la marocanité historique du "Sahara occidental", par référence à l' "Acte d'allégeance".[20]

Un hégémonisme aussi ambitieux que complexe

L'ambition hégémonique algérienne d'essence géopolitique sur fond d'hostilité idéologique à l'encontre de la monarchie marocaine allait jusqu'à contester au Maroc des régions pourtant incontestées (du fait de leur position géographique extra-Sahara espagnol):

Premièrement: au lendemain de la récupération de la région de Tarfaya,[21] le 15 avril 1958, les sources coloniales françaises signalent l'opposition du FLN algérien aux revendications marocaines. C'est en

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[19] Le Roi avait pris l'initiative de proposer l'arbitrage de la Cour Internationale de Justice, le 17 septembre 1974, réagissant diligemment à la décision de l'Espagne – annoncée trois semaines plus tôt (21 août)– d'organiser un référendum d'autodétermination au Sahara. Il demandait, en effet, un *avis consultatif* (résolution 3292 (XXIX) du 13/12/1974) sur la situation juridique du territoire à la veille de la colonisation espagnole, et en particulier ses liens juridiques avec le Maroc et la Mauritanie.

[20] Un mode d'élection du Commandeur des Croyants (Chef à la fois spirituel et temporel) de la Communauté qui, équivalant de nos jours au concept moderne de "souveraineté", était aussi comparable à la notion d'allégeance qui prévalait dans les monarchies européennes des 17e, 18e et 19e siècles, entre les Rois et leurs Sujets. Tout en tenant compte de la notion islamo-politique de l'Allégeance, ainsi que des spécificités culturelles et socio-anthropologiques au Sahara marocain de l'époque, dont le phénomène du nomadisme en particulier. S'appuyant donc sur cette notion islamo-politique que suggère la terminologie "Allégeance" (qu'Il déclarait préférer à celle de "Souveraineté"), le Roi Hassan II annonça, le jour même de la publication du verdict de la Cour de La Haye, l'organisation d'une grande marche "pacifique": la "Marche Verte", de 350,000 personnes vers le Sahara dit Occidental, pour y rétablir la souveraineté marocaine que l'Espagne avait spoliée durant plusieurs décennies. C'est le 6 novembre 1975 que les participants volontaires commencèrent leur marche vers la ville de Laâyoune à partir de Tarfaya. Trois jours plus tard, le 9 novembre 1975, après avoir parcouru une distance de "vingt à trente kilomètres environ", les Marcheurs furent invités par le Souverain à rebrousser chemin. "Il nous faut revenir à notre point de départ, afin de construire une entente, que nous voulons permanente, sans que l'on puisse distinguer un vainqueur ou un vaincu" accentua le Roi. La Marche avait finalement porté ses fruits sans effusion de sang. Elle rendit nécessaire l'ouverture de négociations avec l'Espagne pour mettre un terme à la situation coloniale de ce territoire. Partie concernée et alliée avec le Maroc sur la question du Sahara, la Mauritanie participait aux négociations avec l'Espagne.

[21] En application de l'accord de Cintra, signé par les ministres Ahmed Balafrej et Castiella.

effet ce que rappelle une dépêche envoyée le 14 avril 1958 par Chaban-Delmas, ministre de la Défense nationale[22] au ministre des Affaires étrangères dont nous donnons lecture en bas de page[23].

Deuxièmement: dans un rapport confidentiel rédigé par l'Ambassadeur d'Espagne à Alger, à l'automne 1965, celui-ci "avertissait –le Ministère espagnol des Affaires étrangères– que les autorités algériennes projetaient de faire déplacer certaines tribus sahraouies marocaines d'Oued Addahab et Saqia el Hamra vers Tindouf".[24] Boumediene venait à peine d'écarter Ben Bella et les tristes souvenirs de la guerre des sables semblaient encore vivaces dans sa mémoire. Ainsi germait déjà dans son esprit l'idée de séquestrer une population sahraouie dans les camps de Lahmada.

Troisièmement: Un an plus tard, et au niveau de l'ONU, "le représentant de l'Algérie qui avait participé aux travaux du Comité Spécial à partir de 1966 avait demandé l'autodétermination et l'indépendance du territoire (Sahara occidental)".[25]

Quatrièmement: Le célèbre journaliste français Paul Balta (ancien correspondant du quotidien *Le Monde*) écrivait que Boumediene ne lui a jamais caché l'ambition de l'Algérie d'être "la Prusse du Maghreb".[26]

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[22] Archives des Affaires étrangères, la Courneuve, Maroc 212, 1956-1968, de Mr J. Chaban-Delmas, Ministre de la Défense nationale, au Ministre des Affaires étrangères, Paris, le 14 avril 1958, No 1158, 6.

[23] M. Chaban-Delmas y affirmait: "Nous avons d'autant plus intérêt à en réclamer l'ouverture (des négociations sur les frontières avec le Maroc) que le Maroc découvre peu à peu les difficultés du problème, face à l'Espagne, à l'Algérie française et même au FLN" (fin de citation). En ce temps-là, rappelons-le, l'Algérie était à plus de 4 années d'une indépendance à laquelle le Général de Gaulle lui-même –loin des pouvoirs de la République– ne songeait pas encore. En ce temps-là, le général Massu avait remporté la Bataille d'Alger depuis 16 mois et la base du FLN à Tunis (Saqia Sidi Youssef) avait été anéantie par des bombardements sous les ordres des généraux Challe et Jouhaud.

[24] Bachir Addakhil, ex-cofondateur du "polisario", interview accordée, le 29 mai 2019, à la chaîne de télévision "Kifache TV". Entretien également disponible sur la plateforme "You Tube".

[25] Nicole Kasbaoui, "Les relations internationales maghrébines et le conflit du Sahara occidental", *Série des Thèses et Mémoires, Numéro 1*, (Rabat: Publications de la Faculté des Sciences Juridiques, Économiques et Sociales de l'Université Hassan II, 1977), 56 (Préface de Mohamed Bennouna).

[26] Paul Balta, *Hassan II présente la Marche Verte*, (Paris: Editions Plon, 1990), 159.

"Oui, nous sommes en droit de vouloir être la Prusse du Maghreb –dira le Président algérien– Nous en avons les moyens, nous en avons le sous-sol, nous en avons le territoire et nous en avons les homes".[27]

Cinquièmement: suite au point précédent, l'ancien ministre marocain de l'Information TaibiBenhima, avait déclaré à Paul Balta, en décembre 1974, que "le véritable objectif d'Alger est d'isoler le Maroc, en le coupant de la Mauritanie et de l'Afrique noire".[28]

En conséquence, "tout ce qui permettrait ou aurait pu permettre le développement du Maroc va être sujet de blocage" de la part de l'Algérie.[29]

D'ailleurs, les conditions d'une présence algérienne prépondérante sur le continent, susceptibles de lui assurer une plateforme d'hégémonisme régional semblent encore loin d'être réunies, si l'on se base sur trois paramètres essentiels que nous citons en bas de page.[30]

Toutefois, les impulsions d'hégémonisme passionnelles que générait Boumediene pour son pays semblaient le contraindre parfois à des incohérences dans ses décisions, même parmi les plus décisives. Les conséquences de ses ardeurs irréalistes et infructueuses, semblent perdurer à ce jour, à travers la politique des actuels dirigeants.

Par exemple, pour s'approprier les régions du Sahara oriental marocain qui lui furent léguées par la France, l'Algérie s'était permis, depuis la Guerre des sables en 1963, de faire valoir "le principe de l'intangibilité des frontièreshéritées de la colonization […] admis par l'OUA, en bafouant l'accord algéro-marocain du 6 juillet 1961 relatif à

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[27] *Le Debrief: L'Algérie clairement impliquée dans le conflit au Sahara*, www.medi1tv.ma/…//l-algérie-clairement-impliquée-le-conflit-au-sahara-le-debrief-em…émission, 18 avril 2018, déclaration du journaliste marocain, Naïm Kamal.

[28] Balta, op.cit., 161.

[29] Naïm Kamal, *Le Debrief: L'Algérie clairement impliquée dans le conflit au Sahara*, www.medi1tv.ma/…//l-algérie-clairement-impliquée-le-conflit-au-sahara-le-debrief-em…émission, 18 avril 2018.

[30] a) Les bilans officiels de développement et de croissance émanant des institutions mondiales compétentes (le FMI, la Banque mondiale et la FAO) concernant le Maroc et l'Algérie durant les deux dernières décennies. b) L'état actuel (depuis janvier 2020) des réalisations sociales visibles et des signes de progrès économiques palpables dans les deux pays. c) Les succès diplomatiques et consulaires autant que l'impact des investissements marocains en Afrique et ailleurs en matière de coopération internationale.

la délimitation des frontières entre les deux pays".[31] Toutefois, comble du paradoxe, ce même Etat algérien –pourtant naissant de la décolonisation– reniera à l'Etat marocain séculaire (de 12 siècles) le droit au parachèvement de son unité territoriale. Un droit reposant pourtant sur la "Déclaration pour l'octroi de l'indépendance aux pays et aux peuples coloniaux" du 14 décembre 1960, dont les termes du point 6 stipulent que; "Toute tentative visant à détruire partiellement ou totalement l'unité nationale et l'intégrité territoriale d'un pays étant incompatible avec les buts et les principes de la Charte des Nations Unies".[32]

Aussi, sur l'idée de partage de l'ex-Sahara espagnol entre le Roi Hassan II et Ould Daddah qu'il approuvait officiellement devant ses pairs au sommet arabe de Rabat[33] en octobre 1974, il exprimera, treize mois plus tard, au président mauritanien, un farouche désaccord assorti de menaces[34] en lui adressant sa célèbre phrase: "Il paraît que

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[31]   Le pouvoir algérien arguait donc que "les frontières des États nouveaux sont établies d'après les frontières des anciennes provinces coloniales auxquelles ces États succèdent", Cf. Attilio Gaudio, *Guerres et paix au Maroc*, (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 1991), 133. Il s'appuyait ainsi sur ce que l'on appelle en termes juridico-politiques "le principe de l'*utipossidetis*" qui signifie "ainsi que vous possédez"; c'est-à-dire "le respect des frontières héritées de la decolonization". *Lexique de Politique*, 7ème édition, (Paris: Dalloz, 2001), 179.

[32]   Cette Déclaration –faut-il le souligner– est considérée comme une "véritable charte de la decolonization" devant orienter les actions du Comité de la décolonisation de l'ONU, appelée *Comité des vingt-quatre*.

[33]   En effet, Boumediene avait déclaré devant ses homologues arabes: "Je dis que je suis d'accord et qu'il n'y a aucun problème [...] si les frères présidents et rois consacrent cette formule pour l'entente entre les deux pays et en tout état de cause pour entamer la libération et la délimitation de ce qui sera la zone marocaine et de ce qui sera la zone mauritanienne, je serai alors parmi ceux qui consacrent cette formule" (Voir Le quotidien Le Matin du Sahara daté du 16 novembre 1977).

[34]   Le Président algérien n'était-il pas allé jusqu'à menacer son pair mauritanien (Mokhtar Ould Daddah) le 10 novembre 1975 à Colomb Bechar, en le conseillant de renoncer au projet de partage du Sahara avec feu S. M. Hassan II? Quelles furent les paroles agressives de Boumediene? Les voici telles que les rapportera dans ses Mémoires, celui qui les avait reçues de vive voix: Mokhtar Ould Daddah. Voici les propos du Président algérien: "Si la Mauritanie signe l'accord de Madrid, l'Algérie mettrait à la disposition des combattants sahraouis tous les moyens matériels et humains leur permettant de défendre leur territoire contre le Maroc et la Mauritanie. Et comme cette dernière est le maillon le plus faible, elle serait la première à subir les attaques des Sahraouis contre lesquels elle ne pourra se défendre [...]". Cette menace concernait la conclusion du projet d'accord de décolonisation que la Mauritanie et le Maroc entendaient conclure avec l'Espagne sur le Sahara.

la *Mauritanie* [...] *accepte de partager le Sahara avec le Maroc comme on partage un troupeau de moutons ou de chameaux. Cela l'Algérie ne l'acceptera jamais!* [35] Mais il oubliera ensuite sa mauvaise attitude envers Ould Daddah en se contredisant sur la même question, lorsqu'il s'agira de servir son pays. Puisqu'il ordonna à son ministre des Affaires étrangères de proposer officiellement aux Américains le partage de ce même Sahara entre le <polisario> et le Maroc, après que le renoncement de la Mauritanie, en 1979, au Oued Addahab qui lui revenait. Ainsi, Boumediene ne voyait plus le Sahara comme "un troupeau de moutons ou de chameaux".[36]

Enfin, si l'Algérie prétend ne pas être partie prenante dans le conflit du Sahara marocain et qu'elle défend seulement les bonnes causes universelles, pourquoi son soutien se limite-t-il exclusivement au "polisario" et non aux centaines de mouvements séparatistes dans le monde? Pour ne citer que quelques exemples parmi ceux-ci à titre d'échantillon, pourquoi le régime algérien ne revendique-t-il pas l'organisation d'un référendum d'autodétermination pour la Tchétchénie, le Kosovo, les Kurdes, le Chypre, le Tibet et Taiwan, les Basques, la Catalogne, la Corse ? Pourquoi deux poids deux mesures? De quel pays européen ou asiatique a-t-il peur, en bravant seulement

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[35] (Voir les Mémoires de Mokhtar Ould Daddah: "La Mauritanie contre vents et marées", 498, 640.

[36] A l'occasion de sa visite à l'Institut James Baker à Houston le 2 novembre 2001, le président algérien Abdelaziz Bouteflika déclarait que "l'Algérie et le Front 'Polisario' seraient disposés à examiner ou à négocier une division du territoire (Sahara marocain) comme *solution politique* au différend sur le Sahara [...]". Parallèlement, le président algérien, comme pour draper son initiative, évoqua l'idée du partage du Sahara avec le président Georges Bush lors de leur rencontre à Washington, en ce même mois de novembre 2001. Incroyable mais vrai. Comment, le gouvernement algérien pouvait-il avancer et soutenir une telle proposition alors que, 26 ans auparavant, Boumediene voyait une telle opération comme un péché inqualifiable contre le "peuple sahraoui" lorsque le Maroc et la Mauritanie, avaient décidé la partition de ce territoire entre eux. Une partition d'ailleurs approuvée par Boumediene lui-même. N'est-ce pas étrange que les dirigeants algériens considèrent inacceptable une chose profitant les autres, mais qu'ils trouvent normale et défendable dès lors que ça les concerne? Curieux aussi que la partition du Sahara puisse être vue dans les années 70 (sous l'ère de la guerre froide) comme le "partage d'un troupeau de moutons ou de chameaux" et qu'elle ne soit pas considérée comme telle dans les premières années du troisième millénaire (sous l'ère de la mondialisation).

le Maroc?[37] Et pourquoi ne commence-t-il pas avant par son propre pays en organisant un référendum d'autodétermination pour les Kabyles qui revendiquent leur indépendance depuis 2001? Le MAK-Anavad[38] est-il moins méritoire pour Alger que le "polisario", et la Kabylie est-elle moins importante que le Sahara?

Une longue guerre de séparatisme

Il nous faut d'abord signaler qu'un front appelé "polisario" se déclarant initialement vouloir libérer le Sahara, s'était apparemment créé juste 30 mois avant la Marche Verte, en novembre 1975. Il servira désormais de fer de lance de l'hégémonisme algérien. Et pour démontrer sa combativité sur le terrain, avec l'appui du pouvoir algérien, il passa à l'action, autour de l'Oasis d'Amgala (à environ 260 kilomètres à l'ouest de la frontière algérienne) avant même le départ définitif des soldats espagnols du Sahara,[39] le 28 février 1976.

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[37] Par un examen attentif de l'attitude du pouvoir algérien envers les mouvements séparatistes et les cas de réintégration des territoires, nous constatons une incohérence de comportement algérien en la matière. Par exemple, pourquoi l'Algérie n'est-elle pas hostile aujourd'hui à la légitimité de la réintégration de la Nouvelle-Guinée occidentale au territoire indonésien depuis 1962, sans l'organisation d'un référendum d'autodétermination? Pourtant c'est l'année même de l'indépendance de l'Algérie où le mot "référendum d'autodétermination" semblait être à son top model! Et pourquoi l'Algérie ne soutient-elle pas le mouvement séparatiste en Papouasie occidentale appelé OPM (l'Organisation pour une Papouasie Libre) qui, comme le "Polisario" rejetant l'accord tripartite de Madrid de 1975, rejette également l'accord de New York de 1962. L'Algérie craint-elle l'Indonésie? Pourquoi l'Algérie ne soutient-elle pas la Tchétchénie? (craint-elle la Russie). Pourquoi ne soutient-elle pas le Kosovo? (craint-elle encore la Russie qui soutient la Serbie). Pourquoi ne soutient-elle pas les Kurdes? (craint-elle à la fois la Syrie, la Turquie, l'Iran et l'Irak). Pourquoi ne soutient-elle pas Chypre? (craint-elle encore la Turquie). Pourquoi ne soutient-elle pas le Tibet et Taïwan? (craint-elle la Chine). Pourquoi ne soutient-elle pas les Basques? (craint-elle l'Espagne). Pourquoi ne soutient-elle pas la Corse? (craint-elle la France). Cependant, cette même Algérie qui s'interdit de soutenir tous les mouvements séparatistes ou territoires sécessionnistes précités, soutient mordicus un mouvement séparatiste sahraoui dont il fut à l'origine de sa création et demeure la source de sa survie contre l'intégrité territoriale d'un riverain avec qui elle partage pourtant la religion et l'identité arabo-berbère.

[38] Mouvement pour l'Autodétermination de la Kabylie.

[39] Dans une atmosphère empreinte de patriotisme débordant et de liesse indescriptible, les citoyens des provinces du sud sont venus nombreux célébrer ces grandes retrouvailles au sein de la patrie réunifiée. Les couleurs nationales ont été portées au sommet de l'édifice symbolisant la présence coloniale, comme elles le furent ensuite sur toutes les administrations de ces régions, signifiant ainsi la

La veille, le "polisario" avait proclamé la pseudo "République arabe sahraouie démocratique" (RASD), le 27 février 1976 à Bir Lahlou.[40] La date n'était donc pas fortuite. D'autant que l'idée –paraît-il– émanait de Kadhafi, et naturellement validée par Alger. Les deux engins politiques anti territoriaux marocains étaient ainsi constitués.

La première bataille d'Amgala se déroula entre les 27 et 29 janvier 1976.[41]

Ainsi commença au Maroc la guerre de séparatisme, se substituant illico au conflit colonial maroco-hispanique, pacifiquement réglé.

Relevant de l'histoire militaire au même titre que les conflits d'indépendance, les guerres de sécession ou de séparatisme postcoloniales s'avèrent aussi importantes à étudier, par les motivations qui les déclenchent et les desseins politiques qui les alimentent.[42] Car dans le séparatisme ou le sécessionnisme, "la guerre reprend [également] le fil rompu de la politique, mais en discontinuité avec elle" comme l'affirme John "cette bataille opposait pour la première fois l'armée marocaine[43] à l'armée algérienne",[44] et aboutit à une victoire éclatante des Forces Armées Royales.[45] Selon Rabat, "les

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souveraineté retrouvée du Maroc sur ses provinces récupérées. En cette matinée historique du samedi 28 février 1976, à 11h30, les représentants des autorités marocaines et espagnoles se sont retrouvés dans une atmosphère empreinte d'amitié et de concorde pour marquer l'événement, couronnant ainsi la période transitoire définie par l'accord tripartite de Madrid du 14 novembre 1975.

40   Bir Lahlou est une localité au nord-est du Sahara marocain. Elle est située à 236 kilomètres d'Es-Semara et à quelques kilomètres du village mauritanien d'Ain Bentili.

41   Soit le jour-même de la création dupseudo "RASD".

42   D'autant que les guerres de séparatisme ne sont pas forcément moins longues, moins dramatiques ou moins décisives pour le destin des peuples que les guerres d'indépendance. Même si les batailles de libération qui les ont précédées étaient intermittentes à dents de scies, par des épisodes d'accalmie politique, ou séparées entre elles par des intervalles de trêve prolongés.

43   Les troupes marocaines qui sont commandées par le général Ahmed Dlimi totalisaient en 1976 30,000 soldats.

44   Qu'est-ce qui expliquait cette implication algérienne sauf les motivations que nous avons précédemment évoquées. La seconde bataille d'Amgala se déroula le 14 février 1976. Une troisième aura lieu et d'autres batailles suivront, dans diverses localités du Sahara, jusqu'au cessez-le-feu qui interviendra entre le Maroc et le "polisario" avec la Minurso.

45   Un communiqué du ministère marocain de l'information a annoncé jeudi 29 janvier, qu'Amgala, au Sahara marocain, avait été "définitivement degage" par les Forces Armées Royales. Celles-ci ont fait cent un prisonniers, appartenant à l'armée

forces marocaines qui dégagèrent Amgala "ont fait plus de cent prisonniers algériens".[46]

Toutefois, convaincu que même une fois réalisées, "les victoires militaires ne se traduisent pas toujours par des victoires politiques",[47] le Royaume "adoptera l'option diplomatique" à partir d'Amgala: avant, pendant ou après même les périodes de cessez-le-feu, en 1991; autant que durant presque trois décennies couvrant cette période de trêve, et après sa fin. Une fin unilatéralement décidée par les séparatistes, en novembre 2020, avec le soutien ininterrompu du régime algérien.

Abordons à présent le "polisario", sans lequel cette guerre post-espagnole n'aurait pas eu lieu, en perdurant si longuement. Il y a déjà plus de 45 ans!

Un mouvement séparatiste insolite

L'émergence du "polisario" pour ne pas dire son "eruption" dérive d'une histoire compliquée, très longue à relater, à laquelle contribuèrent, directement ou indirectement, plusieurs gouvernements de la région maghrébo-méditerranéenne, pour des motivations fondamentalement géopolitiques, sur fond géostratégique. Qu'il nous suffit de la résumer par deux déclarations du regretté feu Hassan II, qui en savait plus long que tant d'observateurs. Voici ce qu'il nous en renseignait:

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algérienne, dont un lieutenant, un aspirant et plusieurs sous-officiers. Elles ont "récupéré des quantités importantes d'armement comprenant des véhicules, des pièces d'artillerie et une grande quantité de missiles sol-air". Il y a eu "plusieurs dizaines de morts dans les rangs du Polisario". Aucun crédit n'est accordé ici aux affirmations réitérées d'Alger, selon lesquelles la colonne en marche vers Amgala accomplissait une mission humanitaire en apportant vivres et médicaments aux Sahraouis. Cette colonne paraît avoir suivi un itinéraire partant de Mahbès, proche de la frontière algéro-marocaine du Sahara, et passant par Tifariti. Dans ces deux localités, en effet, le Polisario est implanté. Les combats d'Amgala ont recréé parmi les Marocains l'atmosphère d'exaltation nationale qui prévalait lors des affrontements de 1963, entre les Forces Armées Royales et l'armée algérienne. Cependant, Rabat s'abstient de se lancer dans une guerre des ondes, en réponse aux violentes attaques de la radio d'Alger, pour éviter d'envenimer la situation.

[46] Le Monde du 31 janvier 1976.
[47] Clausewitz "sur la différence entre l'objectif militaire (Ziel) et le but politique de la guerre (Zweck)". Cf. *De la guerre*, Livre I, chap. 1.

"Le "Polisario" est une création mauritano-algéro-espagnole" [48] avait déclaré le Roi Hassan II, en janvier 1980. Il le répétera deux mois plus tard: "c'est la Mauritanie, l'Espagne et l'Algérie qui, en 1972-1973, ont créé le 'Polisario'".[49]

En effet, 6 jours après l'annonce de l'avis consultatif de la Cour Internationale de Justice (C.I.J), soit à deux semaines de la Marche Verte et 23 jours de la signature de l'Accord de Madrid, personne ne parlait du "polisario". Celui-ci n'existait nulle part, ni à l'échelon de la 4ème Commission ni à l'échelle de l'ONU, et la première résolution du Conseil de Sécurité sur le Sahara,[50] sous No 377 (1975), l'ignorait totalement, autant que celle qui la suivra (No 379) dix jours plus tard.[51] Aucune des deux ne parlait de "population sahraouie", encore moins de "peuple sahraoui". Où était alors le "polisario"?

Fondé initialement et majoritairement par de jeunes lycéens sahraouis, politiquement novices, survoltés par des idéologies "révolutionnaires de toutes les tendances" que produisait la guerre

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[48]   Hassan II, interview accordée au journal Ouest allemand "Der Spiegel", janvier 1980.

[49]   Hassan II, interview accordée à "France-Inter" et à "Antenne 2" le 12 mars 1980.

[50]   La Résolution 377 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies est adoptée par consensus lors de sa 1850e séance, tenue le 22 octobre 1975, portant sur la situation au Sahara marocain (dit occidental). Le Conseil a réaffirmé les travaux récents de l'Assemblée générale et a pris note d'une lettre du représentant permanent de l'Espagne. Il a ensuite invoqué l'article 34 de la Charte des Nations Unies pour demander au Secrétaire général d'engager immédiatement des consultations avec les parties concernées et intéressées et de faire rapport au Conseil de sécurité dès que possible sur les résultats obtenus. Le Conseil a souligné qu'il ne voulait pas porter préjudice aux négociations que l'Assemblée générale pourrait entreprendre et a lancé un appel aux parties concernées et intéressées pour qu'elles fassent preuve de retenue et de modération. Aucun détail du vote n'a été donné, si ce n'est qu'il a été "adopté par consensus".

[51]   La Résolution 379 (1975) est adoptée par consensus lors de la 1852e séance du Conseil De Sécurité Des Nations Unies le 02 novembre 1975. Elle "a examiné un rapport du Secrétaire général relatif à la situation concernant le Sahara marocain (dit occidental). Le Conseil a réaffirmé sa résolution 377 et la résolution 1514 de l'Assemblée générale, et pris note avec préoccupation de la gravité de la situation". (L'organisation de la *Marche Verte* était déjà annoncée par feu le Roi Hassan II). La résolution 379 "demande instamment à toutes les parties concernées et intéressées d'éviter toute action susceptible d'aggraver encore la tension dans la région et prie le Secrétaire général de poursuivre et d'intensifier ses consultations avec les parties intéressées et de faire rapport dès que possible". Aucun détail du vote n'a été donné, si ce n'est qu'il a été "adopté par consensus".

froide des années 70, le "polisario" voyait le jour dans l'incertitude la plus inquiétante, mais sans trop s'en rendre compte. Ses cadres, d'origines géographiques hétéroclites (dont plusieurs adolescents) ne tombèrent même pas d'accord sur les conditions d'organisation de leur congrès constitutif, quant au lieu et la date de sa tenue.[52]

Du reste, le "polisario" ne tarda pas –malgré lui– à se révéler essentiellement algérien en dépit de sa carapace sahraouie, à partir du printemps 1975, et ce par deux initiatives purement algériennes:

Primo, la nomination concoctée et inattendue, à l'automne 1974, d'un nouveau secrétaire général du "polisario" par son "comité executive" sur intervention des services secrets algériens, appelé Ahmed Lamine, supplantant brusquement Mustapha El Ouali, [53]

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[52]   On a dit qu'il était né le 23 mai 1973 à Zouerate. Aussi, a-t-on dit que c'était dans cette ville que se tint son congrès constitutif, mais les 28-29 avril 1973 plus exactement et non le 10 mai 1973. (Bachir Addakhil, ex-cofondateur du "polisario", interview accordée, le 29 mai 2019, à la chaîne de télévision "Kifache TV". Entretien également disponible sur la plateforme "You Tube"). On a ensuite affirmé que cette dernière date était exacte, mais c'est à Aïn-Bentili, Mustapha Naïmi, *L'Ouest saharien - la perception de l'espace dans la pensée politique tribale*, (Paris: Éditions Karthala, 2013), 402, qui abrita le congrès constitutif et pas ailleurs. Et puis a-t-on prétendu que c'était précisément et sûrement à Bir Mogrein, à ladite date du 10 mai. Et enfin a-t-on allégué que c'était plutôt à Tan-Tan, tout en maintenant encore la date du 10 mai. Bref, des contradictions de lieux et de dates de naissance du polisario, si nombreuses et discutables que le célèbre journaliste français Paul Balta ne vit mieux pour s'en sortir que d'écrire, dans les colonnes du quotidien le Monde que: le "congrès constitutif du front polisario s'était tenu clandestinement le 10 mai quelque part dans le desert" (Paul Balta, *Le Monde* des 29-30 mai 1983) Il sera d'abord le seul à préciser la manière de sa tenue en disant "clandestinement". Et il sera enfin le seul à dire "quelque part dans le desert": une formule qui arrangerait finalement tout le monde, sans déranger personne. Sauf les historiens soucieux de précisions, bien entendu. Ainsi, obscure et contradictoire dans sa genèse au Sahara, le "polisario" n'a aucune trace de gésine dans le registre des naissances de l'OUA, à l'instar des autres mouvements de libération authentiques. Cette fragile situation où se trouvaient les fondateurs du "polisario", facilitèrent à Boumediene l'altération de leurs objectifs originels, en les écartant de l'idée candide d'une résistance pour chasser l'Espagne du Sahara avec leurs moyens de fortune, vers l'aventureux dessein séparatiste contre l'unité territoriale du Royaume du Maroc. Le Maroc d'Hassan II qui, en ce printemps 1973 où se formait le "polisario" discrètement, semblait bien savoir comment s'y prendre avec un généralissime nommé Franco, contre vents (du Nord) et marées (de l'Est).
[53]   Celui-ci a été écarté sous prétexte qu'il agissait avec autoritarisme, sans associer ses camarades dans ses décisions. En réalité, El Ouali, de par sa personnalité et sa force de caractère ne représentait pas le profil que voulait Boumediene. Il était d'ailleurs l'homme à abattre. Il trouvera alors la mort, lors d'une attaque armée à

pourtant élu par le 2ème congrès tenu quelques semaines auparavant à Tindouf, les 25-28 août 1974. "C'est depuis lors que le destin du <polisario>basculera vers l'infernal projet séparatiste que lui préparait Boumediene contre le Royaume".[54] Les futurs chefs des séparatistes seront désormais choisis par Alger à savoir Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz et l'actuel Brahim Ghali.

Secundo, la "création, dans la même période de 1974, par l'Algérie, du premier noyau de "pseudo-réfugiés sahraouis" à Tindouf, constitué de sept familles, tous de nationalité algérienne".[55] Il formera la communauté embryonnaire des futurs séquestrés sahraouis.[56]

Intervenant au séminaire régional du C24 pour les Caraïbes, M. Hilale, représentant permanent du Maroc à New-York, a souligné que l'Algérie a été, sans conteste, derrière la création en 1973 du polisario. Rappelant que c'était le Maroc qui avait inscrit la question du Sahara, alors sous occupation espagnole, aux Nations Unies, en 1963, l'ambassadeur marocain s'est demandé: "Où était le polisario à ce moment-là?".

Nouakchott, durant l'été 1976, quelques mois après la création de la pseudo-république sahraouie (RASD), en février 1976. Sa disparition est une autre histoire.

[54] Bachir Addakhil, ex-cofondateur du "polisario", interview accordée, le 29 mai 2019, à la chaîne de télévision "Kifache TV". Entretien également disponible sur la plateforme "You Tube".

[55] Ibid.

[56] En effet, "de novembre 1975 au printemps 1976, l'armée algérienne déporte des centaines de personnes. Lors de la débâcle algérienne de février-mars 1976, les Sahraouis qui purent être attrapés furent conduits de force en Algérie et regroupés dans la zone de Tindouf. Ils rejoignirent ceux qui avaient eu le malheur de se réfugier en Algérie lors de l'opération "Ecouvillon" (1958) ou pour échapper à la répression espagnole qui suivit. Selon les Nations Unies, les Sahraouis de Tindouf étaient de 2,400 en 1974. Avec les nouveaux déportés de 1975-1976, le total ne dépassera pas 8,000 personnes au maximum. C'est ces quelques milliers de malheureux qui, selon la propagande algérienne, vont devenir 50,000 à partir de 1981, dès qu'on commence à parler d'un référendum. Pourtant l'Algérie et le "polisario" n'hésiteront pas à parler d'un "peuple de réfugiés sahraouis" en "lutte pour son indépendance" et à réclamer toutes sortes d'aides matérielles et financières auprès des organisations internationales. Or, selon les experts internationaux […] la population des Sahraouis marocains (au Sahara marocain et à Tindouf réunis) s'évaluait entre 100 et 150,000 personnes en 1988; dont 80% vivant dans le territoire sous contrôle marocain. Édouard Moha, *Le Sahara occidental ou le sale guerre de Boumediene*, (Paris: Jean Picollec, 1990), 97-98.

"La réponse est qu'il n'existait pas", a poursuivi M. Hilale. "Comment donc peut-il, aujourd'hui, prétendre à une quelconque représentativité du Sahara?", ajoutant que cela "relève de l'absurde et démontre clairement que le polisario n'a été créé en 1973 par l'Algérie que pour contrecarrer les droits légitimes du Maroc sur son Sahara et les aspirations de mon pays pour recouvrer son intégrité territoriale".

Il convient cependant de souligner que ce "polisario" – là, bien que placé sous les ailes du pouvoir algérien, participe néanmoins, impunément et curieusement, au terrorisme international, dans le Sahel, si bien que "sa connexion avec l'"AQMI" est confirmée à partir de 2010".[57]

Les séquestrés de Tindouf

Un mouvement de libération ou de séparatisme aussi apocryphes ou fantoches soient-ils impliquent des partisans, une population, autant artificiels qu'ils puissent être également, en mercenaires ou en "réfugiés". On vient de voir comment le "polisario" et les "sequesters" de Tindouf ont été constitués. Mais revenons un peu à ces derniers, dans leurs tristes camps.

C'est à croire, qu'en ce troisième millénaire, en Algérie, les soi-disant 'Sahraouis' de Tindouf (ceux authentiquement originaires du Sahara marocain, minoritaires, induits en erreur ou conduits contre leur volonté, autant que ceux amenés par la contrainte de pays

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[57] "Par exemple, durant les deux années, (2010-2011) AQMI a recruté des mercenaires du Polisario, qui sont des combattants aguerris, capables d'assurer le succès des opérations menées par ce groupe terroriste", a souligné l'expert américain Peter PHAM premier vice-Président du comité national pour la politique américaine, dont les propos sont rapportés par la radio Voice of America. Ce recrutement, a-t-il tenu à préciser, "se fait sur la base de considérations pragmatiques et non idéologiques, car il s'agit d'exécuter des opérations de prise d'otages ou encore de protéger le passage du trafic de drogues transitant par la région du Sahel". De toute façon, le cas d'Oumar dit Le Sahraoui, arrêté en Mauritanie pour l'enlèvement de quatre Européens, avait reconnu ne pas être un membre actif d'AQMI, mais un simple mercenaire payé par des chefs terroristes pour capturer des otages. Autant de choses qui ne laissent aucun doute à la connexion entre AQMI et le Front Polisario. Les experts américains avaient avancé cette hypothèse depuis deux ans. Aujourd'hui elle se précise, surtout qu'il se dit que, sous le prétexte d'un soulèvement contre la pratique du paiement de rançons aux terroristes, des opérations pro AQMI sont en préparation à partir des zones contrôlées par le Polisario". Cf. http://polisario-confidentiel.com/569-focus-la-connexion-aqmi-polisario-se-precise.html.

subsahariens riverains ou comme mercenaires) ont été tous "regroupés de force dans la région de Tindouf".[58]

C'est à croire qu' "ils sont soumis à une véritable séquestration sous le contrôle (permanent) de l'armée algérienne. Qu'ils n'ont aucune liberté, pas même celle d'aller d'un camp à un autre".[59]

C'est à croire qu' "il leur est interdit de sortir des zones qui leur sont assignées: que les familles sont séparées afin d'éviter les désertions; que les hommes sont embrigadés de force dans les opérations de guérilla, que les femmes sont gardées comme monnaie d'échange, et que les enfants étaient envoyés dans des écoles de rééducation et d'endoctrinement en Algérie ou en Libye".[60]

C'est à croire qu'en ce troisième millénaire, en Algérie, ontorture atrocement des séquestrés insoumis à Tindouf ou des opposants à la politique algéro-polisarienne envers le Maroc.

C'est à croire que depuis des décennies, le Haut-Commissariat des Réfugiés des Nations-Unies, ne parvient pas encore à accomplir sa mission à Tindouf, en procédant au recensement et à l'enregistrement des séquestrés sahraouis.

C'est à croire que "cette situation, qui régnait dès la fin des années 70, 80, 90 et même quelques années après la faillite du communisme et la chute du mur de Berlin", perdure encore, dans des conditions plus effroyables, en ce troisième millénaire, en Algérie.

C'est à croire, c'est à croire, c'est à croire! Pourtant c'est vrai!

De Kinshasa à Rabat: deux guerres de séparatisme, mais dissemblables

Il est vrai que la guerre de sécession du Congo (1960-1964) parmi celles provoquées en Afrique contre des pays aussitôt décolonisés, serait globalement la plus comparable à celle du Maroc, bien qu'elles soient dissemblables, sur des aspects considérables. Des réalités distinctives faisant du conflit maroco-polisaro-algérien un cas inédit

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[58]   Édouard Moha, *Le Sahara occidental ou la sale guerre de Boumediene*, (Paris: Jean Picollec, 1990), 97-98.
[59]   Ibid.
[60]   Moha, op.cit.

dans l'histoire de la décolonisation, par un mouvement séparatiste insolite.

A cet égard, les situations et les structures politiques coloniales et autochtones concomitantes d'un Etat congolais naissant, sont nettement différentes de celles d'un Etat séculaire comme le Maroc, dotée d'une monarchie constitutionnelle déjà stable (la constitution de 1962-1976) sur fond d'une maturité politique nationale. Cette dissemblance fondamentale expliquait le chaos congolais dans la brutalité, à l'émergence de l'entité séparatiste à partir de structures économiques européennes locales (milieux d'affaires pro-occidentaux) reliées au siège du système colonial occidental d'outre-mer.

Rien donc de comparable avec un mouvement de jeunes élèves marocains démunis, rêvant d'un Etat sahraoui dans l'Etat marocain, mais enchaînés par un pouvoir politico-militaire étranger, aspirant à devenir "la Prusse" de la région. On l'a vu.

Il s'agit en fait, entre Kinshasa et Rabat, de deux guerres différentes, à deux entités séparatistes aux sorts divergents.

Toutefois, force est de reconnaître, dans les deux situations, des réalités communes à savoir:

• Les deux structures séparatistes ont vu le jour dans le contexte de la guerre froide.

• Aucune des deux structures ne sera admise à l'ONU.

Mais revenons à quelques dissimilitudes fondamentales, pour réaliser la fragilité du "polisario" et la mentalité de son seigneur.

Et la région du Katanga qui s'était formé n'était pas une entité politique assujettie à un Etat voisin, en servant spécialement les intérêts de ce dernier. Et aucun régime politique voisin n'avait l'intention de faire de l'entité Katangaise naissante un caillou dans les chaussures de l'Etat central indépendant pour entraver son essor par hégémonisme. Le Katanga semblait plutôt politiquement autonome dans son séparatisme vis-à-vis de l'extérieur, même en coopérant avec ceux qui le soutenaient. Il exerçait librement son autorité sur une population déterminée, un territoire défini, avec une armée, une police et une administration, tous réels; même si leur existence

politique était au chapitre de l'éphémère. Ce qui n'a jamais été le cas pour le "polisario" et ses séquestrés.

Aussi, la guerre de séparatisme du Katanga n'a pas été mêlée à l'Afrique institutionnelle, puisque l'OUA n'existait pas encore. L'ONU s'en était chargée du début à la fin, en facilitant son achèvement et le rétablissement de l'unité territoriale du Congo. Différemment du séparatisme au Sahara marocain qui, durant les premières années du conflit, sera porté à l'OUA. Action qui, au lieu d'aboutir à une solution fraternelle à l'Africaine, compliqua au contraire la donne, malgré l'effort marocain et l'appui des légalistes. Le Jeune continent frémissait encore sous le courant d'air politique de la guerre froide.

Finalement, ironie de l'histoire, le Maroc qui, diplomatiquement et militairement était venu au secours de l'Etat congolais à travers l'ONU pour défendre l'unité territoriale de ce dernier, contre un mouvement séparatiste constitué de l'intérieur (le Katanga), connaîtra à son tour la même épreuve, seize ans plus tard, pour défendre son intégrité territoriale à travers l'ONU, en affrontant un mouvement séparatiste, mais constitué de l'extérieur (la pseudo RASD).[61]

Mais l'élément synthèse à retenir, discriminant globalement le conflit de séparatisme polisarien marocain de celui du Katanga congolais, c'est surtout sa très longue durée atteignant à ce jour 46 ans, par rapport à l'autre, n'ayant atteint même pas quatre années révolues.

Lorsque l'ONU rend justice au Maroc

"La subordination du point de vue politique au point de vue militaire serait une absurdité, car c'est la politique qui a créé la guerre. Elle est l'intelligence, la guerre n'est que l'instrument et non le contraire".[62]

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[61] Ces événements comparables, ne confirment-ils pas la cohérence et la constance du Maroc dans son attachement au principe de l'intégrité territoriale des Etats, tel que proclamé par l'Organisation mondiale, même s'il fallait entrer en conflit armé pour le défendre, en ultime recours. "En ultime recours" disait Hassan II, car "la guerre n'engendre que la plus détestable violence et la plus morne stupidité […] Elle est l'excitatrice des vices sans nombre et sans fin. Elle est la mère de tous les crimes".

[62] Voir Clausewitz, Traité, *De la guerre*, Livre VIII, chapitre 6.

Cette pensée clausewitzienne paraissait bien présente chez le Roi Hassan II depuis le départ des Espagnols, face à un duo algéro-polisarien de plus en plus obstiné à se donner raison. Il semblait l'appliquer en faisant de la stratégie militaire et l'usage des armes *la mécanique exceptionnelle de l'esprit diplomatique permanent*, comme le suggèrent ses paroles et ses actes, en politique étrangère, surtout sur le Sahara. Ainsi agissait-il dans l'alternance des méthodes, tantôt souplement en proposant un référendum (contrôlé) à Nairobi[63] en 1981, tantôt fermement en claquant la porte à l'OUA[64] en 1984, tantôt politiquement en invitant, au printemps 1989, les séparatistes de Tindouf à regagner leur patrie par la clémence de celle-ci,[65] tantôt militairement en construisant un mur de défense contre les éléments armés de Tindouf[66] à partir de 1980.

De la sorte, s'associaient des actions d'ordres politiques et militaires, en période de guerre effective, contre des séparatistes installés à Tindouf, où l'armée et l'armement algériens étaient déjà

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[63]   "Le Roi Hassan II avait annoncé, vendredi 26 juin 1981, à Nairobi, au sommet de l'O.U.A. que le Maroc acceptait le principe d'un référendum au Sahara occidental. Le souverain chérifien a cependant indiqué qu'il s'agissait, dans son esprit, d'un référendum 'contrôlé'" (*Le Monde* du 27 juin 1981).

[64]   Le Maroc avait quitté l'OUA en novembre 1984, à la suite de l'admission du pseudo "RASD". Sur un ton très calme, M. Guédira (Conseiller du Roi Hassan II) donna lecture d'un message du Souverain: "Voilà, est-le déplore, l'heure de nous séparer. En attendant des jours sages, nous vous disons adieu et nous vous souhaitons bonne chance avec votre nouveau partenaire". Avant de se retirer, Guédira réaffirme avec ferveur que la présence du drapeau chérifien sur le sol saharien est "conforme à l'Histoire et à la loi international". Le ministre zaïrois des Affaires étrangères lui emboîte le pas, accusant l'OUA d'accueillir en son sein "un État fantôme et de violer ainsi la charte de l'Organisation", qui stipule que seuls des pays indépendants et souverains sont habilités à y siéger. En fin de journée, au pied du grand escalier de l'Africa Hall, les 140 membres de la délégation marocaine –dont une bonne partie est d'ailleurs d'origine sahraouie– quittent le sommet avec fracas, scandant d'une seule voix: "Le Sahara est marocain et le restera".

[65]   Feu le Roi Hassan II avait lancé un appel, en 1989, aux originaires du Sahara marocain se trouvant à Tindouf à regagner la Mère-patrie. Au 31 mai 2010, 8,000 Marocains d'origine sahraouie répondaient à l'appel royal sous le précepte politico-religieux: "la Patrie est clémente et miséricordieuse".

[66]   C'est à partir du mois d'août 1980 que l'État marocain a commencé la construction d'un immense mur des Sables de 2,700 km (également appelé "mur marocain", "mur de défense" ou "mur de sécurité") comme barrière de défense au Sahara marocain. Il sera achevé à l'automne 1987. Il a été réalisé pour "lutter contre les avancées ennemies, soigneusement gardé par les soldats des Forces Armées Royales (FAR) et doté d'une haute technologie militaire de surveillance".

bien impliqués depuis Amgala I, et sans encore l'espoir d'un cessez-le-feu. Le Maroc combattait toujours à la clausewitzienne, pour protéger son unité territoriale.

Dans cette logique de défense nationale totale, le Roi Mohammed VI suivra la voie de Son père dès la fin des années 90, selon son style et sa vision. L'ONU et l'Afrique [67] seront alors ses terrains de prédilection.

Cependant, réalisant l'échec des tentatives de dénouement du conflit du Sahara [68] durant plus de trois décennies, [69] et suite à la résolution 1570 du Conseil de sécurité qui confirmait l'impasse des négociations sur les propositions inconciliables du Plan Baker II, [70] le Maroc de Mohammed VI décida, au printemps 2007, de soumettre à l'ONU une "Initiative pour la négociation d'un statut d'autonomie de la région du Sahara, dans le cadre de la souveraineté du Royaume et de son unité nationale". [71] Son projet est qualifié de "sérieux" et "credible" par les barons de l'ONU. Le Royaume s'inscrit, dès lors, dans "une dynamique constructive", pour une "issue definitive".

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[67] En commençant par réintégrer, le 30 janvier 2017, l'Union Africaine qui avait remplacé l'OUA.
[68] Un conflit qui, contre toute attente, fut violemment déclenché par l'Algérie, par la bataille d'Amgala (janvier 1976) où fut impliquée l'armée algérienne, avant même le départ définitif et officiel des soldats espagnols, le 28 février 1976. On l'a vu.
[69] Sans parvenir à des résultats concrets et acceptables pour la partie marocaine, face à une attitude négative du pouvoir algérien qui –réellement impliqué dans le conflit comme tout le monde le sait– n'a jamais voulu peser de tout son poids sur les "dirigeants" sahraouis séparatistes qu'il abrite et entretient à Tindouf. Surtout devant un refus quasi permanent du "polisario" et de l'Algérie vis-à-vis des différentes formules de résolutions onusiennes dont la méthode référendaire proposée par le Maroc, en 1981, dans le sens d'un "référendum confirmatif". Après avoir accepté de dialoguer avec le "polisario" depuis particulièrement l'automne 2005 (sous le mandat onusien de Kofi Annan) en différentes circonstances connues, notamment grâce aux bons offices saoudiens à Taef, à Tanger et à Marrakech, sans parler des nombreuses approches informelles et exploratoires qui n'ont pas manqué non plus.
[70] Invitant "les parties et les États de la région à continuer de coopérer pleinement avec l'ONU pour mettre fin à l'impasse actuelle et progresser vers une solution politique".
[71] Voici ce que mentionnait en substance la *Résolution du 28 avril 2007* concernant le projet d'autonomie marocain pour le Sahara dit occidental: *Prenant note* de la proposition marocaine présentée au Secrétaire général le 11 avril 2007 et des efforts sérieux et crédibles faits par le Maroc pour aller de l'avant vers un règlement; *prenant note également* de la proposition du Front Polisario présentée au Secrétaire général le 10 avril 2007.

Mais il nous faut souligner que ce résultat est le fruit d'une guerre diplomatique sans trêve, engagée au niveau du Conseil de Sécurité, dès le printemps 2001, dans le cadre d'un redressement juridico-politique, graduellement rectificatif du dossier du Sahara. Une opération subtile, faisant évoluer les dispositions des résolutions, de l'idée classique d'un "référendum d'autodétermination" qui prévalait depuis septembre 1988 –et littéralement mentionnée encore dans la résolution du Conseil de février 2001– à celle d'une "solution durable" (sans épithète) pour se fixer, dorénavant, à partir de la résolution d'octobre 2006, à l'option finale d'une "solution politique, juste, durable et mutuellement acceptable". Formulation qui, dorénavant, sera reconduite à chaque échéance de séance. Ainsi, pourrions-nous affirmer que l'idée d'un "référendum d'autodétermination" a été définitivement enterrée,[72] à l'automne 2006, soit depuis 15 ans. Et c'est dans la perspective d'une "solution politique" qu'évoluent les épisodes de dialogue entre les parties concernées, sous leur dernière forme de *table-ronde*, dont Genève était l'endroit d'accueil, dès décembre 2018, entre le Maroc, la Mauritanie, le "polisario" et l'Algérie. Celle-ci, nommément considérée partie concernée par son implication réelle, n'a plus l'opportunité de s'esquiver derrière les séparatistes.

Par ce processus adéquat, le Conseil de Sécurité, avec l'adoption du projet d'autonomie au Sahara, mit fin à une situation aussi paradoxale qu'injuste à l'égard du Maroc, incompatible avec une décolonisation dûment accomplie.

La victoire n'appartient qu'au politique

Si personne ne nie la deuxième guerre (des sables) algéro-marocaine que déclencha la bataille d'Amgala I en janvier 1976, le problème qui semble se poser néanmoins c'est la divergence de vues entre le Maroc d'une part, et le duo algéro-polisarien d'autre part, quant à la qualification à attribuer à cette guerre. La question est importante dans la mesure où de la nature du conflit dépendront les conséquences.

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[72]   Notamment par la Résolution du Conseil de Sécurité No 1720 (2006) du 31 octobre 2006.

En effet, tandis que l'Algérie qualifie toutes les batailles qui, depuis 1976, opposèrent le Maroc au "polisario" de "guerre d'indépendance" ou "de decolonization", en considérant le Royaume comme puissance "administrante" ou "occupant", ce dernier considère plutôt les batailles en question comme une "guerre de separatism", et d'une dimension sans précédent dans l'Histoire des relations internationales. "Plus qu'une guerre de separatism", si vous aimez mieux.

Qui a tort, qui a raison?

En démentant la thèse algérienne on en étayera automatiquement celle du Maroc.

Dans son mémorandum du 22 mai 2001 adressé au Secrétaire général de l'ONU, le gouvernement algérien désignait le Maroc de "puissance administrante". Revenant à la charge trois ans plus tard, dans une lettre datée du 18 août 2004, adressée au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, le Président algérien qualifia le Maroc de "puissance occupant" au Sahara, en ajoutant que l'affaire du Sahara est un "conflit de 'décolonisation inachevée'".[73]

Procédons point par point, par la dialectique historico-juridique.

De ce qui précède, le terme "puissance administrante" est donc synonyme de "puissance occupant", car tous deux employés par l'Algérie pour désigner une *puissance coloniale*. D'autant que l'Espagne qui fut bien celle-ci au Sahara –telle que reconnue d'ailleurs par l'ONU depuis toujours– s'est bien qualifiée de "puissance administrante", en décolonisant le "Sahara occidental" (appelée alors Sahara espagnol).

Or comment l'Espagne pouvait-elle décoloniser ce territoire en le restituant au Maroc conformément aux instruments juridiques conventionnels en la matière; en faisant de l'Etat marocain une nouvelle "puissance occupante" de son propre territoire. N'est-ce pas un illogisme?

Passons à la démonstration purement juridique, en confrontant textes et réalités.

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[73]   Le quotidien "Aujourd'hui Le Maroc" No 737 du 27 septembre 2004, 5.

La désignation du Maroc comme "puissance occupant" (synonyme d'administrante) par l'Algérie et le "polisario" est erronée, pour deux raisons essentielles:

1   Le règlement de La Haye de 1907 et la 4ème Convention de Genève du 12 août 1949 définissent le concept de "puissance occupant" comme "un Etat qui occupe partiellement ou totalement le territoire d'un autre Etat et qui bénéficie des compétences liées à la subsistance et à la sécurité de ses troupes". Or non seulement au moment de la récupération du Sahara il n'y avait pas un conflit armé international entre le Maroc et l'Espagne, mais il n'y avait pas non plus d'Etat indépendant autre que le Royaume. Par conséquent, le concept de "puissance occupante" n'a aucune relation avec la situation du Sahara, où il n'y avait eu ni guerre avec un autre Etat, ni occupation d'un territoire tiers, ni avant, ni au moment de la signature de l'accord tripartite avec l'ancienne puissance coloniale.

2   Aucun rapport du Secrétaire Général de l'ONU, aucune résolution du Conseil de sécurité, aucun avis juridique de l'ONU ne qualifie le Maroc de "puissance occupant" A aucun moment, et depuis 45 ans que dure le conflit, une quelconque résolution de l'Assemblée générale sur le sujet n'a conféré au Maroc un tel statut.

S'agissant du troisième point, le Sahara n'est pas non plus un "conflit de 'décolonisation inachevée'".

Pourquoi?

Parce que la 4ème commission de l'ONU (commission chargée des questions politiques et de la décolonisation) avait soutenu que:

"Cette instance n'est plus habilitée à discuter de l'affaire du Sahara. Car celle-ci n'était plus depuis longtemps une affaire de décolonisation. Aujourd'hui, force est de constater que la question du Sahara a déjà vu son destin scellé d'une part par l'avis de la cour internationale de justice (CIJ) et d'autre part par les accords de Madrid. Lesquels ont définitivement mis fin à la colonisation du Sahara marocain".[74] C'était à l'automne 1975.

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[74]   Le quotidien marocain "Libération" du 06 octobre 2000, 3.

Du reste, pourrait-on prétendre que l'Etat français occupe illégalement l'Alsace-Lorraine après les avoir récupérées de l'Allemagne depuis novembre 1944?

Pourrait-on avancer que les Français colonisent aujourd'hui les Parisiens après les avoir affranchis de l'occupation nazie en août 1944? Bien sûr que non!

N'est-il donc pas absurde de penser que l'Etat marocain occupe illégalement les provinces de Sakia Al Hamra et Oued Addahab et que les Marocains colonisent aujourd'hui les Sahraouis, après les avoir libérés de l'Espagne coloniale?

En conclusion, le conflit du Sahara marocain est fondamentalement d'ordre géostratégique sur fond géopolitique entre le Maroc et l'Algérie, comme nous l'auront démontré le plus objectivement possible, les nombreux arguments développés tout le long de cette communication.

Dans un message adressé par le Roi Mohammed VI, au printemps 2018, au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies,[75] le Souverain rappelait sans ambages:

"L'Algérie a une responsabilité flagrante. C'est l'Algérie qui finance, c'est l'Algérie qui abrite, c'est l'Algérie qui arme, c'est l'Algérie qui soutient et qui apporte son soutien diplomatique au Polisario".[76]

Nous nous mentirions alors dans l'amoralité intellectuelle, en faisant la politique de l'autruche; ce qui ne rime d'ailleurs pas à notre mission d'historien. Et absurde de vouloir cacher le soleil de la vérité par le tamierdu faux, si telle était la tentation d'un corrompu.

Et donc dans ce conflit qui continue de déranger certes, mais sans inquiéter outre mesure la sécurité internationale, en raison notamment de son évolution politique positive depuis l'hiver 2020, force est de reconnaître que les mobiles de l'exploitation du "polisario", sont

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[75] Le Message Royal a été remis au Secrétaire général de l'ONU par le ministre des Affaires étrangères et de la coopération internationale, "Nasser Bourita, le mercredi 4 avril 2018. La Lettre Royale faisait suite aux développements gravissimes que connaissait la zone à l'Est du dispositif de défense au Sahara marocain".

[76] Voir: http://fr.le360.ma/politique/sahara-message-du-roi-mohammed-vi-au - secretaire-general -de-lonu-antonio-guterres-162688.

devenus des secrets de polichinelle. Un "polisario" pantin, fantoche et enchaîné –si l'on veut appeler un chat un chat– dont on connaît maintenant l'origine, l'histoire, le présent et surtout la mission forcée qui lui est assignée à l'encontre du Maroc. Tellement les éléments qui le démontrent sont légion qu'ils pullulent sur l'Internet, sous forme de preuves audiovisuelles, enrichissant encore des bibliographies de mémoires et de thèses dans la matière. Et les témoignages les plus convaincants seraient encore ceux des ex-cofondateurs et ex-dirigeants du polisario ayant fui l'Algérie vers le Maroc, dès les années 80/90. La liste est longue.

En somme, le grand défi qu'affronte le Maroc au Sahara "n'est pas une question de frontières, mais une question d'existence" disait SM le Roi Mohammed VI. Mieux encore: "la question du Sahara est une question de vie ou de mort" avait déclaré Son père, en 1976, à Washington, en portant l'insigne de la Marche Verte sur sa veste, devant le Président américain Jimmy Carter, au lendemain des batailles d'Amgala. C'est la médaille éternelle que lui a offert le peuple marocain à travers les 350 mille marcheurs, en guise de serment d'expirer son dernier souffle pour l'unité territoriale s'il le faut.

Mais il est une autre médaille d'équité que le Maroc a reçue des mêmes Etats-Unis, confirmant davantage son triomphe diplomatique sur son Sahara, et non une victoire militaire qu'il n'a d'ailleurs jamais cherchée à accomplir sur son voisin de l'Est en défendant ce territoire.

Cette médaille inappréciable, à la fois politique et morale, se traduit par la reconnaissance des Etats-Unis de la souveraineté du Maroc sur son Sahara, proclamée le 10 décembre 2020. Le Maroc en est sereinement fier dans l'humilité, convaincu que "la victoire n'est pas un concept militaire", parce qu'elle "n'appartient qu'au politique"[77] comme disait enfin Clausewitz.

Toutefois, cette date du 10 décembre signifie bien quelque chose. Tant de choses.

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[77] Ibid.

D'abord, parce que ce jour incarne le 45ème anniversaire de l'"entérinement de l'accord de Madrid sur le Sahara, par l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU, le 10 décembre 1975",[78] jour pour jour.

C'est également le 45ème anniversaire du vote unanime de l'Union Européenne (avec ses 9 membres) approuvant, le 10 décembre 1975, la résolution onusienne de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies entérinant l'accord de Madrid[79] du 14 novembre 1975.

Cette similarité de dates –célébrant l'anniversaire de l'approbation euro-onusienne de la décolonisation du Sahara marocain (ex-Sahara dit espagnol) d'une part, et la reconnaissance américaine de la marocanité de ce territoire d'autre part–[80] est-elle le fruit du hasard? Une pure coïncidence?

Je n'ai pas la naïveté de le croire, convaincu que les Américains sont autant soucieux de leurs anniversaires que de ceux de leurs amis, surtout lorsque ces commémorations portent sur des questions d'intérêts communs.[81] Et la reconnaissance de la souveraineté du Maroc sur le "Sahara occidental" en est un.

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[78] Abdelkhaleq Berramdane, *Le Sahara occidental, enjeu maghrébin*, (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1992), 49.

[79] En effet, les neuf Etats membres de la Communauté européenne (Union européenne) avaient voté tous pour le texte de résolution précité. Il s'agissait des pays suivants: La Belgique, la France, le Danemark, la République fédérale d'Allemagne (R.F.A.) l'Irlande, le Luxembourg, la Hollande (Pays-Bas), la Grande-Bretagne et l'Italie.

[80] A ces trois événements internationaux concomitants de 1975, correspondants au jour et au mois où fut proclamée la reconnaissance américaine officielle de la marocanité du Sahara en 2020, s'ajoute un autre fait historique international sur le même sujet (antérieur de plus de deux siècles et quatre décennies), incarné par la reconnaissance marocaine de l'existence et l'indépendance des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, officiellement exprimée, le 20 décembre 1777. Soit dans le même mois de la reconnaissance américaine de la marocanité de l'ex-"Sahara espagnol", juridiquement et pacifiquement décolonisé en vertu de l'accord de Madrid du 14 novembre 1975.

[81] D'ailleurs, sur la même question –en termes d'anniversaire en jour et en mois– l'on constate un léger décalage de temps (5 jours), entre la rédaction de la lettre du Sultan Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdellah (Mohammed III), datée du 20 décembre 1777, par laquelle le Maroc reconnaissait l'existence et l'indépendance des Etats-Unis d'Amérique d'une part; et la date du 15 décembre 2020, apposée sur la lettre, signée par l'Ambassadrice Représentante permanente des Etats-Unis auprès de l'ONU, Kelly Craft (accompagnant le texte de la Proclamation américaine de la marocanité du Sahara dit "occidental"), adressée à l'ONU, d'autre part.

Finalement, l'ex-Président américain Donald Trump, n'en rappelait-il pas simultanément, le 10 décembre 2020, à l'ONU et à l'Union Européenne, qu'elles avaient reconnu la marocanité du Sahara occidental 45 ans avant son pays?

Quelle leçon américaine! Rappelant également l'importance du respect de l'intégrité territoriale des nations après leur indépendance, surtout lorsque ces deux concepts –fatalement corrélés comme nous avons tenté de le démontrer– ont été concrètement réalisées, autant par la belligérance que la politique. Car cette importance-là, et cette corrélation-là, les Américains étaient les premiers à en connaître le prix et la souffrance dans l'histoire moderne aux 18e et 19e siècles, à travers leurs guerres d'indépendance et de sécession;[82] pour pouvoir en avertir les NationsUnies et l'Union européenne, dans leur 45ème anniversaire de validation de la décolonisation espagnole du Sahara marocain.

Car, rappelons-le, c'est bien par la violation de l'intégrité territoriale d'Etats voisins, en l'occurrence la Tchécoslovaquie et la Pologne, à la faveur du nazisme, que la Deuxième Guerre mondiale a éclaté. Dans ce sens, le célèbre écrivain franco-marocain, Tahar Benjelloun, prix Goncourt de littérature, soutiendra mon point de vue en écrivant, le 19 juillet dernier: "Après tout, c'est une simple question d'intégrité territoriale, une question qui avait d'ailleurs déclenché, au XXe siècle, les deux malheureuses guerres mondiales".[83]

Ainsi, le recouvrement de l'indépendance d'un pays n'est pas plus légitime à provoquer un conflit armé avec l'occupant, que ne puissent l'être le parachèvement ou la défense de l'intégrité territoriale contre un voisin hostilement hégémonique.

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[82] Bien que les guerres d'indépendance et de sécession ou de séparatisme américaines aux 18e et 19e siècles, fussent différentes de celles du Maroc aux 20e et 21e siècles, dans leurs contextes respectifs comme dans leurs causes spécifiques.

[83] Tahar Benjelloun, *La Diplomatie de la vérité* (la chronique de Tahar Benjelloun) injournal en ligne *Le 360*, édition du 19 juillet 2021.

CURRICULUM VITAE

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25. L'ALNK (ARMÉE DE LIBÉRATION NATIONALE DU KAMERUN) ET LE DEUXIEME ÉCHEC DE LA GUERRE D'INDÉPENDANCE AU CAMEROUN (1960-1971)

Daniel Abwa (Cameroon)

Introduction

Le Cameroun en Afrique au Sud du Sahara et l'Algérie en Afrique au Nord du Sahara sont les deux seuls territoires africains dans lesquels les nationalistes ont pris les armes pour revendiquer leurs indépendances face à la hideuse administration coloniale française. Si l'Armée de Libération Nationale algérienne (ALN) créée par le Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) a réussi à contraindre, par les armes, la France à accepter de proclamer, après négociations avec les nationalistes algériens du FLN, l'indépendance de l'Algérie, il n'en a pas été de même pour l'Armée de Libération Nationale du Kamerun (ALNK) créée par l'Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC). Cette armée de libération a connu deux échecs retentissants contre les forces armées françaises et franco-camerounaises malgré la lutte armée qu'elle a engagée contre ces colons et "néo-colons"[1]. Pour mieux appréhender le deuxième échec qui fait l'objet de notre communication, nous allons dans un premier temps examiner comment, à la naissance de l'ALNK, l'échec de la première guerre d'indépendance du Cameroun était déjà programmé (1959-1960). Ensuite, nous allons analyser, tour à tour, le pourquoi de cette

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[1] Les colons, pour perpétuer leur programme de colonisation en Afrique malgré les indépendances des pays africains, ont décidé de qualifier les périodes post indépendances de "néo-colonisation" comme pour dire que la colonisation n'est guère terminée. Les intellectuels africains se sont laissé prendre à ce piège en acceptant de considérer que les dirigeants africains sont des "néo-colons" en se fondant sur leurs relations avec l'ancien colonisateur. Si l'on peut comprendre qu'au lendemain des indépendances africaines sans rupture avec l'ancien colonisateur l'on a pu accepter cette dérive langagière, il est temps que les Africains rejettent purement et simplement cette qualification qui veut les maintenir dans la colonisation. L'Afrique d'aujourd'hui n'a aucune raison de continuer à accepter d[']être prise pour une « néocolonie » même si c'est le vœu des anciens colonisateurs qui, dans leurs rêves les plus fous, ne veulent voir l'Afrique que colonisée.

deuxième guerre d'indépendance (1960-1971), comment elle s'est faite et pourquoi elle a échoué.

Naissance de l'ALNK et échec déjà programmé de la Première Guerre d'Indépendance (1959-1960)

Créée le 10 avril 1948 dans la banlieue de la ville de Douala par douze nationalistes camerounais, l'Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) se donne pour mission prioritaire la revendication de la réunification des deux Cameroun séparés pendant la Grande Guerre et son indépendance. Ce programme suscite, d'une part, une très grande adhésion des Camerounais qui prennent en masse les cartes de ce parti politique et, d'autre part, une profonde hostilité de l'administration coloniale française qui s'emploie par tous les moyens à empêcher la réalisation de ce programme politique. Par des démarches aux contours nationalistes, l'UPC réussit en effet à déjouer toutes les dispositions prises par les Français pour enrayer la sympathie des Camerounais face à ses idéaux, particulièrement lorsque, triomphalement, le secrétaire général de ce parti, Ruben Um Nyobé, présenta les doléances des nationalistes camerounais au-devant de la Quatrième commission de l'assemblée générale de l'ONU à New York en 1952, 1953 et 1954.[2] Ces succès engrangés par l'UDC tant sur le plan territorial qu'international suscitent et accroissent l'agressivité de l'administration coloniale française qui s'investit désormais à rechercher la formule idoine qui lui permettrait de mettre définitivement un terme à l'activité de l'UPC au Cameroun. Les massacres de mai 1955 lui en donnent l'occasion car, de ce fait, un décret, qui interdit l'existence légale de l'UPC et de ses organes annexes sur l'ensemble du territoire camerounais sous tutelle française, est signé le 13 juillet 1955 par le président du conseil, Edgar Faure, en conseil de ministres.[3] Ce faisant, l'UPC n'est plus autorisée

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[2]   Pour en savoir plus, lire Daniel Abwa, *Cameroun, histoire d'un nationalisme 1884-1961* (hereafter: *Cameroun, histoire*), (Yaoundé: Editions Clé, 2010), 322-324.

[3]   Lire entre autres à ce sujet, Thomas Deltombe, Manuel Domergue, Jacob Tatsitsa, *Kamerun! Une guerre cachée aux origines de la françafrique 1948-1971* (hereafter: *Kamerun! Une guerre*), (Yaoundé: Editions Ifrikya, 2012), 168-186; lire aussi Daniel Abwa, *Commissaires et hauts-commissaires de la France au Cameroun. Ces hommes qui ont façonné politiquement le Cameroun*, deuxième édition, (Yaoundé: PUY et PUCAC, 2000), 356-373; Abel Eyinga, *L'UPC, une révolution manquée*, (Paris: Editions Chaka, 1991), 77-84.

d'exercer publiquement et légalement ses activités politiques au Cameroun sous administration française. Par ailleurs, par une manœuvre grossière des autorités judiciaires et administratives françaises, son secrétaire général, le Mpodol Ruben Um Nyobé, menacé d'emprisonnement, est obligé de se retirer dans son Boumnyebel natal où, dans la clandestinité, il continue l'œuvre de revendication de la réunification et de l'indépendance du Cameroun. Forcée de ce fait à la clandestinité, l'UPC, au cours d'une conférence convoquée par Um Nyobé et tenue à Makaï les 2 et 3 décembre 1956, adopte un programme en 6 points dans lequel le 4è point recommande la création d'une armée de libération nationale dénommée CNO (Comité National d'Organisation) devant revendiquer et obtenir par les armes, comme c'était déjà le cas en Algérie et en Indochine, l'indépendance et la réunification des deux Cameroun.[4] Ainsi commence la première guerre d'indépendance au Cameroun en l'absence de l'ALNK car elle a été d'abord menée par le CNO (1956-1958) sous la houlette de Ruben Um Nyobé avec pour épicentre le pays bassa ; cette première phase connaît un profond ralentissement avec l'assassinat de Ruben Um Nyobéle 13 septembre 1958. Pierre Messmer, qui a été haut-commissaire au Cameroun au début de cette première guerre d'indépendance, croit effectivement que cet assassinat marque le début de la fin de cette quête par les armes de l'indépendance quand il déclare : "La fin de la rébellion suivra de peu la mort d'Um Nyobé, le 13 septembre 1968 […]".[5] Messmer se trompe lourdement car, bien avant l'assassinat de Ruben Um Nyobé, les nationalistes camerounais avaient déjà engagé, une autre phase de cette première guerre d'indépendance avec pour épicentre le pays bamiléké dans l'Ouest-Cameroun.

Il s'agit de la phase d'une armée de libération nationale dénommée Sinistre de la Défense Nationale du Kamerun (SDNK) qui précède elle aussi l'ALNK. Sa création, le 10 octobre 1957 dans le quartier Nka de la chefferie de Baham, est l'œuvre de Martin Singap qui profite des conditions d'insurrection et d'insécurité suscitées par l'arrestation, la

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destitution et l'exil du jeune chef traditionnel de Baham, Pierre Kamdem Ninyim, fraîchement revenu de France où il faisait ses études et qui manifestait ostensiblement son activisme pro UPC, parti politique pourtant officiellement dissout. Il est, en effet, condamné, non pour activité nationaliste, mais pour "reconstitution de parti dissout, coups et blessures, détention d'armes, faux et usages de faux".[6] L'activité qu'entreprend Martin Singap, le 10 décembre 1957 lui avait été assignée par les leaders politiques de l'UPC car, lors du deuxième congrès de la jeunesse démocratique camerounaise (JDC) tenu à Kumba, au Cameroun britannique, du 30 novembre au 3 décembre 1956, il avait été chargé

> De l'organisation de la région bamiléké en s'inspirant, comme le CNO, du programme en 6 points et la résolution du 17 mai 1955. Pour ce faire, il (devait) s'occuper de l'éducation politique des masses et favoriser la création des maquis dans la région bamiléké. Il (devait) par ailleurs rendre compte au Bureau du Comité Directeur (BCD) en vertu de l'article 16 des statuts organiques de l'UPC.[7]

L'organisation du SDNK mise en place par Martin Singap n'a cependant pas une coordination aussi centralisée et stricte que celle du CNO car la configuration du pays bamiléké l'oblige à laisser à ses lieutenants une plus grande autonomie d'actions. C'est ce qui fait dire aux auteurs de *Kamerun! Une guerre cachée…* que "L'objectif du SDNK est moins militaire que psychologique. Il consiste à semer la terreur parmi les collaborateurs de l'administration et à rallier à sa cause les populations".[8] Une telle souplesse dans l'organisation ne pouvait pas empêcher des conflits entre les principaux leaders des troupes de SDNK et surtout des bavures dont la plus retentissante qui a suscité beaucoup d'émois a été l'assassinat, le 13 décembre 1957, du jeune député bamiléké, Samuel Wanko, "ancien étudiant à Paris, ingénieur des Ponts et Chaussées, colistier du chef Bandjoun Joseph Kamga, […] présenté comme un « nationaliste modéré » et prometteur".[9] Cet

6   Abwa, *Cameroun, histoire*, op.cit., 280-286; F.M. Kenné, *Les grands chefs de l'insurrection armée en pays bamiléké et leurs activités de 1955 à 1971*, thèse de doctorat/Ph.D, (Université de Yaoundé I, 2007), 19-29.
7   Abwa, *Cameroun, histoire*, op.cit., 289.
8   Deltombe et al, *Kamerun! Une guerre*, op.cit., 229.
9   Ibid., 236.

assassinat sonne le glas, pendant un certain temps (jusqu'au mois d'avril 1958), de la présence des troupes de cette armée de libération en pays bamiléké car, « Traqués, Pierre Simo (capitaine général du SDNK) et ses troupes se réfugient dès lors au Cameroun britannique voisin, en compagnie de Martin Singap, pour reconstituer leur organisation et recruter au calme au cours des premiers mois de 1958 ».[10]

La reprise des activités du SDNK en région bamiléké se fait dans un climat d'indiscipline caractérisée qui amène Martin Singap son bâtisseur à jeter l'éponge puisqu'il se voit réduit à n'être considéré que comme un simple « chef de bande parmi tant d'autres ».[11] Cette situation qui l'indispose profondément l'oblige à s'exfiltrer du Cameroun pour se rendre à Conakry, en Guinée où se trouvent en exil ses commanditaires du Bureau du Comité Directeur de l'UPC. Il leur rend compte de la situation catastrophique qui prévaut au Cameroun avec le SDNK et demande la conduite à tenir. Il lui est instruit en retour de procéder à la dissolution du SDNK et à son remplacement par une structure armée nouvelle, l'Armée de Libération Nationale du Kamerun (ALNK), au rétablissement de l'unité des troupes sous son autorité restaurée puisqu'il est nommé commandant suprême de cette nouvelle armée et à galvaniser ses troupes pour l'intensification de la guerre d'indépendance qui devrait devenir totale sur l'ensemble du territoire camerounais. Dès qu'il revient au Cameroun, Martin Singap s'emploie *à mettre* promptement *à exécution les directives du Bureau du Comité Directeur* :

> Dès son retour au Cameroun, –écrit Daniel Abwa– Singap Martin convoque une importante réunion le 31 mai 1959 rassemblant près de Nkongsamba dans le Moungo la plupart des chefs militaires de l'ancien Sinistre et leur annonce la naissance de la nouvelle branche militaire et l'impératif de l'unité des troupes sous son commandement. Les objectifs de l'ALNK sont les mêmes que ceux du Sinistre et du CNO à savoir l'accession à l'indépendance et la réunification des deux Cameroun avec

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[10] Ibid., 230-231.
[11] Jean Keutcha, *Un pays, des hommes, un continent*, (Paris: Les Presses du Management, 1991), 48. Pour une lecture plus approfondie de l'indiscipline dans le SDNK entre 1958 et 1959, consulter entre autres Deltombe et al, *Kamerun! Une guerre*, op.cit., 337-340 et Abwa, *Cameroun, histoire*, op.cit., 297-302.

*cependant une importante variante compte tenu de l'évolution de la
situation politique au Cameroun français.*[12]

La naissance de l'ALNK le 31 mai 1959 et ses objectifs avoués
semblent totalement anachroniques puisque le principe de l'accession
à l'indépendance du Cameroun sous administration française, à la
demande des parlementaires camerounais et des autorités françaises,
est déjà accepté par l'ONU, consacrant, par ce fait même, l'échec de la
quête de l'indépendance par les armes. Deux mois plus tôt, en effet, le
13 mars 1959, la Quatrième commission de l'assemblée générale de
l'ONU avait, par 56 voix pour contre O voix contre et 23 abstentions,
voté une résolution qui stipule que le Cameroun doit accéder à
l'indépendance le 1er janvier 1960 sans organisation préalable de
nouvelles élections comme le réclamait l'UPC et que ce territoire est
autorisé à devenir membre de l'ONU au lendemain de son
indépendance. [13] La cause semble par conséquent définitivement
entendue. Pourtant, l'ALNK et le Bureau directeur de l'UPC persistent
à revendiquer « l'indépendance du Cameroun et sa réunification » tel
qu'il est annoncé dans la déclaration du 19 juin 1959 que rapporte
Onana Mfegue:

> *Le 19 juin 1959, le Bureau directeur de l'UPC exilé au Caire annonce
> son programme révolutionnaire en quatre points : poursuivre la
> révolution ; empêcher l'indépendance sans élections préalables ; obtenir
> qu'aucun Etat ne signe de traité avec le pouvoir en place à Yaoundé ;
> dissuader les investisseurs.*[14]

N'ayant pas réussi à empêcher la proclamation de l'indépendance,
l'ALNK engage, pour ce faire, dès le 1er janvier 1960, "la deuxième
guerre d'indépendance du Cameroun" qui dure 11 ans (1960-1971).
Comment expliquer cette persistance ?

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[12]   Archives Provinciales de Bafoussam (hereafter: APB) 1 AC 220, ALNK, activités
subversives 1959, cité par Abwa, *Cameroun, histoire,* op.cit., 302-303.
[13]   *Documents officielles de l'Assemblée générale, IVème Commission, 13ème session, point 13
de l'ordre du jour;* lire également Daniel Abwa, *André-Marie Mbida, premier
premierministre camerounais (1917-1980),* (Paris: l' Harmattan, 1993), 164-221; Abel
Eyenga, *Introduction à la politique camerounaise,* (Paris: l'Harmattan, 1984), 235-247.
[14]   Cité par André-Hubert Onana Mfegue, « L'Armée de libération nationale
kamerounaise et sa stratégie 1959-1970 », *Outre-Mers* 93(348-349) (2005), 257.

ALNK et la Deuxième Guerre d'Indépendance du Cameroun (1960-1971) : pourquoi ?

Deux raisons nous semblent essentielles pour pouvoir expliquer pourquoi l'ALNK persiste dans sa décision d'entreprendre une nouvelle guerre d'indépendance du Cameroun alors que ce pays a proclamé et fêté son indépendance le 1er janvier 1960 en présence des invités venus de par le monde. D'abord parce qu'elle est intimement persuadée que l'indépendance obtenue n'en est vraiment pas une car elle est totalement fictive et essentiellement formelle dont le but est de brouiller les cartes afin que la France continue son œuvre de colonisation du Cameroun. Ensuite parce que l'ALNK est convaincue de sa capacité à atteindre ses objectifs tels que présenté dans l'article 2 de ses statuts :

> L'ALNK est un instrument qui permettra au peuple de poursuivre sa lutte révolutionnaire contre l'impérialisme franco-britannique et ses alliés américains et ouest-allemands jusqu'à l'aboutissement de ses objectifs politiques et d'instaurer une fois la victoire acquise un régime de démocratie nouvelle qui assurera le bien-être de la nation et de son peuple.[15]

Quelques jours avant la fête de l'indépendance, le 29 décembre 1959 plus précisément, Félix-Roland Moumié, président de l'UPC, Abel Kingué et Ernest Ouandié vice-présidents de ce parti proclament, dans leur exil de Conakry, leur conviction du caractère fictif de l'indépendance annoncée dans la déclaration suivante :

> L'indépendance actuelle ne répond nullement aux objectifs poursuivis par l'UPC dès sa naissance. A partir du 1er janvier, le Kamerun jouira d'une indépendance nominale. Loin d'être un instrument indispensable au plein épanouissement du peuple, elle sera au contraire le carcan au moyen duquel les agents du colonialisme et de l'impérialisme continueront à le tenir prisonnier dans son propre pays.[16]

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[15] Service historique de l'armée de terre (hereafter: SHAT), 6H 241, Rébellion camerounaise, rapport des opérations 1957-1962.

[16] Cité par Christian-Tobie Kuoh, *Mon témoignage. Le Cameroun de l'indépendance (1958-1970)*, (Paris: Karthala, 1990), 99.

A la vérité, l'UPC n'est pas la seule à reconnaître le caractère fictif de l'indépendance du Cameroun sous administration française car, les autorités françaises elles – mêmes en sont également intimement convaincues, comme le confirme si bien l'ancien haut-commissaire Pierre Messmer :

> *Et la décolonisation du Cameroun sera aussi atypique que sa colonisation. La France accordera l'indépendance à ceux qui la réclamaient le moins, après avoir éliminé politiquement et militairement ceux qui la réclamaient avec le plus d'intransigeance ; dans les régions bassa et bamiléké, l'ordre n'est pas encore complètement rétabli le 1er janvier 1960, lorsque le Cameroun, sous administration française devient indépendant ; à cette date, les frontières du Cameroun ne sont pas définitivement fixées, la question de la réunification n'étant pas tranchée [...].*[17]

L'ambassadeur de France au Cameroun, Jean-Pierre Bénard, utilise quant à lui le vocable de « façade » pour qualifier la réalité de l'indépendance du Cameroun : « Derrière une façade camerounaise, – écrit-il– l'édifice du régime continue de dépendre du soutien et de l'aide de la France [...] L'indépendance du Cameroun ne sera qu'une façade aussi longtemps que l'aide extérieure demeurera le facteur essentiel de sa vie économique ».[18]

Si les déclarations ci-dessus répertoriées témoignent à suffisance que l'UPC et son armée de libération avaient bien raison de bouder l'indépendance accordée par les Français au Cameroun sous leur tutelle, la présence des militaires français sur les champs de bataille, le double jeu de certains d'entre eux, le comportement arrogant des administrateurs et autres citoyens français à l'endroit des Camerounais prétendument indépendants dans leur pays renforcent le caractère nominal de l'indépendance obtenue. Des exemples sont nombreux qui justifient cette vérité et nous allons en citer quelques-uns pour la soutenir.

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[17]   Messmer, *Les Blancs*, op.cit., 115.
[18]   Centre d'Accueil et de Recherche des Archives Nationales (hereafter: CARAN) Paris, FPU 466, Rapports de Jean-Pierre Bénard au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du 26 janvier 1962 et du 2 octobre 1962.

Au sujet de l'omniprésence des militaires français au Cameroun après la proclamation de l'indépendance le 1er janvier 1960, nous laissons la parole à Monsieur Sadou Daoudou qui, sans discontinuité, a été ministre des forces armées camerounaises de 1961 à 1980. Dans une série d'entretiens qu'il a eus avec Daniel Abwa,[19] il confirme et justifie dans l'un d'eux la présence des militaires français au Cameroun après le 1er janvier 1960 :

> Il y avait deux tenues des Forces armées au Cameroun, en effet. Les Français qui portaient des tenues camerounaises étaient des conseillers techniques qui aidaient à la formation des Camerounais. Les unités françaises portaient leur tenue et elles étaient, quant à elles, commandées par leur Général [20] [...] *La présence d'une Armée française au Cameroun postindépendance était une nécessité car, le Cameroun n'avait pas encore les moyens de faire face aux différentes formes de menaces dont je vous ai déjà parlé. Par ailleurs, la rébellion était soutenue au Cameroun par les pays communistes : Chine, Union Soviétique, Tchécoslovaquie, etc...* [...].[21]

C'est encore par le ministre Sadou Daoudou que nous avons un témoignage du double jeu de certains militaires français en service au Cameroun :

> Tous les militaires français qui étaient au Cameroun n'étaient pas pour la fin de la rébellion. Pour ceux-là en effet, la fin de la rébellion signifiait le départ de la France du Cameroun et bien sûr leur rapatriement. Ce devait aussi être la perte des avantages qui leur étaient alloués et la perte de la considération dont ils étaient l'objet dans ce territoire [...] Les militaires français appartenant à cette catégorie jouaient un double jeu: ils faisaient semblant d'être avec nous alors qu'ils aidaient la rébellion en lui fournissant armes, munitions et

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[19] Daniel Abwa, *Sadou Daoudou parle de l'armée camerounaise et…1961-1980* (hereafter: *Sadou Daoudou*), 2ème édition, (Yaoundé: PUCAC, 2017).
[20] Il s'agit du général Max Briand, qui a déjà fait ses preuves en Algérie et que l" on présente comme un militaire ayant "un goût très prononcé pour le Travail de pacification" cf. Deltombe et al., *Kamerun! Une guerre*, op.cit., 397-399.
[21] Abwa, *Sadou Daoudou*, op.cit., 62. C'est nous qui soulignons.

renseignements. Ceci a eu des conséquences sur les rapports humains entre Français et Camerounais [...].[22]

Ces conflits entre militaires camerounais et français ne se limitaient pas aux seuls hommes de troupes. Même les officiers supérieurs y étaient confrontés. C'est le cas de cet incident survenu le 7 novembre 1963 lors d'une réunion de travail présidée à Nkongsamba par le Ministre Sadou Daoudou et rapporté avec morgue et mépris par le colonel Jean Victor Blanc[23] dans "une fiche sur le moral des cadres français mis à la disposition du gouvernement camerounais". Il écrit :

> *Un officier camerounais, le capitaine Nganso Sunji, de **formation militaire hâtive**, récemment rentré de Métropole, **s'en est pris avec une certaine hargne et une certaine mauvaise foi à des cadres français ».** Dans le document annexé à cette fiche, le colonel Blanc précise que le capitaine Nganso avait au cours de son exposé **accusé le commandant Foulquier, son prédécesseur de ne lui avoir laissé aucune consigne au moment où il lui passa le commandement; qu'il avait critiqué l'insuffisance et l'imprécision des ordres du chef de bataillon Thibaudeau commandant le secteur militaire du littoral » ; « qu'il avait taxé de fantaisistes les renseignements fournis par le lieutenant Marsot, l'officier de renseignements du secteur militaire du littoral » et « qu'en matière de renseignements, le secteur militaire du Littoral n'avait qu'un but, faire croire que la situation était mauvaise dans le Moungo pour lui nuire » ; que le bilan de ses résultats à la tête du quartier de Nkongsamba pour la période du 25 septembre au 6 novembre 1963 était de loin meilleur que celui obtenu par son prédécesseur Foulquier pour la période du 15 mars au 1er septembre [...].[24]*

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[22] Ibid., 67. L'auteur compléta cette information par l'exemple du lieutenant Vin qui, du fait de ce double jeu qui entraîna le massacre des élèves gendarmes camerounais à Alati, un village situé entre Djoum et la frontière du Congo, fut chassé du Cameroun avec l'assentiment des officiers français.

[23] CARAN, FPU, 467, D'après une note de François Quirielle du août 1961, le colonel Jean-Victor Blanc était l'éminence grise de l'armée française au Cameroun, à la fois chef de la section Forces armées de la mission française et chef de l'état-major de l'armée camerounaise ;

[24] SHAT, 6H 270, Fiche sur le moral des cadres français mis à la disposition du gouvernement camerounais du 15 mai 1963. C'est nous qui soulignons.

Quel qu'en soit le cas, pour les nationalistes de l'UPC, la présence des unités militaires françaises au Cameroun après l'indépendance proclamée le 1er janvier 1960 n'avait qu'une seule signification : c'était une armée d'occupation qu'il fallait combattre et chasser afin que le Cameroun devienne effectivement indépendant et jouisse véritablement de sa souveraineté.

Un autre exemple qui consacre quant à lui l'arrogance du personnel administratif français encore en activité au Cameroun après le 1er janvier 1960 est celui qui se rapporte à une mésaventure vécue par Eugène Wonyu le 20 octobre 1961 alors qu'il exerçait les fonctions de ministre de l'information et qu'il relate dans ses mémoires :

> Un jour, un chef de service de l'information –camerounais– fut battu – je dis bien battu– par un certain Doniau et cela, sans raisons. Invité par téléphone à s'expliquer dans mon bureau sur la plainte de ce Camerounais, M. Doniau dit textuellement qu'il ne reconnaissait pas de ministre de l'information et que, d'ailleurs, M. Ahidjo était son ami au temps des gouverneurs ; il n'avait donc pas de comptes à rendre au petit ministre camerounais que j'étais.[25]

Le caractère fictif de l'indépendance du Cameroun étant ainsi démontré et justifiant que l'UPC la rejette, cela est-il suffisant pour donner raison à l'ALNK dans sa volonté d'engager une deuxième guerre d'indépendance compte tenu du rapport de forces qui ne lui est guère favorable et qui lui a fait perdre la première guerre d'indépendance? Cette question, l'UPC et l'ALNK ne se la posent pas puisqu'elles sont convaincues de leur capacité à mener à bien cette nouvelle guerre. Cette conviction vient d'abord du fait que cette armée est persuadée qu'elle a pris toutes les dispositions

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[25] Cité par Deltombe et al., *Kamerun! Une guerre*, op.cit., 505. Il s'agit d'un ancien militant de l'UPC devenu ministre de l'information après sa nomination le 20 octobre 1961 et qui ne fit pas long feu à ce poste. Il fut ahuri de constater que la réalité du pouvoir se trouvait aux mains des Français ; "avant d'arriver au ministère, je n'avais aucune idée de notre dépendance vis-à-vis de l'extérieur, car tout Français qui se trouvait alors dans nos bureaux ministériels était un véritable ministre, qu'il soit « conseiller » ou autre. Chacun de nos gestes, de nos propos était rapporté à l'ambassade de France, surtout du temps de Jean-Pierre Bénard. Celui-ci était en fait le véritable président du Cameroun […]" Écrit-il dans ses mémoires. Cf. Eugène Wonyu, *De l'UPC à l'UC, témoignage à l'aube de l'indépendance (1953-1961)*, (Paris: l'Harmattan 1980), 90.

règlementaires nécessaires pour se débarrasser de tous les démons ayant occasionné sa défaite lors de la première guerre d'indépendance. Il en est ainsi des dispositions prises pour discipliner et galvaniser ses troupes en adoptant comme devise « Vaincre ou mourir », et en se dotant d'un code de conduite intitulé « les lois de 13 articles ». Par ailleurs, pour fidéliser ses troupes, elle fait prêter serment à chacun de ses membres au moment de son engagement :

> Tout combattant, pendant son engagement, doit prêter serment devant son chef de bataillon ou devant un groupe de combattants, en répétant ces mots : je jure de lutter jusqu'à ce que l'UPC, l'UDEFEC, le JDC et l'ALNK soient reconnus dans l'ensemble du pays et même par les valets de nos ennemis d'aujourd'hui comme les mouvements libérateurs du Kamerun. Je jure de lutter jusqu'à ma dernière goutte de sang pour la Libération de ma grosse patrie le Kamerun.[26]

En plus, pour imposer la permanence de l'unicité de commandement militaire dont l'éclatement avait fait la faiblesse du SDNK, elle prit, le 15 septembre 1961, une décision comprenant plusieurs articles dont l'article 26 menace de dénonciation tout contrevenant à cette unité. Cet article dit en effet ceci :

> Toute organisation militaire ou paramilitaire qui continuera à se couvrir du manteau de l'UPC et de son armée pour commettre les actes et exactions […] après publication de cette décision, sera considérée comme servant la contre-révolution. Ses dirigeants seront dénoncés à la population à toutes fins utiles.[27]

Toujours sur le plan militaire, en s'inspirant de la stratégie adoptée par l'ALN algérienne pour plus d'efficacité, l'ALNK renouvelle ses stratégies et ses moyens d'action. C'est bien ce qui ressort des notes générales des services de renseignements français que paraphrase Daniel Abwa en ces termes :

> Elle (ALNK) ne se contente plus seulement de quelques attentats et assassinats contre les valets du colonialisme, elle cherche désormais à « anéantir les forces ennemies sur notre territoire ; reconquérir la totalité du Pays ; écraser complètement la volonté d'agression de l'ennemi ».

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[26]   APB 1 AC 220, ALNK, activités subversives 1959.

[27]   SHAT 6H 241, Rébellion camerounaise, op.cit.

> *Pour ce faire, il faut s'attaquer directement aux biens meubles et immeubles de l'usurpateur sur l'ensemble du territoire camerounais pour donner à ces actions leur caractère national, aux personnes physiques et morales qui le représentent et enfin à ceux des Camerounais qui leur apportent leur concours.[28]*

Pour gagner cette nouvelle guerre, l'UPC et l'ALNK savaient pouvoir compter sur le soutien des pays de l'Est, en l'occurrence la Chine, l'Union soviétique, la Tchécoslovaquie qui leurs fournissaient en armes et qui recevaient leurs militants en stages de formation à la guérilla, la guerre froide aidant. Elles avaient aussi le concours de certains pays africains déjà indépendants, l'Egypte, le Ghana, la Guinée qui avaient accordé l'exil aux membres du Bureau du Comité Directeur et mettaient à la disposition des militants paramilitaires de l'UPC des centres d'entraînement pour acquérir des techniques de la guerre asymétrique. Après son indépendance, l'Algérie s'était jointe à ce trio. Ces efforts louables et forts éloquents pour une potentielle victoire espérée, ne vont cependant pas peser lourds devant de nombreux handicaps qui vont consacrer, une fois de plus, l'échec de l'ALNK et de l'UPC dans la quête d'une deuxième guerre d'indépendance du Cameroun par les armes.

ALNK et l'échec de la Deuxième Guerre d'Indépendance du Cameroun (1960-1971)

Engagée dès le 1er janvier 1960, jour de la proclamation de l'indépendance du Cameroun sous administration française, la deuxième guerre d'indépendance orchestrée par l'ALNK et qui dure 11 ans (1960-1971) ne connaît pas la victoire escomptée par les nationalistes camerounais. Trois faisceaux d'éléments expliquent les raisons du nouvel l'échec de l'ALNK notamment ceux liés au fonctionnement de l'UPC et de l'ALNK, à la riposte de l'armée franco-camerounaise et au silence des Occidentaux.

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[28]   SHAT 6H 264, dossier 3, Pour mieux comprendre la rébellion. Notes générales 1956-1961, 1. Cité par, Abwa, *Cameroun, histoire,* op.cit., 303-304.

Eléments liés au fonctionnement de l'UPC et de l'ALNK

Situation de l'UPC de l'intérieur du Cameroun

Au lendemain de la proclamation de l'indépendance du Cameroun, on assiste d'une part à la divergence de vues entre les militants de l'UPC ayant décidé de se rallier tout en gardant leur spécificité Upéciste et ceux de l'ALNK engagés dans la deuxième guerre d'indépendance. D'autre part les divergences idéologiques entre les leaders poursuivant la guerre de libération nationale avec l'ALNK.

   L'UPC avait demandé des élections préalables avant l'indépendance, et celles-ci n'ont pas eu lieu ; par contre, l'ONU avait demandé que ces élections aient lieu immédiatement après la proclamation de l'indépendance. Ahmadou Ahidjo les a organisées en avril 1960 après avoir auparavant déclaré une amnistie partielle de l'UPC sur le territoire camerounais et sa légalisation le 25 février 1960 afin de permettre aux militants de l'UPC légale, adeptes de la réconciliation nationale, d'y prendre part. Parmi ceux qui y participent et sont élus à l'assemblée législative du Cameroun, il y a Théodore Mayi Matip qui se présente comme le président de la jeunesse démocratique du Cameroun (JDC). Devant la 940ème séance de la Quatrième commission des Nations Unies, il défend la position de l'UPC légale en ces termes :

> *Plébiscité en avril dernier par les départements de la Sanaga-Maritime et du Nyong-et-kéllé, je suis député de l'opposition à l'Assemblée Législative et par conséquent je représente l'opinion des nationalistes qui, dans l'intérêt national, dans l'intérêt supérieur du peuple et de la jeunesse du Cameroun, désapprouvent et la politique de l'actuel Gouvernement et la politique actuelle des animateurs d'une inopportune action armée dans les circonstances actuelles. Fidèle à la mémoire et au testament de Um Nyobé, je suis sa ligne et applique dans mon pays avec un succès admirable la politique de conciliation et de réconciliation pour l'unité et l'indépendance nationales dont la primeur d'expression et le tracé du processus reviennent à notre grand chef national, je nomme : l'immortel Ruben Um Nyobé […]. Si donc nous parlons de réconciliation aujourd'hui et que nous l'appliquons comme la seule tâche correspondante à l'actuelle conjoncture, c'est parce que nous sommes des révolutionnaires comme nous l'avons*

> *démontré dans nos principes et que la réconciliation, véritable*
> *révolution, est la seule politique d'unité nationale et de limitation de*
> *dégâts [...]. Mais la réconciliation n'implique pas le droit de maintenir*
> *effrontément, dans l'illégalité, les mouvements nationaux qui ont lutté*
> *depuis toujours pour cette indépendance qui nous attend le 1er janvier*
> *1960 [...].La réconciliation n'est pas non plus la liberté, pour l'UPC,*
> *d'entretenir la haine et le désordre, le tout couronné par le sang et le*
> *chantage. La réconciliation, c'est la table ronde de toutes les tendances*
> *politiques, c'est l'esprit de concessions non compromettantes aux*
> *principes dans l'intérêt de la nation [...].*[29]

Ainsi, avec Mayi Matip, à l'intérieur du Cameroun, il existe désormais deux UPC: une légale, qui se réclame du Mpodol Ruben Um Nyobé, –et pas des autres leaders de l'UPC en exil– qui accepte des concessions pour une réconciliation nationale et l'autre, celle de l'ALNK et des leaders réfugiés à l'extérieur, qui veulent obtenir une indépendance différente de celle en vigueur. Cette division de l'UPC affaiblit tant l'UPC légale que l'ALNK car la loi sur la subversion votée en mars 1962 réduit considérablement la marge de manœuvre de la première, comme on a pu constater l'impuissance de ce parti « légalisé » lorsqu'en début janvier 1962, les soldats du régime Ahidjo dispersent à coups de baïonnettes les Upécistes au premier congrès de leur parti depuis sa réhabilitation.[30] Cet affaiblissement autorise aussi le gouvernement camerounais à utiliser, sans aucune justification, toutes sortes d'actes qu'il peut se permettre contre des « Camerounais subversifs et rebelles ».

Situation de l'ALNK et des leaders de l'UPC en exil

En ce qui concerne les partisans de la lutte armée, dont les principaux leaders étaient réfugiés hors du Cameroun avec néanmoins des combattants à l'intérieur du Cameroun, par leurs choix idéologiques différents, ils s'isolent les uns des autres, chacun menant sa part de

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[29] Cité par, Anonyme, "Constante politique d'unité pratiquée par Ruben Um Nyobé" Licence eden-13-160856-LIQ429550 accordée le 03 novembre 2020 à Shannon Thomson, 4, 5, 9 10.

[30] Daniel Abwa, *Ni Anglophones, ni Francophones au Cameroun : tous des Camerounais!! Essai d'analyse historique en hommage au regretté Pr. M. Z. Njeuma*, (Yaoundé: les Editions le Kilimandjaro, 2015), 83.

guerre sans associer les autres.Onana Mfege décrit très bien les effets négatifs de cette divergence en ces termes :

> Le conflit idéologique qui oppose la Chine et l'URSS entraîne en 1960-1961, la division de l'UPC en deux tendances rivales : une tendance prochinoise, elle-même en proie au désordre, et une tendance prosoviétique. Cette situation s'accentue après la mort du leader du parti, Félix Moumié, en novembre 1960 à Genève. Les divergences survenues au sein du comité directeur à propos de sa succession aboutissent au bicéphalisme de la présidence. Abel Kingue et Ernest Ouandié, respectivement premier vice-président et second vice-président, se partagent le parti. Le premier s'installe à Accra au Ghana où il est rejoint par Tchapchet, Michel Ndôh et Woungly Massaga, tandis que l'autre regagne les montagnes du Mungo en août 1961 pour poursuivre la lutte jusqu'à son arrestation en 1970.[31]

On peut distinguer ainsi trois phases de la guerre armée animée par des leaders différents avec leurs partisans à l'exclusion des partisans des autres leaders: la phase Roland-Félix Moumié-Martin Singap (1959-1961), la phase du Comité révolutionnaire d'Ernest Ouandié-Abel Kingue (1961-1971) et la phase du 2ème front de René Jacques Ngouo Woungly Massaga - Castor Ossende Afana (1964-1966).

La Phase Moumié-Singap

Martin Singap, ayant reçu l'ordre de créer l'Armée de libération nationale du Kamerun et de réorganiser les maquis en pays bamiléké, resta en relation permanente avec le président de l'UPC qui sillonnait le monde à la recherche des soutiens à la lutte menée contre le colonisateur français au Cameroun. C'est la période au cours de laquelle on assiste à une forte offensive de l'ALNK contre l'armée franco-camerounaise car, s'inspirant de l'exemple algérien, c'est la guerre totale par Martin Singap sur le terrain militaire et Félix-Roland Moumié sur le plan diplomatique :

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[31] Onana Mfege, « L'Armée de libération nationale kamerounaise et sa stratégie 1959-1970 », 5-6. Voir aussi ANY (Archives Nationales Yaoundé), 1AA 450 (17), Rébellion, recrudescences 1961; Georges Chaffard, *Les carnets secrets de la décolonisation*, tome 2, (Paris: Calman-Levy, 1967), 403-410; Philippe Gaillard, *Le Cameroun*, tome 2, (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1989), 21.

> *Pour Moumié, plus que jamais inspiré par le modèle algérien, il est nécessaire de relancer l'offensive et de ne plus faire de quartier. La révolution doit être „„totale"": politique et militaire certes, mais également économique, médiatique, culturelle. Comme l'avaient fait dès le départ les Algériens du FLN et contrairement à ce qu'avait décidé Um Nyobé, il faut désormais s'attaquer directement aux Européens. Comme les Algériens, il faut lancer l'assaut au cœur des villes, briser les infrastructures économiques, obliger les Camerounais à prendre parti.[32]*

Cette stratégie est effectivement mise en application et on assiste à une recrudescence de la violence avec des attentats, des assassinats, des pillages multiples dans le Wouri, principalement dans la ville de Douala et ses environs, dans les exploitations agricoles des Européens dans le Moungo, et en pays bamiléké où on a fait croire aux combattants qu'ils pourront s'approprier les biens des Blancs notamment leurs plantations de café et de banane. On s'attaque, également à de nombreux Camerounais considérés comme des « collabos ». Sur le plan diplomatique, Moumié multiplie des déclarations hostiles au régime au pouvoir à Yaoundé, comme celle du mois de février 1960 où il formule ses propositions pour la solution du problème camerounais et indique les quatre conditions qui devraient permettre le retour à la légalité au Cameroun de sa branche de l'UPC.[33] Cette montée de la violence du côté de l'ALNK de Singap et Moumié inquiète profondément les autorités françaises dès l'entame de cette offensive, comme en témoigne cette alarme dans un rapport militaire en décembre 1959, lancée par Mathieu Rigouste :

> *Les rebelles gagnent du terrain et étendent leur zone d'action… La situation précédemment signalée comme sans cesse s'aggravant, devient inquiétante. Les forces de maintien de l'ordre sont insuffisantes et, malgré les efforts du personnel, inefficaces pour parer à une telle situation.[34]*

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[32] Deltombe et al., *Kamerun! Une guerre*, op.cit., 341.

[33] Pour en savoir plus, lire, Elie Claude Ndjitoyap Ndam, *Félix-Roland Moumié 19251960 itinéraire fulgurant d'un grand nationaliste*, (Yaoundé : Editions CLE, 2021), 114-115.

[34] Mathieu Rigouste, *L'ennemi intérieur. La généalogie coloniale et militaire de l'ordre sécuritaire dans la France contemporaine*, (Paris : La Découverte, 2009), 51 cité par

Face à cette montée fulgurante de la violence et les succès engrangés par les combattants de l'ALNK, les autorités françaises adoptent de nouvelles formes de lutte, non seulement en renforçant leurs troupes sur le terrain mais aussi en visant particulièrement les principaux leaders de l'ALNK pour casser cette « rébellion ». FélixRoland Moumié est alors assassiné par empoisonnement à Genève (03 novembre 1960), et Martin Singap est abattu au combat, les armes à la main (8 septembre 1961).

La phase du Comité révolutionnaire[35] d'Ernest Ouandié (1960-1971)

L'assassinat du président en exercice de l'UPC, Roland-Félix Moumié, désempare les leaders de ce parti en exil à Accra, les deux vice-présidents, Ernest Ouandié le 1er et Abel Kingué, le 2è, chacun voulant être reconnu comme le principal successeur du président décédé. Néanmoins, en 1961, une idée germe selon laquelle la véritable victoire contre le colonisateur français ne peut s'obtenir qu'au Cameroun. D'où la décision de faire rentrer les exilés au Cameroun comme nous le révèle Ngouo Woungly-Massaga, l'un des protagonistes de cette épopée :

> En 1961, à peine arrivé de France, et en enchaînant pour ainsi dire
> avec les émotions de notre évasion de l'ambassade du Ghana à Paris, je
> me suis retrouvé impliqué, comme principal concepteur de l'opération,
> dans la préparation concrète du retour clandestin du vice-président
> Ernest Ouandié au maquis.[36]

Deltombe et al., *Kamerun! Une guerre*, op.cit., 352. Les auteurs ajoutent le commentaire suivant : "En effet, la progression des troupes de Moumié, Singap et Momo est autant due à leur organisation qu'à la motivation qu'à l'inefficacité de la répression française, incapable de reproduire ses succès obtenus en Sanaga et à l'ouest lors des deux années précédentes".

[35] C'est après son retour au Cameroun et pour consolider son autorité comme premier leader de l'UPC après l'assassinat du président Moumié face aux contestations d'Abel Kingué et ses affidés que Ouandié convoque le 13 septembre, en souvenir de la date anniversaire de la mort d'Um Nyobi, une « Assemblée maquis » au cours de laquelle est créée une nouvelle instance dirigeante de l'UPC dénommée Comité révolutionnaire placée sous son commandement assisté de ses alliés. Contestée par ses adversaires politiques qui ne croient pas que cette Assemblée populaire ait pu se tenir sous maquis, et pour les confondre, il en convoque une seconde le 25 avril 1963, appuyée cette fois-ci de photos de l'événement.

[36] Daniel Abwa, *Ngouo Woungly-Massaga, alias Commandant Kissamba: "Cameroun, ma part de vérité"*, (Paris: Editions Minsi, 2005), 129-130.

L'idée de ce retour au maquis consacre la rupture entre les deux vice-présidents lorsque le 2ᵉ vice-président refuse d'assister à la réunion convoquée, le 15 septembre 1961 par Ouandié ; réunion au cours de laquelle il est décidé le retour sous maquis au Cameroun de ce dernier sous le pseudonyme de « camarade Emile ».[37] L'objectif de ce retour est de « reprendre en main une organisation militaire déliquescente » car « les ordres circulent mal d'un maquis à l'autre, se contredisent parfois et sont mal appliqués quand ils parviennent à leurs destinataires ».[38] Il fallait également redonner confiance aux troupes de l'ALNK qui subissent sur le terrain la contre propagande convergente orchestrée à la fois par l'UPC légale et le gouvernement Ahidjo, afin que la deuxième guerre d'indépendance soit un succès etque la France quitte enfin le Cameroun avec l'abrogation des accords franco-camerounais signés par Ahidjo.[39]

Vers la fin du mois de juillet 1961, le retour du camarade Emile au Cameroun, à travers la frontière nigériane se fait avec succès et il établit ses quartiers dans la région du Moungo où il est traqué sans cesse par l'armée franco-camerounaise qui, très tôt, par ses services de renseignements, est informée de la présence au Cameroun du vice-président de l'UPC. Cette armée franco-camerounaise d'occupation, a, en effet, déjà compris, à la suite des assassinats d'Um Nyobé et de Moumié, que la meilleure stratégie pour mettre un terme à la guerre menée contre elle par les nationalistes camerounais, c'est d'éliminer le principal leader. C'est pourquoi elle met en œuvre de nombreux stratagèmes afin de capturer et d'éliminer Ernest Ouandié par tous les moyens. Pendant près de dix ans (1961-1971), le vice-président de l'UPC est ainsi l'objet d'une féroce traque, l'obligeant de « fuir en permanence à travers le Moungo » et quelques fois en se réfugiant dans les villages du pays bamiléké. Ce qui lui permet d'échapper « aux nombreux barrages routiers, contrôles policiers et offensives des forces armées »[40] jusqu'à cette journée fatidique du 16 août 1970 où il

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37 Ibid., 145-151. Woungly-Massaga y décrit dans le détail comment, en sa compgnie, Ouandié a été infiltré au Cameroun via le Togo et le Nigéria.
38 Deltombe et al., *kamerun! Une guerre*, op.cit., 527.
39 APO, 1C 158, Rapport de sûreté du 1er au 15 décembre 1961, lettre n° 090/UPC/BCD/MA61 "Pourquoi la lutte continue", 18-24.
40 Deltombe et al., *Kamerun! Une guerre*, op.cit., 533.

fut capturé à Mbanga, dans le Moungo, avec ou sans la complicité de Monseigneur Albert Ndongmo. [41] Cette arrestation et celle de Monseigneur Ndongmo plus tardont donné lieu à un procès retentissant devant le tribunal militaire de Yaoundé au cours duquel Ouandié fut jugé coupable, condamné à mort et fusillé sur la place publique à Bafoussam, chef-lieu de la province de l'ouest le15 janvier 1971. Les griefs retenus contre Ouandié furent, ainsi présentés par le greffier de l'ordonnance :

> *Ouandié Ernest, en sa qualité de vice-président de l'UPC, a pris le commandement des maquis du territoire en 1961 pour continuer la lutte révolutionnaire engagée par ce qu'on a appelé « Armée de libération nationale kamerounaise »; que cette lutte avait pour but essentiel de faire abdiquer le pouvoir par les autorités en semant la terreur dans les populations par les assassinats, des meurtres, des pillages en vue de prendre le pouvoir suprême ; que Ouandié a résisté aux opérations montées et effectuées par toutes les forces régulières du pays… Le bilan des opérations de rébellion est très éloquent. On compte en effet depuis 1961 jusqu'en 1970 : 47 militaires, 69 gardes civiques et 962 civils tués. 448 personnes enlevées, 114 militaires et 458 civils blessés, 2269 cases et 56 véhicules incendiés. Tandis que le nombre connu des hors-la-loi tués par les forces régulières dans la même période est de 3852. C'est grâce au soutien sans réserve de quelques citoyens menant une vie apparemment paisible, surtout à celui de M. l'abbé Ndongmo devenu évêque qu'Ouandié n'a pu être mis hors d'état de nuire depuis 1961. Comme tout a des limites, même l'infini, ce criminel a été capturé le 19 août 1970 par les populations des environs de Mbanga, en l'absence de son puissant protecteur. Ainsi la duplicité de ce prélat s'annonce très dangereuse, car Mgr Ndongmo qui s'est caché dans sa soutane d'homme de l'Eglise a pris fait et cause pour Ouandié Ernest en le protégeant, en collaborant avec lui, en l'assistant matériellement et moralement et spirituellement*

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[41]   Cette arrestation à laquelle est associé le nom de cet évêque a donné lieu à de nombreuses analyses dont certaines soutiennent le prélat de trahison car collusion avec le pouvoir en place et d'autres le considèrent comme une innocente victime car piégé par le régime d'Ahmadou Ahidjo. Lire à ce sujet les témoignages de Sadou Daoudou, à l'époque ministre des forces armées du gouvernement Ahidjo et de Woungly Massaga, combattant upéciste du régime Ahidjo respectivement dans Abwa, *Sadou Daoudu*, op.cit., 119-121 et Abwa, *Ngouo Woungly-Massaga*, op.cit., 307-314.

> même dans ses activités plus criminelles que réellement révolutionnaires.[42]

Ainsi, le 15 janvier 1970, la fusillade de Ouandié consacre définitivement l'échec de la deuxième guerre d'indépendance menée contre le régime d'Amadou Ahidjo au pouvoir depuis le 1er janvier 1960 par l'ALNK et son comité révolutionnaire. Cependant, avant cette cuisante défaite, le Comité révolutionnaire avait déjà connu une autre avec son deuxième front.

La phase du Comité révolutionnaire du 2è front Woungly-Massaga-Ossende Afana (1963-1966)

La décision de créer un autre front au Cameroun contre l'armée franco-camerounaise, en plus de celui commandé par Ernest Ouandié, est prise au cours d'une réunion tenue à Accra. C'est Woungly Massaga qui en fait la révélation en disant:

> En 1963, au cours de la première réunion des membres du Comité Révolutionnaire de l'UPC à l'étranger, réunion qui se tint à Accra, et qui avait été évidemment boycottée par Abel Kingué et par Ossende, tous les autres membres du C.R. avaient prêté serment qu'ils entreraient au maquis coûte que coûte et quelles qu'en soient les difficultés. Peut-être que pour d'autres c'était une déclaration sans conséquences, mais, pour ce qui me concerne, ce serment me marqua au point de m'amener à intégrer le projet de l'entrée sous-maquis dans ma vie conjugale en commençant à envisager avec mon épouse Annie les modalités futures de cet engagement.[43]

Bien que cette volonté de créer un autre front sous-maquis ait été lancée depuis 1963, il a fallu attendre 1965 pour que cette décision devienne une réalité concrète. C'est encore le commandant Kissamba qui nous donne les circonstances de la création du 2ème front. Tout part d'une rupture des relations entre Accra et Ouandié:

> Alors que des rendez-vous avaient été programmés avec le Commandant Fermeté ou avec d'autres agents de liaison envoyés en ses lieux et place par Ernest Ouandié, personne ne vint au maquis. Le

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[42] Lire à ce propos Louis Kamga Kamga, *Ernest Ouandié. Le "Che Guevara" africain, dernier chef historique de l'UPC*, (Paris: l'Harmattan, 2016).

[43] Abwa, *Ngouo Woungly-Massaga*, op.cit., 130.

> *Comité Révolutionnaire dut par conséquent se réunir à Accra et il*
> *décida qu'il fallait de toute urgence explorer la possibilité d'une percée*
> *par le sud en mettant à profit mes contacts avec le MPLA et avec*
> *certaines autorités du Congo Brazzaville [...] C'est ainsi qu'est née*
> *l'idée du IIème Front de l'ALNK.*[44]

Aussitôt dit, aussitôt fait. Quatre premiers combattants sont infiltrés au début de l'année 1965 à Brazzaville et à la frontière nord du Congo et d'autres les suivent quelques mois plus tard. En juin de la même année, face à la rupture de plus en plus évidente entre Ouandié et Accra, le C.R. enjoint Woungly Massaga de s'installer au Congo pour organiser et commander les maquis de ce 2ème front. Il s'y rend mais quelques mois plus tard, il a la désagréable surprise de voir arriver sur le même terrain un autre Upéciste ayant déjà fait la preuve de son hostilité aux actions menées par le C.R. Il s'agit de Castor Ossende Afana dont l'arrivée au Congo est décrite ainsi qu'il suit:

> *En 1965, informé du passage de Woungly-Massaga au Congo et de la*
> *présence dans ce pays des premiers éléments infiltrés par ce dernier, le*
> *groupe Ossende s'est rué en force au Congo sans aucune discrétion[...]*
> *Le camarade Ossende arrive à Ouesso en juillet 1965 [...] Le projet du*
> *camarade Ossende était de faire de la „„propagande"" à partir de*
> *Ouesso et d'étudier ensuite comment rentrer au Cameroun.*
> *Cependant, dans cette zone très sensible, la présence très peu discrète*
> *du groupe Ossende finit par être gênante pour les autorités congolaises*
> *[...].*[45]

La présence de deux armées dirigées par deux leaders en opposition de phases ne pouvait donner aucun résultat positif. Fidèle à sa stratégie qui a déjà fait ses preuves, Ossende Afana est recherché, tué et décapité par l'armée camerounaise le 15 mars 1966; sa tête est envoyée « en cadeau » à Ahidjo à Yaoundé. Quant à Ngouo WounglyMassaga, il réussit à quitter clandestinement le Congo pour se réfugier en Angola, au Cabinda, auprès du MPLA en lutte pour l'indépendance de ce pays. Le 2ème front n'a guère fait long feu.

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44   Ibid., 131.
45   Ibid., 297.

S'il est indéniable que l'UPC, par ses divisions internes et son incapacité de se doter d'une armée équipée en armes et disciplinée, a profondément contribué à l'échec de la deuxième guerre d'indépendance de l'ALNK, il n'en reste pas moins vrai que la riposte de l'armée franco-camerounaise et le silence complice des Occidentaux y ont pesé d'un grand poids.

Eléments liés à la riposte de l'armée franco-camerounaise et au silence complice des occidentaux

La riposte de l'armée franco-camerounaise et armée camerounaise (1960-1971)

De nombreux travaux ont déjà fait état de la riposte de l'armée franco-camerounaise à laquelle succède l'armée camerounaise et du gouvernement post indépendance camerounais pour empêcher la victoire de l'ALNK dans sa quête d'une nouvelle indépendance du Cameroun. Non seulement, ils ont réussi, par des stratagèmes divers, à empêcher la mise en place d'une véritable armée de libération nationale à l'image de l'ALN algérienne mais en plus ils ont réussi à susciter la peur chez certains Camerounais ayant de la sympathie pour les idéaux de l'ALNK. En procédant systématiquement à la chasse, capture, assassinat, exécutions sur les places publiques des leaders de l'ALNK et en utilisant leurs alliés occidentaux pour empêcher que ces nationalistes n'entrent en possession des armes pour combattre l'armée camerounaise, le gouvernement d'Ahmadou Ahidjo s'est donné les moyens de vaincre l'ALNK. Furent ainsi assassinés et exécutés sur les places publiques les Camerounais suivants : Um Nyobé, Roland-Félix Moumie, Martin Singap, Ossende Afana, Makanda Pouth de son vrai nom Mpouma Kilama Théodore, Kamdem Nyinim, Tankeu Noé, Ernest Ouandie, Tabeu Gabriel, Fotsing Raphael, Takala Célestin [...].[46]

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[46] Pour en savoir plus sur ces exécutions publiques lire Jean P. Moutassi, *Epilogue d'une guerre clandestine. Verdict sur le génocide français au Cameroun (1954-1964)* (hereafter: *Epilogue d'une guerre*), (Paris: L'Harmattan Cameroun, 2020), 177-189. Dans cet ouvrage, l'auteur demande que la France soit jugée pour ses "crimes de génocide, crimes de guerre et crimes contre l'humanité" au Cameroun et en donne les raisons, 191-361.

En vue d'instiller la peur dans l'esprit des Camerounais de toutes les origines, le gouvernement d'Ahmadou Ahidjo a pratiqué le terrorisme d'Etat contre le terrorisme de l'ALNK (exposition des têtes coupées), la terreur juridique et les tortures diverses (ordonnance sur la subversion, création des centres d'assignation à résidence surveillée, de détention administrative, de rééducation civique et des brigades mixtes mobiles, sans oublier la délation orchestrée par les services de renseignements coiffés par le bureau d'études et de documentation transformé plus tard en direction d'études et de documentation).[47] Il faut ajouter à cette panoplie de mesures pour instiller la peur dans l'esprit des Camerounais, le recours aux us et coutumes camerounais en fonction des régions à l'instar de la pratique du cadi ou du chien noir dans l'ouest Cameroun dit pays bamiléké.Tout ceci se faisait au su et au vu de la communauté dite internationale mais dans un mutisme et une complicité criards des alliés occidentaux du Cameroun indépendant.

Mutisme et complicité des alliés occidentaux du Cameroun indépendant

Le mutisme et la complicité des occidentaux, en particulier de la France et des Etats-Unis se manifestent par l'absence de condamnation des actes de torture au Cameroun nouvellement indépendant, par le refus de reconnaître qu'il y a eu guerre de libération nationale au Cameroun et en affirmant qu'on y a seulement pratiqué le maintien de l'ordre contre des rebelles. Jusqu'à ce jour, ils se manifestent aussi par le fait que rien de précis n'a encore reconnu de l'accusation de génocide (utilisation des bombardements aériens et soupçons de l'utilisation du napalm) formulée contre la France. C'est pourquoi Jean Pierre Moutassi condamne "le négationnisme sur le génocide camerounais" et en appelle à « l'impératif d'une mémoire historique authentique sur le génocide français au Cameroun ».[48] La dé classification des archives françaises revendiquées par les

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[47]   Pour en savoir plus sur cet épisode de la vie au Cameroun (1960-1971) lire C. Christian Tsala Tsala, Jules Ambroise Noupoudem, *Raisons d'Etat. Autopsie des centres de rééducation civique au Cameroun*, (Douala: EDI-CAD, 2020), collection politique africaine en mutation 2020.

[48]   Moutassi, *Epilogue d'une guerre*, op.cit., 361-370.

Camerounais pour que justice soit faite et promise par le président français François Hollande au cours d'une visite officielle éclair au Cameroun tarde à prendre son envol. Ce mutisme et cette complicité ont été également décriés par les auteurs de *Kamerun! Une guerre cachée…* qui démontrent pour s'en étonner, que ce sont des attitudes qui remontent à la première guerre d'indépendance au Cameroun (1956-1960). Ils le manifestent par les interrogations suivantes :

> *Comment se fait-il que ces atrocités aient suscité si peu d'intérêt, si peu d'écrits et, finalement, si peu d'émoi en métropole ? Au moment où la guerre d'Algérie y déchaîne les passions, presque personne ne parle de la répression au Cameroun qui, toutes proportions gardées, y ressemble pourtant étrangement Les rares journaux qui évoquent les « troubles » vont dans le sens de l'armée, confrontée, selon l'Agence France Presse, à l' « action criminelle » de l'UPC. Le 18 février 1958, L'Aurore exhorte à ne pas « s'humilier devant ce farouche agitateur » qu'est Um Nyobé. Le 23mars 1958, alors que la répression en ZOPAC bat son plein, Le Monde intitule son éditorial consacré aux débats à l'ONU sur la gestion française du Territoire : « Une chance pour le Cameroun » ! Sans un mot sur les opérations militaires* […].[49]

Conclusion

L'ALNK a connu un échec, –comme il vient d'être démontré dans cet article– dans sa quête d'une véritable indépendance du Cameroun lors de la deuxième guerre d'indépendance déclenchée dès la proclamation de l'indépendance du Cameroun le 1er janvier 1960. Cet échec fait suite à celui connu par les armées de libération nationale, CNO et SDNK de la première guerre d'indépendance. La question qui mérite d'être posée est celle de savoir si cette indépendance du Cameroun, sans rupture avec la France, a permis à la souveraineté camerounaise de s'exprimer dans toute sa plénitude? La réponse appartient aux Camerounais.

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[49] Deltombe et al., *Kamerun! Une guerre*, op.cit., 285.

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Livres

- 2020: *Ecrire et enseigner une histoire des vaincus pour une Afrique qui gagne,* (Yaoundé: Editions CLE)

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- 2017: *Sadou Daoudou parle de l'armée camerounaise et… 1961-1980,* (Yaoundé: PUCAC (nouvelle édition)

- 2016: L'histoire du Cameroun racontée à nos enfants, (Paris: les éditions Jaguar)

- 2016: *Ni Anglophones, ni Francophones au Cameroun: tous des Camerounais,* (Yaoundé: Ed. du Kilimandjaro)

- 2012: *Regards croisés sur les cinquantenaires du Cameroun indépendant et réunifié,* (Paris : l' Harmattan)

- 2010: *Cameroun: Histoire d'un nationalisme.1884-1961* (Yaoundé: CLE)

- 2005: *NGOUO WOUNGLY MASSAGA alias commandant KISSAMBA:* "*Cameroun, ma part de vérité*", (Paris: Ed. Minsi)

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- 2001: *Dynamique d'intégration régionale en Afrique Centrale,* T1 et T2, P.U.Y

- 2000: *Commissaires et Hauts-Commissaires de la France au Cameroun de 1916 à 1960: Ces hommes qui ont façonné politiquement le Cameroun,* (Yaoundé: P.U.Y et PUCAC (2è édition)

- 1999: *Inventaire des sources de l'Histoire de l'Intégration régionale en Afrique Centrale et des relations Europe-Afrique,* (Yaoundé : P.U.Y)

- 1993: *André-Marie MBIDA, Premier Ministre Camerounais (1917-1980): Autopsie d'une carrière politique,* (Paris : l' Harmattan).

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Vie Politique

• 2012: Chargé de mission de la Commission Régionale D'Encadrement et d'Appui pour le Centre

• 2012: Vice-Président de la Commission Départementale d'Encadrement et d'Appui du Département du Mbam et Inoubou

• 2012: Président de la Commission Communale d'Encadrement et d'Appui de la Commune de Makenene

• 2011: Président de la Commission Communale de Makenene pour les élections Présidentielles

• 2011: Membre suppléant élu du Comité Central du RDPC

• 1985-2008: Délégué du Comité Central du RDPC pour les élections présidentielles, législatives et municipales dans l'Arrondissement de Makenene en qualités de membre, chargé de mission, vice-président et enfin président de la délégation communale ou d'arrondissement

- 1985-2008: Délégué du Comité Central du RDPC pour le renouvellement des organes de base du parti dans l'Arrondissement de Makenene en qualité de chargé de mission, de vice-président et de président
- 1985-2008: Délégué du Comité Central pour les primaires aux municipales et aux législatives dans l'Arrondissement d'Ombessa et le district de Nitoukou
- 1985: Militant du Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais.

Vie Associative

- Conseiller de l'Association du Développement du Mbam (ADM)
- Ancien secrétaire général de l'Amicale des Elèves et Etudiants du Mbam (AEM)
- Ancien Secrétaire général de l'Action pour le Développement de l'Arrondissement de Ndikiniméki (ADANDI)
- Ancien secrétaire général du Comité de Développement des villages Nyokon (IKO'O)
- Ancien président du Comité de Développement des villages Nyokon (IKO'O)
- Porte Parole de la Communauté Nyokon
- Vice- président de l'ONG Mbam'Art
- Président fondateur du Forum des Enseignants et des chercheurs du Cameroun (FOREC), syndicat de l'enseignement supérieur.

Langues de travail

- Français: lu, parlé, écrit
- Anglais: lu, parlé, écrit
- Allemand: lu
- Langues locales parlées: Nyokon, Banen, Douala, Bassa.

WORKING SESSION X

Chair: Peter Lieb (Germany)

26. THE LIBERATION OF SLOVAKIA (1919)

Miloslav Čaplovič, Matej Medvecký (Slovakia)

For approximately one thousand years Slovakia was an important part of multinational Hungarian kingdom. The rise of nationalism at the end of 18th century and especially 19th century had a very specific form in the Hungarian kingdom. Obsessed with chauvinism, Hungarian noblemen in charge of the country launched a Magyarisation program with the intention to transform Hungary into a one nation country. Before the long-term program could be accomplished, Central powers were defeated in World War I and the Habsburg dual monarchy ceased to exist.

At the end of the World War I, on the ruins of Austro-Hungarian monarchy Czechoslovakia emerged as a new country. Czechs and Slovaks soldiers who served in the legions in Russia, Italy and France provided the new country strong support to its right to exist. Though, until summer 1919 Czechoslovak armed forces were formed under complicated conditions.[1] The borders of the country were finally set and were not guaranteed by powers. At the same time, the severe post-war situation did not allow Czechoslovak authorities to invest sufficient effort into planning and organisation of the army.

Shortly after the election of Tomáš Garrique Masaryk to the presidential office and appointment of the new government of Karel Kramář, the Ministry of National Defence was established on 15 November 1918. It was tasked with difficult objectives of securing the authority of the Czechoslovak state on all its territory and securing its borders. At the same time, vast majority of Czechoslovak soldiers were still abroad. Our armed forces consisted of the Legions with more than 100 thousand men in France, Italy and Russia as well as 55 home defence battalions with 57 thousand men formed from Czechs

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1   For further info on participation of Slovaks on the front of World War I see: Miloslav Čaplovič, Jana Zaťková, *Slovensko a Slováci vo víre prvej svetovej vojny. Vojenské dejiny Slovenska 1914-1919 slovom a obrazom* [*Slovakia and Slovaks in the Whirlwind of World War I. Military History of Slovakia 1914-1919 in Words and Pictures*], (Bratislava : Vojenský historický ústav – Pro Militaria Historica, 2018).

and Slovaks, former Austro-Hungarian POWs in Italy.[2] Czechoslovak military administration therefore quickly started to build up regular military units at home while organizing improvised volunteer units. At that time border tensions grew stronger with Poland as well.[3]

The liberation of Slovakia that was still under the control of Hungarian authorities had four phases and was not without dramatic turnarounds. It began spontaneously. Soldiers of the supplementary battalion of the 25th home defence regiment under the command of the first lieutenant Alois Ripka (1 officers and 120 soldiers) liberated on 1 November 1918 the border city Holíč, one day later village Gbely and on 4 November 1918 city Malacky. Two days later provisional Slovak government headed by Dr. Vavro Šrobár arrived to Skalica, another town on the border. At this moment an accompanying group of Czech gendarmeries together with Slovaks serving in the Lučenec regiment took active role in the liberation process. On 7 November 1918 they liberated Trnava but six days later soldiers were forced to empty the city after strong attacks of Hungarian soldiers and sailors. On 10 November 1918 the Headquarters of Czechoslovak Armies in Slovakia was established with its seat situated in Uherské Hradiště and since 16 December 1918 in the city Žilina in northern Slovakia. As commander Gen. Josef Štika was appointed who was on 25 November replaced by colonel František Schöbl. Soon, the operations of Czechoslovak troops became planned and organized.

Col. Schöbl had two groups under his command: the so called "Holíč" (lt. col. Verich, headquarters in Holíč) and the other so called "Trenčín" (lt. col. Šembera, headquarters in Trenčín). During the first days of December 1918, with regard to the expected arrival of Czechoslovak Army Legion Corps from Italy responsible for securing the demarcation line between Hungary and Slovakia both military

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[2]   For more detail see: Lamberto Ferranti, *Československo 1919. Oslobodzovanie Slovenska spod maďarskej nadvlády* [*Czechoslovakia 1919. Liberation of Slovakia from Hungarian Rule*], (Krupina: Spoločnosť M. R. Štefánika, 2020).

[3]   Marián Marián, "Geopolitické postavenie Slovenska vo Veľkej vojne a vo vojenskom konflikte ČSR s Maďarskou republikou rád roku 1919" ["Goepolitical Standing of Slovakia in the Great War and in the military conflict of Czechoslovakia and Hungarian Republic of Councils in 1919"], in *Slovensko vo vojnách a v konfliktoch v 20. Storočí* [*Slovakia in Wars and Conflicts of the 20th Century*], (Bratislava: Vojenský historický ústav, 2003), 41.

groups were tasked by order of the commander of Czechoslovak army in Prague and organizer of Czechoslovak volunteer units field *Untermarchall* Jan Diviš to advance to Nitra and take action towards Žilina. Units of the 2nd military group under the command of lt. col. Šembera succeeded by 12 December 1918 to secure the territory behind the line Devínske jazero – hill Malín – Pezinok – Sereď – Nitra – Žilina – Čadca. On that day the Ministry with Full Authority to Administer Slovakia was established in Žilina with Dr. Vavro Šrobár as minister. This ministry had its own military department where Fedor Houdek was quickly replaced by member of the legions Pavel Virsik as its head.[4]

First military group of the home army under col. Hrbenský, which included Slovak volunteer Guard of Slovak Freedom commanded by cpt. Ľudovít Šimko (since 28 November upgraded to 1st Regiment of Slovak Freedom under the command of lt. col. Verich) by 20 December 1918 managed to seize without facing stronger Hungarian resistance upper part of the territory by the river Váh and part of the Spiš county. At the same time, other Czechoslovak troops liberated Kreminca from the direction from Vrútky, on 21-22 December Zvolen and Banská Bystrica a by the end of December 1918 whole Orava county in the northern Slovakia. This stage of liberation reached its peak on 28-29 December 1918 when Czechoslovak troops entered Prešov and Košice.

For these events, soldiers of the Czechoslovak Army Legion Corps from Italy were responsible. On 25 December 1918 its commander division general Luigi Giuseppe Piccione took the command over all military operations in Slovakia. Regiments of the 7th Legion division under the command of Italian Gen. Boriani liberated Bratislava on 2 January 1919, during the night from 2 to 3 January Lučenec, on 9 January Nové Zámky were liberated without fight and on 10 January the south Slovak city of Komárno. Regiments of the 6th Legion division under Gen. Rossi by 15 January succeeded to occupy the demarcation line between Hungary and Slovakia in the eastern part of

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[4]   Pavel J. Kuthan, *V těžkých dobách. Boje na Slovensku 1918-1919* [*In Difficult Times. Fights in Slovakia 1918-1919*], (Praha: Corona 2010), 21.

the country. The home army liberated whole inland of Slovakia by 20 January 1919 without facing serious difficulties.[5]

In the footsteps of Czechoslovak soldiers the new Czechoslovak administration started to administer the country. The Ministry with Full Authority to Administer Slovakia was transferred from Žilina to Bratislava and the city became the administrative centre of Slovakia. However, the major military actions were approaching.

On 16 February 1919 the Supreme War Council on the Paris peace conference set a second demarcation line between Slovakia and Hungary that went further south on the territory of today's Hungary. It lead from the mouth of the river Ipeľ through the highest peaks of Novohrad highlands and Bukové vrchy hills to the south of Miskolc through Sárospatak, Zemplénagárd and straight to Perečín and river Uh. This demarcation line reflected geopolitical and military considerations of the Czechoslovak delegation in Paris. Hungarian government was informed on 20 March 1919 by col. Ferdinand Vix. This was the final blow to the effort of Hungarian politicians to keep the territorial integrity of Hungarian kingdom. Shortly after, Hungarian Republic of Councils was established lead by a communist government chaired by Béla Kun. Hungarian communists expecting to receive support and help from soviet Russia as well as proletariat of the neighbouring countries focused on spreading the revolution by power of arms. It formed the new Red Army and refused to accept the note of col. Vix. As a result, on 16 April 1919 Romanian army started its advance towards the river Tisa. By that date the Czechoslovak command was not able to finish all preparations and therefore the advance towards the second demarcation line was not coordinated with the Romanians. Furthermore, Czechoslovak armed forces were not able to reach the line as the well equipped Hungarian Red Army, strengthened by recent mobilisation up to 100,000 men, launched on 21 May 1919 its counterattack. Attacking forces succeeded in pushing

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[5]   More detailed information on Italian generals and their activities in the war with Hungary may be found in: Marián Hronský, "K pôsobeniu talianskej vojenskej misie na Slovensku (december 1918-máj 1919)" ["On Activities of Italian Military Mission in Slovakia (December 1918-May 1919"], in Emil Borčin, Marta Drličková (eds), *"Spoznal som svetlo a už viac nechcem tmu..."* ["I learned the light and I do not want the darkness anymore..."], (Bratislava: Veda, 2005), 44-74.

Czechoslovak forces out of Salgótarján and Miskolc and advanced northwards. Czechoslovak forces had to withdraw back to the original demarcation line and fights continued on the territory of Slovakia.

In the night from 29 to 30 May 1919 reorganized and well equipped Hungarian forces launched the so called Northern campaign. In few days, Czechoslovak forces were forced to withdraw to the line east of Komárno – Nové Zámky – Zlaté Moravce – Nová Baňa – Banská Štiavnica – Zvolen – Tornaľa – Košice – Slovenské Nové Mesto. The most difficult situation was in the middle section of the frontline where Czechoslovak units suffered several defeats. The attacking Hungarian forces in the first half of June 1919 seized Košice and Prešov and were able to reach Slovak – Polish border near Bardejov. During these critical moments, Italian commanders were replaced by French and Czechoslovak officers.

By decision of the president T. G. Masaryk, the commander of the French military mission[6] to Slovakia Gen. Naurice C. J. Pellé was appointed as the commander of the Czechoslovak army.[7] Together with other officers and generals from the mission they at the beginning of June 1919 took the command over the Czechoslovak army engaged in the fights with the Hungarian Bolsheviks. Gen. Pellé started a reorganisation with the aim to stop the advance of the enemy, regroup forces and launch a counteroffensive. He ordered organisation of the reserve units in the western part of the country and ordered to form new units that were to be transported from Bohemia and Moravia to Slovakia. He divided the front into two

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[6] For further information on the French military mission see: Miloslav Čaplovič, "Les généraux et les officiers supérieurs français dans l'armée tchécoslovaque au début des années vingt", in *Bâtir une nouvelle sécurité. La coopération militaire entre la France et les États d'Europe centrale et orientale de 1919 ŕ 1929*, (Château de Vincennes: 2001), 373-399; Miloslav Čaplovič, Pavol Petruf, "Francúzska vojenská misia v Československu 1919-1938" ["French Military Mission in Czechoslovakia (Report on Its Activities between February and October 1919)"], *Vojenská história [Military History]* 5(4) (2001), 85-102; Radko Břach, "Válka o Slovensko 1919 a francouzská vojenská mise v Československu" ["War for Slovakia 1919 and the French Military Mission in Czechoslovakia"], *Vojenská história [Military History]* 7(4) (2003), 41-53.

[7] On the role of French generals in the war with Hungary see: Jiří Fidler, "Francouzští generálové na Slovensku a Podkarpatské Rusi (1919-1925)" ["French Generals in Slovakia and Subcarpathean Ruthenia (1919-1925)"], *Vojenská história [Military History]* 4(3-4) (2000), 79-86.

territories. Eastern under the command of Gen. Edmond Ch. A. Hennocque and western under the command of Gen. Eugène D. A. Mittelhauser. Hennocque's group consisted of two sections – Košice territory manned by the 6th division and Subcarpathian section manned by the 3rd division. Western territory army group consisted of the Danube section (7th division) and Ipeľ section (2nd division). At the same time Gen. Pellé asked Marshal Ferdinand Foch for immediate supplies of military material, especially heavy artillery, ammunition and airplanes. Soon two complete air units (reconnaissance planes, fighters and bombers) arrived from France[8] followed by freight trains carrying big calibre guns and large amount of ammunition. Further measures of the French command included establishment of military tribunals, tightening of the discipline at the military units and in accordance with state authorities declared martial law in Slovakia. At the same time, production in ammunition factories was reopened and military industry changed to war production.

Once the front line with Hungary was stabilized, the general reorganisation of Czechoslovak home units as well as legionaries, unification of command, improvement in supplying and signals, strengthening of the morale and discipline was carried out, Gen. Pellé ordered to launch a counterattack in Slovakia. It began on 5 June 1919 from Komárno and Nitra and on 6 June 1919 another counterattack with the goal to recapture Nové Zámky was launched. On the next day the city was liberated. On 10 June Hungarian Bolshevik units were forced to leave Banská Štiavnica. From 9 to 12 June there were heavy fights in south Slovak city Levice considered as strategically important by both sides. At the same time Hungarian command changed its tactics and concentrated its forces on a counterattack in the direction Kománo – Bratislava presuming that capturing of Bratislava could decide the struggle in favour of Budapest. Additional attack of Hungarian Bolsheviks was launched in direction Nové Zámky on 19 June that resulted in fierce and bloody fights.

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8   For more information on establishment of Czechoslovak air force see: Jan Kaše, Petr Lukeš, *Češi a Slováci v historii letectví: 90. výročí vzniku československého letectví a letectva* [*Czechs and Slovaks in the Aviation History: 90th Anniversary of Establishment of Czechoslovak Aviation*], (Praha: Aeromedia, 2008).

Meanwhile, on 12 June 1919 the Supreme War Council on the Peace Conference in Paris made a final decision on Slovak-Hungarian borders.[9] Its decision was delivered to the Hungarian government on 15 June. Despite the decision the fighting went on and command of the Hungarian Red Army launched a large scale attack in the west that should threaten Bratislava. On 22 June 1919 the chair of Paris peace conference Georges Clemenceau informed Czechoslovak government that the commander of French military mission to Czechoslovakia division general Maurice Pellé was empowered to set the Hungarian forces dates and means to withdraw to the set border line. Despite fierce resistance and counterattacks, Hungarian troops were forced to leave Slovak territory in the second half of June 1919 in the eastern part as well. Due to the development on the battlefield, the Hungarian Bolshevik government lead by Béla Kun declared on 23 June 1919 armistice and made obligation to withdraw its forces from the Slovak territory under the condition that the Romanian army leaves the territory it occupied during the Romanian offensive. Gen. Pellé responded that the Czechoslovak army stops any military action until 4 July 1919, a date set to Hungary to withdraw its forces. Would they not succeed, Czechoslovak army was ready to launch a new offensive.

On 25 June 1919 the Hungarian-Czechoslovak peace talks started in Reduta building in Bratislava which resulted in an armistice agreement signed on 1 July 1919. Until 4 July, units of the Hungarian Red Army were withdrawn to the newly set border and up to 7 July 1919 this border line was held by Czechoslovak forces. Two months of intensive fights in Slovakia cost the newly established Czechoslovak army more than 1,000 men killed in action and 3,700 wounded. Estimated Hungarian loses were 1,000 – 1,500 killed in action and over 3,600 wounded.[10] The armistice with Hungary signed on 1 July 1919 not only ended the several months long "undeclared war" but was also a milestone in the history of Czechoslovak armed forces. Securing the bridgehead of Bratislava –the village Petržalka– on 14 August 1919

9   For further information see: Marián Hronský, *The struggle for Slovakia and the treaty of Trianon 1918-1920*, (Bratislava: Veda, 2001).
10   Kuthan, *V těžkých dobách [In Difficult Times]*, op.cit., 161.

was not only the last stage of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian conflict but at the same time an epilogue to the military conflict as well. The event resulted in a Slovak-Hungarian border which was stabile for another 20 years until the Vienna Award in November 1938.

The events of summer 1919 showed the way for formation of the Czechoslovak armed forces in the upcoming years. Peace conditions allowed that during the second half of the year 1919 Czechoslovak troops secured the territory of Slovakia and Subcarpathean Ruthenia and allowed the Czechoslovak administration to take care of the disputed territory.

The 1919-experience influenced Czechoslovak military planning for the years to come. Hungarian territorial demands, revisionist politics and irredentism resulted in hostile relations of both countries in the interwar period. Despite the fact that Hungary was not able to threaten superior Czechoslovak military alone, military planners in Prague had to calculate with simultaneous attacks from German-Hungarian alliance which finally occurred at the end of the 1930s. Thought the two front war never materialized, Czechoslovakia had to cede great amount of Slovak territory to Hungary after the Vienna Award in 1938 and newly established Slovak republic was forced to cede some more territory after surprising Hungarian attack at the end of the March 1939. During the World War II, both Slovakia and Hungary were German allies. Nevertheless, both countries made steps to be prepared for a future military confrontation, e.g. both countries did not equip units in the East with purchased modern German heavy arms with the intention to save it for possible "uncertainties" in the future.[11]

The end of the war and strengthening of Soviet hegemony in the central Europe changed priorities for both countries as Czechoslovakia as well as Hungary military planning from the late 1940s and upcoming decades followed different ideological patterns. After the fall of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia, military planners estimated new threats and the calculated even with surprise Soviet attack with Soviet forces attacking not only from the territory of

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[11] Miloslav Čaplovič, Igor Baka, "Slovakia in Alliances in the First Half of the 20th Century", *Studia Historica Slovenica* 9 (2009), 147-169.

the USSR but from Hungarian territory as well. With both countries NATO-members, the issue of Hungarian military threat seem to finally fade.[12]

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[12] Miloslav Čaplovič, Matej Medvecký, "The Role of Slovakia in Alliance Warfare throughout the 20th Century", in Harold E. Raugh, jr., (ed.), *Alliance planning and coalition warfare: Historical and contemporary approaches*, (Belgrade: Institute for Strategic Research), 2019, 201-222.

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27. THE ADRIATIC QUESTION AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE: THE ITALIAN ROYAL NAVY AND THE BIRTH OF THE KINGDOM OF SHS

Davide Borsani (Italy)

The Adriatic Sea has historically involved the Italian Royal Navy (the "Regia Marina") as an instrument of Italy's foreign policy. The access from the south through the Strait of Otranto and the eastern shore – the Dalmatian coast– have traditionally played an essential role in the Italian strategy.

A study entitled "Comparison between the Italian fleet and the Austrian fleet" conducted by the Regia Marina in 1904 emphasized the unfavourable geostrategic situation of Italy. Accordingly, the enemy –Austria-Hungary, in fact a controversial ally for Italy in the Triple Alliance– would operate from a rocky coast stretching from Pola to Ragusa. There, a direct landing would have been practically impossible for the Italian Navy. The Austrian fleet had its strategic strengths in the naval bases of Pola and Cattaro, and several islands and good ports, including Trieste, Zara, Sebenico and Spalato. In Istria, the naval base of Pola was protected by the fortified island of Lussin, thus being easily defensible. The same went in the south in the Montenegrin area at Cattaro, which was in an excellent position to control the southern Adriatic (Figure 1). On the other hand, the Italian situation was less favourable, being conditioned by two opposing factors. First, the insufficiency of the naval bases in terms of number and location. Second, the many coastal targets were exposed to the enemy's offensive. If we add that a war could be fought simultaneously in the Tyrrhenian and the Adriatic Seas because of the geographical position, these factors forced the Italian Royal Navy to make Taranto the strategic pivot of its maritime strategy. From there, the fleet could be more easily deployed in the east or west.

The signing of the Treaty of London in April 1915 represented a milestone for Italy, opening the doors to intervention in the Great War. It started a very peculiar phase of its foreign policy, lasting about a decade. Throughout these years, Rome played its international role alongside the allies of Great Britain and, despite some ups and downs,

France. Italy remained substantially loyal to this alliance for its duration, even in the first half of Benito Mussolini's *ventennio*. The French and British played a relevant role in negotiating the thorny Adriatic Question at the Peace Conference. Nevertheless, Italy had to take into account another significant player – the United States, not as an ally but as an associated power that did not sign the Treaty of London. On the contrary, Washington disavowed the agreement.

The Treaty of London regulated the modalities of Italian entry into the war, listing several clauses defining the territorial acquisitions by Rome in the event of victory (Figure 2). In the north, in Trentino, the agreement granted Italy its natural geographical border. In the east, the entire region of Istria and half Dalmatia would be assigned to Italy, including the main islands in front of the coast. The shores from Cape Planka to the Sabbioncello peninsula and between Ragusa and Cattaro, and those islands not assigned to Italy would also be neutralized. The following Adriatic territories would be given to Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro: in the Northern Adriatic, the entire coast from Istria to the northern border of Dalmatia, and the whole shore of Croatia, with the Port of Rijeka (in Italian: Fiume). In the southern Adriatic, the entire coast from Cape Planka to the Drina River, with the critical ports of Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro. In Albania, Italy would receive full sovereignty over Valona, the Island of Saseno and surrounding territory to ensure the defence of this area.

For the Italian government led by Prime Minister Antonio Salandra, the abandonment of the city of Fiume, populated by Italians, was a "sacrifice". Still, it was done to achieve total military dominance in the Adriatic Sea. Not a secondary aspect: the Treaty of London did not consider the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, keeping it as the main threat to Italy.

A firm supporter of the Treaty was the Chief of Staff of the Italian Royal Navy, Admiral Paolo Thaon di Revel. After the victory, in his view, the complete application of the agreement was necessary because Italy had entered the war above all to ensure domination of the Adriatic. The coasts of Romagna and Puglia, he maintained, would be at the enemy's mercy without controlling Dalmatia and its archipelago. This would expose Italy to threats coming from east and

west simultaneously, where the French fleet remained a powerful rival. The debate on the self-determination of Fiume did not interest Thaon di Revel very much. In his words, "if Fiume represents wealth, Dalmatia represents security. Fiume represents the possibility of sumptuously furnishing a house without doors; Dalmatia means equipping a house with inviolable doors, albeit more modestly. Between these two solutions, there can be no doubt about the choice: to hold firm for Dalmatia, and when everything fails, immolate Fiume but save Dalmatia".

From the perspective of the Italian Royal Navy, an enemy with the shore between Zara and Spalato in its hands, including the military port of Sebenico and its neighbouring islands, would regularly have the possibility to exercise sea denial in the whole Adriatic Sea. Under this scenario, the Italian fleet would find itself exposed to a significant naval threat, even if it had control of the base of Pola. The Great War had shown that this event was a real possibility since the Italian Navy could not conduct a decisive attack against the Austro-Hungarian fleet.

On the one hand, the collapse of the Habsburg Empire was a crucial factor in the failure to apply the Treaty of London. In the eyes of the British and French allies, Austria-Hungary's disappearance cancelled the main threat to the Italian coasts. However, Italy's view differed a lot. The proclamation of the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (i.e., Kingdom of SHS or Yugoslavia) was not a factor of stability in the Adriatic Sea. On the contrary, despite being militarily weak, the new State could constitute a strategic danger in the medium to long term, directly or indirectly, at least by providing its basis to Italy's enemies and rivals. To France, for instance.

On the other hand, the idealism of the US President, Woodrow Wilson, represented a further influential element at the diplomatic table of the Peace Conference. In January 1918, Wilson illustrated his Fourteen Points peace program without being bound to previously signed war treaties. In his view, the principles of nationality and self-determination of peoples represented the foundation of true international justice. The ninth point envisaged a redefinition of the Italian borders along clearly recognizable lines of ethnicity. Even if it

granted Rome the northern natural border, it also removed Italy's control of the eastern shore of the Adriatic populated by Slavs. The eleventh point –the only one Wilson submitted to an external observer for consultation, a Serbian– asked for access to the sea for Serbia.

The Paris Peace Conference began in January 1919. Previously, an intense political debate took place in Italy on the need to annex Fiume, even by sacrificing some territorial acquisitions in the Adriatic. At the end of 1918, the Italians living in the city of Fiume asked for annexation through a referendum, and the Italian public opinion supported this measure. Therefore, the Italian government, now led by Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, made the annexation a diplomatic goal. Thaon di Revel had come to terms with this, accepting a derogation from the complete application of the Treaty of London. In his words, "of course I could not have opposed renunciations that proved indispensable for political or territorial military reasons, since this judgment exceeded from my competence". Thaon di Revel would agree on giving up some inner islands, such as Meleda, Lesina and Curzula, if the control of Fiume was granted from this trade-off. After all, he believed that Fiume could be quickly transformed into a naval base in the event of war, acquiring a strategic value in the upper Adriatic.

As far as Yugoslavia was concerned, if Wilson's plan would be implemented, the mere fact of possessing the eastern Adriatic coast would keep threatening Italian security in Thaon di Revel's opinion. It was not important whether the great Powers considered the new Kingdom a threat to Italy or not. It did not even matter that Yugoslavia had no substantial fleet. Nor that the winning Powers would not allow Belgrade to build one in the future. All this would not give a definitive solution to the naval problem of the Adriatic. According to Thaon di Revel, only full Italian dominance of the sea would solve the problem.

Great Britain, France but especially the United States disagreed with this perspective. Not only Wilson rejected the Treaty of London, but he also believed that the possession of a single island in front of Dalmatia was more than sufficient for Italy. As for Fiume, the principle of self-determination had to be applied by considering also

the district behind the city itself, consisting of two-thirds of Slavs and one-third of Italians. Thus, it should belong to Yugoslavia, not to Italy. In Wilson's view, economy was also important. If Trieste went to Italy, Fiume had to be assigned to Yugoslavia to create trade competitiveness between Rome and Belgrade. In sum, the Yugoslavs were to be granted the eastern coast of Istria, including Fiume, the entire Dalmatian coast and its archipelago. In the earliest weeks of the Peace Conference, the US position was strengthened by the unilateral recognition of the newborn Kingdom.

The difference between the American and Italian approaches was striking. The United States intended to deal with Yugoslavia as a liberated State, which did not participate in the conflict. According to Wilson, the newborn Kingdom was not hostile to the new European order, representing a significant pillar of the US project in Eastern Europe. As for Italy, it maintained Serbia as an ally alongside the Entente during the war, being the first country attacked by the Central Empires. But the status of the Croats and Slovenes was far more controversial. Many of them had fought among the ranks of Austro-Hungarian troops against Italian soldiers. Others, however, had lined up alongside the Serbs. Once the new Kingdom was created by joining Serbians, Croats and Slovens, the problem increased in size. The Italian Prime Minister, Orlando, told Wilson that the unilateral recognition of the new Yugoslav Kingdom was not a friendly act towards Italy. At the end of the day, the Italian government considered the Croats and Slovenes as enemies who replaced the Austrians. As for Great Britain and France, the Yugoslav union made Croatia and Slovenia a part of an enlarged Serbia, a firm ally during the war.

According to Wilson, Italian fears were unmotivated even considering the creation of the League of Nations. The US President could not imagine a Yugoslav fleet that could threaten Italy under the League's regime. The only risk would be an alliance formed by Yugoslavia with some other Powers, which did not adhere to the League (i.e. Russia and Germany). For this reason, Wilson maintained that the old game of spheres of influence had to disappear in the Balkans. Therefore, his task was to avoid any foot in the region by any

European Power, including Italy. For the Italian government, however, the guarantees offered by the League of Nations were not enough to prevent the new Yugoslav Kingdom from threatening Italy. During the negotiations, the Italian Foreign Minister, Sidney Sonnino, told the counterparts that what was happening on the Adriatic Question was a "crime against the Italian people".

Each of these problems had no solution throughout 1919. Neither the withdrawal of the Italian delegation from the Peace Conference nor the change of government in Rome could solve the Adriatic Question. The more weeks passed, the clearer it was that the full application of the Treaty of London and the Italian domination of the Adriatic were inaccessible prospects. Meanwhile in Italy, those politicians and military claiming full control of the Adriatic, even by sacrificing Fiume, became weaker and weaker in the face of the prolonged stall in Paris. A significant socio-economic crisis also shifted public opinion's attention from the Peace Conference to domestic priorities. Thaon di Revel, thus, decided to resign as Chief of Staff of the Navy. He judged the situation unbearable for him. The Adriatic victory in the Great War, as he had conceived it, was effectively nullified.

Rome and Belgrade finally resolved the Adriatic Question at a bilateral level in November 1920, when they signed the Treaty of Rapallo (Figure 2). The agreement granted Italy a favourable border in Istria. Fiume became a free and independent city to be united to Italy by a short strip of territory. Italy was also granted the outer islands of Cherso, Lussin, Lagosta and Pelagosa (not Lissa) and sovereignty over Zara. All Dalmatia was handed over to the Yugoslavs with guarantees for the protection of Italian minorities living there. The entire coast and its archipelago, however, were not neutralized, as Treaty of London stated instead. Fiume went under Italian sovereignty four years later with the Treaty of Rome. But from that moment on, Italy and Yugoslavia became clear strategic enemies.

To conclude, the World War I had significant strategic consequences on Italy. On the one hand, it concluded a crucial phase of Italian history aimed at reaching its natural borders, such as the northern barrier in Trentino. Moreover, the traditional enemy –the

Habsburg Empire– disappeared. On the other hand, the dissolution of Austria-Hungary caused a failure of Italy's naval aspirations. The position of the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes at the Peace Conference was stronger than Italian government's expectations, hovering between defeated or winning Power mainly due to US support.

The Italian Royal Navy and Thaon di Revel himself irremediably lost the Adriatic diplomatic "battle" waged at the Peace Conference. The Italian Navy did not see its sacrifices in the Great War repaid, being deprived of the absolute domination of the Adriatic. On the contrary, the birth of a new Yugoslav Kingdom laid the foundations for developing a future antagonistic naval Power. Thus, on the one hand, the World War I turned out to be a lost victory for the Regia Marina, as many Italian naval historians still maintain. But, on the other hand, we must consider that the myth of *vittoria mutilata* (mutilated victory), so crucial at the time for the rise of Fascism, obscured three fundamental facts:

• The Treaty of Rapallo gave Italy a more solid and defensible frontier than in 1914;
• Italy defeated its traditional Austrian enemy to a much greater extent than what the French did with the Germans;
• Italy was a winning Power with a new international status and responsibilities alongside Britain and France.

And, for sure, the lack of credible political leadership was a factor in the failure to grasp all of this after the end of the war.

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
Figure 1: Italian and Austria-Hungarian naval bases in the Adriatic Sea.

Source: Archives of the Historical Office of the Italian Navy, folder 3131.

Figure 2: Eastern Italian boundary according to the London agreement and the Treaty of Rapallo.

Source: Map from the volume *Venezia Giulia*, dated 1946. The author is unknown. It has been recently published on the website of the Instituto regionale per la storia della Resistenza e dell'Età contemporanea nel Friuli Venezia Giulia.

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28. THE THIRD WAR OF ITALIAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRUSSIAN MILITARY MODEL ON THE ITALIAN ARMY'S ORGANIZATION AND PROFESSIONAL CULTURE

Gianluca Pastori (Italy)*

In 1866, the Third War of Italian Independence closed the long process of national unification ("Risorgimento").[1] The conflict led to the acquisition of Veneto and drastically reduced Austria's influence over the country. At the same time, it reconfirmed some limits of the Italian military establishment already emerged during the Second War of Independence in 1859. From a diplomatic perspective, the war was carefully prepared. On 8 April, the government presided by General Alfonso Ferrero della Marmora [La Marmora from now on] (1804-1878) signed a military alliance with Prussia, actively promoted by the Prussian Chancellor Prince Otto von Bismarck.[2] The Italian negotiator was General Giuseppe Govone, who played a relevant role in the upcoming war and the following Italian military events until his death in 1872. French Emperor Napoleon III looked favourably to the Prussian-Italian entente and assured his benevolent neutrality in the upcoming events. In August 1865, the French Foreign Minister, Édouard Drouyn de Lhuys, confirmed to the Italian Ambassador in Paris, Costantino Nigra, that the French government, in case of an Austro-Prussian conflict, would have stuck to neutrality and would not have opposed a possible Italian involvement. Russia and Britain

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1   On the Third War of Independence within the context of the 1866 Austro-Prussian War, see, among else, Geoffrey Wawro, *The Austro-Prussian War: Austria's War with Prussia and Italy in 1866*, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); on the political background of the conflict and its role in the framework of the Italian "Risorgimento", see Frank J. Coppa, *The Origins of the Italian Wars of Independence*, (London, New York: Routledge, 1992). On the events of the southern front, a recent synthesis is in Hubert Heyriès, *Italia 1866. Storia di una guerra perduta e vinta*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2016).
2   On the negotiations of the Prussian-Italian alliance, see Gian E. Rusconi, *Cavour e Bismarck. Due leader fra liberalismo e cesarismo*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011), esp. 101 ff.

sported the same attitude. Albeit for different reasons, their shared interest was to weaken Austria's role in Europe, an interest that largely coincided with Prussia's and Italy's war aims.

The Third War of Independence and its political and military impact

At the beginning of the military operations (23 June 1866, on the Italian front), the Kingdom of Italy mustered a force of some 220,000 regular troops, plus some 38,000 volunteers of the Corpo volontari italiani (CVI - Italian Volunteer Corps) under Giuseppe Garibaldi. The Italian twenty regular divisions formed two main bodies. An "Armata del Mincio" ("Mincio River Army") on twelve divisions in three army corps under King Victor Emmanuel II and General La Marmora as Chief of Staff[3] deployed in eastern Lombardy. In parallel, on the south-eastern bank of the Po River, an "Armata del Po" ("Po River Army") under General Enrico Cialdini (1811-1892) added other eight divisions to the order of battle. Garibaldi's CVI operated from north-eastern Lombardy towards the Adige River valley, through the Tonale and Stelvio (Stilfser) passes and the Sabbia and Chiese valleys. La Marmora held the general command; however, Cialdini enjoyed extensive operational autonomy, and Garibaldi's CIV acted as a de facto independent component. Which force had to deliver the main attack was unclear due to the ambiguities of La Marmora/Cialdini relations. Equally unclear was the campaign aim: whether to engage the Austrian forces in a large-scale, decisive battle, outflank them, or carry out a more limited action to support the Prussian thrust toward the Danube and Vienna.

Despite several fine units, in quantitative terms, the Austrian forces were significantly inferior to their counterpart, although the split of the Italian troops in two bodies partly compensated for such a weakness. The Imperial troops in northern Italy accounted for some 190,000 men, but the field army under Archduke Albrecht von Habsburg-Teschen (1817-1895), deployed in eastern Venetia, between

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[3]   On 20 June, La Marmora had relinquished the premiership to Baron Bettino Ricasoli (1809-1880), who led the Council of the Ministers until 10 April 1867, signing the peace treaty of Vienna.

the Mincio and Adige rivers, was just 61,000 men strong on three army corps plus a hastily arranged 11,000-men-strong reserve force made of personnel subtracted from its fortress duties. The Austrian manoeuvre pivoted on the solid position of the so-called "Quadrilatero" ("Quadrilateral") defence system, with the fortresses of Peschiera, Mantua, Legnago and Verona guarding the territory between the Mincio, the Po, and the Adige. In Trentino, facing Garibaldi's volunteers, the troops under General Franz Kuhn von Kuhnenfeld (1817-1896) amounted to some 15/17,000 men (partly local), enjoying robust support from the population and benefitting a better knowledge of the region and its particular traits.

La Marmora's irresolute and ill-prepared effort to cross the Mincio River and force the "Quadrilatero" proved unsuccessful, leading to the defeat of Custoza (24 June), the same place where Austrian troops had defeated the Sardo-Piedmontese army in 1848. While not decisive, the Austrian victory of June 24 forced a large-scale withdrawal of both La Marmora and Cialdini (behind the Oglio and Panaro rivers, respectively) and a lull in the Italian action, which restarted only on 5 July with the beginning of Cialdini's operations against the Austrian bridgehead in Borgoforte. In the meantime, the Prussian victory in Sadowa/Königgrätz (3 July) and the collapse of Benedek's forces paved the way for the signing of the Nikolsburg preliminaries (26 July) and the end of the northern campaign. The evolving scenario prompted new Italian activism. On 14 July, the War Council met in Ferrara, chaired by King Victor Emmanuel and including the President of the Council of the Ministers, Baron Ricasoli, the Foreign, War and Navy ministers Visconti Venosta, Pettinengo, and Depretis, and generals La Marmora and Cialdini. It ratified –among else– a fourteen-division-thrust in Venetia and Friuli under General Cialdini, while General La Marmora engaged the "Quadrilatero". On 19 June, moving from Padua, one of Cialdini's divisions, under General Giacomo Medici (1817-1882), moved northward via the Valsugana to support Garibaldi's slow advance in Trentino.

The transfer of one Albrecht's corps to Austria and the redeployment of the other two to cover Trentino and the Isonzo line made the Italian penetration in the Venetia swift and relatively easy.

However, on 12 August, after the signing of the Cormòns armistice, troops had to withdraw behind the old administrative borders of the Lombardy-Venetia, evacuating those parts of Trentino and Friuli they had occupied in the previous weeks in their push to Trento and Trieste. On 3 October, the treaty of Vienna ratified the agreement. Austria lost Venetia, the territories still controlled in eastern Lombardy, and today's western Friuli up to the Judrio River. According to the treaty's provisions, Vienna ceded these territories to France, which transferred them to Italy after a formal plebiscite (21-22 October): a solution France had agreed on 29 July, through its ambassador at the Berlin court. For the Italian public opinion, these arrangements proved quite frustrating. The Italian-speaking Trentino and eastern Friuli (Princely County of Gorizia and Gradisca) remained under Habsburg sovereignty. The French involvement was perceived as humiliating for the national pride, while Prussia's attitude was resented due to the promise (made in art. 1 of the Nikolsburg preliminaries) that "[w]ith the Exception of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom, the Territory of the Austrian Monarchy remains intact".[4]

   In this highly emotional context, the political impact of the defeats that the Army and Navy had suffered during the conflict was momentous. Admiral Carlo Pellion di Persano (1806-1883), who commanded the fleet defeated in Lissa (20 July), was judged by the Italian Senate, condemned, and cashiered from duty (15 April 1867). For the land campaign, the effort to define responsibilities was far more elusive, mainly due to the direct involvement of the King as the (formal) head of the field army. Custoza was an encounter battle, largely unplanned, and its outcome was the product of many, sometimes contingent, elements. Poor or no reconnaissance; no actual battle plans; operational difficulties; misunderstandings; lack of coordination and a good deal of personal and professional jealousy between La Marmora and Cialdini; La Marmora's loss of temper after the withdrawal of the 1st and 3rd divisions: all these factors conjured in transforming a manageable setback into a large-scale retreat of the

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4   Edward Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty; Showing the Various Political and Territorial Changes which Have Taken Place since the General Peace of 1814*, vol. III, (London: Butterworths - Harrison, 1875), 1698-1701.

whole Italian dispositive. Between 25 and 29 June, a clash ensued between the commanders of the two Italian Armies about the relative authority and margin of responsibility, an event that made evident the already tricky relationship between them. Finally, the paralysis of the Italian military initiative led to diplomatic tensions with Prussia, which (already resentful for the lack of coordination) found what it believed the ally's weak fighting spirit a source of frustration.

Garibaldi's and Medici's successful penetrations in Trentino, as well as Cialdini's fast-paced advance in Venetia in pursuit of the withdrawing Austrian forces (Rovigo was reached on 11 July; Padua on 12 July; Treviso on 14 July; Vicenza on 21 July; and Udine on 22 July), were not enough to change the attitude of those who asked for a radical change in the Risorgimento's trajectory. In this perspective, the war opened a profound moral crisis in the country. On the one hand, Custoza and Lissa marked the end of the "heroic myth" of the Italian unification; on the other, they highlighted the limits of the "old" Piedmontese military culture that had produced La Marmora, Persano, and a large part of the senior officers who had led the troops on the field. The political instability that marked the period did not help ease the tensions. In the five years between 1866 and 1870, seven different governments rotated at the country's lead. In the same period, two generals –General Cialdini and General Luigi Menabrea (1809-1896)– became President of the Council of the ministers, with Menabrea presiding three cabinets in a row between October 1867 and November 1869. Military issues were also at the forefront of the debate due to the Kingdom's persistent security needs. At the same time, financial and budgetary constraints made any organic reform impossible and limited the government's action to adopting piecemeal measures that did not tackle the heart of the problems.

The "Prussian model" and the development of the Italian army

The main lesson drawn from the experience of the 1866 war was about the supposed superiority of the Prussian military model compared to the French model that the Kingdom of Italy had chosen in 1861 when it adopted the "Ordinamento Fanti". The foundation of this

"ordinamento" (just like of the "Ordinamento La Marmora" that preceded it) were a semi-professional, relatively small, high-quality army (which could, at the same time, fit the limited financial resources of the young Kingdom and soothe its fears about the impact of a large-scale draft system on the Army's political reliability) and a non-mobile national guard to take charge in wartime of all non-essential duties. The outcome was the product of a lively parliamentary debate; at the same time, it was clearly a compromise among different instances. The main strength of the "Ordinamento Fanti" was that it "did not exist the spiritual, cultural, psychological, social, financial and military conditions for a different choice", the main weakness – probably– was its resting on the same arrangements and organizational foundations that La Marmora created ten years earlier for the *pétite bonne armée* of the Kingdom of Sardinia.[5]

The efforts to overcome this situation started in early 1867. Between January and March, the War Minister General Efisio Cugia di Sant'Orsola (1818-1872) (who commanded the 8th division at Custoza) appointed and led a technical commission including generals Eugenio Beraudo di Pralormo (1822-1907), Ettore Bertolé Viale (1829-1892), Gerolamo "Nino" Bixio (1821-1873), Raffaele Cadorna (1815-1897), Giuseppe Govone (1825-1872), and Cesare Ricotti Magnani (1822-1917),[6] and charged with the elaboration of a first reform project "based on both the national and foreign experience". Cugia (who held his office until the end of the Ricasoli cabinet) also promoted the creation of a War School ("Scuola Superiore di Guerra") to provide a

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[5]   The quotation about the "Ordinamento Fanti" as only possible option is from Filippo Stefani, *La storia della dottrina e degli ordinamenti dell'Esercito Italiano*, vol. I, *Dall'Esercito piemontese all'Esercito di Vittorio Veneto*, (Roma: Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito - Ufficio Storico, 1984), 162. On the cultural debate about the "Ordinamento Fanti" and the proposed alterative solutions, see Virgilio Ilari, *Storia del servizio militare in Italia*, vol. I, *Dall'"Ordinanza Fiorentina" di Machiavelli alla costituzione dell'Esercito Italiano*, (Roma: Rivista Militare, 1989), 317 ff.

[6]   Together with Cugia, three other members of the commission held command positions in Custoza: General Bixio (who commanded the 7th division), General Govone (who commanded the 9th division), and General Beraudo di Pralormo (who commanded the cavalry of the III Army corps under General Enrico Morozzo della Rocca). While not directly involved in the battle, during the war in 1866, General Cadorna commanded the 17th division in the "Armata del Po", while General Bertolè Viale was head of the Army's General intendance during the war.

top-level professional formation to the Staff officers, the future commanders of the Army's major units, and the holders of posts of high organizational responsibility. In Cugia's vision, establishing the War School was just one step in a broader process to strengthen the officers' professional formation, since "the technical schools already working to this end since some years, did not meet the expectations, as far as their results are concerned".[7] This attitude explicitly referred to the Prussian experience, which Cugia mentioned in a "Report to His Majesty" ("Relazione a S.M.") accompanying the Royal Decree reordering the Army Staff.

The creation of the Scuola Superiore di Guerra was the only major reform that the Cugia commission carried out. Its proposals to overcome the "Ordinamento Fanti" envisaged a broader application of the draft system, a shorter service period, and an effort to limit the legal alternatives to the military service. However, they were abandoned after the Parliament reduced the budget of the War Ministry to 145 million lire (in 1865, it was 192,7 million, swollen to 510,8 million in 1866 due to the war needs[8]), forcing to partially disband both the wartime and peacetime establishment and ruling out any long-term transformation of the existing situation. It was just after three years, marred by recurrent crises, that –in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871– the Parliament passed the laws that shaped the new "Ordinamento Ricotti" (1870-1875).[9] Following the path that the Cugia commission opened, General Ricotti based his reform on a "short" compulsory service period (at the end of the process, the period was three years under the colours, and five in the cavalry), fed by a nationwide universal draft system, in which the

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[7]   "Le scuole tecniche funzionanti in tale intendimento da alcuni anni, non risposero all'aspettazione che si aveva dei loro risultati" [R.D. Riordinamento del Corpo di Stato Maggiore. Firenze, addì 11 marzo 1867. Relazione a S.M., in Giornale Militare. Ossia Raccolta Ufficiale della Leggi, Regolamenti e Disposizioni Relativi al Servizio e all'Amministrazione militare. Pubblicato per cura di Ministero della Guerra, (Firenze, Torino: Fodratti, 1867), 270-273 (270)].

[8]   Figures are in Giorgio Rochat, Giulio Massobrio, Breve storia dell'esercito italiano dal 1861 al 1943, (Torino: Einaudi, 1978), 67-68.

[9]   General Cesare Ricotti Magnani was War Minister in the Lanza cabinet (where he entered replacing General Govone on 7 September 1870) and Minghetti II cabinets, between 1870-1876 and, later, in the two Depretis cabinets (Depretis VI and VII) between 1884 and 1887.

different forms of substitution, commutation, and draft exemption were drastically limited (and progressively removed). In the long term, this system aimed to create a large and trained reserve force to replenish –in wartime– a framework of ten army corps kept at reduced strength in peacetime. Ricotti also envisaged creating two militias of different operational values (a mobile militia to support the mobilized field army and a territorial militia to perform second-line duties), both fed with discharged personnel.

Once again, the tight budgetary constraints imposed by Italy's economic and financial conditions impacted the system's implementation.[10] To partially cope with this problem, Ricotti envisaged a distinction between wartime and peacetime establishment and, within the peacetime establishment, between theoretical strength ("forza organica") and those actually under the colours ("forza bilanciata"), whose number varied according to the appropriation that the Parliament approved from year to year, with the assumption that the "forza bilanciata" should never have been less than half of the Army's wartime establishment. Despite these limits, the "Ordinamento Ricotti" proved quite effective in transferring the Prussian lesson in the Italian context. Some of its aspects radically differed from the original model. The nationwide draft system, for example, negatively impacted units' cohesion while the units' rotation among different regions approximately every four years and their frequent use in resented public order duties widened the existing gap between Army and society. However, such provisions were deemed essential in a country still lacking a mature national consciousness and living a turbulent period of transformation, and it appeared a relatively small price to pay to shape the Army's structure along the same lines of the most successful European power.

In this sense, "the history of the Italian Army's organization between 1870 and 1890, and even after, identifies with the 'Ordinamento Ricotti', which fully preserved its validity until the

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[10] On average, the Army budget accounted for 250 million lire in 1861-1865, 160 million lire in 1867-1872, and 180 in 1873-1876, including extraordinary expenses (Rochat, Massobrio, op.cit., 84). However, figures widely fluctuated from one year to the other, mostly impacting on the number of conscripts enrolled.

beginning of World War One".[11] The decline of the "Destra storica" (the liberal-conservative elite that presided over the Risorgimento process and, following Camillo Cavour's heritage, ruled the Kingdom in the first decades of its life[12]) only partially reverberated on the country's military policy. In 1876-1877, the "Ordinamento Mezzacapo" –the first one that the country's new political elite (the so-called "Sinistra storica") elaborated– tried to overcome some limits of the previous system (which Mezzacapo had heavily contested when at the opposition); on the other hand, it reaffirmed both Ricotti's guidelines and his "ordinamento"'s fundamental principles. The budgetary constraints remained (and impacted the reforms' implementation), but the public attention now focused on other elements. At both political and technical levels, the international context gained new prominence, and the efforts to keep the Italian standards up to the level of the other European powers received growing attention. The entry into the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary (20 May 1882) made the Army's efficiency an increasingly critical factor. At the same time, the vision of the army's role gradually shifted from defence (as it had been under the governments of the "Destra storica") to offence: another element that made the military elite increasingly resentful of the Parliamentary tugs-of-war and supported the request for more significant military budgets.

Alberto Pollio and the legacy of Custoza

The same general vision inspired the reforms carried out between the early 1880s and the late 1890s ("ordinamenti" Ferrero, 1882-1883; Bertolè-Viale, 1887-1888, and Pelloux, 1896), and paved the way to the large-scale changes started in 1909 upon the initiative of General Paolo Spingardi (in office: 1909-1914). Their common aim was keeping

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[11] Stefani, op.cit., 286.
[12] The political experience of the "Destra storica" ended on 18 March 1876, when Marco Minghetti's second cabinet resigned after a non-confidence vote. This "Parliamentary revolution" marked the first time when the Parliament –not the King– dismissed a government. After some twenty years at the opposition, the "Destra storica" returned to power in 1891-1892, with Antonio di Rudinì's first cabinet, and in 1896-1900, with the cabinets di Rudinì II-V and Pelloux I and II.

the Army's strength and technological standards adequate while avoiding overburdening the country's weak economy. Expansion and contraction phases alternated. The Army's budget increased in the 1880s from 201.9 million lire in 1881 to 403.1 million in 1888-1889; in the following years, it sharply declined before restarting to swing between the mid-1890s and mid-1900s. In 1882, Ricotti's ten Army corps grew to twelve, while the "forza bilanciata" passed from 207,000 men in 1884-1885 to 240,000 in 1890-1891, gradually closing the gap with the "forza organica" (253,000 men in 1884-1885; 270,855 in 1890-1891). However, the effort proved not entirely successful. If on the quantitative side the Italian army partially filled the gap existing with the other European armies, in qualitative terms the gap widened and the overall efficiency declined, since, despite growing technological investments, "the increase [in the number] of the infantry regiments was not matched by similar developments in armaments, heavy weaponry, and the other services".[13]

Despite this and other limits, the "Prussian model" remained the primary ideological reference of the Italian military elite. Its universal character matched the Italian favour for large-scale establishments. At the same time, it supported the vision of the Army as a "school of citizenship" that was popular among the leaders of the "Sinistra storica". If the principle that military service was compulsory to all citizens already appeared in the "Ordinamento Ricotti" (Law No 2532, 7 June 1875), the "Ordinamento Mezzacapo" embraced it, just like all the following reforms consistently did, also due to the "almost uncontested" influence that Mezzacapo exerted until 1884.[14] The fascination that Germany exerted on the Italian political circles during Francesco Crispi's premiership (1887-1891; 1893-1896) was another factor that contributed to the Prussian model's popularity. Sometimes seen as an embodiment of the "armed nation" concept, it also benefitted from its many ambiguities. "[T]he *armed nation* […] satisfies the ideals of the conservatives, who see in it a solution to the problem of having a large army with a limited expense; of the progressists, who saw in it a tool to deepen the merge between the army and the

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13   Rochat, Massobrio, op.cit., 114.
14   Virgilio Ilari, *Storia del servizio militare in Italia*, vol. II, *La "Nazione Armata" (1871-1918)*, (Roma: Rivista Militare, 1990), 139 ff.

nation; of the radicals, who aim at achieving Carlo Cattaneo's motto: *all militiamen, no soldier*, and oppose the *armed nation* to the current *barracked nation*".[15]

General Alberto Pollio (1852-1914), Chief of the Army Staff in 1908-1914, was one of the most prominent figures of the Italian "Prussian school". Military attaché to the Vienna embassy (1892-1897) and strongly pro-German, he outspokenly supported the country's participation in the Triple Alliance. As Chief of the Army Staff, he was an active promoter of the Army's modernization at technical and doctrinal levels (although the Italo-Turkish war on Libya in 1911-1912 partially impacted the results) and committed Italy to cooperate with the Central Empires in case of a European war.[16] Thanks to a positive relationship with the War Minister, General Paolo Spingardi (in office: 1909-1914), and following a trend started in 1906, during Pollio's tenure, the military ordinary and extraordinary expenditure grew from 356 million lire in 1908-1909 to 694 million in 1912-1913. Between 1909 and 1914, the renewal of the artillery park appropriated 145 million lire, the purchase of light weapons 25 million, and fortification and military roads and railways 24 million. In quantitative terms, between 1908-1909 and 1912-1913, the Army's strength increased from 236,110 to 250,000 men as "forza bilanciata" and from 272,688 to 274,850 as "forza organica".[17] Pollio's reforms also affected the Army's organization, its tactical and operational vision, its logistics, and fortification, de facto shaping the military instrument with which the Kingdom entered World War I.

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[15] "[L]a *nazione armata* [...] soddisfa agli ideali dei conservatori, che vedono in essa una soluzione al problema di avere un grande esercito con limitata spesa; dei progressisti, i quali vi scorgono un mezzo per aumentare maggiormente la fusione fra dell'esercito con la nazione; dei radicali, che mirano a realizzare il motto di Carlo Cattaneo: *tutti militi, nessun soldato*, e contrappongono la *nazione armata* all'attuale *nazione accasermata*" (Felice de Chaurand de Saint Eustache, *Le odierne tendenze nell'organizzazione degli eserciti*, (Roma: Carlo Voghera, 1888), 257-258).

[16] A sketch of Pollio's activity as Chief of the Army Staff is in Filippo Cappellano, "L'azione di Alberto Pollio Capo di Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito (1908-1914)", *Annali del Museo Storico Italiano della Guerra* 24 (2016), 109-133.

[17] *L'Esercito italiano nella Grande Guerra (1915-1918)*, vol. 1-bis, *Le forze belligeranti (Allegati)*, (Roma: Ministero della Guerra, Comando del Corpo di Stato Maggiore - Ufficio Storico, 1926), All. No 12.

As a military thinker, Pollio devoted special attention to Custoza. When he wrote his *Custoza (1866)*[18], the battle had already been widely studied. In 1866, the *Rivista Militare Italiana* had published the relation by then Major Giovanni Corvetto (1830-1898, a future head of the Army Staff Study Branch). In the same year, Corvetto's work was published as a volume, while in 1875-1895, the Army Staff published a two-volume official history (*La campagna del 1866 in Italia*), and later a two-volumes *Complemento* (1909)[19]. In the wake of the war, several technical aspects had been reviewed, and a mass of popular literature had contributed to form a sort of "conventional wisdom" about the event. Although typically to justify their decisions, La Marmora and other protagonists also contributed to the debate. However, in the cultural milieu of the early 20th century, Pollio's approach had a peculiar value. In dealing with the reasons for the defeat, he mentioned the lack of a unified command, the contrasts between La Marmora and Cialdini, and the limits of the Piedmontese military elite, remarking how, due to the "immense improvements" that the Army had made since that time, "we will do no more many of those tactical errors"[20]. More radically, Pollio criticized what he saw as the high command's lack of resolution, comparing this attitude to the "firmness" ("fermezza") he praised as the primary military virtue ("la massima delle virtù guerriere").

In this sense, Pollio's reading of the events (especially La Marmora's behaviour, and his "inexplicable" and "incomprehensible" decision to "abandon [the Army] in a moment when a direction was more needed […] than ever; when things were *almost restored* on all the front"[21]) reflected his favour for a more aggressive approach to the

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[18] Alberto Pollio, *Custoza (1866)*, (Torino: Roux &Viarengo, 1903).

[19] [G. Corvetto], *La campagna del 1866 in Italia. Note e documenti. Con carte e piani*, (Torino, Firenze: G. Cassone e Comp., 1866); *La campagna del 1866 in Italia. Redatta dalla sezione storica del Corpo di Stato maggiore*, 2 vols, (Roma: Carlo Voghera, 1875-1895); *Complemento alla Storia della campagna del 1866 in Italia*, 2 vols, (Roma: Stab. Tip. della Società editrice laziale, 1909).

[20] Pollio, op.cit., 4.

[21] "Tutti gli errori, le omissioni, le illusioni del G[enerale] La Marmora, si possono spiegare e scusare. Ma che egli, quale comandante effettivo di un Esercito, lo abbandoni appunto nel momento in cui è più necessaria che mai, ed è possibile, una direzione; nel momento in cui le cose erano *pressoché ristabilite* su tutta la fronte, è cosa inesplicabile. Che poi lasci l'Esercito senza rimettere a nessuno il comando, anzi senza

battlefield, generally seen as a pillar of the "Prussian way of warfare". Beyond the technical fault, what transformed the Austrian tactical success in Custoza into a crushing victory (and, from the Italian side, a military humiliation) was –in his vision– the Italian high command's lack of fighting spirit. The point emerges from the very beginning. According to Pollio: "[t]he battle of Custoza was defined a fiasco, and such it was until the evening of June 24. It became the worst of the defeats after that us, renouncing to any counter offensive concept, withdrew first behind the Oglio River, and later behind the Po!"[22]. The same idea emerges in the narrative of what happened on 24-25 June. Although "[i]t was probably difficult to retry an attack in the morning of the same [June] 25", a "simple offensive move would have neutralised, to a large extent, the negative moral effect of the unhappy action of [June] 24". "Our final withdrawal, instead, gave […] to the unhappy tactical action, the character that it had not, viz that of a total defeat".[23]

In this perspective, Pollio's interpretation of the 1866 campaign was a sort of manifesto. Unsurprisingly, firmness and decision were also the pillars of the tactical regulations he approved as Chief of the Army Staff, such as the *Norme generali per l'impiego delle grandi unità di Guerra* and the *Norme per il combattimento*, both adopted in 1913). While not endorsing an "all-out offensive" vision like the French contemporary *offensive à outrance*, these regulations constantly emphasized the need for an aggressive posture and left ample room for the subordinate commanders to exploit local tactical advantages, another element whose lack Pollio critically highlighted in *Custoza*. Equally important was the emphasis placed on the role of infantry and the need for greater cooperation with the other branches of service, especially artillery, which should have increased its tactical mobility to provide adequate fire support to the advancing troops.

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lasciar disposizioni di sorta, è assolutamente incomprensibile", (Pollio, op.cit., 326-327).

[22] "La battaglia di Custoza fu definita un insuccesso, e tale era di fatto la sera del 24 giugno. Divenne la più completa delle sconfitte, dopo che noi, rinunziando ad ogni concetto contr'offensivo, ci ritirammo da prima dietro l'Oglio e poi dietro il Po!", (Pollio, op.cit., 4).

[23] Pollio, op.cit., 398.

After Pollio's sudden death (1 July 1914), the new Chief of the Army Staff, General Luigi Cadorna (1850-1928), partially revised these regulations, uneasily integrating what seemed to be the lessons of the early months of World War I. However, Pollio's vision remains the most coherent example of the Prussian model's influence on the 19th-century Italian military establishment, playing a relevant part in shaping the officer corps' mindset –especially of its professional component– until the eve of the Great War.

Concluding remarks

The *Custoza* heritage reverberated on the development of the Italian army and its self-perception in different cultural and political ways. Among else, it made the adoption of the "Prussian model" a sort of panacea to its perceived structural and operational limits. If the effort to embrace this model was only partially successful on the organisational side (mainly due to the persisting economic and financial constraints), things were somewhat different on the ideological side, transforming the Prussian (later German) experience into a sort of mantra. General Pollio's reading of the battle of 1866 highlights how deeply the "offensivist" approach penetrated the Italian military professional culture, according to a pattern that was common to all the major contemporary armies. Pollio's attitude was not exceptional. It can be framed into a broader contrast that, in late 19th/early 20th century's Italy, opposed pro-Germany and pro-France factions in the political, economic, cultural, and social realm. Despite the technical, tactical, and organizational transformation it triggered (most of them stemming from the German experience on the Western front), World War I only partially impacted this state of things. Worth noting, the debate of the immediate post-war years about the Army's future also witnessed a revival of the armed nation idea, whose inherent ambiguities made it palatable to the progressive forces without rising too much hostility from the conservative circles.

CURRICULUM VITAE

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WORKING SESSION XI

Chair: Tomasz Ciesielski (Poland)

29. FROM ROME TO ATHENS: THE CARABINIERI PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION IN CRETE TO BUILD THE NEW CRETAN GENDARMERIE (1897-1906)

Flavio Carbone (Italy)

Foreword

A French officer wrote the best words on the Italian Carabinieri role during quite 10 years of peace-keeping operation in Crete: "l'oeuvre entreprise par un modeste capitaine secondé par six officiers seulement, sur un territoire à peu plus aussi étendu que celui de la Corse, ou nous avons un lieutenant-colonel, deux chefs d'escadron et onze commandants d'arrondissement, m'a paru, au début, une entreprise bien téméraire. Ma conviction était que jamais les Italiens n'arriveraient à discipliner et à faire, d'anciens insurgés, des gendarmes. Grâce à leur persévérance, aux qualités militaires et à l'intelligente activité qu'ils ont déployés en cette occurrence, ils sont arrivés en fort peu de temps a d'excellents résultats".[1] Who is the speaker? The speaker is a Captain of the French Gendarmerie, Gustave Biche-Latour, an expert in the domain. He wrote an article speaking about the job done by the Italian Carabinieri on the island of Crete. Again, the same author continues later "Néanmoins, ils eurent le grand mérite d'accomplir leur devoir dans des conditions particulièrement difficiles. Mal logés, mal nourris, faisant leur service par des chemins presque impraticables, ils surent surmonter toutes les difficultés et arriver rapidement à des excellents résultats. Il leur a fallu en outre montrer beaucoup de tact et de fermeté pour résister jusqu'à ce jour aux empiétements des autorités civiles, qui ignorant les attribution exactes de la gendarmerie et les leurs à l'égard de cette arme, croient pouvoir la commander et la diriger à leur gré et fantaisie".[2]

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[1] Capitaine Gustave Biche-Latour, "Etude sur le Corps des Carabiniers Italiens et la Gendarmerie Crétoise", *Journal de la Gendarmerie* 2248 (27 Novembre 1903), 776.
[2] Ibid., 778.

In his article dated 1903, the French Gendarmerie officer Gustave Biche-Latour gave the perfect feeling of the mission and the results that Carabinieri achieved (Figure 1).

The political framework

Between the XIX and the XX Century, the Ottoman Empire collapsed little by little. Specifically, the situation in Crete was very complex because of the fights between the ethnic groups, the local Cretans and the Ottoman authorities and military forces. In 1897, the main Powers of the time intervened on Crete island to stop the skirmishes between the Cretan insurgents supported by Greek forces and the Ottoman units. European Powers (Britain, France, Italy, Germany, The Austro-Hungarian Empire, Russia) imposed a truce (Figure 2). The Council of Admirals had the provisional authority on Crete, leaving out the Ottomans. This action led to the birth of an autonomous State under the formal sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire.[3]

With the massacre of 6th September 1898 caused by Ottoman Cretans towards Greeks islanders and British forces (the Vice-Consul, his family and 14 soldiers died), all the Ottoman forces were forced to leave. So at the end of the year the Admirals' council ended its duties and the Prince George of Greece started his new mandate as High Commissioner.[4]

So, which was the role of Italian Carabinieri in the International Peacekeeping operation? When the European Powers stopped the insurrection through the naval bombardment, the blockade of the main cities and disembarkation of sailors and marines from the naval

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[3]   Emanuela Alberini, *La Marina italiana a Creta – Il potere marittimo in funzione della politica estera (1896-1899)*, (Roma: Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare, 1998). See Giovanni Battista Casa, *Creta Insurrezione del 1896-97 – Marinai e Soldati d'Italia a Creta*, (Livorno: Giusti editore, 1906), 213-482.
[4]   For further analysis of the political situation see Antonello Biagini, Leopoldo Nuti, "Note sulla partecipazione italiana a corpi di spedizione internazionale", in *Studi Storico-Militari 1995*, (Roma: Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito - Ufficio Storico, 1996), 497-513; Claudia Reichl-Nam, "Viribus Unitis? Austria-Hungary and its participation in the peace mission on Crete in 1897/98", in *39o Congresso della Commissione Internazionale di Storia Militare Torino 1-6 settembre 2013 - Le operazioni interforze e multinazionali nella storia militare Acta*, t. I, (Roma: Commissione Italiana di Storia Militare, 2013), 240-256; Constantine Kerofilas, *Venizelos his life and work*, (London: John Murray, 1915), 27-29.

units, an International Gendarmerie had been established under 4 European Powers (Britain, France, Italy and Russia) who controlled four different parts of the island.[5]

The provisional presence of the "International Gendarmerie" created different problems in recruiting and training local personnel. So a new decision of the Admirals' council led to the building of a unique Cretan Gendarmerie under the guidance of the Italian Carabinieri.

The first team led by Captain Federico Craveri and composed by the lieutenants Arcangelo De Mandato and Candido Celoria, with the sergeant-major (brigadiere) Giuseppe Pesavento arrived on 6th February 1897 during the building of the International Gendarmerie Force under the control of the European Powers (Figure 3).[6]

The Italian Carabinieri mission

The need to coordinate the efforts to guarantee public order and private security led the Great Powers and the High Commissioner to ask for the deployment of the Italian Carabinieri Officers and NCOs as the backbone to build the Cretan Gendarmerie.[7]

The first bunch of Carabinieri had been employed creating the 1st Battalion of the International Gendarmerie, where Craveri became the commander with the rank of major. On 10 March 1897, the International Gendarmerie dissolved.[8]

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[5]   Cesare Cesari, "Le truppe italiane a Candia (1897-1906)", *Rassegna dell'Esercito* XI-XII (1925), 3-21.
[6]   A synthesis of the Carabinieri role in Crete in Umberto Rocca, "I Reali Carabinieri nell'isola di Creta (1897-1906)", *Informazioni della Difesa* 5 (2006), 42-47. The presence of armed forces was maintained till the end of the mandate in 1906, for the Italian posture see Giovanni Macchi, "Partecipazione italiana ad una operazione multinazionale: Creta 1897-1906", in *Studi Storico-Militari 1985*, (Roma: Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito - Ufficio Storico, 1986), 665-710.
[7]   Umberto Ancarani, *La Gendarmeria cretese organizzata dai RR. Carabinieri italiani e cenni cronologici sul Corpo Internazionale d'occupazione in Creta 1897-1903*, (Atene: Tipografia P.D. Sakellarios, 1903).
[8]   Maria Gabriella Pasqualini, *Le missioni all'estero dei Carabinieri 1855-1935*, (Roma: Ente Editoriale Arma dei Carabinieri, 2001), 28-49 and Umberto Ancarani, *L'azione diplomatica dell'Italia per la pace in Oriente 1896-1907*, (Roma: Tipografia delle Mantellate, 1926).

The Great Powers of the time acknowledged the failure of their intentions due to the hostility and corruption encountered together with the lack of unity in the command and instructions.

Nonetheless, Admiral Canevaro, the chairman of the Admiral Council asked for and obtained from the Italian Ministry of War to keep the officers under his command.

Police functions continued to be nominally carried out by the Ottoman force, but the service was performed effectively by the sailors landed, by the Carabinieri Reali and 80 Montenegrins gendarmerie personnel arrived on the Island in February.

According to what other European countries decided, the Army General Staff sent an Italian contingent of about 1,550 men, authorizing the departure of another 30 Carabinieri, who arrived on the island on 24 April 1897 to be allocated to Candia and to Hyerapietra.

The island was divided into sectors under the influence of the different European nations, to better control the area.

In May 1897 the council of admirals decided to put directly under the orders of Captain Craveri the Ottoman Gendarmerie still present, waiting for establishing and organizing the Cretan Gendarmerie. Another contingent of 20 Carabinieri arrived in November to support the action led by Craveri. The situation was really critical because of the tension among the Turkish gendarmes and their own Command. There was the need to contain mutinies, due to the lack of salary payment.

On 23 July 1898 Italy handed over to France the International Superior Command and the direction of the police service to the French Gendarmerie. Following this transfer of authority quite 20 Carabinieri returned to Italy. Craveri remained at the Admirals' Council disposal with the task of organizing and facilitating the harmonization of the instituting Gendarmerie Regiment, who received all the gendarmerie and the local police forces trained by the European powers.

In August 1898 the newly elected Cretan Parliament officially deliberated to establish the new Cretan Gendarmerie Corps

appointing captain Craveri as commander, for the work carried out by the Carabinieri Reali. The High commissioner for the Island, Prince George of Greece, arrived in December, starting his office.

In January 1899, other 12 Carabinieri units arrived, including NCOs, in order to proceed establishing new Cretan Gendarmerie stations in the Italian sector. At the same time captain Craveri presented to the local authority his conclusion for the organization of the Cretan Gendarmerie. Other Carabinieri departed from Italy, after the request of Prince George.

On 26 June 1899, captain Craveri handed over the command of the all Cretan Gendarmerie. From that moment the organization phase moved from theoretical to a more operational level.

The new Cretan Gendarmerie was organized by five companies under the Italian Carabinieri lieutenants command, with two companies in Chania, one in Heraklion, one in Rétimo and one in Mirabella.

According to the Carabinieri regulation, the gendarmes trainees should have been selected among local young men "considered best for physical strength and quality moral". In Chania, at the Gendarmerie Command headquarters, a small NCOs' School had been established with the purpose of training local personnel in order to fulfil the tasks as Gendarmerie station commanders.

The good results obtained in training of the Cretan islanders allowed the repatriation of a first group of Italian Carabinieri in March 1900. In the same period the approval of a new regulation for the Cretan Gendarmerie clarified the enrollment and promotion system using the Italian one as a model.

In some reports to Italy, Craveri wrote that Cretan gendarmes performed their duty showing "sense of duty, giving proof of good will and zeal".

New challenges for the Carabinieri

On 6th June 1900 a ceremony marked the transfer of authority from captain Craveri to the count Captain Balduino Caprini (Figure 4).[9] The

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[9] Pasqualini, op.cit., 50-57.

second commander of the Gendarmerie had some contrasts with the High Commissioner and other authority in the struggle to defend his autonomy in front of the political power in the island. Two years later, in 1902, however, he proposed to the Carabinieri General Headquarters to extend the presence of the Carabinieri on the island. He absolved the role of unit commander, chairman of the administration council of the corps (an administrative body tasked to manage the logistical and administrative fonctions) and the disciplinary council chairman.

He also intervened rearranging the Gendarmerie service and dismissing those local elements who did not give certain guarantees to perform the service in the best of ways (Figure 5). All these movements created discontent such as to consider an inspection convenient in Crete, authorized by the Ministry of War.

The inspection led by international authorities had very positive results with attestations of esteem of the other commanders and diplomats.

Because of his authoritarian ways, after 1902 Caprini had some differences with Prince George, who complained of not being held by him due account as Head of the Gendarmerie (Figure 6).

Caprini himself wrote to Italy to have some difficulties in interpersonal relationships. In defence of the officer it must be said that he had taken charge of his role with a deep sense of duty in an attempt to form an efficient high-level gendarmerie, according to the Italian models. Thus, misunderstandings and conflicts pushed Caprini to ask for his repatriation (Figure 7).

The real problem arose from the new climate created: the Cretan Chamber had gradually become hostile to the foreign element in general and they did road to new nationalistic pressures. Cretan interference in the Italian administration was emphasized in his reports also by the Italian Consul in Crete, Count Negri. For those reasons Caprini moved to the Macedonian Gendarmerie, under the command of lieutenant general Emilio De Giorgis, who requested a Carabinieri officer with extensive expertise in the field.

Caprini left Crete on 23rd September 1903, receiving Prince George esteem and appreciation for the work done.

The third and last commander of the Cretan Gendarmerie was Captain Eugenio Monaco who found Italian Carabinieri 60 men. He had the delicate task of stitching up the relations with the local authorities to continue the work.[10]

The so-called "Theriso revolt"

The most difficult event to deal with for Captain Monaco was the so-called "Theriso revolt" between March and November 1905.[11] In this paper it is important the position of the Cretan Gendarmerie (Figure 8). So during this long period the Cretan Gendarmerie remained loyal to her officers and to Prince George, confronting the rebels. The behaviour of the gendarmes showed the benefits of the training and the self-confidence they had in managing the confrontation with small losses from both parts: we can remember the different episodes in Voukolies (end of April) with 3 rebels and 2 gendarmes killed, the fight of Koubes (august 1905), with some victims among the insurgents.

A new political dialogue between Prince George and Venizelos, the political leader of the unification movement failed. In September the Cretan assembly voted for new laws in order to reduce the prince's power asking for a national assembly. On the political side the situation was a stalemate. From the perspective of the rebels, the coming winter pushed some of them to accept the amnesty. In October, the dialogue between Venizelos and the European consuls led by a new amnesty with the surrender of the rebels who obtained honourable conditions to stop any actions. At the end of the insurrection only the former gendarmes who deserted were not allowed to receive any indulgence. They would have transferred to Greece.

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[10] Ibid., 58-63. Flavio Carbone, "Medaglioni per una storia dell'Arma: il Capitano Eugenio Monaco", *Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento* XCIX(I) (2012), 77-90.
[11] Enrico Fumo, "La Gendarmeria cretese durante l'ultima insurrezione (23 marzo - 26 novembre 1906)", *Rivista Militare Italiana* 2 (1907), 297-321; Samuel Beach Chester, *Life of Venizelos*, (London: Constable and Company, 1921), 30-133 and Kerofilas, op.cit., 38-52.

The international commission who visited Crete recommended handing over the Cretan gendarmerie to Greek officers, with the withdrawal of the European forces from the Island (Figure 9).

So, on 25th July 1906, the European powers announced new reforms and among them the end of the Italian presence at the head of the Cretan gendarmerie.

In August 1906 the Italian Consul in Crete, Baron Carlo Fasciotti, proposed to keep open only a Carabinieri station in Chania to provide judicial service to the consul.

In November, a Carabinieri station was established in Chania for providing military police functions during repatriation operations. On 31 December 1906, the third and last Italian commander of the Cretan gendarmerie left the island with the last Carabinieri after the handover to the Greek officer Artillery Lieutenant Colonel, Andreas Momferratos, head of the Greek mission in Crete.

The Carabinieri received recognition and gratitude for the job done providing the Cretan Independence Island a professional and valuable force: the Cretan Gendarmerie.

Conclusions

During about 10 years, the Carabinieri Officers, NCOs and Carabinieri were able to build reliance and competences in the new Cretan Gendarmerie.

So in 1906 all the Carabinieri left the new Corps and Crete in the hands of Greek officers. In that long period, Italians were able to build up the Cretan Gendarmerie who gained the trust of the Cretans and the foreigners.

The most important evidence of the job done was the behaviour of the Cretan Gendarmerie during the Theriso Revolt (March-November 1905).

The European Powers agreed to gradually leave the Island and to transfer the authority from the Italian Carabinieri officers to Greek colleagues. The Gendarmerie at the end of 1906 was under the command of Greek officers (mainly from the Army) with new commissioned officers coming from the Cretan ranks.

The good results of the Italian job led Greece to ask for an Italian mission in order to reorganise the Greek Gendarmerie between 1912 and 1923, but this is another story.[12]

Figure 1: 1905. Bilingual (Italian – Hellenic) postcard celebrating the Cretan Gendarmerie.

Source: Carabinieri Museum Postcards Collection.

Figure 2: Crete island, Cretan Gendarmerie personnel, officers and NCOs
from the Countries of the International Force.

Source: Carabinieri Direction of historical and documentary
assets photo library No 36.32.

Sopra: Guardie civiche del settore italiano (col Comandante, Capitano Craveri e il Tenente De Mandato); sotto: ufficiali della Gendarmeria Cretese (il 4°, da sinistra, è il Comandante Conte Caprini).

Figure 3: Civic Guards of the Italian sector (With Commander, Captain
Craveri and Lieutenant De Mandato.

Source: Carabinieri Direction of historical and documentary assets
photo library No 36.33(2).

Figure 4: 1902. Officers of the Cretan Gendarmerie. From the left to the right:
Lieutenant Carlo Fabroni, Lieutenant Egidio Garrone, Lieutenant Luigi
Bassi, Captain Balduino Caprini, Lieutenant Ferdinando Mensitieri,
Lieutenant Costantino Bucas (Hellenic Navy), Lieutenant Giuseppe Borgna.

Source: Carabinieri Direction of historical and documentary
assets photo library No 36.33(1).

Figure 5: 1902. Drilling in summer uniform; on the right Captain Caprini.

Source: Carabinieri Direction of historical and documentary assets
photo library No 36.34.

Figure 6: 1902. Parade of Cretan Gendarmes in front of the High
Commissioner Prince George of Greece on his name-day.

Source: Carabinieri Direction of historical and documentary assets
photo library No 36.53.

Figure 7: 1902. Officers and NCOs of the Cretan Gendarmerie.

Source: Carabinieri Direction of historical and documentary assets
photo library No 36.54.

Gendarme a cavallo in grande uniforme.

Figure 8: 1899. Crete: on horse gendarme in parade uniform.

Source: Carabinieri Direction of historical and documentary assets
photo library No 36.89.

Figure 9: 1899. Crete: on horse vicebrigadiere (sergeant) and gendarme in duty uniform.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Flavio Carbone, alumni of the Military School Nunziatella of Naples (197o promotion), after the military Academy in Modena (169o promotion), received the insignia of Carabinieri officer, on duty in different parts of Italy and in different organizations within the Carabinieri corps (training, mobile, territorial, central). Currently he is lieutenant colonel.

For about 20 years, he has been dealing with the history of the Carabinieri and the history of military institutions. For about 15 years, he works on military archives. He is the president of the Committee of Military Archives within the ICMH. He received a Ph.D. in contemporary history and a Ph.D. in Archival Science.

He published 5 books about history and archival science, edited 3 and printed more than 100 essays, articles, part of books and congress presentations.

30. THE 1814-1815 CAMPAIGN OF MURAT. IMPERIAL FALL OR NATIONAL DAWN?

Paolo Formiconi (Italy)

A brave new king

When in 1808 Napoleon chose his major brother Giuseppe as a substitute of the Bourbons in Madrid, he gave the Kingdom of Naples to the general Joachim Murat. Murat –named as King "Gioacchino Napoleone"– was his sister's Carolina husband.[1]

However Murat aspired to the Kingdom of Poland or Spain rather than being the "prince consort" of the Kingdom of Naples. Arriving there on 1st August 1808, he –as well as his wife– was convinced to have been not enough thanked for his services.[2] Although, once seated on the throne, they started quickly a dynamic activity, oriented to get the favour of their new people and remarked the independence of the "Kingdom of Naples". Murat became quickly quite popular, and this fact encouraged him to keep on.

Fatefully, this way would have conduct to a serious conflict with Napoleon. He knew Murat pretty well and identified him with a good soldier but ambitious and inconstant. In order to had him under a continuous surveillance he sent to Naples Saliceti, his loyal and trusted old friend with the charge of Minister of War and chief of the Police. At the same time he included in the Naples's government many French officers.

Moreover, especially in the army, French personnel was averagely poor. Thus, almost all of the Frenches that have chosen to be employed in the Neapolitan army, had failed in the French one.

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[1]   Napoleon himself said to spanish delegates his will of give the Spanish crown to "another me". A concept of sovranity that couldn't agree with his sister ambitions. Virgilio Ilari, Piero Crociani, Giancarlo Boeri, *Storia militare del Regno Murattiano*, (Roma: USSME, 2008), 16-18.

[2]   "I'm not another Baciocchi", said Murat, alluding to his brother-in-law Felice Baciocchi, husband of Elisa, the other sister of Napoleon and Queen of Etrururia. For a complete analisys of the french age in the Naple's Kingdom, see also: John A. Davis, *Naples and Napoleon. Southern Italy and European Revolutions 1790-1860*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

At first, things went quite well. On 5 October 1808 the French –
Naples army- the garrison commanded by the general Hudson Lowe,
the future guardian of Napoleon in S. Elena took the island of Capri,
in front of Naples. Following such victory, which increased Murat's
vanity, the climax changed.[3]

The main problem was represented by the *continental blockade*, that
precluded the long-standing commerce with Great Britain and forced
the Kingdom to buy all his, at any price, from France.

At first, Murat tried an underground action by calling around him
an "Italian party", formed by the old Italian jacobins, interested to
build an Italian state, like the Italian general Pino, one of the most
important officers of the Kingdom of Italy. Many others just wanted to
replace Frenchs in the government charges.[4]

The emperor, informed day by day of the continuing violations of
the blockade, wrote to Murat: "I remind you that you are a king only
on my will and for the general profit of the Empire".

The crisis was revived after the Saliceti's death (December 1809).
He was replaced by general Daure. Shortly afterwards, when his affair
with the queen Carolina was uncovered, Daure was dismissed by the
king.[5]

When informed, Napoleon ordered to the French army in Italy to
occupy the Kingdom. Murat immediately wrote a touching letter,
professing himself "almost died" and declaring "Sir, you are losing
your best friend". Napoleon was really furious but, in a subsequent
meeting, decided to accept his apologises. As a proof of loyalty, Murat
illustrated to Napoleon a plan aimed at capturing Sicily the next
summer.

Napoleon was not excited at all but, at the end, decided to
implement it. Afterward he stated: "When he see me, he is totally
mine. But far from me, he is of who flatters him".

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[3] For the Capri's conquest, see: Piero Crociani, "Lo sbarco e la conquista di Capri. 4-
7 ottobre 1808", in *Le operazioni interforze e multinazionali nella storia militare. Atti del 39o
Congresso della Commissione Internazionale di Storia Militare*, Torino 1-6 settembre 2013,
(Roma: USSME, 2014), 189-195.
[4] Reuben John Rath, *The fall of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy. 1814*, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1941), 85.
[5] Ilari, Crociani, Boeri, op.cit., 20-21.

Tried in September, the invasion of Sicily failed. Murat blamed French officers for sabotaging the campaign and issued a law to force all of French officers of the kingdom to naturalized themselves as Naples citizens. It was just too much. Napoleon forced him to immediately cancel the law, and considered to transform Naples in a part of the Empire. Only two years before, he has done the same with his brother Louis, King of Holland, and for the same reason: his hostility to the Continental blockade.[6]

Few months later, in 1811 Murat and Carolina arrived in Paris for the birth of the "King of Rome", Napoleon's son. The meeting was very unpleasant, but, surprisingly, Murat gained an appeal proof. Unfitting in the role of king, he has always been an excellent commander. Preparing the invasion of Russia, another half-friend state which not agrees with the blockade, Napoleon wanted Murat at the head of his chivalry.

Bentink: In Italy like in Spain

Murat took part with 30,000 Italian soldiers to the Russian campaign. He showed himself grateful to the emperor. But rumours of emperor's brooding geted to him, probably by his wife Carolina. He was against his husband politics, but was also really scared by his powerful brother's intention to abolish the Kingdom of Naples.

Was exactly in this period that, by the half-legal commercial relations, some contacts were created between Naples and Britons deployed in Sicily in order to protect the last Bourbon land in Italy.[7]

At the head of British troops were Lord Bentink, a peculiar army officer of radical opinions, who hated the absolutism, that he was forced to endure in Sicily, and dreamed to create in Italy a new model of state on the ruins of the Napoleonic system.[8]

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[6]   Desmond Gregory, *Napoleon's Italy*, (Cranbury, N.J.: Fairley Dickinson University Press, 2001), 102.
[7]   George F. Natziger, Marco Gioannini, *The defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy (1813-1814)*, (Connecticut, London: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 5-7.
[8]   John Rosselli, *Lord William Bentink e l'occupazione britannica in Sicilia, 1811-1814*, (Palermo: Sellerio, 2002).

In the same period another British officer, Arthur Weelesley duke of Wellington, was leading the Spanish war, at the head of a British army that would be the nemesis of the French generals.

Bentink, who was not exactly a friend of Welleslsey, thought that a similar plot was possible in Italy, repeating the success gained in the 1800 at the age of the Partenopean Republic's fall, but at that time with a national and democratic liberation army.[9]

It was the same project of the mysterious Italo-Spanish officer, Giuseppe Lahoz, an unusual Jacobean officer and conspirator. Some years before Lahoz, considering himself treasured by the French Italian policy, planned with the Anglo-Austrian help, a democratic counter revolution in Eastern Italy, and died under the wall of Ancona fighting against his old French comrades.

To led the rebellion, he planned to take an Italian prince, who would become king of an Italian unified state after the war, *wall against French and Germans cruel intensions in Mediterranean.*

The British government accepted the idea, and considered in a first time to rescue, with a commando action, the Pope Pio VII from Rome, transfer him to Malta and transform the "holy man" in the chief of the "Italian crusade".[10] After the capture of the Pope in France, ordered by Napoleon exactly to avoid his withdrawal, the choice was on Francesco Asburgo-Este, an Austro-Italian prince, former pretender to Modena Principate, but the Austrian Empire denied his favour. A free and independent state of Italy was the last thing that Asburgo wanted.

After all, also Napoleon, listening the proposal of a greater unified Kingdom of Italy, replied: "Never! I would rather lost my Empire. A unified Italy is a threat for France".[11]

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[9]   For a complete exam of the British seapower in the guarrilla's substain, see: Virgilio Ilari, *Debellare Superbos. Taccuino 2003-2014*, (Roma: [n.n.], 2012), 255-257.

[10]   Ibid., 175.

[11]   Some years before, knowing the intention of some Italian notables about a united Italian Kigdom, Napoleon, said "The Italians declaring their independence! "They had better merit it. When they have an army of 40,000 men, only then will the French leave Italy. [...] The Italians are a people without character, false, intriguers, whom I have been mistaken in raising to the status of nationhood", Gregory, op.cit., 62.

Bentink, training in Sicily an Anglo-Italian army called "Italian Levy", was thinking over a new possibility, when the crisis between Murat and Napoleon opened new chances to his project.[12]

Joint with the Allies, but not against Napoleon

The crisis arrived after the Russian disaster on 1812. At the end of the retreat, Murat left the command to Eugenio de Beuharneis, deputy-king of Italy and son-in-law of Napoleon, and came back as quickly as possible to Naples.

Few weeks later Austria and Prussia, allied in the Napoleon campaign, came back on the Russian, and British, side and London's diplomacy upgraded their efforts to find further allies on the French little-allies: Sweden, Saxony, Bavaria, and also in Italy.

Therefore Bentink was authorized to send a formal –and secret– proposal of alliance to the Murat's government. Joachim, just back in his capital and probably already traumatized by the Russian defeat, accepted the idea, but only in case of Allies' promise of giving him Tuscany and Papal States. Instead, he would take the arms against Napoleon and the Kingdom of Italy in the next war.

It's hard to not consider this a treason, but on Murat view, the Napoleonic policy was itself a treason. How he would properly govern if every decision was totally on French advantage?

Murat was really interested in becoming an ally of Great Britain? Was Great Britain really in power to refuse a coming back of the Bourbon on the Naple's throne? Last but not least, what Austria, Prussia and Russia would have thought about a similar luck? Probably all they were waiting the events. When Napoleon in May won the hard battle of Bautzen, Murat ordered a *Te Deum* in Naples cathedral.[13]

On the 11 June the *Morning Chronicle* published the news that the Naple's Kingdom has signed an economic agreement with the United Kingdom. It was not all true. At the moment, Murat was already waiting the Bentink's reply when Napoleon wrote him a letter: "The

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12   Ilari, Crociani, Boeri, op.cit., 255-256.
13   Ibid., 69.

title of king has confused your head. If you dont' want to lose it, behave right".

It was enough. Murat stopped the negotiations and reached Napoleon in Germany, where they won their last battles in the German campaign of 1813.

Nevertheless, on 16 October they lost the decisive battle of Leipzig, during which Swedish troops were led by another former-French Marshall, Bernadotte, and the Saxon one abandoned French side.

Come back to Italy, Murat discovered that, during his absence, his wife Carolina had took contact with the imperial minister Metternich, her former lover, and undertook to join Naples to the Allies front, renouncing to any idea of *Italian state*. Like a castaway who see the land, Murat accepted.

Austrians and Britons showed him their war plan: the Italo-French army under the command of Eugenio was defending the Isonzo-line. An Austrian contingent under the command of Nugent will land at the mouth of the Po, on the back-side of Eugenio. Another one, with Bentink, will take Livorno, and after advance toward Piedmont. A Bavarian army will march down from the Alpes.[14]

If Murat will marched trough the central Italy to the right side of the Po, the Italo-French army will be forced to roll back on Lombardy and, few late, in France.

Murat accepted but at the moment of action exited. On November his army was in Bologna, but he didn't start the operations against the Italo-French army. Why?

On 13 November Fouché, the French minister of interior, met general Pino and encouraged him to propose to Murat the plan of the Italian independence, but under French protection.[15]

On 22 November, Eugenio also will receive a similar proposal by his father in law, the king of Bavaria: an Italian northern-state, over Lombardy, Modena and Romania, but he refused.

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14   Natziger, Gioannini, op.cit., 103-107.
15   Virgilio Ilari, Piero Crociani, Ciro Paoletti, *Storia Militare del Regno Italico. 1802-1814*, (Roma: USSME, 2004), 69-70.

In the same weeks Napoleon was gaining his last victories on the France Campaign of 1814.

"If his alliance is only a sort of non-intervention against us, it would be better to have him as a declared enemy", said the Austrian commander.

A couple of days later, on 15 November, general Nugent landed near Ravenna with 3,000 soldiers and issued a proclamation about "Independent kingdom of Italy". The French-Italian troops in front of him, weren't contrasting him strongly. Their commander was general Pino.[16]

On 10 December, also British attempt to keep Livorno with the *Italian Leavy*, 1,000 men recruited from Italian prisoners and deserters taken in Spain, but they failed for the unexpected resistance of the garrison.[17]

On 14 February Murat opened the hostilities by conquering Ancona and marching against Eugenio. Murat lost a battle the 2nd of March but won the decisive fight of Reggio (7th March). During the campaign was wounded his only good general, Filangeri. Murat replaced him with the general Giuseppe Lechi, notorious criminal, but brother of Fanny, former Murat's lover. Wrong choice.

On 9 March Bentink landed a second tile in Tuscany and quickly marched on Geneva. Attacked by three sides, Eugenio was forced to sign the Mantua's Conventions on 23 April, and some days later abandoned Italy for his Bavarian exile.[18]

Napoleon left his throne on 6 April, and left France for his exile on the Elba island.

For a moment Murat was the winner, but some clouds were gathering in his horizon. In the Dijon Congress, on 3 April, Metternich and the British foreign minister Castlereagh agreed to put an end to the Italian politics pursued until that point.[19]

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16 Natziger, Gioannini, op.cit., 98-99.
17 Ilari, op.cit., 59.
18 Natziger, Gioannini, op.cit., 220-222.
19 Ibid., 226-227. See also Ilari, Crociani, Paoletti, *Storia Militare del Regno Italico*, op.cit., 72.

The twenty days and the final crash

Murat's excitation during the campaign gave much ammunition to those who were planning the Bourbon return to Naples: their cousins in France and Spain, and the British Conservative Party.

They planned –for the autumn 1815– an invasion of Naples with French, Spanish, Italian and British troops, under the command of the Duke of Wellington. Metternich understood that it would be better if Austrians themselves fixed the Murat affair, as soon as possible.[20]

Bentink, the strongest allied of Murat, was discharged by his government and dislocated in India. Despite his acceptance of the the Lorena dynasty return in Tuscany, Murat was not invited to the Wien Congress, where his fate have to be fixed. He sent to Wien a *Memoire historique* to explain his behaviour during the war, but without success.

By now, he made some mistakes. First, he didn't rescue Ancona, strongly required by the Pope, liberate by Napoleon exactly on revenge against his traitor former general.

Second, he had a dangerous correspondence with Napoleon, clearly indicating the planning of a new war.

At last, Murat didn't emanate a democratic constitution, but relied on his contacts with the Italian secret societies, with the goal of a free state *under the Po River*.

At the same time, Murat called under the arms 40,000 Italians. He had lost an half of his veterans in Spain and Russia, and another five regiments were destroyed in Germany. Without expert officials and the necessary issues, his new army resulted oversized and poorly trained.

When Napoleon landed in Southern France (5 February 1815), Murat has already decided to join him another time, but he badly chose the timing.

On March 21, with 60,000 men, he invaded the central Italy, occupied Florence and Bologna, and went forward to the Po river, where his untrained army were rolled back.

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[20]   Ilari, Crociani, Boeri, *Storia militare del Regno Murattiano*, op.cit., 36-37.

He was already a good general, and in the following battle on the 3rd May, in the Tolentino plane, he could be at the gates of a unexpected success. Although, his second in command general Lechi, didn't execute his orders well, and the fight remained inconclusive.[21]

Soon after, it was announced to him that the British Fleet was in the Gulf of Naples, and that another enemy's army was at the border of the Kingdom with Tuscany.

When he decided the retreat, his army started to disband. On 12 May, but dating it at 30 March, he announced his "Proclama di Rimini", calling all Italians "God willing men to fight".

For the second time, when he came back to his capital, he founded a peace-treaty fixed by his wife with the Britons. He accepted to renounce to his crown but he immediately went to France. He wanted to take part in the last part of Napoleonic adventure.[22] Unfortunately, he failed also in this.

Distrusting on him, Napoleon refused to give him his chivalry, and left for his last campaign.

After Napoleon's defeat, Murat continued to pursue his dream. On view the global frame, he seemed at the border of madness, but valuing his behaviour we must consider that him and all others Napoleonic generals had became to glory and power only thanks their courage, their ambition and their ability. Murat had the first two qualities, quite few the third.

Few weeks later, with 250 men he landed in Calabria, along the lines of the old Bentink plane. He was soon defeated, sentenced of death and shouted by a Borbonic firing squad on the 13 October.[23]

The idea was not so bad as this exit suggests. Some teens after, the Kingdom of Naples and the Italian unity, will be conquered by another army, led by a general who well learned the previous failures. The *Bentink's crusade* hadn't been totally in vain.

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21   See also: Piero Pieri, *Storia militare del Risorgimento*, (Torino: Einaudi, 1962).

22   Ilari, Crociani, Boeri, *Storia militare del Regno Murattiano*, op.cit., 38.

23   For an interesting and romantic storytelling of the facts, see: Alexandre Dumas, *Murat*, (Palermo: Sellerio, 2005).

Surprisingly, Murat suffered the same death of his colleague, Marshall Michel Ney, who replaced him at the head of the chivalry at Waterloo, and failed in all his attempts.[24]

Reflecting on his last days, Napoleon said about Murat: "I didn't feel strong enough to impose to the Armeé a traitor as him. But at Waterloo perhaps he would gave me the victory".

CURRICULUM VITAE

Dr. Paolo Formiconi born in 1982, he studied in Contemporary History and Archivistic Science. He also obtnaided a degree in Paleography and diplomatic science at the School of Archivio Segreto Vaticano.

Since 2007 is a consultant of the Italian Army's Historical Branch and Defence Historical Branch. In 2010-2012 was consultant of the Italo-German Joint Historical Commission.

He has published in 2015, with Alberto Becherelli, *La quinta Sponda. Una storia dell'occupazione italiana della Croazia* (Defence Historical Branch) and, in 2019, *Missione in Siberia. I soldati Italiani in Russia 1915-1921*, (Defence Historical Branch).

He is an officer of Italian army and member of Italian Society of Military History.

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[24] For a complete biography of both marshals, see David Chandler, *Napoleon's Marshals*, (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987).

31. IFNI, THE FIRST SPANISH POST IN NORTH AFRICA

José Romero Serrano (Spain)

The Atlantic was immense, overwhelming. Seen from the top of Sidi Ifni,
on the red cliff, it exhibited long, imperturbable waves that broke incessantly [...]
Seven waves. Embarking or disembarking in those waves was foolhardy.
Miguel Sáenz, *Territorio*, (Barcelona: Funambulista, 2017), 21.

Introduction (Figure 1)

Interaction between the peninsular and archipelagic territories of Spain and Portugal with North Africa has a complex track record that goes back some seven centuries and according to different phases.

For the purposes of this paper, we differentiate between initial contacts, in the form of exploration and conquest, trade and war, from the 15th to the 17th centuries, which brought about the first occupation of Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña (1476) –in an exact location that is currently unknown– and later contacts, which would have two very interesting episodes:

• In the time of the King Charles III, with the special embassy of scientist Jorge Juan (1767) and

• A century later, with the popular African War against Morocco (1859-1860), which led to the Treaty of Wad-Ras, which gave the *territory* its legal status. The treaty could not specify either the place or the extent to be ceded to Spain (Santa Cruz mentioned above), which would be settled, as was stipulated, by the technical work of mixed commissions for this purpose.

The second phase coincides with the European colonial boom that crystallised in the Berlin Conference (1885), and which provoked the race for the "effective occupation" of what was claimed: Western (or Spanish) Sahara and Equatorial Guinea-Río Muni, in the case of Spain. A distinctive sign of this time is the "Scramble for Africa" and the Middle East between, mainly, England and France. At this time, mixed cartographic commissions decided the location of Santa Cruz in the area known as Wad-Ifni, proposed by Spain and accepted by the Sultan.

The third phase is characterised by the predominance of agreements within the framework of the *Protectorates* derived from European colonialism; that is, a certain idea of tutelage, of providing assistance[1] for the development of incipient peoples who retain their sovereignty, and accept with more or less pressure this safeguard. These agreements, some public and others secret, were opened in 1900 between France and Morocco with Spain, separately, and culminated in 1912 with a definitive document, the Spanish-French Agreement that established the extension of Ifni (once its location had been agreed), the delimitations of the Northern and Southern Protectorate of Morocco, and the definitive boundaries of the Spanish Sahara. Ifni was effectively occupied in 1934.

The attached map (Map 1) (Tomás García Figueras) shows the areas mentioned, their dimensions and the changes caused by the treaties.

With Morocco's independence, agreed between France (which was the colonial or administering power) and the Sultan in 1956, and the United Nations resolutions on colonialism, a process of decolonisation began that affected the Spanish territories of the Northern[2] and Southern Protectorates (1956), Fernando Po and Equatorial Guinea (1969), Ifni (1969) and, finally, the Spanish Sahara (1975).

Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña – Ifni

But let us return to the origin. After the conquest of the manorial islands of Lanzarote and Fuerteventura (at the beginning of the 15th century), the lord of Lanzarote promoted the occupation by Diego García de Herrera of a fortified square on the African coast to be used for fishing, but also for trading with the Moors, as well as being a point of entry for raids (*cabalgadas*) in search of slaves and cattle plundering. The story is told by Canary Island professor Rumeu de Armas (1912-2006) in his monumental work. This occupation even predates the conquest of the main islands of Gran Canaria and Tenerife.

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[1]   Analogy with NATO's current *Security Sector Reform* missions and other governance sectors.
[2]   With the progressive withdrawal of troops and Spanish presence.

Moreover, what is interesting to note is that this occupation, later signed by the Catholic Monarchs, took place in 1476, before any other Castilian occupation or post in Africa, and only anticipated by Portuguese Ceuta.

It is well known that by means of the Treaty of Alcaçovas (1479), Portugal and Spain agreed on their zones of influence in these latitudes, leaving the Canaries and Atlantic navigation to the west for the Catholic Monarchs, and giving control of the Guinea route (African voyage) to Portugal; and, what is more, the Castilian need to assert "its rights regarding the Atlantic coast between Cape Aguer and Cape Bojador",[3] a great coastal arc, precisely because of the possession of the Canaries, is set out.

Spain's projection in North Africa was profuse and staggered, beginning with Melilla in 1497, once the Reconquest was over. Professor Martínez Ruiz has published and refers to the character of these *presidios* as a coastal post to prevent the occupation of potential rivals and to radiate internal stability –hinterland– politically and commercially, or to undertake economic activity (fishing, minerals, etc.). There is no doubt that this deployment effort was a far-reaching strategic response to Barbary piracy and the threat of the Ottoman fleet, and as such was hotly contested, with notable feats of arms (the capture of Tunis in 1535, for example) and constant gains and losses.

The fact is that Santa Cruz de la Mar Pequeña, as this outpost was called because this sea was the space between the African coast and the islands of Lanzarote and Fuerteventura, did not survive the Moorish raids, despite being reinforced on occasion, and its interest declined over time. It was not until Charles III sought two points in Africa to enforce his policy of balance in the European concert that interest was rekindled: these were Fernando Po, dependent on Buenos Aires, on the same latitude, and Santa Cruz, dependent on the Canary Islands, thanks to the negotiations of Ambassador Jorge Juan, although this did not materialise (1767) in any action. Even so, the Sultan's fine diplomacy accepted the presence of Canary Island

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[3]   Mariano Fernández-Aceytuno, "A sesenta años de la ocupación de Ifni", *Revista Historia Militar* 77 (1994), 189.

fishermen in the area, but warned of the exposure of their presence in a territory they barely controlled.

Despite not having achieved its recovery, Santa Cruz tower always remained in the national subconscious as an aspiration, and so when the Moroccan War (1859-1860) was fought, with the capture of Tétouan, the recovery of this fishing area was agreed with the Sultan, both in the *preliminary bases* and in the definitive treaty, with this handover "in full sovereignty and in perpetuity". General O'Donnell, President of the Government, General-in-Chief of the Army and originally from Tenerife, undoubtedly understood the importance of this territory, at a time when France had already expanded into Algeria, Tunisia and had its sights set on Morocco (Fez).

García Figueras says: "On 26 March 1860, General O'Donnell and Muley El Abbas signed the *Preliminary Bases for the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace*, which in its article 2 states: In the same way, H.M. the King of Morocco undertakes to grant in perpetuity on the coast of the Ocean, next to Santa Cruz la Pequeña, sufficient territory for the formation of a fishing establishment like the one Spain had there in the past.

On 26 April 1860, the *Treaty of Peace and Friendship* between Spain and Morocco was signed in Tétouan, article 8 of which reads as follows: His Moroccan Majesty undertakes to grant in perpetuity to His Catholic Majesty on the coast of the Ocean",[4] [continues the same as the previous paragraph].

The terms of the treaty did not specify either the site (as it was unknown) or the extent of the territory, to be set later, although it did refer to its use, as a fishing area.

The growing interest in geography (creation of the Geographical Society of Madrid in 1876) and raw materials favoured the implementation of the mixed commission that was to establish the two points mentioned above. In fact, it was the 1878 expedition of the *Blasco de Garay* under the command of Captain Fernández Duro, then vice-president of the Geographical Society of Madrid, which surveyed the coastline and established Wad-Ifni as the possible location of the

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4   Tomás G. Figueras, *Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña-Ifni-Sahara*, (Madrid: Ed Fe, 1941), 63.

site. The Moroccans were more in favour of Puerto Cansado, near Cape Jubi, where the British were already interested in establishing a factory (as they did in 1882, the Mackenzie factory).

It is curious that the study by Marine Brigadier Pelayo Alcalá Galiano, on a calculated distance of 33 leagues from Lanzarote, also coincided in that location (Puerto Cansado), as did the Moroccan delegation's proposal. Nevertheless, the Moroccans eventually accepted Wad-Ifni as the place to "cede" to Spain under the Treaty of Wad-Ras.

Consequently, it was in that year, 1882, that a military expedition was prepared from the Canary Islands for its occupation, with Marine Infantry forces and a provincial battalion of the Captaincy, without ever landing in the Territory.

As we have mentioned, this territory, Ifni, south of the Sus and Nun rivers, was not under the Sultan's royal authority, and as an inhospitable and hostile territory, he showed no haste or interest in making a pact where the Sultan lacked authority. This whole line of research is developed (not only) by Cosialls in his reference book.[5]

Ifni, geographical-military description

The agreed Territory, in its location and size, was a rectangle about 60 k long along the coastline and 25 k deep inland; that is, about 1,700 square km. It was inhabited by the *Ait Ba Amrani* tribe distributed in its various kabyles.

Lieutenant Colonel R. Donoso Cortés gives us a geographical-political and military description in 1913, just after the decisive agreement with France. Donoso tells us about its 20,000 inhabitants, the northern and southern rivers that frame it (Uad Bu-Xedra and Uad Assaka or Nun, respectively) and various geographic and ethnographic details.[6]

The sultan's authority in the 20th century deserves further explanation. Captain Antonio Casar describes in his book *Blad el*

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[5]   Andrés M. Cosialls, *Ifní. Del tratado de Wad-Ras a su ocupación* (Madrid, Publ Defensa, 2016).
[6]   Andrés Miguel Cosialls Ubach, *IFNI. Del tratado WAD-RAS a su ocupación*, (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2016), 184.

Mahzen y Blad es Siba (province of government and province of rebellion), written in 1924, the characteristics of Morocco, and when he speaks of the authority of thesultan cites that in reality his role is twofold: that of temporary Commander of the Believers (Amir al-Mu'minin), and that of Pontiff (Imam) because of his religious character. The latter was recognised by almost all his subjects, but not the former, which only reached those kabyles (tribes) "in which he succeeded in imposing himself and collecting taxes by force of arm".[7]

The collection of taxes, as was the case in the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire, was more important than territorial control itself. This is how the ambiguous stance of Morocco's pragmatic diplomacy is to be understood. In all this, the figure of the Mahzen (as Government) was the key to articulating the will of the Sultan over the obedience of his subjects.

In short, there were three situations, the captain said: "those who pray and pay [...], those who pray but do not pay [...] and those who neither pray nor pay",[8] and no doubt many southern tribes were in this situation. And this division would have a practical result with enormous repercussions, because in reality the Mahzen territory will end up under French protectorate and the Siba, with its difficulties, under Spanish protectorate, as we will see below.

With these intentional delays by the Sultan, and a solid (Bourbon) Restoration in national politics under the leadership of Antonio Cánovas (1828-1897), the 19th century was coming to an end.

Protectorate and Independence of Morocco

The 20th century began with the European Protectorates in Africa and the Middle East governed by France and the United Kingdom (remember here the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, and in the former the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904).

Spain ended the century with a minor war in Melilla (Margallo War of 1893-1894) and the loss of its possessions in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. It was precisely as a result of this "Disaster of

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[7] Antonio Casar, *Blad el Mahzen y Blad es Siba*, (Orense: Imp P.E. La Popular, 1924), 156.
[8] Ibid., 157.

'98" that Spain tried to regain a certain dynamism in Europe and give an honourable exit to an army that had suffered many casualties overseas.

Ignacio Fuente is spot-on when he states that the strategic objectives of Cánovas' policy in Africa (late 19th century) consisted of "the domain of two specific territories: the southern coast of the Strait of Gibraltar and the African coast opposite the Canary Islands".[9] This line drawn with the Catholic Monarchs at the start of the paper is key to understanding Spanish expansion in the Northern Protectorate (Rif and Yebala) and the consolidation of Ifni, Western Sahara, and the so-called Southern Zone of the Protectorate, from the Dra river to parallel 27.40, the latter area which even French maps (1890) placed outside the Morocco's area of influence [see R. de Flotte of 1908, in (Map 2)] and which French diplomacy declared, to the severe detriment of Spain, as a Protectorate in 1912.

Spain's presence in Africa in the 20th century was torn between cooperation and competition with France, which also suffered its own "debacle"[10] in the continent.

Cooperation crystallised in a series of agreements between 1900[11] and 1912, which culminated in 1912, as we have already mentioned, and by means of which the territories of colonial occupation were basically divided up. France reserves for itself the more substantial and less hostile part of Morocco (they would call it "the useful Morocco"),[12] with the possibility of extracting minerals in the promising deposits in the interior of the Sahara. The Algeciras International Conference (1906), a consequence of German pressure in Tangiers, would give solidity and international recognition to the presence of the two Mediterranean countries, to the detriment of Germany, which had its sights set on Tangiers and Agadir. These agreements are complemented by the Spanish-Moroccan Agreement of 1910.

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9   Ignacio Fuente, *El conflicto del Sahara occidental*, (Madrid: Publ de Defensa, 2006), 139.
10   Fachoda incident against the British in 1898.
11   In 1890, a Spanish-French treaty recognises Spain's dominions in West Africa. In 1904, the Convention of that year expressly recognised Spain's dominion over Ifni.
12   Between Fez and Marrakesh.

However, French competition would provoke a fearful policy by Spain, which lost territories initially agreed to be under its control before 1912. The 1907 Chías y Carbó map (Map 3) shows Ifni's position and how Morocco's influence was confined to Agadir, with a smaller presence to the south, but never beyond the Dra River. French pressure also prevented the most serious attempt by Spain to effectively occupy Ifni in September 1911, when military units from Tenerife and Las Palmas, under the command of Colonel Burguete[13], finalised their preparations, and in 1914, with the aborted expedition of Major Bens.

Ultimately, it was in 1912, with the "Spanish-French Agreement to specify the respective situation of the two countries in relation to the Xerifian Empire", that the "Spanish-owned zone" (Ifni) and the "protectorate zone"[14] were specified and their limits drawn.

The immediate consequence of the agreement, in favour of France, is that Ifni and the southern zone of the protectorate no longer have territorial continuity, which they did have in the 1904 Secret Agreement.[15] Thus, with the agreements already in place, effective occupation policies became urgent.

A planned expedition by Major Bens to Cape Jubi and Ifni was postponed due to the outbreak of the Great War, but his raid overland from the Sahara to Cape Jubi was not, without the express permission of the government. Bens, who finally occupied Jubi in 1916, undertook a reconnaissance and exploration expedition of Ifni in 1919, without actually occupying it.

It should be remembered that Spain was embroiled in a war of attrition in the northern part of the protectorate, and was in action almost without interruption between 1909 and 1927. This is why a new plan to occupy Ifni in 1921 was aborted because of the "Annual disaster" that same year.

The position with France was said to have always been ambivalent, between cooperation and competition. It was a very extraordinary circumstance outside Spain that led to Colonel Capaz's expedition

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[13]   Chief of the Tenerife Infantry Regiment.
[14]   Cosialls, op.cit., 89.
[15]   Ibid., 187.

and the effective occupation of Ifni in April 1934. And the circumstance was that 1934 was "the year of the French pacification of Morocco", with highly significant actions in Mauritania, Rio de Oro and the border area of Ifni.

Ifni, in its agreed extension of some 60 k of coastline by 25 k deep (according to the 1912 agreement), had in fact become a refuge for the rebels (some 70,000 are cited). For this reason, the ship *España No 5* arrived from Ceuta with three Mehal-las of the Xauen Group, an Infantry Battalion (*Tabor de Regulares*) and a *Bandera del Tercio* unit (García Escámez). Two mountain batteries and a company of sappers from the Canary Islands were prepared, but eventually did not come, to consolidate Capaz's arrival.

With the same impetus, Smara, the religious capital of Spanish Sahara, was occupied in 1934 and El Aaiún (Captain Antonio del Oro) was founded.

Ifni's occupation structure is revealing of its importance

At the head of the government, a Provisional Government of Ifni (civilian and military) was established, initially under the command of Capaz himself, promoted to Brigadier General, assisted by an Office of Indigenous Affairs, which at the same time acted as deputy governor, and an Indigenous Guard that would be renamed the Territorial Police of Ifni. Indigenous courts were also set up (for civil matters of the natives), with other cases depending on the courts of Gran Canaria.

A Scientific Commission and a Cartographic and Boundary Commission, with such important personnel as Staff Officers Noreña and Gazapo (Map 4), were set up to carry out their first work in the Territory.

In May (1934), the steamer *Isla Gran Canaria* arrived from Ceuta carrying the Mehal-la de Gomara, which would be the basis for the "Batallón de Tiradores de Ifni" (Ifni Marksmen Battalion), with 1,100 personnel, three battalions, and preferably recruited from local personnel.

This administrative bloc was directly dependent on the Council of Ministers, which is a clear indicator of the sovereignty that was exercised over the territory. The same Government included a Directorate General of African Colonies and Territories, with responsibility for the Protectorates and the Sahara. In any case, the administrative situation would be highly variable. In general terms, African territories depended directly on the Moroccan High Commissioner but in 1946, with the creation of Spanish West Africa (AOE in Spanish), the Governor of AOE would have effective authority over the three Atlantic zones (Ifni - Protectorate South and Sahara).

Morocco's independence is based on a powerful geopolitical idea, like all those that come to fruition, based on a mythical history and a representative map. Indeed, the great 20th century geopolitician, the German Karl Haushoffer, said that "the best tool of geopolitics was the suggestive map", and that is what the best-placed party in Morocco in 1950, Istiqlal, and its leader Al-lalel Fassi, offered. We refer to the map of "Greater Morocco", sculpted by the actions of the armed gangs[16] (ELN), kabylas and harkas according to Moroccan tradition.

The historical foundation lay in the Almohad and Almoravid empires of ten centuries ago. According to García Figueras, the Almoravids were originally from Senegal, from the Senhaya tribe, with their capital at Ribat, who converted to Islam; while the Almohads, from the Niflis Valley, High Atlas, were from the Mesnudas tribe. The "national" idea of Morocco was based on the latter, and without prejudice to the Marinids –the third Berber-Moroccan dynasty– all three between the 10th and 12th centuries, hence its aspirations extended from the Senegal River, Mauritania, inland Mali (Timbuktu), the western part of Algeria, to the Muluya River, to the east of Melilla. Likewise, all the territories governed by Spain were included in this Greater Morocco. It should be noted that the geopolitical idea of Cánovas and geographer Díaz de Villegas, of a

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[16] The Liberation Army (*Yeicht Taharir*), founded in 1951, preceded the Sultan's Royal Forces, and was seen as the armed wing of Istiqlal.

Spain with a natural space between the Pyrenees and the Atlas Mountains, clashed head-on with the Moroccan dream.

The facts tell us that independence is produced with an expansive eagerness to reach the spaces considered their own. More than twenty years have passed (1934-1956), marked by the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and World War II (1939-1945), of relative tension within the colonial calm, due to the interplay of forces in the Mediterranean and North Africa. It was towards the end of World War II that the incipient Istiqlal movement made its aspirations for independence and the dream of Greater Morocco known.

International situation, decolonisation and the Ifni War (1957-1958) (Figure 2)

The Moroccan independence process was framed in a decisive international environment, and this was so because the 1950s saw the most critical, course-setting period of the Cold War. Russia (the USSR) and the USA, both with intercontinental nuclear arsenals capable of causing the destruction of the other side, are protected by gravitational defensive blocs (NATO vs. Warsaw Pact), they consequently defined areas of interest understood by the rival, where the superpower in question could resolve conflicts undisturbed.

Precisely in the mid-1950s two situations confirmed this: the US intervention in Guatemala, the most important country in Central America, which had taken a socialist turn in 1954; and the USSR in Hungary in 1956, in the face of an attempt at democratisation. Only in disputed areas did the two great powers keep their arms and exercise their interests through *proxies*, as was the case in the Middle East, leading to limited confrontation (the Arab-Israeli wars).

Similarly, the US took a firm stand against any hint of colonial intervention. The US made a surprising decision for its allies, in the case of Egypt in the Suez Canal, in the face of its leader Nasser's policy of nationalisation in 1956, when the UK, France and Israel agreed to a combined intervention that was thwarted by a veiled American threat.

This American anti-colonial stance, coupled with the fact that the Ifni conflict area was to be in its zone of influence, was decisive in the way the conflict was resolved as it would be 20 years later, in 1975, with respect to the Spanish Sahara.[17]

The reader will note that France was then in a very delicate situation. The Algerian FLN had launched an all-out war for independence (1954-1962), French units were soundly defeated at Dien Bien Fu, French Indochina (1954), and it had lost its influence in the Middle East and Egypt (failed intervention in 1956). In April of the same year, Morocco had agreed to independence after a campaign of harassment against its colonising power.[18] Tunisia got it the same year and Mauritania in 1960, with Morocco's opinion against it. Curiously, the US, avoiding supporting colonial attitudes, would partly occupy the space that France was leaving in the Middle East (Eisenhower Doctrine).

This whole process of decolonisation was underpinned by a very active UN policy, which, through General Assembly (GA) agreements and Security Council (SC) resolutions, urged colonising powers to comply with them. These include SC R. 1560 and GA Declaration 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 which "proclaims a speedy and unconditional end to colonialism in all its forms". Those that directly involved the territory of Ifni were 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965 and subsequent, in which the fate of the territory remained linked to the fate of the Spanish Sahara.

The situation in Spain was one of international openness at the time. The 1953 Cooperation and Assistance Agreement with the US (Madrid Pacts) had been key to a tacit recognition of the Franco regime and had entailed Spain's admission to the UN (14 December 1955).

These two circumstances and the fact, in itself, of the proximity and stability of Morocco, and the always delicate situation of the Canary Islands, moderated Spanish policy in the Ifni, or rather Ifni-Sahara,

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[17]   Here, in another context, Russian leader Bresnev's policy could be confronted by the US through its alliance with Algeria.
[18]   Known as the "Revolution of the King and the People".

conflict. On the other hand, the US asserted its mediating role in the region in a very active but discreet manner.

Let's go back. During the years of World War II, reports issued by the Army's Central General Staff stated:

"Without the existence of the Canary Islands in these latitudes, we would not need a colony in a barren desert country".[19]

This judgement was congruent with the threat to the Canary Islands from Allied countries for a secure base in the Atlantic during WWII. Moreover, it was during the 1940s that France, a weakened France, was seen as Spain's hypothetical enemy in the region. Another sign of the cooperative and competitive relationship between the two countries.

In 1946, Spanish West Africa (AOE), which included the territories of Ifni, the southern zone of the Protectorate and the Sahara, was formed along the lines of the French (AOF). The population (census of 31 December 1950) was 38,385 in Ifni and 13,444 in Zone S of the Protectorate and Sahara (including Europeans). The most populous town was Sidi Ifni with 7,951, including more than two thousand Europeans, twice as many as El Aaiún and Vila Bens.

The deployment of Ifni Territory forces (under the Ministry of the Army) were:

- Ifni Rifle Group No 1 (two battalions, I and II)
- Ifni Battery
- Ifni-Sahara Transmission Unit
- AOE Quartermaster Company. Dependent on the Presidency of the Government
- Sea section
- Ifni Police Troops (two companies and one speciality company)

In the Spanish Sahara (under the Ministry of the Army), there was the III Battalion of Ifni, with garrisons in Aaiún, Villa Cisneros, Villa Bens-Cabo Yubi, and Tan-Tan; a squadron of dragoons transported

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[19]   General Military Archive of Madrid, Ifni-Sahara Estudio Geográfico-militar del Sahara, Conclusiones, roll 1.

from the Sahara, a transported Battery, two transmissions sections, and an AOE Quartermaster company. There were several units under the Presidency of the Government, including two Nomadic Groups (Captain La Gándara and Sahiael Hamra).

Generally speaking, a very small garrison, given the size of the territory and its exposure. In this situation, Moroccan armed groups attacked Ifni and the Sahara (November 1957) in the wake of Moroccan independence.

The conflict itself, military actions as a whole, is very well studied and we will only give a few references here. Certainly, anniversaries have given rise to a number of publications on the subject. Its military study is simple, because there are well-collected sources (at least on the Spanish side), its duration is limited: three months of campaign, and the territorial scope is also limited (Ifni-Sahara). The number of units that participated, their actions, and their difficulties (casualties, rotations, etc.) are well known.

Indeed, this researcher is of the opinion that the *ignored*, or *forgotten*, war terminology often used can be misleading. The war was cited at the time and soldiers sent letters to families that were published in local media. Even the official NO-DO newsreel was very accurate, in the light of what is known today, in its reporting.

The territorial part is interesting to mention: Ifni, the Sahara (Sahiael Hamra and Rio de Oro), the Southern Zone of the Protectorate (ceded to Morocco in April 1958) and the Canary Islands formed what we now call a Theatre of Operations, with a head of the theatre (the Captain General of the Canary Islands) and a war directorate in the Ministry of the Army and the Government.

Actions were limited to the Territory (Ifni) and the Sahara;[20] the former was defensive and exclusively national, the latter offensive and of Franco-Spanish cooperation. The availability of the French forts of Fort Etienne, Gouraud, Trinquet and Tindouf, in Mauritania and Algeria, bordering the Sahara, favoured this option of military

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[20]   The Madrid Plan (initial) was based on securing the key positions of Sidi Ifni, Villa Bens, El Aaiún, Villa Cisneros and La Güera; the five coastal towns.

cooperation and converging columns. The operation was completed with a Spanish naval presence off Agadir.[21]

Generals Casas de la Vega and Fernández-Aceytuno have devoted time to studying the operation and have reference publications on it. A very valuable synthesis is provided by the latter in the *Revista de Historia Militar* (RHM) in an article entitled "A sesentaaños de la ocupación de Ifni (Sixty years after the occupation of Ifni)", and the former with another in the same journal entitled "Ifni-Sahara (1957-1958)".

As we have seen, the military garrison was very small in the so-called AOE, giving priority to Ifni as a sovereign territory. Thus, when attacks by armed gangs[22] (23 November 1957) were unleashed, the government's first reaction was to reinforce the garrison and evacuate the most threatened and lesser peripheral positions,[23] to establish a defensive perimeter, a true "entrenched camp", around the capital Sidi Ifni (5 to 8 km radius) with well-defended positions. Perhaps the military memory of the Annual disaster in 1921, with remote positions that were impossible to reinforce, weighed heavily in the decision. The fact is that reinforcement troops, based on the Legion, Paratroopers and expeditionary battalions of some Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery regiments, plus air and naval support, under the command of General Gómez Zamalloa, put up a defence that made armed attempts by the Moroccans to gain access to Sidi-Ifni futile.

Actions in Ifni came to an end three months later. At the same time, the so-called Operation Teide was in force in the Sahara, offensive actions by means of columns that penetrated into the territory to quell rebels, in coordination with the French. Spain knew it could not fight a long colonial-type war (memory of 1909 and evidence of what was happening with France in Algeria). However, in the midst of the war, in January 1958, Spain created the two colonial provinces of Ifni and Spanish Sahara, which it paradoxically surrendered by accepting the first UN declarations in 1960 citing both provinces as Non-Self-Governing Territories (to be decolonised).

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21 Canarias and Méndez Núñez cruisers, with 4 destroyers.
22 5,000 men, according to Casas de la Vega.
23 Operations Gento and Netol.

The final toll of Spanish casualties was 198[24] killed, 573 wounded, and 80 missing (852 in total). Casualties among the armed gangs amounted to several thousand (inaccurate data).

The handover of Ifni (return) would take place in 1969, by the Treaty of Fez.

Conclusions

Attempting to dominate opposite shores is a constant in geopolitics, as we have pointed out from the beginning of this paper. At the same time as the conquest of the Canary Islands, the fortification of Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña was installed in Barbary (15th century), as part of Castilian expansion (Queen Isabella and Cardinal Cisneros, the *plus ultra*, and the recovery of Hispania Tingitana and the Gothic presence) in North African territories on both the Atlantic and Mediterranean shores.

Attempts to maintain this presence opposite Lanzarote and Fuerteventura (either Ifni or Puerto Cansado) were repeated with Charles III (1767), with the Treaty of Wad Ras (1860), and the Canovist policy of the Restoration, until effective occupation in 1934 during the 2nd Spanish Republic.

The acquisition of Ifni was the result of a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Morocco, by which the territory was ceded in full sovereignty and in perpetuity, very different in nature from areas acquired in the midst of European colonialism (Berlin Conference, 1885); for example, Western Sahara, Guinea, or in the form of a Protectorate, the N and S zones[25] of Morocco awarded to Spain, but with Moroccan sovereignty.

In short, the history, legality and legitimacy of Ifni is similar to that of Ceuta and Melilla, and it could well have remained a Spanish post after the independence of Morocco.

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[24] The bloodiest action for Spanish arms took place in Edchera (Sahara), near El Aaiún, where the 13th Battalion of the Legion was ambushed on 13 January 1958, with 48 dead and twice as many wounded.
[25] Zone S, as we know, never belonged to Morocco as such before its independence.

The dates of cession were: Protectorates of Morocco N in 1956,[26] S in 1958; Ifni (sovereign) and Equatorial Guinea (colony), in 1969; Western Sahara (of "Spanish free action" or colony), in 1975 (under UN MINURSO mission monitoring).

The main actor in the area has always been Morocco, which motivated territorial readjustment after its independence in 1956. Spain has always maintained a neighbourly and balanced relationship with the Kingdom of Alaoui. However, the European actor in the area, as we have seen, with which Spain had to maintain a relationship of competition and cooperation from the late 19th century onwards was France.

France motivated the effective occupation of Ifni in 1934, as an aid to its pacification campaign in Morocco, and France established the limits of Spanish territories (1912) and mediated Spanish policy in North Africa until Moroccan independence.

Spain's complex position in the mid-1950s, with the agreements with the USA, UN membership, the precariousness of the place (Ifni) –a so-called *costly and sterile territory*–, the need for good neighbourly relations with Morocco, and the mediating power of the USA, led to the formula of "return" of the Territory, despite having declared it a province (1958) and not renouncing its Spanish status until the last moment.

In short, considering that France occupied the province of Mahzen[27], the true Moroccan national nucleus, and Spain that of Siba (rebellion), Ruiz Miguel is right when he says that "in addition to unifying it, Spain enlarged and strengthened Morocco",[28] as we have seen in the preceding paragraphs.

And the story continues...

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[26] Although the last Spanish unit was withdrawn in the summer of 1961.
[27] Independent Morocco emerged in the French cultural and economic zone (Ruiz Miguel).
[28] Carlos Ruiz, *El Sahara occidental y España*, (Madrid: Ed Dykinson, 1995), 70.

Figure 1: Marching along the beach to Ifni, expedition to Ifni by the geographical commission of Morocco on 21 june 1934.

Source: Photographer: Corporal J. Zarco, gelatine on Baryta Paper.

Figure 2: Spanish territories in the form of sovereignty, protectorate, and colony in the 20th century.

Source: El Rincon de Sidi Ifni, *Western Africa 1956*, (webpage: www.sidi.ifni.com).

Map 1: Sketch of Sovereignty Zones and Protectorate of Spain in southern Morocco and Western Sahara.

Source: Tomás G. Figueras, *Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña, Ifni-Sahara*, (Madrid: Edid Fe, 1941), 330.

Map 2: French map showing Moroccan Empire as far as the Dra River.

Source: R. de Flotte, *Maroc*, (Paris: H. Barrère, 1908), Sig. MAR-57-07.

Map 3: The Moroccan Empire.

Source: Military engineer Benito Chías y Carbó (early 20th century).

Map 4: Delimitation of Ifni.

CURRICULUM VITAE

José Romero Serrano, Infantry Colonel, Spanish army (Staff Graduate). Col Romero was born in Barcelona, in 1959. He joined the Army (Military Academy) in 1976 as a cadet. As a junior officer, he served in the Mountain Troops Battalions along the Pyrennees. As a Major (1995) he was posted at the Escuela de Estado Mayor (Staff College) in Madrid, as Instructor in "Strategy and Military History".

In 2001, once promoted to Lt Colonel, he was appointed to the UK as Spanish Liaison Officer at Directorate General of Development & Doctrine (DGD&D) and Land Command HQ in Upavon (Wiltshire). In 2004, he was posted at the NATO Component Command-Land HQ Retamares (Madrid) as Political Advisor to the Commander. In 2009 was promoted to Colonel and appointed as C.O. Light Infantry Regiment "Canarias" No 50, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. In 2011 was posted as Executive Officer (XO) to the Commander Allied Force Command Madrid HQ. In 2013 was posted as Senior Staff Officer to the IMS/NATO HQ in Brussels, working at the "Strategic Annalisys Capabilities" Cell. In 2016, Col Romero was posted at the Instituto de Historia y Cultura Militar (Madrid), Army History Military Institute; his current position. He has carried out Operational Tours in the Balkans (1989).

Col Romero is Master in "Peace, Security and Defence" at the Open University and has participated within el Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos (1996-2001) in different studies and publications. He wrote *Enciclopedia del Arte de la Guerra* (Ed Planeta, Barcelona, 2001) under the direction of Martínez Teixidó. He has written *Evolution of the Spanish army* (Ed Dykinson, 2018), *Las Jornadas del Coronel* (Universo de Letras, Sevilla, 2018), *Guadalajara y sus Campos de Batalla* (Diputación de Guadalajara, 2018) and *Grandes Tratadistas de Interés Militar* (Ed Ministerio de Defensa, 2019).

He is married to Marta and has two daughters. He likes reading and running.

32. BUILDER, LAWYER, SOLDIER, SPY: RECONSIDERING THE CAREER AND PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS OF PROCOPIUS OF CAESAREA

Joseph Frechette (USA)

The evidence we have for the life and career of the sixth century historian Procopius depends mainly upon his own works. To these we may add some later *testimonia* which confuse as much as they illuminate certain issues. His text tells us he was a native of Caesarea in Palestine,[1] and that he was well qualified, as an advisor to the general Belisarius,[2] to relate the history of the emperor Justinian's wars. It is generally assumed, on the basis of his obvious education and later references to him as either a *dikēgoros*[3] or a *rhetor*,[4] that he was a trained jurist,[5] and that he served Belisarius as an *assessor*, or legal advisor. It may, however, be worth recalling that certain

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1   Procopius, *Wars*, 1.1.1, *SH* 11.25.
2   Ibid., *Wars*, 1.1.3, 1.12.24 (*symboulos*), 3.14.3 (*paredros*).
3   Menander Protector, Fr. 14.2 [Blockley].
4   Agathias, *Hist.*, pref. 22, pref. 32, 2.19.1, 4.15.1, 4.26.4, 4.29.5, 4.30.5; Evagrius, *HE*, 4.12, 4.19, 5.24; *Suda*, pi 2479.
5   John B. Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire from the Death of Theodosius I to the Death of Justinian*, vol. II, (New York: Dover Publications, 1952), 419 n 2; Otto Veh, *Zur Geschichtsschreibung und Weltauffassung des Prokop von Caesarea*, vol. I, (Bayreuth: Oberviechtach, 1950/51), 5; followed by James A. S. Evans, *Procopius*, (New York: Twayne, 1972), 32; Tony Honoré, *Tribonian*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 6 n. 42, 243; Averil Cameron, *Procopius and the Sixth Century*, (London: Duckworth, 1985), 6; Geoffrey Greatrex, "Lawyers and Historians in Late Antiquity," in Ralph Mathieson (ed.), *Law, Society, and Authority in Late Antiquity*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 150; idem, "Recent Work on Procopius and the composition of Wars VIII", *BMGS* 27 (2003), 58; Anthony Kaldellis, *Procopius of Caesarea: Tyranny, History, and Philosophy at the End of Antiquity*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 151-154, 223-228 (somewhat implicit), but accepted explicitly in *idem*, Introduction to *The Secret History: With Related Texts* by Prokopios (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub, 2010), xviii, and Introduction to *The Wars of Justinian* by Procopius (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub, 2014), viii; Henning Börm, *Prokop und die Perser: Untersuchungenzu den römisch-sasanidischen Kontakten in der ausgehenden Spätantike*, (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2007), 45; Christopher Lillington-Martin, "Procopius, πάρεδρος/quaestor, Codex Justinianus, 1.27 and Belisarius' strategy in the Mediterranean," in Christopher Lillington-Martin, Elodie Turquois (eds), *Procopius of Caesarea: Literary and Historical Interpretations*, (New York: Routledge, 2018), 153–181.

nineteenth century scholars doubted this conclusion.[6] More recently, there have been some attempts at revision suggesting, in one case, that Procopius might have been a military engineer.[7] It may be useful to further problematize the consensus view by focusing on another facet of his military interests, that of espionage. Not only did Procopius occasionally note the presence and utility of intelligence, spies, and their importance within both the Roman and Persian military establishments, but he also vividly described his own experience on a spy mission in Sicily. Although the general tendency of recent scholarship has been to focus on the literary aspects of Procopius' history of Justinian's wars, a reexamination of his treatment of military issues, such as intelligence, may help to illuminate how serious he was when he claimed that his work would be of practical benefit to the soldiers and statesmen in his audience.[8]

An examination of Procopius' biography is suggestive of certain preoccupations and concerns. First and foremost, the modern reader must bear in mind that Procopius was a participant in events, a fact he regarded as a qualification for writing history, like his historiographic predecessors.[9] In suggesting that Procopius' biography must be borne in mind when interpreting his *Wars*, it may be fairly argued that this approach is something of a throwback to that of Berthold Rubin, who saw the *Wars* as written on behalf and for the glory of Procopius' patron, Belisarius.[10] The approach here, however, is that it was not the person of the general, but of the historian himself that provides a key to his work.[11]

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[6]   Felix Dahn, *Prokopius von Cäsarea: ein Beitrag zur Historiographie der Völkerwanderung und des sinkenden Römerthums*, (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und sohn, 1865), 67-69; Jakob Haury, *Zur Beurteilung des Geschichtsschreibers Procopius von Cäsarea* (Munich: H. Kutzner, 1896), 19-20.

[7]   James Howard-Johnston, "The Education and Expertise of Procopius," *An Tard* 8 (2000), 19-30.

[8]   Procopius, *Wars*, 1.1.1-2.

[9]   Ibid., 1.1.3. Cf. Herodotos, 2.99.1; Thucydides, 1.22.2-3; Polybios, 12.26-28a.

[10]   Berthold Rubin, *Prokopios von Kaisareia*, (Stuttgart: Alfred Druckenmüller Verlag, 1954), 84.

[11]   An approach explicitly eschewed by Cameron, op.cit., 15.

Procopius tells us that he joined Belisarius' retinue in Mesopotamia at Dara in 527,[12] and, except for a hiatus in the service of the general Solomon in Africa,[13] he remained with Belisarius at least until his entry into Ravenna in 540.[14] While serving in the west he occasionally appears as a specific actor in his history, receiving and noting particular omens of success against the Vandals in 533/4,[15] engaging in a bit of espionage (to which we shall return),[16] organizing supplies for the forces besieged in Rome in 538,[17] and advising Belisarius on an effective system of tactical trumpet signals.[18] He was resident at Constantinople by the outbreak of the great plague in the spring of 542 and thereafter presumably devoted himself to writing not only his history of Justinian's wars, but also his notorious invective, the *Secret History*, and his panegyric on Justinian's building programs, the *Buildings*. Despite occasionally noting an intention to compose an ecclesiastical history, Procopius does not appear to have ever produced such a work.[19]

If Procopius truly was Belisarius' *assessor*, he would presumably have ranked among the *spectabiles comites primi ordinis*.[20] Ernst Stein suggested, on the basis of the *Suda*'s reference to Procopius as *illustris*,[21] that the vacant illustrate may have served as a "bien mince" imperial reward for his service with Belisarius.[22] In a late seventh century chronicle John of Nikiu referred to Procopius as a patrician and prefect.[23] Although the chronicles of Malalas and Theophanes attest a Procopius as the urban prefect of Constantinople in 562-

12   Procopius, *Wars*, 1.12.24.
13   Ibid., 4.14.39-41.
14   Ibid., 6.29.32.
15   Ibid., 3.12.3-5, 3.15.35.
16   Ibid., 3.14.3-15.
17   Ibid., 6.4.1-20
18   Ibid., 6.23.19-23.
19   Ibid., 8.25.13; *SH*, 1.14, 11.33, 26.18.
20   *CTh*, 6.15.1; *CJ*, 1.51; Ernst Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire. Tome II, De la disparition de l'Empire d'Occident à la mort de Justinien (476-565)*, (Paris-Bruxelles-Amsterdam: Desclée de Brouwer), 711-712; on assesors generally, cf. Jones, *LRE*, 500-503.
21   *Suda*, pi 2479.
22   Stein, op.cit., 712.
23   John of Nikiu, 92.20; Stein, op.cit., 712.

3, [24] John's testimony is late and somewhat confused and the identification with the historian remains inconclusive.[25]

Such, in brief, is what may be said with some degree of confidence. To this we may add more or less speculative theories concerning Procopius' background, education, and interests. Procopius' outlook as expressed in his works is thoroughly conservative and aristocratic,[26] while his mastery of classical literature and rhetorical ability has occasioned differing conclusions regarding his level of education. The preponderance of opinion and the traditional view is that he must have received a reasonably sophisticated education in the *liberales artes*. Likewise, Procopius' fluency with the canon of classical history is unsurprising. While history was not one of the formal exercises within the rhetorical training of the *progymnasmata*, such exercises included a great deal of historical material touching on archaic and classical Greece to be memorized and imitated.[27]

For over a century scholars have noted that Procopius' affinity for Thucydides appears to be shared by his contemporaries, the rhetors of Gaza,[28] and it is possible that Procopius received some part of his education there. The essential point of this position is encapsulated by Jakob Haury's argument that, with respect to language and world-view, Procopius should be counted among the Gazans.[29] Haury and Geoffrey Greatrex have gone so far as to suggest that Procopius not only studied at Gaza, but that he was the son of a certain Stephanus, who was proconsul of Palestina Prima in 536. This conclusion is

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24   Joh. Mal. 494, 496; Theoph. AM 6055.
25   Stein, op.cit., 712.
26   Dahn, op.cit., 134-144; Stein, op.cit., 711; Rubin, op.cit., 28; Evans, op.cit., 95-96; Cameron, op.cit., 6-7, 227-228.
27   Craig A. Gibson, "Learning Greek History in the Ancient Classroom: The Evidence of the Treatises on Progymnasmata", *Classical Philology* 19 (2004), 103-129; "History was at the center of a young man's training in the manipulation of words and ideas to create spoken and written discourse; one simply could not learn how to argue without learning how to argue about history".
28   Haury, op.cit., 10-19; Glanville Downey, *Gaza in the Sixth Century*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), 112; Evans, op.cit., 31-32; Geoffrey Greatrex, "Stephanus, the Father of Procopius of Caesarea?", *Medieval Prosopography* 17 (1996), 125-145.
29   Haury, op.cit., 10-19, "Prokop von Cäsarea in Bezug auf Sprache und Weltanschauung völligzu den Gazäernzuzählenist".

conjectural and has met with varying degrees of favor.[30] I would only note that Rubin was certainly correct, that such a connection would fit with the traditional understanding of Procopius' social class and education. There certainly was a fair degree of intellectual contact between Caesarea and Gaza,[31] but the issue must ultimately remain an *aporia*, particularly since the school of Gaza did not have a monopoly on the study of Thucydides.[32]

Recently, in an important revisionist study, Maria Kouroumali has suggested a more conservative view of Procopius' education and literary talents.[33] She argued that Procopius does not display the level of practiced rhetorical or sophistic ability that we might expect from someone who had progressed far beyond the standard secondary education of the day into advanced study of rhetoric or philosophy. Rather than a writer of great ability at sophistic declamation or epideictic rhetorical displays, Kouroumali saw the work of man of a more prosaic and technical mind.

Kouroumali's argument relies to some extent on Procopius' relative lack of rhetorical sophistication in comparison to Thucydides, and, like Averil Cameron before her,[34] she takes a very narrow view of Procopius' purpose in the *Wars*.[35] I would suggest that the very fact that she could make such an argument is telling. It should caution us against too easily assuming that his intended audience was confined to those whose education had progressed into the rarefied air of advanced rhetorical and sophistic writing. This has implications regarding his intent in writing the work.

That all said, we should also take care not to over-analyze these points. The plain fact of the matter is that Procopius was educated enough to compose the most substantial extant history in Greek since

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[30] Note the objections of Bury, *LRE* II, 420; followed by Rubin, *Prokopios*, 23-24 and Cameron, *Procopius*, 6-7.
[31] Choricius, *Or.* 8.12-14.
[32] Gibson, "Learning Greek History", 116-117.
[33] Maria Kouroumali, *Procopius and the Gothic War*, (D.Phil. Thesis, Oxford University, 2005), 62-83. Cf. Ramsay MacMullen, *Soldier and Civilian in the Later Roman Empire*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 174-77 on the "military mind".
[34] Cameron, *Procopius*, 25.
[35] Kouroumali, op.cit., 59, "the random project of a well-educated individual with a flair for writing and the ability of a good reporter".

that of Cassius Dio as well as an invective and panegyric, and to lace them with references to classical literature. Whether these came at first or second hand, as Cameron suggests,[36] the ability to draw these elements together in a coherent fashion is indicative of a degree of literary skill and analytical thought that should not be readily dismissed.

When we turn to the related issue of Procopius' professional interests, we also encounter a point of debate. The current general consensus is that Procopius was indeed a lawyer. [37] However, Kouroumali has noted that his text does not display an interest in, or knowledge of, legal issues beyond what might be expected of any civil servant, and that we should be cautious about assuming he had received an advanced legal or rhetorical education.[38] Although this conclusion is based in part on an argument from silence, it is a further indication that the assumption that Procopius was a jurist or rhetorician is somewhat tenuous.

James Howard-Johnston, inspired by Kouroumali's work, has made much of the fact that, despite the archaizing features of Procopius' prose, his syntax is actually rather simple, suggesting that he was perhaps not so well-trained a rhetorician or lawyer as is often supposed.[39] In his estimation later authors made an inferential leap when they applied the title "rhetor", noting that Procopius' references to legal issues are few and not terribly sophisticated. [40] Instead, Howard-Johnston suggests, based on the *Buildings*, that Procopius was an engineer rather than a literary intellectual, whose education was more likely technical than rhetorical, with a particular interest in hydraulic construction.

Greatrex has vigorously challenged this conclusion, noting that Procopius displays interests in other technical matters such as wounds, military technology, and economic affairs. [41] Howard-

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36   Cameron, *Procopius*, 38-39.
37   See above No 5.
38   Kouroumali, 9.
39   Howard-Johnston, "Education and Expertise", 19-30. A point reinforced and elaborated by Kouroumali, op.cit., 19-61.
40   Ibid., 24.
41   Greatrex, "Recent Work on Procopius", 57-61.

Johnston, however, deserves credit for reinvigorating an old discussion. In the nineteenth century, neither Felix Dahn nor Jakob Haury were convinced that Procopius was a jurist and the question deserves further consideration.[42] In a modern intellectual environment in which the literary and rhetorical elements in the works of historians ancient and modern is often privileged,[43] the degree to which Procopius' interests may be said to be a product of a rhetorical or legalistic background is not a purely academic question.

Much depends on how we construe Procopius' position on Belisarius' staff. If he was an *assessor*, it naturally follows that he was probably a jurist.[44] In his discussion of the issue Greatrex notes that Procopius himself, like his contemporaries, did often use the term *rhetor* to refer to jurists,[45] but we should note that he never applied the term to himself, and that in contemporary usage it was indiscriminately applied to nearly all the historians and chroniclers of the period.[46]

The identification of Procopius as an *assessor*, requires us to imbue a specific and technical significance to the terms that Procopius does use to refer to his position on Belisarius' staff which are *symboulos*,[47] and *paredros*.[48] An examination of these terms in the handful of other instances in which they occur does not lend itself to any neat

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[42] Dahn, op.cit., 67-69; Haury, op.cit., 19-20. "Dahn hat aber gezeigt, dass er wenig juristische Kenntnisse besass. Es scheint mir, dass er überhaupt kein Jurist war. Da schon seit Diocletian und Konstantin die militaris administratio von der civilis administratio getrennt war, so waren bei einem Militärbeamten, besonders bei Belisar, der zur Zeit, als er Prokop zu seinem Geheimschreiber machte, Kommandant in Daras war, kaum besondere juristische Fragen zu entscheiden".

[43] Hayden White, *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), esp. 81-100; A. J. Woodman, *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography*, (Portland: Areopagitica Press, 1988), esp. 70-101.

[44] Adolf Berger, "Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law", *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 43 (1953), 351; Jones, *LRE*, 500-501; Veh, op.cit., 5. Note, however, Haury, op.cit., 20 which adduces Libanius *Or.* 33.4 to note that at least some military *assessores* were not trained jurists. Likewise, if we may trust the *Secret History*, even a *quaestor sacri palatii*, Junilus – successor of Tribonian, could be entirely lacking both in legal education and experience and even knowledge of Greek, Proc. *SH* 20.17.

[45] Greatrex, "Lawyers and Historians", 150 No 14.

[46] Georgios Fatouros, "Zur Prokop-Biographie", *Klio* 62 (1980), 517-518.

[47] Proc. *Wars* 1.1.3, 1.12.24.

[48] Ibid., 3.14.3.

conclusions, but we may note some suggestive points. Although the term *symboulos* is often equated with *assessor*,[49] Procopius used it elsewhere without any technical specificity other than to denote individuals serving in advisory capacities, two of which occur in entirely non-Roman contexts. The Armenian *strategos* Bassicius was a *symboulos* to his king, Arsaces.[50] Likewise Stephanus of Edessa noted that he had been a *symboulos* to the Persian king Kavad I.[51] The only instance that occurs in a Roman context is a vague statement put into the mouth of the officer Gregorius in an address to his cousin Artabanes that Belisarius had come to Africa with many *symbouloi*.[52] Not only is such a statement not dispositive, we should note that its occasion is an exhortation to liberate Africa from the rebel Gontharis in 546, and thereby surpass the glory of Belisarius whose victory over the Vandals had been assisted by a notionally formidable force. The *symbouloi* referenced here were supposedly a strong aid to Belisarius' campaign. It is difficult to believe that Procopius meant his readers to believe that they were mere jurists without recalling the joke about white-collar FBI agents telling felons to surrender because they were "surrounded by lawyers and accountants". The usage of the other classicizing historians of the period is no more specific.[53]

Procopius' use of the term *paredros* is a bit more suggestive, but hardly conclusive.[54] In the majority of cases he clarified his use of the term to indicate that he is referring to individuals serving as *quaestores palatii* to the Roman and Ostrogothic courts: Proclus,[55] Tribonian,[56]

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[49] See most recently Lillington-Martin, op.cit., 154-156.
[50] Proc. *Wars*, 1.5.17.
[51] Ibid., 2.26.35.
[52] Ibid., 4.27.12.
[53] Malchus, Fr. 23.20 [Blockley]; Priscus, Fr. 14.76 [Blockley]; Agath. *Hist.* 3.12.1; Theoph. Sim. 4.5.4, 7.7.2.
[54] Lillington-Martin, op.cit., 156-57 makes much of Procopius' use of this term as an indicator of advisers of greater seniority, equivalent to *quaestores palatii*, and argues that Procopius used it in his own case to play up his own importance. From there he speculates that, in such a role, Procopius would have "processed" and "communicated" information from the western theaters to Constantinople which, in turn, informed the composition of *CJ* 1.27 and the organization of the diocese of Africa. While the theory is attractive, it rests on tenuous linguistic echoes between Procopius and the *CJ* and remains speculative absent further evidence.
[55] Proc. *Wars*, 1.11.11, *SH* 6.13.1.
[56] Proc. *Wars*, 1.24.12; *SH* 13.12.1.

Fidelis,[57] and Spinus.[58] There is a legal connotation here, but it is unclear how universal such usage might be when, as in his own case, he does not add the specific clarification *quaestor*. In one instance, referring to members of the imperial court, Procopius simply meant the various learned advisers that typically surround sovereigns.[59] In the one non-autobiographical instance in which he used the term to describe a member of a general's retinue he noted that Hermogenes, who had served as a *paredros* to the general Vitalian, assisted Belisarius in organizing the defense of Dara in 530.[60] We might also note that neither term has any legal connotation in Procopius' thematic and stylistic models, Herodotus and Thucydides.[61]

Even if we accept that *paredros* generally denotes an *assessor* and therefore a jurist, in Procopius' specific case it could easily fall well short of comprehending the true scope of an individual's activities and interests. The example of Hermogenes is a case in point, since he also served extensively as an envoy to the Persian court and as *magister officiorum*.[62] In the case of Procopius himself it was, in part, his wide-ranging interests and activities that caused Howard-Johnston to question the notion that he was simply a jurist. After noting that Procopius described himself dealing with personnel, intelligence, and operations in his service with Belisarius, Howard-Johnston then dismissed the notion of Procopius as a staff officer rather than an engineer since he views such a combination of functions as appropriate only to a "chief of staff", which Procopius certainly was

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57 Proc., *Wars*, 5.14.5.
58 Ibid., 7.40.20.
59 Ibid., 1.2.6.
60 Ibid., 1.13.10.
61 *Symboulos*: Hdt. 5.24 Histaios as adviser to Darius; 7.50 advisors to shahs; 8.101 advisers to Xerxes.; Thuc. 2.85.1 Spartans send Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron with ships as *symbouloi*, 3.42.4 fear deprives city of advisers, 3.69.2 and 3.76.1 Brasidas as *symboulos* to Alcidas, 5.63.4 ten advisors to Agis, 8.39.2 and 8.41.1 Spartans send eleven *symbouloi* wi. Astyochus. *Paredros*: Hdt. 5.18 Persian envoys to Macedon want girls to sit beside them; 6.65 ephors sitting next to Ariston; 7.147 advisers/companions of Xerxes; 8.138 adviser/companion to king of Macedon; 9.94 Apollonians sitting next to Evenius.
62 *PLRE* IIIA 590-593.

not.[63] This entails an implicit and anachronistic assumption that the late Roman army must have organized its staff system along the lines of that developed in nineteenth century Europe with specialized discrete elements for the various functions of military staffs.

Justinian himself did note in his *Institutes* that those who completed a legal education would be able to perform whatever official duties might be entrusted to them.[64] However, even if we concede some degree of legal training and responsibility, to sum up Procopius' position in Belisarius' retinue as a jurist runs the risk of conjuring up an equally anachronistic picture of a modern judge advocate or provost. I would suggest a simpler proposition. If we must have a modern analogy for his function, it seems to me that Procopius was precisely what he presented himself to be: A soldier or adjutant on Belisarius' staff. This has the virtue of making sense of the passage noted above, in which Gregorius suggested that *symbouloi* were of real value to generals on campaign, as Hermogenes was in the defense of Dara. Whatever the scope of his legal education, function, and responsibilities may have been, they certainly do not represent at all the sum total of Procopius' activities on campaign or his interests as a historian. Rather, as J.A.S. Evans noted, "He spoke in the *Wars* with the voice of the military establishment".[65]

If we may be permitted to go further, we may recall that the single longest personal note in the *Wars* regarding his military duties was that of his reconnaissance mission on the way to Africa with Belisarius in 533.[66] During a stopover in Sicily Belisarius was concerned by his lack of intelligence regarding the Vandals and the Roman soldiers' dread of a naval engagement. He therefore sent Procopius (as a *paredros*) to Syracuse to learn the Vandals' dispositions with the cover story of buying provisions from the Goths. While there Procopius happened to meet with a childhood friend. The man had a slave just come from Carthage who confirmed that the Vandal fleet was safely away, that the African coast lay open, and the Romans maintained the

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63   Howard-Johnston, "Education and Expertise", 23-24. Cf. Kouroumali, op.cit., 9-11, "an advisor, but certainly not the senior or most important one".
64   *Institutes*, proem [Constitutio *Imperatoriam maiestatem*] 7.
65   Evans, *Procopius*, 103.
66   Proc., *Wars*, 2.14.

element of surprise. Procopius promptly spirited the slave away to Belisarius, and the Romans took heart and promptly made landfall in Africa. Rubin felt that we should not be naïve regarding this passage. He rejected the elements of coincidence in Procopius' story in favor of a "well-organized espionage and information service".[67]

At a strategic level we can reinforce this point by noting that twice Procopius made mention of a long-serving formal intelligence service which was specifically dedicated to keeping the Romans informed on affairs in the Persian court.[68] Of course in the *Wars* he noted that Justinian made adroit use of such men, while in the *Secret History* he castigated the emperor for allowing the service to fall into ruin. Regardless, he clearly assumed that the service had value, and expected his readers to agree. Likewise he occasionally noted the internal spies Justinian and Theodora employed against their own people.[69]

Much more relevant to our purposes here is that Procopius repeatedly noted the role of scouts, spies, and espionage (*kataskopoi* and *kataskope*) by commanders at the tactical and operational levels. Some of these references occur in non-Roman,[70] or mythical contexts,[71]

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67   Rubin, 24. "*wohlorganisierten Spionage und Informationsdienst*".
68   Proc. *Wars* 1.21.11, *SH* 30.1.12-14. Presumably here he was not referring to the corps of the *agentes in rebus* whose service was centralized under the *magister officiorum*, and whose duties were both more overt, prosaic, and internally focused. Cf. Jones, *LRE* 578-582; Christopher Kelly, *Ruling the Later Roman Empire*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 206-207; N.J.E. Austin, N.B. Rankov, *Exploratio: Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople*, (New York: Routledge, 1995), 219-221.
69   In a negative sense, Proc. *SH* 1.2, 16.14. Although one might have expected more if Justinian was the "Stalin" of the ancient world.
70   Proc. *Wars* 1.9.11 (scouts of the Persian commander Glones), 1.17.36 (al-Mundhir describing Saracen scouts), 1.21.11-16 (Persian and Roman spies and their potential duplicity), 2.30.38 (Persian scouts captured and reveal information to Romans in Lazica in 549), 3.8.17 (the Moor Kabaon sent spies to Carthage against the Vandals), 5.7.28-32 (Gothic spies report strength of advancing Roman army in 536 leading Gripas to abandon Salona), 7.5.5 (Gothic scouts report on the Roman advance on Florence in 542), 7.18.12-16 (the Romans capture two Gothic scouts in Calabria in 546, one turns cloak and gives information to the Romans), 7.26.5-9 (Gothic scouting force defeated by John at Capua in 547), 8.8.17-28 (Persian scouts routed by Romans and Lazi in 549).
71   Ibid. 5.15.9 (reference to spy mission of Diomedes and Odysseus in the *Iliad*.)

but others are part and parcel of descriptions of Roman operations,[72] and Procopius appears to have been aware of their activities and importance. In at least one instance, his account has the feel of personal acquaintance with the soldiers involved. His account of the narrow escape of a scouting party led by the guardsman Diogenes from the Vandals in 533 is dramatic and detailed, including notes about Diogenes' wounds and how they healed.[73]

Likewise, Procopius was aware that a lack of information from proper scouting and reconnaissance could be disastrous. He described how a Roman cavalry force was destroyed by the Goths in Lucania in 548 due to their own negligence. [74] Even when information was available, it was up to commanders to grasp its importance and act upon it. In December 546 the commanders, Bessas and Conon, willfully ignored the reports of their own scouts, allowed the Goths to breach the defenses of Rome, and lost the city.[75]

The practical nature of the events he described would have had an immediacy that it is hard to appreciate from the remove of the modern academy. Procopius was a man who had spent a good deal of his adult life on campaign with one of the premier captains of his generation and had seen many of the practical problems of war firsthand. If his abilities as an operational and strategic historian

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72 Ibid., 2.16.1-4 (Belisarius sends spies into Persian territory in 541 who inform him that Khusro was occupied elsewhere by the Huns), 2.19.27 (al-Harith sends scouts for the purpose of creating a false report to the Romans), 2.25.15 (Roman scouts report on the enemy array at Anglon), 3.17.14 (Roman and Vandal scouts encounter each other in 533 as the Romans advance on Carthage), 3.23.5-18 (a Roman scouting party led by Diogenes escape a Vandal trap in 533), 5.7.2-3 (a Roman scouting force in Dalmatia led by Mauricius, the son of Mundo, destroyed by the Goths in 535/6), 5.8.33 (Roman scouts report Gothic dispositions in Dalmatia to Constantianus), 5.24.3 (Belisarius describes having to engage the Goths while scouting outside Rome in 536 in letter to Justinian), 7.11.21-25 (Roman officer Ricila imprudently scouts alone and is killed by the Goths in 544 near Osimo), 7.20.10-12 (Roman scouts capture Goths who reveal Totila's plans but are ignored by commanders in Rome in 546), 7.26.15-21 (Roman scouts inform John of Totila's advance too late to prevent Roman rout in Lucania in 547).
73 Ibid., 3.23.5-18. It may also be worth noting that Procopius describes Diogenes later activities in Italy sympathetically, Proc. Wars 2.21, 5.27.11-12, 6.5.9, 6.9.9-10, 7.36-37, 7.39.25-28.
74 Ibid., 7.28.11-16.
75 Ibid., 7.20.10-21.

sometimes appear to leave something to be desired, we should still remember that Procopius was no mere armchair analyst of events. He was a man of affairs who had seen triumph, defeat, genius, bungling, death, maiming, and atrocity, all of which might be frustrated or retrieved by the impenetrable whim of chance. The problems of war must have been not simply academic for him, but tragically serious. If his claims for utility, or the lessons he imparts, occasionally seem to modern readers to be *topoi*, that does not mean that they were not meant in earnest and did not bear repeating.[76]

CURRICULUM VITAE

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He completed his doctorate in history in 2017 at the University of Maryland College Park with fields of concentration in imperialism, ancient historiography, and late antiquity. His dissertation, *Procopius of Caesarea*, Pragmatike Historia, *and the Limits of Imperial Power*, was on various aspects of Procopius' sixth century history of the wars of the emperor Justinian.

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[76] Note Peter J. Rhodes, "In Defence of the Greek Historians", *Greece and Rome* 41 (1994), 156-171. Simply because something is a common-place, does not make it untrue.

FRIDAY, 3 SEPTEMBER

WORKING SESSION XII

Chair: João Vieira Borges (Portugal)

33. DECENTRING WORLD WAR II: A THINK PIECE ON HOW TO FRAME MILITARISED VIOLENCE IN THE 1930s AND 1940s[1]

Frank Reichherzer (Germany)

Proposition: "World War II" – A complex system

In early 1941 US-President Franklin D. Roosevelt summarised his administration's position on the current state of international affairs to the US ambassador in Tokyo: The President believes "that the fundamental proposition is that we [the USA] must recognise that the hostilities in Europe, in Africa and Asia, are all parts of a single world conflict".[2] Similar the German Seekriegsleitung (Maritime Warfare Command), was aware of the ongoing globalising of war as well. The official war diary on the day of the Japanese attacks in the Pacific considered: "Almost every country in the world would be dragged in this war. The date 7 December 1941 will mark the beginning of a new phase in the fighting. The remarkable event opens a global (weltumfassend) and transcontinental (überkontinentalen) prospect (Vorausschau) on the future order of our planet".[3] However, political leaders and military planners were not the only people conscious of the interconnectedness of conflicts and events. German troops experienced British Mathilda tanks marked with red Soviet stars during the battle of Moscow in late 1941. Red army men put on US-produced boots before marching into battle. In huge numbers, soldiers from all parts of the colonial empires fought in Northern

[2] President Roosevelt to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew), 21 January 1941, drafted by Alger Hiss, in: Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV, Document 5, p. 6-8, quote p. 7 (online https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1941v04/d5, 10.01.2022).

[3] Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung 1939 – 1945, Part A, vol. 28. Dezember 1941, Entry 7.12.1941, p. 102, (online https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-zmsbw/frontdoor/index/index/searchtype/series/id/1/start/49/rows/10/docId/40 (10.01.2022).

Africa, Burma, France and elsewhere for the liberation of Western Europe and Southeast Asia – and eventually for the independence of their colonised home territories. Foreign forced labourers from occupied territories were exploited for the German war machine. Finally, fighting the war could not be isolated from the Shoah, industrialised murder in general, massacres and other war crimes. This list could be endless. The global scale, interconnectedness and the all-embracing effects of militarised mass violence and genocide in the 1930s and especially the 1940s are genuine truisms.

Historiography has been aware of this worldwide dimension and the interdependencies of the conflicts that assemble "World War II". In the last three decades, the high time of global history[4] has provided comprehensive theoretical reflections and high quantities of detailed empirical knowledge.[5] Quantitative analysis of conflict mark a trend. For example, the Correlates of War Project did not show solely "World War II". Instead, the database indicates 49 intra- or inter-state wars in the two decades from 1930 to 1950. A rough analysis of the English Wikipedia finds even 182 entries of wars or armed conflicts in the same period. Some of these conflicts of the 1930s and 1940s –for

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[4]   Global history is not another fancy word for what has been called "World History". The focus of global history lies on globally interconnected phenomena. Out of an endless list on literature see the seminal series "A history of the World" edited by Akira Irye and Jürgen Osterhammel. Here especially for the age of World Wars Emily S. Rosenberg (ed.), *A World Connecting, 1870-1945. A history of the World*, vol. 5, (Cambridge: MA Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012). For a conceptual framework see Sebastian Conrad, *What Is Global History?*, (Princeton NY, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016); Manuel Perez Garcia, Lucio de Sousa, *Global History and New Polycentric Approaches*, (Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-4053-5. As self-reflecting repositioning on the benefits, limits and challenges to the global history paradigm see Jeremy Adelman, "What is global history now?", *Aeon* (2017), https://aeon.co/essays/is-global-history-still-possible-or-has-it-had-its-moment (01.01.2022).
[5]   This knowledge has already reached textbooks. Inspiring is Andrew Buchanan, *World War II in Global Perspective, 1931-1953: A Short History*. Wiley short histories, (Hoboken NY, Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2019); a classic is Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*, Second edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511181863; See also Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, *Germany and the Second World War, vol. 6: The Global War*, (Oxford, 2001, German Orig., 1990). Even the Journal "Global War Studies" isdedicated to the (global) history of the Second World War. The centenary has enriched our understanding of a global World War I. And global cold war has produced also inspiring insights.

example the war in China– resists conventional western dominated time frames like 1939-1945 or 1941-1945. Consequently, there are many "small wars" in "big war". Vice versa, "big war" consists of different minor wars. Based on this, "World War II" emerges as a dynamic and complex system of interwoven conflicts. These findings draw attention to what historian Andrew N. Buchanan recently described as an "intersecting series of events – that sprawled messily over more than two decades",[6] events which we are used to calling "World War II". Here, armed conflicts, interstate war and civil war, theatres, campaigns, operations, battles, skirmishes, massacres merged.

Here, my paper starts. I want to shed a little light on the epistemological consequences of these insights: the dynamics of interdependencies, manifestations, and logics of conflict on the global, regional, and local levels. I try to argue that these findings animate to a re-evaluation and a re-framing of "World War II". Overall, the historicisation and global experience of conflict challenge a narrow sense and conventional narratives of "World War II". Mono-perspective approaches like "methodological nationalism" and "eurocentrism" are blind for essential aspects of the history of military conflict and violence in the 1930s and 1940s.[7]

As a think piece and as a work in progress, in this paper, I just could raise questions and cannot deliver finite answers. My argument follows a relational approach. This concept does not only take interconnectedness into account. Further, this way of thinking suggests making relations and dynamics the centre for analysis. A

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[6]   Buchannan, *World War II in Global Perspective*, 58.
[7]   The critique on "methodological nationalism" questions the nations state as the one and only entity for research. Especially the analysis of warfare –involving at least two parties or entities– shows the limits of a one-sided, and exclusive analysis. Out of the huge amount of literature on this see for example and enriching Saskia Sassen (ed.), *Deciphering the Global: Its Scales, Spaces and Subjects*, (New York, NY, London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2007); Saskia Sassen, "Neither Global nor National: Novel Assemblages of Territory, Authority and Rights", *Ethics & Global Politics* 1(1-2) (2008), 61-79, https://doi.org/10.3402/egp.v1i1.1814. Sure, there could and sould be a "national" approach. Deep knowledge on the national level is necessary. Even a multi-perspective Europe centered view is enriching. But it is important, that these worksare aware of "the beyond" and that they reflect that a interconnectedness of action could be possible.

promising way to show this approach's potential is to decentre our understanding of "World War II". Hence, it stimulates to reflect the (too often) un-reflected.

Decentring I: On naming – or: What is "World War II?"

To reflect the un-reflected leads first to the wording. At first glance, it seems obvious what "World War II" is. As a container, "World War II" marks a structuring watershed of twentieth century history, especially in a European or a transatlantic chronology. Nevertheless, contemporaries and following generations alike have used many different names to describe their violent environment of the 1930s and 1940s. "World War II" (or "Second World War") was used seldom during the war. The Term became popular only in retrospect to make sense of the struggle. Soon after 1945, "World War II" became quasi-naturalised. However, "World War II" is not a matter of fact and is not self-explanatory. People have made or chosen this wording with a specific interest or impulse. Surprisingly, historical semantics or etymology of the terms "World War II" or "Second World War" have been researched on rare occasions.[8]

The expression "world war" has been part of the political language in Europe since early modern times.[9] In most European languages –

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[8]   I regret just to mention only the main power here. More research on the naming and historical semantics of conflict could –as far as I see– be done. Nevertheless, the research done so far shows the potential of decentering. Especially David Reynolds made in the case of the "World Wars" the process of naming a topic for historical analysis and gives aninstructive picture of experiencing and framing the events of war. David Reynolds, "The Origins of the Two 'World Wars': Historical Discourse and International Politics", *Journal of Contemporary History* 38(1) (2003), 29-44, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009403038001962. See likewise David Reynolds, *From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s*, 1. publ. in paperback, (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), Chapter I. 1. The same is true for the World War II in Japanes parlance, see Junichiro Shoji "What Should the 'Pacific War' be Named? A Study of the Debate in Japan", *NIDS Security Reports* 12 (2011) (online: http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/research/profile/senshi/03syouji. html (10.01.2022). This paper was finished before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The recent debates about escalation of war showed a revival of "World War-Parlance".

[9]   For the German language and see the linguistic database https://woerterbuchnetz.de/?sigle=DWB&lemma=weltkrieg#0. Here one can see the

especially in German ones– "world", "great", "encompassing", "universal", etc., became part of the same semantic field. From the eighteenth century onward and especially during the French Wars of Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the term "World War" was used in the sense of "great power conflict". A spatial dimension of "world" was only a constituting part of the overall meaning of "greatness" or "importance". At the turn of the century, "world war" became a future-orientated term as part of the apocalyptic visions of a possible globalised and industrialised war. In the context of international global-scale ventures in the decades around 1900, like universal time, standardisation of units of measures, communication systems, and global traffic "world-words" in the sense of a global universalism were booming.[10]

Apart from "Great War" in France and Britain, the expression "World War" appears especially in the German-speaking countries and in some respect in the USA for describing and giving meaning to the military violence from 1914 till 1918.[11] In the German context of a "world-obsession",[12] not only the "greatness" of the war but the fight against a "whole world of enemies" gained an important semantical part of the term, driven specifically in retrospect by making sense of defeat.[13] In the USA, the term echoes the fierce debates about US intervention in a "European" war and the efforts of President Woodrow Wilson to create a post-war "New World Order" and

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huge number of composita starting with the prefix "Welt" (world) in German language.

[10] For the history or world projects see Markus Krajewski, *World Projects: Global Information Before World War I*, Electronic mediations 45, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015).

[11] See here for a reframing of "World War I" as a "Greater War" beyond the western front scope e.g. the Oxford University Press Series "The Greater War" here Robert Gerwarth, Erez Manela (eds), *Empires at War: 1911-1923*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); or Guoqi Xu, *Asia and the Great War: A Shared History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). Beside this series e.g. Jörn Leonhard, *Pandora's Box: A History of the First World War*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018).

[12] Reynolds sees this obsession with world especially in case of late imperial Germany. Reynolds, "The Origins of the Two 'World Wars'", 31. I would consent here.

[13] Official German history was "Der Weltkrieg" (The World War). For this case and other countries see Reynolds, "The Origins of the Two 'World Wars'".

"World Peace". Hence, speaking of "World War" gained a holistic,
planetarian connotation beside a marker of greatness. The world-war
terminology was "product and procreator of globalisation"[14] and
interconnectedness. This reference to spatial universalism also became
true for the subsequent great carnage.

In an article on the state of war preparations in Europe of June
1939, *Time* Magazine foresaw an upcoming "Second World War". The
authors numbered the pervious and the expected war and created a
close relationship between both events.[15] Almost three months later,
Time Magazine took on this notions: "World War II began last week at
5:20 a.m. (Polish time) on Friday, September 1"[16] – in this words, the
article informs its audience about the first phase of the German
invasion of Poland. Further, the text delivers an outlook on the
possible geographical outreach of the conflict. The author proposed a
logistical support route to Poland by France and Britain via the
Mediterranean to sustain polish resistance. Things turned out
different. From another perspective, the threshold to "World War"
was exceeded not with the beginning of the German invasion of
Poland but three days later. For instance, the "Kristeligt Dagblad" –a
Danish newspaper– stated as primary headline on 4 September 1939:
"The Second World War broke out yesterday at 11 a.m.".[17] The article
referred to the expiry of the British and French ultimatum to Germany
on 3 September 1929. The declaration of war to Germany by Britain
and France in the following evening worked as a trigger for framing
the events as a "New World War" or "World War II".

In Germany, after the escalation toa full-scale war in 1939, "World
War II" or similar terms were marginally used. In documents, official

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14   Reynolds, "The Origins of the Two 'World Wars'", 29.
15   Background for War – War Machines, *Time* Magazine 12.06.1938, 28a-34. The
terms "Second World War" (p. 28b), and not coherent "World War I" (p. 29) was
mentioned in the same article. Digitized version https://time.com/vault/issue/1939-
06-12/page/31/.
16   Grey Friday, *Time* Magazine, 11.09.1939. Starting with this issue a regular section
"WORLD WAR" was introduced by *Time* magazine (p. 13 in the same issue). The
Time Magazine also distinguished a "Polish" and a "Western Theatre" as different
news sections.
17   Kristeligt Dagblad, 4 September 1939, Extra edition, quoted in Wikipedia, article
World War, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_war (10.01.2021).

statements and everyday speak, names of campaigns and theatres became more common. Almost "this world war" appeared occasionally. [18] Mostly "der Weltkrieg" referred in retrospect to "World War I". In respect to the ongoing struggle, World-war-terminology appeared in connection with Adolf Hitler's infamous Reichstag speech on 30 January 1939, when he "prophesied" the "annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe" in connection with the menace of an upcoming "World War".[19] The clear connection between global war and the genocide on European Jewry was made shortly after the Pearl Harbor attacks. After a meeting with Hitler and leaders of the Nazi-party in the Reich Chancellery on 12 December 1941, Reich Minister of Propaganda Josef Goebbels noted in his diary in reference to Hitler's earlier prediction: "He prophesied that if the Jews once again brought about a world war, they would experience their extermination. This was not an empty phrase. The world war is here. The extermination of the Jews must be its necessary consequence".[20]

In Britain, the politico-linguistic treatment of the ongoing war was simply called "the war" in official communication.[21] However, in public, different names were used. Following David Reynolds, Britons link the actual war with the last war against Germany and put the events into the framework of another "Great War". In June 1944, the publishing house Macmillan asked the British government if there is an official government ruling concerning terminology on the war

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[18] This argument is based on research of the magazine *Signal*, an illustrated propaganda photo journal of the German army specifically for audiences in neutral and occupied countries and the "Illustrierter Beobachter" an illustrated propaganda magazine published by the Nazi Party.

[19] For a broader and different contextualization of the speech and Hitler's annihilation prophecy see Hans Mommsen, "Hitler's Reichstag Speech of 30 January 1939", *History & Memory* 9(1-2) (1997), 147-161; Ian Kershaw, "Hitler's Prophecy and the 'Final Solution'", in Moshe Zimmermann (ed.), *On Germans and Jews Under the Nazi Regime: Essays by Three Generations of Historians; a Festschrift in Honor of Otto DovKulka*, (Jerusalem: Hebrew University Magnes Press, 2006), 49–66, https://doi.org/ 10.2979/HIS.1997.9.1-2.147. The part of the speech could be found here: https://www.ushmm.org/learn/timeline-of-events/1939-1941/hitler-speech-to germ an-parliament (10.01.2022).

[20] Entry Goebbels Diaries 13 December 1941. Find the digitized edition here: https://www.degruyter.com/database/tjgo/html?lang=en.

[21] Reynolds, "The Origins of the Two 'World Wars'", 36.

because the American wording of "World War I"and "World War II" had become prominent in publications reaching Britain from the other side of the Atlantic. From the options, "War of 1939-?" or "Five (or six, or seven) Years" War Prime Minister Winston Churchill circled "First World War" and "Second World War" as possible names in the file. However, the government answered that there would not be an official wording. The official name of the war should be "decided by popular judgment" over time. [22] In another case just right before printing, Churchill himself changed the title of his war memoirs from "Second Great War" to "Second World War" shortly before publication. [23] Avoidance of world-connotation in official communication in Britain could be seen in the context of eroding imperial power. For the people in the Empire fighting, supporting, and suffering a "World War" had the potential to fuel the aspirations for emancipation – and finally independence.

In the French case, making the war a "World War" was different. After the fall of France in 1940, the recurse to the global world-war-semantics worked as an integrative and mobilising force. In his first radio broadcast from London on 18 June 1940, Charles de Gaulle, in these days a relatively unknown French General, gave himself the legitimacy to continue fighting by saying: "This war is a worldwide war (une guerre mondial)".[24] Based on French oversea territories, the British Empire and the industrial power of the (still neutral) USA, de Gaulle used the semantics of global war to foster the Free French position that "France has lost a battle! But, France has not lost the war!".[25]

Different was the case for the USSR. "Great Patriotic War" developed into official parole in the republics of the Soviet Union and the struggle against Nazi-German from 1941 till 1945. The name was a

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22 All ibid., 36
23 Ibid., 36.
24 For Text and further information see the dossier of The National Achieves (TNA), https://blog.nationalarchives.gov.uk/france-has-lost-a-battle-but-france-hasnt-lost-the-war/(10.01.2022).
25 This "classical" statement was not in the speech of 18 June but was printed on poster recruiting Frenchmen to join the government in exile. See e.g., the material on the TNA blog https://blog.nationalarchives.gov.uk/france-has-lost-a-battle-but-france-hasnt-lost-the-war/(10.01.2022).

reference to the Napoleonic invasion of Russia in 1812 called "Patriotic War". Of course, the red army's invasion of Poland in mid-September and further armed conflicts like the "Winter War" against Finland from November 1939 till March 1940 and Soviet–Japanese border conflicts are not part of the "Great Patriotic War". The power of narrative and how disputed and politicised wording and naming could be shows an episode of our days. In Ukraine, in 2015, the parliament approved a law renaming the "Great Patriotic War" as the "Second World War".[26] Consequently, the war museum in Kyiv was renamed from "Museum of the Great Patriotic War" into the "National Museum of the History of Ukraine in the Second World War". During the conflict with Russia since the early 2010s, a soviet master-narrative and tradition were abandoned, and Ukraine tried to inscribe herself into a more independent, even western-style narrative.[27]

In Asia, things differ totally. China was drawn into military struggles since the revolution in 1911. Japanese official languages labelled colonial aspirations and violent expansion in China as "incidents". Besides the reality of full-scale war since 1937 at the latest, Japan officially was not in a state of war with China until the Chinese declaration of war against the Axis powers in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attacks. Short before the Japanese took the offensive in the Pacific, the Japanese government set up a commission for naming the upcoming war. The Imperial General Headquarters-Government Liaison Conference decided: "Greater East Asia War".[28] This name merged the ongoing fighting in China and the war against the Western Allies in Asia and the Pacific. The wording connected Japanese expansion with the idea of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" – a decolonising/recolonising project aiming for a

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[26] Nolan Peterson, "Ukraine Purges Symbols of Its Communist Past", *Newsweek*, 4 October 2015, https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-purges-symbols-its-communist-past-321663(10.01.2022).

[27] See the homage of the Museum: https://www.warmuseum.kiev.ua/_eng/ museum/about_us/ (10.01.2022).

[28] Other suggested names were "Pacific War", "War against the United States and Britain", "War for the Development of Asia". See Shoji, "What Should the 'Pacific War' be Named?".

Japanese regional hegemony. Even in the controversy about naming, it had become clear that in practise imperial Japanese army and the navy fought almost two different wars. After 1945 the USA imposed the name "Pacific War" into Japanese post-war socio-political language – a term also preferred by the Imperial Japanese navy before.

The USA are an interesting case for making sense of this war. For domestic politics, President Roosevelt used world-semantics in connection with war and conflict early on. Especially after the fall of France in 1940, he argued for engagement against supposed Nazi-aspirations of world dominance. The administration aimed to push rhetorical for a US engagement in a conflict of global scale. Not less than the "world order" was at stake. Notably, the lend-lease politics with immense support and aid for Britain and the later the USSR and China were framed in "World War" terminology. Hence, referring to a globalising conflict legitimised the flow of armaments to allies as essential for the defence, security, and values of the USA, and the "Western Hemisphere". However, with entering the war as a belligerent nation in December 1941, the administration seems to be unhappy with the world-war-speak. In April 1942, Roosevelt announced at a press conference that he would be delighted to get proposals on how the current war could be named. The War Department was bombarded with 15,000 suggestions within a few weeks. Roosevelt, by himself, believed "there is one word that we could use for this war, the word "survival". "The Survival War", as he said in his remarks to the Pan American Union in April 1942, makes clear what is at stake: "the survival of our civilisation, the survival of democracy, the survival of a hemisphere [...].[...]. So, I think that survival is what our problem is, survival of what we have all lived for, for a great many generations".[29] Nevertheless, Gallup polls showed that "World War II" still had an overwhelming preference in parlance in the USA. Roosevelt's suggestion, "survival war", ended far behind "War for World Freedom", "Freedom War", "Liberty war", and

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[29] Franklin D. Roosevelt, *Remarks to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, 14 April 1942*, (online: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/ remarks-the-governing-board-the-pan-american-union (10.02.2022).

"Anti-Dictator War".[30] In the USA globality, a fight for future world order, the imagination of "One World" became the prominent attribution of the current war – again.[31] Later, in September 1945, directly after the victory over Japan, there was a governmental statement that the war in retrospect should be named for uniformity from now on "World War II".[32] This denomination of the events became hegemonic within the west and beyond. With some irony on the fading imperial British power, the establishment of the term "World War II" was seen as another "American victory"[33] in the eyes of the British Historian Llewellyn Woodward shortly after the War.

There could be many examples more. Especially looking beyond major powers would be fruitful. By analysing different processes, possibilities, and concrete practices of naming, we decentre our understanding of World War II as a solid "naturalised" entity. However, a consequence is not to abandon the term "World War". World-war-terminology has a surplus value for historical research. Decentring means looking at how different people (during and after the war, even until today) created a different sense by naming conflicts. Here, one can identify two major forces and realities at work.

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[30] "A name for this war?", in *Gallup and Fortune Polls. The Public Opinion Quarterly* 6(3) (Autumn 1942), 486. The popularity of naming in the USA shows e.g., the President of the Advertising Federation of America. He suggested "The War that Business Helped to Win", in order to foster the position of "Corporate America" in US-politics, quoted in Tracy Campbell, *The Year of Peril: America in 1942*, (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2020), 119.

[31] Some US-Publication put the war or "World War II" into the categories of "Global War". Especially maps tended to form theglobal imaginary. For example, see Harrison, Richard Edes, "One world, one war; a map showing the line-up and the strategic stakes in this the first global war", *Time*, New York 1942. Digitized high-resolution version here: https://collections.library.yale.edu/catalog/15238314 (10.10.2021). An earlier Version of the map from August 1941 with the "mapped" possibility of a crushed USSR and visualizing the threat to US-interest could be found here: http://2.bp.blogspot.com/YhksJZKw4cM/UNYyeW4KdlI/AAAAAAAACy0/bYKT f7050/s1600/world_divided_1941.jpg(10.10.2021). An interesting fact is that Edes uses a stereographic projection to show the "continuity of the land and water areas. Using the north pole, the map shows the whole planet and the ongoing war, but in a truly northern perspective. The global thinking of the time in the USA is obvious in the influential book "One World" – published in the book 1943 by republican senator and presidential candidate in the 1940 Elections, Wendell Willkie

[32] See for example the Series US Army in World War II.

[33] Reynolds, "The Origins of the Two 'World Wars'", 38.

On the one hand, the applied "world-semantics" shows the planetary outreach of the war in the 1930s and 1940s. On the other hand, as David Reynolds argues, historians should be careful on terminology, especially getting trapped in a "second world war box"[34]. A hasty use of 'World War II' bares the risk of hiding and obscuring the diversity and the specific characteristics of per se distinct conflicts and different agendas of the involved people.

Decentring II: On time – or: When did "World Wat II" happen?

It is hard to say when the first and the last shot of World War II were fired.[35] There are good arguments for September 1939 – from a European perspective. Or was it 1941, when the war expanded in scale after Germany invaded the USSR? Or is it the beginning of the Imperial Japanese offensive in the Pacific and the German declaration of War against the USA half a year later, when conflicts involving all five continents became connected and "World War II" became a genuinely global war? Or did "World War II" start much earlier in Eastern Africa? Was the beginning in Ethiopia in 1935 when the Italian invasion showed the instability of the international order? Or was China the place where the war began? Maybe in Manchuria in 1931, in Shanghai 1932, or was it near the Marco-Polo Bridge in Beijing in 1937 where World War II started? Furthermore, what about the civil war in Spain – a conflict that originated as a mere Spanish affair and later became an ideological clash between liberal democracy, fascism and communism?

What about the end? On the night from 8 to 9 May 1945, officially, war turns to peace – "zero hour" in Germany. With the capitulation of German armed forces, the war ended only in the European theatre of operations. In Eastern Asia and the Pacific, the war continues. Japan's surrender was announced by Emperor Hirohito on 15 August and formally signed on 2 September 1945. Japanese troops –still occupying vast territories– surrendered one by one in the following weeks.

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34   Ibid., 42
35   See beside the following citations the ongoing project of Bernd Wegener "The first global war. Dynamics of violence in the international system, 1931-1948".

However, (military) violence did not come to an end. For some people (militarised forms) of violence continued or even started to begin. In the last month of the war, extreme violence continued and transformed in the grey zone from war to peace. In Southeast Asia for example, nationalist and anti-colonialist movements used the power vacuum between the Japanese surrender and the attempts to restore the colonial states to proclaim independence. British troops fought reinforced by 35,000 Japanese soldiers against a nationalist guerrilla in the Dutch East Indies. Later the Netherlands mounted two significant military interventions. In 1949 the islands now called Indonesia became an independent state. The Indonesian independence and the harsh, extreme violent anti-communist policies of the mid 1960s are just one example of how "World War II" transforms global conflicts and how strongly "World War II" is connected with "Decolonization" and the "Cold War" as central cyphers for two major (entangled) trends of post-World-War-II history.

Another critical event points at the connection and transformation of violence in Algeria, in the province of Constantine. On the same day, the guns in Europe officially went silent, guns were fired in Algeria. In the city of Sétif, the celebration of victory over Nazi-Germany on 8 May 1945, turned into an anti-colonial protest.[36] The war in Europe, Asia and Africa involved immense resources from the colonised world and showed the problems and fragility of empires. Even the Japanese success in the early years shattered the belief in the superiority of colonial powers. The contribution of people, resources, materials and finances for the Allied victory became associated with reform of colonial relations and not least independence.[37] In this atmosphere, the victory parade in Sétif turned into an anti-colonial protest when Algerian nationalists unrolled banners and raised claims

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[36] An introduction can be found here: Jean-Pierre Peyroulou, *Setif and Guelma (May 1945, Algeria)*, 26 March 2008, https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/setif-and-guelma-may-1945.html (10.01.2022).

[37] Especially for the French case see the Brazzaville Conference in January 1944. Here, Free French authorities made many concessions. However, self-government or independence was explicitly rejected, but fundamental reorganization of the relation between the colonial center and the colonies and an improved status of indigenous colonial subjects was promised.

for independence. The police tried to stop the anti-colonial demonstration. Shots were fired, and protesters and police officers were killed. The situation escalated further into riots and murder. During the rage in the following hours, 28 people of obvious continental French origin were killed in the streets of Sétif, 48 got injured. During the following days, around 100 French settlers were killed in attacks. French settler-militias and authorities retaliated heavily on the Muslim berber population. The uprising was cracked down by the use of military force and vigilantism. People got court marshalled, imprisoned and 28 were executed. Within six weeks, the anti-colonial uprising, and the colonial repression cost thousands of lives. Death figures are disputed and range from 6,000 to 45,000. The events in Sétif and the surrounding area on VE-Day (victory-day Europe) set a series of mass violence into motion. The massacres and killings fuelled French-Algerian tensions and led to the independence war in Algeria, beginning almost ten years later. Here, in the relation between World War II on the one hand and the process of decolonisation on the other, one can see a reconfiguration of violence and conflict. The process of decolonisation is strongly affected by "World War II". The same is true the other way around, for the effects of anti-colonialism and decolonization on the "World War".

There will be many dates and events for a beginning, end, and transformation of violence and conflict. Moreover, every date, caesura, and reference to continuities and transformations have a right in its own. Some books have been playing with unusual timeframes for "World War II" in the last years. Dan Diner, for example,is zooming into a specific conflict constellation. In his inspiring book, he looks at "World War II" in Palestine.[38] For him, 1935 and 1942 are important dates. Diner starts with the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the soft British response, and the repercussions of empire in Palestine culminating in the "Arab Revolt" one year later. In the following eight years, the triangulated conflict in Palestine between the British Mandate, the Jewish and the Arab communities was heavily shaped by a fourth force: the German and Italian advance in the Western

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[38] Dan Diner, *Ein anderer Krieg: Das jüdische Palästina und der Zweite Weltkrieg, 1935-1942*, (München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2021).

Desert. For example, Jewish soldiers fought alongside the British when German forces threatened the territories east of Suez. Diners "World War II" in Palestine ended in 1942 when the Axis advance in North Africa was stopped. After the Second Battle of El Alamein (and Stalingrad) in the Winter 1942/43, the threat for the Jewish people in Palestine vanished, and the constellation of the struggle over Palestine between the British, the Jews and the Arabs was transformed and heated up again.

In another example, Andrew N. Buchanan zooms out. His enriching book looks at "World War II" from a global perspective.[39] Watersheds for him are the Invasion of Manchuria of 1931, and 1953, the end of the Korean War. Even 1975 is mentioned as a possible date for an end. From a specific Vietnamese perspective(despite domestic conflict and division in Vietnamese society), the Japanese invasion 1941, resistance and Allied backing during occupation, the failing French recolonisation efforts after 1945, the "First Indochina War" (1946-1954), and at least the US "Vietnam War" which faded out in 1975 could be seen as one internal and external struggle.[40]

Richard Overy offers a similar approach.[41] Overy´s lens for analysing global conflict is the condition of the world system. He situates mid-twentieth century military conflicts in the state of an unstable imperial world order, which triggered conflicts. Framed as the "Great Imperial War", he describes the carnage in detail as a clash of imperial projects and ambitions – and finally as the endgame of the empire. The struggle over a global imperial order provides the links between different conflicts. The temporal core of this overarching argument are the years 1931 to 1945, which Overy describes as a

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[39] Buchannan, *World War II in Global Perspective*. The book was published while I started thinking about "Decentring World War II" and points in the same direction as my thoughts, but in a more elaborate way.
[40] A detailed history of the conflict in Vietnam it an early phase from 1940s to the 1950s see, Shawn F. MacHale, *The First Vietnam War: Violence, Sovereignty, and the Fracture of the South, 1945-1956*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108936b002.
[41] Overy, Richard J, *Blood and Ruins: The Great Imperial War, 1931-1945* (London: Allen Lane 2021).

turning point between high imperialism and the cold war world order.

The case-driven practises and manifold possibilities of timing what we are calling "World War II" shows that a clear-cut chronological definition is not possible – and not necessary. In a multi-perspective and polycentric approach, "World War II" becomes frayed. The examples provided by Diner and Buchannan and Overy show how fruitful a fluid handling of chronology and temporal positioning of "World War II" could be. Here, a broader picture becomes visible: first, there is no definite timeframe for World War II; second on interconnectedness and chains of effects; and finally on the transitory and transforming power of "World War II".

Decentring III: On space – or: Where did "World War II" take place?

These manifold "World Wars" happened in many places in different ways. Conflicts not only took place at the frontlines. The war was not only fought by the military. Armed conflict had a huge impact on societies as a whole. The carnage of the 1930s and 1940s involved all continents and oceans. The war was fought in dugouts, planes, ships, and headquarters, as in laboratories, offices, and factories. During World War II, many regions and places were connected. Waging war was manifold. An obvious manifestation of the connection of different spaces and the construction of a global perspective could be seen in the sphere of military logistics. Deploying and sustaining troops overseas for fighting a war (far) away from homelands produced ramified global networks and a system of bases that connects places all over the world. The following map (Figure 1) on "Air and Water Logistics" is an example of these sinews of warfare from a US perspective. The lines of communication and supply routes sketched there can give an image of the connection of spaces, the flows of goods, armaments, raw material, people, and ideas.

Figure 1: Time and space chart. Air and water logistics.

Source: *Biennale Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army July 1, 1941, to June 30, 1943, to the Secretary of War*, 14.

This interrelatedness of space and place literally materialises itself in objects. Following material history, objects –like weapons– have archived implicit information. Mapping the spatial connection of a weapon system used in the war, its development, production, deployment, and operation would show many worldwide connections. Imagine this for a shot of a German V-2 missile: High-tech laboratories, test sites, death camps and forced labour, refineries for rocket fuel, special alloys, optics, cloth producers for uniforms, synthetic rubber for tires of the launcher, trains, and coal for transportation, tobacco for a good smoke for the operating personnel, andnot at least a projectile traveling hundreds of kilometres in seconds relating fore position and target zone. The list would be endless. The same would be true for less complex weaponry like infantry rifles and ammunition.

On the level of grand strategy, Daniel Hedinger argues in his stimulation book on the relations of the Axis powers for a decentred perspective. Sure, the Axis was far away from the level of synchronizing warfare in time and space like the Allies. Not to

mention cooperation and integration of military force of the Anglo-Americans. Nevertheless, the actions of the Axis powers were strongly related to each other, and places and spaces became linked by Axis actions. For example, the campaign of the later axis partner Italy in Eastern Africa could show the weakness of the British and French in maintaining international order.The invasion of Ethiopia by Italian troops in 1935 not only sparked events in the Mandate of Palestine, as mentioned above. The situation triggered political calculus in Germany as well. The remilitarisation of the Rhineland and introduction of conscription in 1935 put the Versailles world order up for question and paved the way to full-scale war in Europe.[42] Another example of repercussions between the Axis powers is the Japanese dealing with the German invasion of the USSR in summer 1941. The rapid advance of German troops was critical to the Japanese assessment of the global situation in autumn of 1941. The events in Eastern Europe had a high impact on the Japanese decisions to act against the US Pacific Fleet plus British and Dutch possessions to create a defence perimeter and force the USA into an agreement over disputes between both countries.[43]

In addition, decentring space goes beyond recognising the interrelatedness of distant spaces and events. Again, Dan Diner delivers an example in his book on Palestine. He confronts two horizons: first, a "west-east narrative" of the war, and second, a perspective from the global south and the colonial world, a "south-north storyline".[44] Diner shows local manifestations of "World War II" and the effects of local events on the global scale. His works demonstrate how perspectives which are centred in the global south could enrich research. Hence, his book does more than integrate the "south" elements to a "northern" perspective. His approaches go beyond the question of how the global south contributed to the "European", "Pacific" or "Northern War". First and foremost, his focal point always is Palestine and stays in Palestine. He asks what

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[42]   Daniel Hedinger, *Die Achse: Berlin - Rom - Tokio 1919-1946*, (München: C.H. Beck, 2021).
[43]   Brendan Simms, Charlie Laderman, *Hitler's American Gamble: Pearl Harbor and Germany's March to Global War*, (London: Allan Lane, 2021).
[44]   For the two "horizons" see Diner, "Ein anderer Krieg", 1.

happened there and relates this event to a broader context. Thus, he shows the mutual effects (from short- to long-term) between the assemblage of overarching conflict and the "south". Hence, Diner gives a detailed insight on how different levels and scales of conflicts –on the local, regional, and global– interacted and influenced each other.

However, there is no definite "margin" in "World War II" history. The criteria "core" and "periphery" have to be defined during the research process. Hence, research on the topology of World War II is complex, challenging, andvery promising. A topological way of thinking should focus on space-driven relations and does make a decentred approach not only possible but necessary.

Decentring IV: On ways of warfare: A short comment on "Wars of Independence"

There is reason to categorise "World War II" as a conventional interstate war. However, decentring of terminology, space and time shows that many types of warfare and organised violence interact, and together form "World War II". In the environment of world war, genocide and massacres were committed, guerrilla and civil wars were fought, and many forms of militarised violence up to gang crime could be seen. The German offensives in Central and Eastern Europe, for example, created vast territories with fragile statehood.[45] Social and ethnic tension rose in this situation. Occupiers played one group against another to foster their weak position. In these circumstances, violence escalated, and civil wars were fought in the wake of a great power war. Here –last but not least– the conference's topic comes in and stimulates another example for a decentred view. Looking at "World War II" from a perspective of "Wars of Independence" could be a fruitful endeavour. A short theory of "Wars of Independence" based on the papers presented at the Athens conference of the CIHM in 2021 is helpful. First, there are many ways to name the phenomenon called "Wars of Independence" Just to highlight some mentioned during the conference "war of liberation", "war of

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[45] Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, (New York: Basic Books, 2012).

unification", "war of secession". Another cluster would be "uprising", "revolt", "insurrection", "insurgency". A further group contains "intervention", "peacekeeping mission", "counterinsurgency", "riot control". The naming is highly politicized and depended on the speaker's position in the discourse. More or less, all these sorts of conflicts have something in common. The constellation is very dynamic. First, a "war of independence" is primarily a conflict in – between civil war and inter-state war– if the classification category is statehood or sovereignty. Hence, the central marker of a "war of independence" is the steady changing character of the conflict over time. Some transformations as simplified tendencies could be identified:

Dynamics and Transformations of Conflict		
from	**to**	
asymmetric	symmetric	
internal	external	to internal again (maybe)
part	own entity	new borders, re-territorialisation
irregular	regular	role of military force, experts on violence

Second, wars and conflicts of independence have a hybrid character and are transitive and in flux. Third, there is no stable differentiation between opposing forces over the conflict. Instead, one can often identify the shifting composition of military forces and coalitions. Fourth, "Wars of Independence" often are part of a broader "conflict-environment" and take place in complex political, economic, social, and cultural contexts. Fifth, interconnectedness is another main character of "Wars of Independence" and, therefore, events and structures from the micro to the macro level are an important aspect. Sixth, many perspectives are possible, and these perspectives should be part of an integrated analysis; hence, the keyword is "multi-perspectivity".

Finally: Detail and Panorama – What makes "World War II"

There would be much more to tell.[46] I hope the loose variety of thought and the arbitrary use of some examples in the proceeding chapters have given an idea of the benefit of looking at relational aspects and the potential of a multi-perspective and a poly-centric view on "World War II". The good news is that this is not all new. Historians from all parts of the world have researched many aspects of "World War II". However, this is not the point. The point is that we have to bring these works and perspectives together. By integrating these enriching findings detailed as panoramic view of "World War II" could be painted. How details constitute a wider picture could rouse new questions and stimulate further research. Here I want to summarize in short, some ideas on such a panoramic understanding of "World War II" along with three keywords: diversity, assemblage, and emergence.

Diversity and Integration: Framing "World War II"

The first keyword is based on empirical evidence. Looking at the various forms of military violence in the age of "World War II", it becomes clear that there are many different conflicts. Hence, there is no exclusive, all-embracing narrative for all occurrences, structures, processes, and actions of conflict in the mid-twentieth century. The diversity of conflict does not make "World War II" an obsolete description. On the contrary, this only breaks the container "World War II". Using World War II as a kind of epistemological device hints at different but interconnected manifestations of violence and conflict on the global, regional, and local levels and their reciprocal effects.

Assemblage: Towards the global fabric of conflict

This empirical base leads to a theoretical framing. The sometimes loose, sometimes solid, sometimes fluid accumulation of conflicts

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[46]   Just mention the decentering of actors. The multinational and diversified structure of military forces in World War II is an interesting topic. Here the contribution of colonial troops for Allied victory comes in. What about women? World War II seems to be a totally male enterprise with woman only on the margins, what is more than misleading And: During World War II more civilian people were killed or murdered than military personnel – despite any temporal and regional framing. This fact makes is clear, the history of World War II could not focus only the military.

could be described as an assemblage. Initially, the word assemblage describes an artistic form in which different elements are gathered into a single context.[47] This analogy helps to frame an understanding of "World War II". The central assumption of an assemblage is that different elements relate to each other, couple and create something (new). Even though, assemblages are dynamic in connecting, in disconnecting, and reconnecting as well. From this point of view, the fabric of "World War II" could be understood as an assemblage of different conflicts or just parts of these. The nature of "World War II" –or less essential, the constructive principle– is behind the question, what makes conflicts to(de-)couple and how do these elements/conflicts relate to each other.

Emergence: Connections as process

This theoretical framing leads to methodology. The concept of emergence could help to answer how and why things relate to each other. In contrast to the models of evolution or even history, emergence does not imply a linear process. The authors of Wikipedia make in short apparent what emergence is about: "[E]mergence occurs when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own, properties or behaviours which emerge only when the parts interact in the broader whole".[48] Applied to "World War II" this means more than adding up distant conflicts under the umbrella of "World War II". The surplus for analysing the carnage of the 1930s and 1940s lies in the hidden dimension of interactions and linking. The question than is, what constitutes the "World War II" as a single event (for whom)?[49]

These were some thoughts on how historians could deal with "World War II". As a think piece, and by focusing on relational approach my paper wanted to open up new points of view. I'm sorry for not delivering answers. However, I tried to show some possibilities for future research. One thing is clear, the panoramic view as a whole

47   A first application of assemblage to social theory was made by Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, French Orig. 1980).
48   Emergence, in: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence (10.02.2022).
49   The theoretisation of historical events could help here.

and the small details on the canvas could not be done by one person alone. Hence, this is not only a think piece, but it is also an invitation to bring different expertise, knowledge, and historical approaches together to reframe and to research together the relation of militarised conflict in the 1930s and 1940s (and beyond), and –as I hope to show– to get new insights, in what we will still call "World War II".

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Since 2018: Head of the resarch group "Military and Violence" within the framework of the 2028 Agenda of the "ZMSBw Center for Military History and Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr"

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34. THE HISTORICAL LEGACY OF THE GREEK REVOLUTION ON THE EOKA STRUGGLE: POLITICS, GUERRILLA WARFARE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Andreas Karyos (Cyprus)

Introduction

The Greek Revolution of 1821-1830 (or the Greek War of Independence or the Struggle of 1821) is a significant chapter in modern history, for its impact was both regional and transnational: the efforts of the Greeks ended Ottoman rule and brought about the proclamation of the Greek independent state in 1830. In the decades that followed, Greek independence decisively generated a surge of nationalism in the Balkan Peninsula, spurring the formation of states across the region.

The Greek War of Independence also had a decisive effect on Cyprus. During the war Ottoman authorities in Cyprus executed Greek Cypriot political elites to stave off a possible Greek Cypriot uprising,[1] while between 400 and 1,000 Greek Cypriot volunteers participated in the mainland uprising.[2] More significantly, though, the Greek Revolution and its immediate result, the establishment of an independent Hellenic state, became the foundation for the development of the Greek Cypriot *enosis* movement to liberate Cyprus and unite it with Greece.[3]

In the period of British colonial rule following the Ottoman occupation of Cyprus, the historical legacy of the Greek Revolution held a pivotal role in the promotion of Greek national identity and

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[1]   Georgios Kipiadis, *Απομνημονεύματα των κατά το 1821 εν τη Νήσω Κύπρω Τραγικών Σκηνών [Memoirs from the Tragic Scenes in the Island of Cyprus in 1821]*, 2nd ed. (Alexandria: Omonia, 1888), 13-24; Andreas Mitsidis, «Η Εκκλησία της Κύπρου επί Τουρκοκρατίας» ["The Church of Cyprus in the Ottoman Occupation of Cyprus"], in Theodoros Papadopoulos (ed.), *Ιστορία της Κύπρου: Τουρκοκρατία [History of Cyprus: The Ottoman Occupation of Cyprus]*, vol. 6, (Nicosia: Foundation of Archbishop Makarios III, 2011), 710-719.

[2]   Costis Kokkinoftas, *Κύπρος και 1821 [Cyprus and 1821]*, (Nicosia: Center of Studies of Kykkos Monastery, 2021), 301.

[3]   Ibid., 276-278.

political *desiderata* by the Greek Cypriot majority.[4] Consequently, the image and perception of the Greek War of Independence became particularly influential in the late 1950s, when Greek Cypriot anti-colonial (and pro-*enosis*) efforts reached their zenith, triggering EOKA's national liberation struggle and bringing British colonial rule to an end in the pattern of an independent Cyprus.

The present study discusses the multifaceted impact of the Greek War of Independence on the EOKA insurgency in Cyprus in 1955-1959. It draws on a variety of primary sources to fulfill its scope of research, including the collections in the National Struggle Museum, poems and songs written by EOKA fighters or sympathisers in 1955-1959, the EOKA movement's underground publications, the correspondence of EOKA heroes, articles in the Greek press and material in the Cyprus State Archive.

The Greek Revolution and EOKA

Throughout British colonial rule the memory of the Greek Revolution influenced the development of the Cypriot *enosis* movement, both politically and as part of the collective memory of Greek Cypriots. The Greek War of Independence had a profound impact on the nature of the armed *enosis* movement of EOKA (*Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston* – The National Organisation of Cyprus Fighters) when the latter launched a physical insurgency in Cyprus in the late 1950s. More precisely, EOKA, when determining its operational model, quoted the national liberation struggles of the Greek Revolution of 1821-1830 and the Greek Resistance of 1941-1944 (against Axis Occupation), rather than any other anti-colonial movements.[5] It was

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4   See for instance Stevenson to Churchill, April 13, 1921, FCO 141/2394, The National Archives of the United Kingdom. Moreover, in 1921 and 1930, on the occasion of the Greek Revolution Remembrance Day (25th March), representatives of the Greek Cypriots voted two pro-*enosis* resolutions. The original material can be found in the collections of the National Struggle Museum (Nicosia, Cyprus). It has been produced also in printed form: see Theodoros Papadopoulos (ed.), *Ενωτικόν Δημοψήφισμα 1921* [*The Enosis Referendum of 1921*], (Nicosia: Epiphaniou, 2003) and Theodoros Papadopoulos (ed.), *Ενωτικόν Δημοψήφισμα 1930* [*The Enosis Referendum of 1930*], (Nicosia: Epiphaniou, 2003).
5   Evantis Hatzivassiliou, *Στρατηγικές του Κυπριακού: Η Δεκαετία του 1950* [*Strategies of the Cyprus Question: The 1950s*], (Athens: Pataki, 2004), 245.

not coincidental, therefore, that the military leader of EOKA, Georghios Grivas-Dighenis, referred to the Greek tradition in guerrilla warfare; he understood the Greek War of Independence as a historical experience in which the main methods of irregular warfare were employed and could be deployed in Cyprus. In his book *Guerrilla Warfare and EOKA's Struggle* he explains the reasons that drove him to use guerrilla warfare as the best method to liberate Cyprus:

"The Greek War of Independence of 1821 began as a guerrilla war. Although subsequently its forces grew greatly in strength, the bands of irregulars became organized on military lines and, with the help of foreign Philhellenes who came to Greece, a small number of regular corps were formed, nevertheless the methods generally employed by that revolutionary army were guerrilla methods. For, faced by a vastly more powerful army, the weaker side cannot employ the conventional methods of warfare, but is bound to adopt new ones which will make up for its inferiority in numbers and material means".[6]

The influence of the Greek Revolution on the organisation of EOKA can also be traced in the process EOKA developed for the recruitment of fighters. The secret "ritual" of initiation involved oath-taking, and the oath of EOKA resembles the oath used for admittance to *Philikí Etaireía* (Friendly Brotherhood), a secret organisation which played a leading role in the preparatory stage of the Greek Revolution. A comparison of these two texts reveals the common expectations from the prospective members: service to the country/nation, implicit obedience to the leadership of the organisation and a commitment to safeguard the secrecy of the organisation. Also, in both texts it was plainly stated that for those who did not honor their oath of allegiance, the punishment was death.[7] To give an example:

Oath of *Philikí Etaireía*: "In the presence of the true God, spontaneously I swear, that I will be faithful to the *Etaireía* in all and

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[6]   George Grivas-Dighenis, *Guerrilla Warfare and EOKA's Struggle: a Politico-military Study*, A. A. Pallis (transl.), (London: Longmans, 1964), 1.

[7]   Christodoulos Papachrysostomou, *Άπαντα, Τόμος Γ', Κείμενα για τον Αγώνα της EOKA 1955-1959* [*Complete Works, Volume 3, Works for the EOKA Struggle 1955-1959*], (Nicosia: 1999), 36-40.

through all; I will never betray the slightest portion of its acts or words; nor will I ever in any manner give even my relatives or friends to understand that I am acquainted with them".[8]

Oath of EOKA: "I shall not reveal any of the instructions which may be given me even to my fellow combatants".[9]

Events commemorating the Greek War of Independence, held on 25th March, provide evidence of the impact of the Greek Revolution on the national liberation struggle of Cyprus from 1955 to 1959. The organisation of celebration festivals, which honored the struggle of the Hellenic nation for liberty, also stimulated the Hellenic national spirit in Cyprus and the willpower of the Greek Cypriots to resist British colonial rule; it also rebuffed any allegation made by Britain before the international community to dispute the Greek ethnicity of Greek Cypriots. EOKA mobilised the Greek Cypriot people to celebrate the Greek Revolution on 25th March through its affiliated organisations, PEKA (*Politiki Epitropi Kypriakou Agonos* – Political Committee of the Cypriot Struggle) and ANE (*Alkimos Neolea EOKA* – Robust Youths of EOKA).[10] In 1956 the Greek Revolution Remembrance Day was celebrated by the Greek Cypriots with a high patriotic fervor ignited by the decision of the British colonial government to declare a curfew.[11] Despite orders issued by the colonial authorities, the local press reported the curfew was disobeyed in 600 instances, and bomb

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8   Cited in Ioannis Philimon, Δοκίμιον Ιστορικόν περί της Φιλικής Εταιρίας [*A Historical Essay on the Philiki Etaireía*], (Nafplia: Kontaxi & Loulaki, 1834), 155.

9   Cited in the memoirs of one of the main recruiters of EOKA in the region of Nicosia, Papastavros Papagathangelou. See Papastavros Papagathangelou, *Η Μαρτυρία μου: Πώς Έζησα την Προπαρασκευή και τον Αγώνα της ΕΟΚΑ* [*My Testimony: How I Experienced the Preparation and the Struggle of EOKA*], (Nicosia: Foundation of Papastavros Papagathangelou, 1995), 272.

10 The text of the leaflets published by PEKA and ANE to exhort the Greek Cypriot public to honor the Greek Revolution Remembrance Day can be found in Spyros Papageorgiou (ed.), *Αρχείον των Παρανόμων Εγγράφων του Κυπριακού Αγώνος 1955-1959* [*Record of the Underground Documents of the Cyprus Struggle 1955-59*], 2nd ed., (Nicosia: Epiphaniou, 1984), 321, 428.

11 Also, it should be taken into account that on 9th March 1956 the colonial government of Cyprus had deported the political leader of the Greek Cypriots, Archbishop Makarios III, to the Seychelles, thereby unintentionally boosting national spirit in Cyprus. For the British measures on the Greek Revolution Remembrance Day see «Η εθνική επέτειος εις την μαρτυρικήν Κύπρον» ["The national remembrance day in wretched Cyprus"], *Eleftheria* (Athens), 25 March 1956.

attacks against British soldiers occurred in the cities of Paphos and Famagusta.[12] In 1957, in the course of commemoration events in Limassol, the Colonial Police used tear gas to disperse demonstrating mobs, while in Nicosia the British Army resorted to the use of batons to combat parading Greek Cypriot youths.[13] The following year, the colonial government did not ban 25th March commemoration festivals. Consequently, as the newspaper *Eleftheria* vividly reported, "[…] the crowds of people flooded all the streets of the island, which were covered by Greek flags".[14] The Greek Revolution Remembrance Day was honored even by Greek Cypriot detainees, thereby defying (in some occasions implicitly) the ban imposed by the colonial administration of prisons and detention camps.[15] Amongst the various incidents that have been identified in various sources, the celebration of the Greek Revolution Remembrance Day in the Pyla Detention Camp, in 1957, provides a remarkable snapshot: the Greek Cypriot detainees, after parading, performed the theatrical play *Cyprus Fights*.

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[12] «Οι Άγγλοι φοβούνται ότι η ΕΟΚΑ θα διενεργήσει γενικήν επίθεσιν κατά την προσεχή Κυριακήν» ["The English are afraid that EOKA will execute a full-scale attack on next Sunday"], *Eleftheria* (Athens), 27 March 1956.

[13] «Με μαχητικάς διαδηλώσεις και την κραυγήν: 'Ένωσις» εώρτασαν χθες οι Κύπριοι» ["With fighting demonstrations and the call for 'Union' the Cypriots celebrated yesterday"], *Eleftheria* (Athens), 26 March 1957. It is noteworthy to mention that in July 1957, during the memorial service for Archbishop Kyprianos, Bishop Suffragan Yennadios of Salamis stated that the deportation of Archbishop Makarios by the British (in 1956) resembled to the execution of Archbishop Kyprianos (hanged by the Ottoman authorities in 1821 to stave off a possible Greek Cypriot uprising) in that each one of the foreign rulers tried to stop the liberation movement in Cyprus. See "Service at Phaneromeni Church", 8 July 1957, CO 926/937, The National Archives of the United Kingdom.

[14] «Με ζητωκραυγάς υπέρ της Ενωσεως 140 χιλιάδες Κύπριοι εις τους δρόμους δια τον εορτασμόν της της εθνικής επετείου» ["With cheers for Union 140,000 Cypriots poured into the streets to celebrate the national anniversary"], *Eleftheria* (Athens), 26 Mach 1958.

[15] Renos Th. Kyriakidis, *Τετράδια των Φυλακών* [*Notebooks from Prisons*], (Nicosia, 2013), 315; Elenitsa Seraphim-Loizou, *Ο Απελευθερωτικός Αγώνας της Κύπρου, 1955-1959: Οπως τον Έζησε μια Τομεάρχης* [*The Cyprus Liberation Struggle, 1955-1959: Through the Eyes of a Woman EOKA Area Commander*], 3rd ed., (Nicosia: Epiphaniou, 2005), 209-210; Georgios S. Olympios, *ΕΟΚΑ – Αγώνας 1955-1959: Μαρτυρίες* [*EOKA – Struggle of 1955-1959: Testimonies*], (Larnaca: Negresco, 2017), 102-103.

Even more impressively, they used flammable materials to write *EOKA* in the yard of the detention camp.[16]

EOKA viewed the Greek War of Independence as a liberation struggle to bring an end to the suppressive rule of a foreign empire, the Ottoman Empire: the Ottoman Empire had ample material and human resources but lacked the righteousness or the moral values of the Greeks, thus the latter, by launching a liberation struggle, eventually succeeded in materialising national self-determination. In line with such a consideration, the Greek Cypriot armed *enosis* movement determined and projected its origins, development and *modus operandi* as a liberation struggle directed against the British Empire, thereby continuing the spirit of the Greek Revolution. At the same time, by using the historical experience of the Greek War of Independence as its referent, it indicated to Greek Cypriots that their own liberation struggle would likewise be victorious. Indeed, the first leaflet circulated by EOKA on 1 April 1955, amongst a list of those who had fought for the liberation of Greece, highlighted the fighters of the Greek Revolution and declared: "liberation from [a] foreign ruler is always gained by shedding [Greek] BLOOD".[17] In another leaflet, EOKA leadership again referenced the Greek Revolution and stated: "The steam-rollers of Kütahı and Ibrahim ravaged everything […] But all this, did not subdue the morale of enslaved Greeks and strengthened their persistence to struggle and they won. Why we, genuine descendants of them, prove ourselves inferior?".[18]

It must be taken into account that EOKA, in its official publications and rhetoric, frequently referenced the fighters of the Greek War of Independence and their heroic deeds, with the main objective to hold these historical figures up as a model of virtue. More importantly, however, by referring to the Greek Revolution, EOKA sought to legitimise its establishment of an armed movement in Cyprus and win

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[16] Renos Lyssiotis, *Το Ημερολόγιο του D.P. 743* [*The Diary of D.P. 743*], (Nicosia, 2012), 101-103.

[17] Papageorgiou, *Underground Documents*, 59-60.

[18] «Προς τους Ελληνας της Κύπρου» ["To the Greeks of Cyprus"], Collection of Michalis Nicolaou, National Struggle Museum. A similar argument is made in two other leaflets: see «Δεν θα λυγίση η ψυχή μας» ["Our soul will not yield"] and «Δυο επέτειοι» ["Two anniversaries"], Collection of Michalis Nicolaou, National Struggle Museum.

the aid and support of Greek Cypriots. This was a precondition for its survival as an insurgent movement, especially when considering the operational terrain in Cyprus did not favor the application of guerrilla warfare in its classic paramilitary patterns.[19] This was the reason why EOKA's underground publications were so concerned with the Greek War for Independence. In the fifteen issues of *Agogi ton Neon* [*Youth Education*], an ANE periodical, the Greek Revolution is mentioned forty times: specifically, one can identify twelve references to the Greek War of Independence, five to its forerunning events, twelve to leading fighters of the Revolution, ten to military episodes, and one to the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople Gregory V (hanged by the Ottomans after he was blamed for his inability to suppress the Greek Revolution).[20]

Another interesting aspect of the historical legacy of the Greek War of Independence was it became a source of inspiration for the fighters of EOKA. This inspiration took a variety of forms. To start with, around 200 military code names EOKA members used were inspired by prominent fighters of the Greek Revolution, including Androutsos, Genneos, Diakos, Dikeos, Zaimis, Kanaris, Kolokotronis, Makrygiannis, Bouboulina, Niketaras, Panourgias, Tsakos, Ypsilantis, etc.[21] Military code names were one of the security measures EOKA fighters adopted to hide their identities from the forces of the British colonial regime.

[19] On the problematic morphology of the operational terrain in Cyprus see George Grivas, *Απομνημονεύματα Αγώνος EOKA 1955-59* [*Memoirs of EOKA Struggle 1955-59*], (Athens, 1961), 13. For the importance of popular support for EOKA's survival as an insurgent movement see George Grivas, *Χρονικόν Αγώνος EOKA, 1955-59* [*Chronicle of the EOKA Struggle, 1955-59*], (Nicosia, 1972), 25.

[20] Vassiliki Karayianni, «Ο Αυτοπροσδιορισμός του Ένοπλου Αγώνα: Κύπρος 1955-1959» ["The self-definition of the Armed Struggle: Cyprus 1955-1959"], in Vassilis K. Gounaris, Stathis N. Kalyvas, Ioannis D. Stefanidis (eds), *Ανορθόδοξοι Πόλεμοι: Μακεδονία, Εμφύλιος, Κύπρος* [*Unorthodox Warfare: Macedonia, Civil War, Cyprus*], (Athens: Pataki, 2010), 368-371. Moreover, in the leaflet «Η ημέρα της Ελευθερίας» ["The day of Freedom"] a parallel is drawn between the death of Christos Kapsalis (Greek Revolution) and the death of Gregoris Afxentiou (EOKA Struggle). See Item 376, National Struggle Museum.

[21] This number constitutes a finding of my investigation into the military code names cited in Konstantinos P. Konstantinidis, *Ψευδώνυμα και Κωδικοί EOKA 1955-1959* [*Military Code Names of EOKA 1955-1959*], (Nicosia: Epiphaniou, 2011).

The strong emotional power the Greek Revolution exercised on the EOKA Struggle is also mirrored in the arts. When investigating the themes or the technical features of songs and poems composed during the period of 1955-1959, we realise these works were inspired by the Greek War of Independence. In the poem *Ton Progonon Mimites* [*Imitators of the Ancestors*] EOKA hero Gregoris Afxentiou chose death (in March 1957) rather surrender, as the women of Souli did so many decades earlier, when they were trapped by Ottoman troops near the village of Zalongo (Epirus, Greece). The choice made by Afxentiou and by the women of Souli are described as glorious and having a great and lasting importance.[22] In a line of the poem *Thamaste Mis e Nikites* [*We will be victorious*] the effort to liberate Cyprus revives various heroes of Greek Antiquity and the Greek Revolution: "Leonidas [of Sparta] and [Athanassios] Diakos live again in our souls".[23] Furthermore, Demetris Giallouris, in one of his poems, describes the place where four combatants of EOKA resisted British forces to the bitter end as "a new Gravia Inn".[24] In this way, Giallouris links the Battle of Liopetri of September 1958 with the Battle of Gravia Inn in May 1821. Also, EOKA hero Andreas Karyos (killed by the British forces in September 1958) states in a poem he wrote to honor the memory of EOKA hero Markos Drakos (killed by the British Army in 1957): "Your shed blood was not wasted/ Cyprus writes with it a new 1821".[25]

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[22]   The poem can be found in Panayiota M. Ioannou-Psillita (ed.), *Το Έπος της ΕΟΚΑ: Ποιητική Έκφραση του Αγώνα* [*The Epic Poem of EOKA: the Poetic Expression of the Struggle*], 2nd ed., (Nicosia, 1987-1988), 54.

[23]   For the lines of the poem see Ioannou-Psillita, 65.

[24]   The content of the poem *Στους Ήρωες του Λιοπετριού* [*To the Heroes of Liopetri*] can be found in Ioannou-Psillita, 172.

[25]   For the lines of the poem see «Στο Μάρκο Δράκο» ["To Markos Drakos"], 4 April 1957, ΕΟΚΑ/3, Cyprus State Archive. Furthermore, in his poem *Ύμνος στον Γρηγόρη* [*Hymn to Gregoris*] Andreas Karyos mentions that the sacrifice of Gregoris Afxentiou was equivalent to that of the heroes of the Greek Revolution: "On the headstone of our heroes we wrote one more [name]!/ you followed the example of the heroes of 1821!" The poem can be found in «Ύμνος στο Γρηγόρη» ["Hymn to Gregoris"], 4 March 1957, ΕΟΚΑ/3, Cyprus State Archive. Another example of how the works of Andreas Karyos were influenced by the events of the Greek War of Independence constitutes the poem *Στους Πεσόντες* [*To Those Who Fell*] in which he writes: "Gregoris, Drakos, Modestos, Karaolis and Lenas/ and all of you who fell like Leonidas,/ loyal to your duty towards the Faith and the Country,/ in our enslaved island, you offer

When exploring songs from the period 1955-1959 about the EOKA Struggle, characteristic examples with influences from the Greek War of Independence are the verses *Tis Kyprou e Leventes* [*Brave Men of Cyprus*] written by EOKA hero Michalakis Paridis (killed in action in 1958). These verses were sung to the melody of *Saranta Palikaria* [*Forty Brave Men*], a popular Greek folk song considered to be inspired by the Greek Revolution. [26] In the song *EOKA Milisse* [*EOKA Spoke*] mention is made of the events of the *Exodus* of *Missolonghi (April 1826)*: "Bravery came out/ gallant young men, gallant young women/ and with blood it flooded/ and it reminded of Missolonghi". [27] In the lines written by EOKA hero Petrakis Yiallouros (killed in 1956) for the song *Nees Souliotopoules* [*New Women of Souli*], the braveness of Greek Cypriot women is described equal to that of the women of Souli. [28] The Greek Revolution, likewise, is reflected in the song *Yiomissan Kleftes ta Vouna* [*The Mountains are Full of Klephts*]. This work includes the following verses: "The mountains were full of klephts again/ 1821 was awaken again" and "Better have an hour of free life/ than eighty years of English occupation". [29] Finally, the discussion agenda should also include the unofficial *Hymnos tis EOKA* [*Hymn of EOKA*], in which the second verse states: "Honored children of our homeland/ and with faith to our sweet Panayia/ let us go up to the mountains for a new 1821/ to live free at least for one hour". [30] The examples from these poems and songs given do not begin to exhaust the topic.

The various heroes of EOKA, namely those who were killed in action, drew their inspiration from the Greek War of Independence and its fighters. For instance, the National Struggle Museum (Nicosia, Cyprus) displays the book *Heroes tou 21* [*Heroes of [18]21*]. This book was read by EOKA hero Gregoris Afxentiou and by other members of EOKA. [31] Additionally, EOKA hero Kyriakos Matsis (killed in

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blood instead of wine/ of a new [18]21". See «Στους Πεσόντες» ["To Those Who Fell"], 19 February 1958, EOKA/3, Cyprus State Archive.
[26]   For the lyrics of the song see Ioannou-Psillita, *The Epic Poem of EOKA*, 219.
[27]   The verses of the song can be found in Ioannou-Psillita, 223.
[28]   For the lines of the song see Ioannou-Psillita, 242.
[29]   The verses of the song can be seen in Ioannou-Psillita, 246.
[30]   For the content of the song see Ioannou-Psillita, 220.
[31]   Display Room 3, National Struggle Museum.

November 1958) quotes the case of the Orthodox Metropolitan of Old Patras, Germanos III: When the Greek leadership was unable to sponsor his enlightenment campaign to Europe, Germanos was forced to borrow money to advance the Greek Revolution. Matsis used this example to clarify to a fellow-fighter that EOKA leadership never denied resources to serve the needs of the organisation (provided that these needs were justifiable); he stated, also, that if any delays occurred, these were due to misunderstandings.[32] EOKA hero Photis Pittas (killed in September 1958) writes that the Greek Cypriots revolted because they followed the example of their ancestors: "the heart of Cyprus is made from the same materials as the hearts of the fighters of Marathon and Sparta, as well as the klephts of [18]21 and the brave men of [19]40".[33] EOKA hero Savvas Rotsidis (killed in November 1958), in a theatrical play, calls upon Greek Cypriots, whom he considers descendants of the "immortal heroes" of 1821, to strike the British and bring foreign rule to a finale.[34] Finally, EOKA hero Georghios Karyos (fatally wounded in October 1958) quoted examples from the Greek Revolution to encourage the youth of the community of Avgorou to staff the ranks of the insurgent movement. As his fellow fighter Andreas Arnaoutis testified, "He made us believe that [Theodoros] Kolokotronis and the other fighters [of the Greek Revolution] were enormous".[35]

Conclusion

To sum up, the effect of the Greek War of Independence is explicitly evident in the years 1955-1959, when the demand for the union of Cyprus with Greece reached its climax. The Greek Revolution was one of the main pillars of the Greek Cypriot rebellion's historical legacy (along with Antiquity and the National Resistance of 1941-1944). Indeed, EOKA identified in the historical period of 1821-1830 substantial raw materials to define its operational model and

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[32] Kyriakos Matsis' (undated) letter is cited in Spyros Papageorgiou (ed.), *Δια Χειρός Ηρώων [By Hand of Heroes]*, (Nicosia: K. Epiphaniou, 1979), 153.
[33] The content of Photis Pittas' letter (dated 22 August 1958) is presented in Papageorgiou, 257.
[34] Extracts from Savvas Rotsidis' play are cited in Papageorgiou, 268.
[35] Testimony of Andreas Arnaoutis to Andreas Karyos and Panayiotis Karyos.

recruitment methods and to project the national identity of the Greek Cypriots, gain their active support, raise their morale and inspire their collective will to resist British colonial rule. Also, the Greek War of Independence was a crucial source of inspiration for EOKA fighters and for Greek Cypriots generally. This was expressed in much of the Greek Cypriot music and poetry produced during the uprising, as well as in the correspondence of the EOKA heroes who were killed in action during the insurgency. Consequently, having taken into consideration all the relevant historical evidence, we reach the conclusion that the Greek Revolution of 1821-1830 had a deep impact on the national liberation struggle of Cyprus of 1955-1959.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Andreas Karyos (BA in History & Archaeology, University of Athens; MA in Twentieth Century European History, Queen Mary, University of London; PhD in History, School of Advanced Study, University of London) has been teaching faculty in various state and private academic institutions providing education to undergraduate and postgraduate students, but also to Cypriot policemen.

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WORKING SESSION XIII

Chair: Winfried Heinemann (Germany)

35. LA GUERRE D'INDÉPENDANCE AU CAMEROUN: FRONTS, THÉÂTRES, BATAILLES ET TACTIQUES

Ntuda Ebodé Joseph Vincent (Cameroon)

Introduction

Cette communication porte sur la guerre d'indépendance au Cameroun. Elle a pour sous-titre :« fronts, théâtres, batailles et tactiques ». Il faut donc d'emblée s'entendre sur ces quatre notions, telles qu'elles sont comprises en polémologie, avant de voir sous quels visages elles peuvent être appliquées au Cameroun des années cinquante-soixante et soixante-dix. Commençons donc par la notion de front[1]. Pendant toute la période classique et même contemporaine, l'ordre de bataille comportait un front, mais aussi des flancs et des arrières offrant de grandes possibilités tactiques : rupture au centre ; enveloppement par ailes, débordement. C'est un espace en largeur, occupé par un élément et mesuré de l'extrémité d'un flanc à l'extrémité de l'autre, dans lequel s'affrontent deux forces opposées.[2] En l'absence d'une situation de combat, le front devient alors la direction à laquelle font face les forces placées sous le même commandement.

A la faveur de la Première Guerre mondiale, l'idée du front va prendre une nouvelle signification ; avec l'extension en longueur des lignes de contacts, sous l'influence de facteurs tels que l'ampleur des effectifs, le développement de la puissance de feu (avec l'introduction des armes automatiques permettant de tenir des secteurs plus longs), et le développement des moyens de transport modernes. On assiste alors à l'apogée des fronts continu[3] qui, de temps à autres, en situation de rupture sous l'effet des attaques de l'une ou de l'autre des forces qui s'opposent sur le théâtre des opérations, alterne avec la guerre de mouvement dans l'optique de colmater les poches ou les brèches.

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1   Philippe Masson, « Front », in *Dictionnaire de stratégie*, Dirigé par Thierry De Montbrialet Jean Klein (Paris : PUF, 2000),255-257.
2   Jacques Soppelsa, Michèle Battestiet Jean-Christophe Romer, *Lexique de géopolitique* (Paris : Dalloz, 1988), 123.
3   Masson, « Front ».

Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, la notion de front proprement dite va disparaître, à une exception près, la guerre de Corée, notamment suite au blocage de l'offensive nord-coréenne aux abords du réduit du port de Pusan[4]. C'est l'un des derniers théâtres de guerre où l'on retrouve un front rappelant celui de 1914-1918 avec abris, barbelés et champs de mines ; où l'artillerie joue un rôle dominant.

Comme on peut donc le constater, la notion de front prend sens à l'occasion des guerres inter-étatiques où deux armées représentant deux États ou deux coalitions d'États en conflit, s'affrontent autour d'enjeux territoriaux et/ou idéologiques bien déterminés. Avec la diminution en nombre de tels conflits armés puis leur presque disparition après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, et durant toute la période coloniale dans les pays du Sud jusqu'au début des années 1990, l'idée de front dans les conflits armés aura tendance à disparaître.

Philippe Masson relève ainsi que dans les guerres de décolonisation, Indochine, Algérie, ou encore au Vietnam et en Afghanistan, il n'y a pas à proprement parler de front. On enregistre tout au plus des sièges. Pour lui, ce sont plutôt des guerres en surface, où les forces en présence (armée coloniale contre rebelles ou insurgés indépendantistes), s'efforcent de contrôler les principales agglomérations et les axes majeurs ; d'entraver les courants logistiques de l'adversaire et détruire des bandes de partisans ou des unités régulières opérant en liaison étroite avec la population. Toutes choses qui correspondent traits pour traits, comme nous le verrons plus tard, à la situation observée dans le cadre de la guerre d'indépendance au Cameroun.

Quant aux théâtres, classiquement définie comme l'espace où se déroule la confrontation militaire, le lieu où une tactique est mise en œuvre, la notion de théâtre d'opération ou théâtre de la guerre renvoie traditionnellement à une unité de temps et de lieu où se concentre l'opposition des forces en présence et plus précisément les représentants des forces armées de deux États-nations belligérantes[5].

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4   Ibid.
5   Michel Poivert,« Théâtre des dernières guerres », *Vacarme* 4(37) (2006) : 41-44, https://www.cairn.info/revue-vacarme-2006-4-page-41.htm

Cette acception qui met en représentation un jeu cruel, un face-à-face réglé par l'accomplissement violent d'un différend, apparaît cependant limitée pour appréhender dans leur globalité les théâtres d'opération de la guerre d'indépendance au Cameroun.

En effet, la guerre camerounaise revêt un caractère intrinsèquement asymétrique, du fait de la confrontation entre un État, l'État français en l'occurrence, et un mouvement de libération nationale, l'Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC). Aussi, allons-nous élargir la notion de théâtre des opérations aux aspects non militaires, pour mieux saisir la nature non conventionnelle des territoires de confrontation observés. En réalité, ces territoires ont revêtu un caractère stratégique tant du point de vue politico-diplomatique que du point de vue strictement militaire.

En troisième lieu, venons-en à la notion de bataille. À partir de la célèbre phrase du Général De Gaulle en 1940, selon laquelle la France a perdu une bataille ; mais pas la guerre, on comprend aisément que la guerre est constituée d'une série de batailles et que l'essence de la stratégie consiste à utiliser ces batailles pour gagner la guerre. Il existe néanmoins une grande variété de batailles. On peut en distinguer selon les forces militaires engagées (bataille terrestre, aérienne, navale, cavalerie, etc.), selon la tactique employée (bataille de siège, d'encerclement, d'anéantissement, d'embuscade, etc.), ou selon l'issue (bataille décisive, mineure, etc.)[6]. Ainsi, toutes les batailles n'ont pas la même portée ; en conséquence certaines pèsent plus que d'autres sur l'échiquier stratégique.

Les batailles, correspondent ainsi à ce pourquoi on se bat. Elles sont constituées des différents enjeux satellites dont la conquête concourt à s'octroyer de force, l'enjeu principal étant de gagner la guerre. Techniquement, il faut différencier les batailles, non seulement du théâtre d'opérations mais aussi du front de combat. Par ailleurs, la bataille ou précisément son objet, diffère d'un belligérant à l'autre. Si l'on admet que les batailles sont perceptibles en termes d'enjeux, lesquels peuvent être matériels ou symboliques et que leurs potentiels

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6   Hervé Drévillon, *Batailles. Scènes de guerre de la table ronde aux tranchées*, (Paris : Seuil, 2009) ; Claude Merle, *Dictionnaire des grandes batailles*, (Paris : Flammarion, 2009).

gains ou pertes ont une incidence sur le résultat final de la guerre, on peut stratégiquement en identifier, en se plaçant du point de vue des indépendantistes camerounais, trois batailles types : la bataille diplomatique, la bataille politique et la bataille militaire.

Quant aux tactiques enfin, définies comme l'art de combiner en opérations les actions de tous les moyens militaires ; pour atteindre les objectifs assignés par la stratégie opérationnelle,[7] elles reposent en partie sur l'expérience individuelle et collective des acteurs militaires. En situation de guerre cependant, différentes approches sont mises sur pied dans le but d'effectuer une combinaison d'actions ayant pour finalité la satisfaction de l'option politique retenue par les décideurs. Toutefois, dans la formulation de la démarche stratégique à mettre en œuvre, le niveau tactique correspond à la préparation, à la conduite et à l'exécution des manœuvres en vue d'atteindre les objectifs définis par les décideurs politiques et militaires.[8]

En ce sens, elle fait appel à des actions concrètes, traduites dans les faits, incarnés physiquement par des soldats confrontés à des ennemis sur le champ de bataille. Elle est organisée autour des décisions reposant sur une analyse méticuleuse de nombreux facteurs replacés dans un contexte spatio-temporel spécifique et influencé par un degré d'incertitude plus ou moins important selon les circonstances.

La tactique diffère donc de la stratégie dont elle est un complément. C'est une manœuvre opérationnelle combinant à la fois les moyens coercitifs et non coercitifs qui confèrent à l'action militaire la capacité de contrainte, de contrôle et d'influence pour l'atteinte de l'état final recherché.[9] Son élaboration et sa mise en œuvre sont fonction des objectifs opérationnels à atteindre. Entre 1955 et 1971, le Cameroun a été le théâtre d'un conflit violent entre d'une part les nationalistes camerounais regroupés au sein de l'UPC et d'autre part l'administration française puis l'État camerounais. Dans le but d'atteindre leurs objectifs politiques et militaires au plan opérationnel,

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[7]   Antoine Windeck, « Un impératif : anticiper et décider », *Le Casoar, Revue trimestrielle de la Saint-Cyrienne*, Issue 227 (2017) : 15-16, https://en.calameo.com/read/00468019386b8a8c024c0.

[8]   Philippe Coste, « Du cadre d'emploi des forces armées », in *Tactique Générale*, Dirigé par Philippe Coste, (Paris : Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces, 2008), 8-17.

[9]   Ibid.

les factions rivales ont régulièrement défini leurs tactiques de guerre en fonction de l'évolution de la situation sur le terrain. Les aspects tactiques de ce conflit peuvent être saisis sur le plan politique et militaire.

La phase militaire débute avec l'interdiction de l'UPC le 13 juillet 1955. En raison de la détermination de la France à maintenir le Cameroun dans sa sphère d'influence d'une part, de l'interdiction de l'UPC et du harcèlement politique et militaire de ses partisans. Ce parti va donc mettre sur pied une armée (Armée Nationale de Libération du Kamerun), dont la mission sera d'organiser la résistance clandestine anti-coloniale dans le Cameroun Français[10]. Le déploiement opérationnel de cette armée épousera diverses formes allant du maquis au terrorisme et se fera de manière séquentielle.

Que retenir de nos quatre concepts en rapport à notre sujet? Premièrement que la guerre d'indépendance au Cameroun, sera appréhendée ici comme une guerre en surface, c'est à dire sans front. Deuxièmement, que la notion de théâtre d'opération sera élargie aux aspects non militaires pour mieux saisir la nature multiscalaire des territoires de confrontation. Troisièmement, que les batailles seront diplomatique, politique et militaire. Quatrièmement enfin, que les tactiques se structureront autour de deux périodes : l'avant et l'après mort du leader charismatique de l'UPC : UmNyobè. Tout ceci nous amène donc à un plan en deux parties: fronts et théâtres d'opérations de la guerre d'indépendance au Cameroun (I) ; et batailles et tactiques dans la guerre d'indépendance au Cameroun (II).

Fronts et théâtres d'opérations de la guerre d'indépendance au Cameroun

Après avoir exploré et analyser la pertinence de la notion de front pour décrypter les manifestations de la guerre d'indépendance au Cameroun (A), nous en présenterons les théâtres d'opérations (B).

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[10] Mark Dike DeLancey, Rebecca NehMbuh, R. et Mark W. DeLancey, *Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Cameroon*, 4e edition, ([n.p.]: Scarecrow Press, 2010).

Une guerre sans fronts : un conflit en surface

Une lecture des manifestations du conflit armé ayant opposé l'armée coloniale française et ses alliés nationaux aux forces de résistance nationale amenées par l'UPC entre 1955 et 1971, permet de ressortir sa spécificité tout en le rapprochant des manifestations observées dans le cadre d'autres guerres d'indépendance dans certains pays du Sud comme l'Algérie. Si dans le cadre de certaines de ces dernières, l'on a pu observer la constitution de fronts éphémères, notamment du fait des efforts des puissances coloniales visant à contrer les attaques portées par les insurgés à partir de pays voisins, la situation a été toute autre au Cameroun. Ici, les affrontements se sont davantage déroulés en zones rurales avec une absence totale de fronts, notamment du fait de l'incapacité des forces rebelles de l'UPC de lancer des attaques à partir des pays voisins du Cameroun.

Onana Mfegue[11] retrace les sentiers de cette rébellion de l'U.P.C. dont la branche militaire, l'ALNK, rappelle à bien des égards celles du Viet Minh et du F.L.N. (Front de libération nationale) algérien. S'inspirant des analyses de Philippe Masson sur la spécificité des guerres d'indépendance, il souligne que l'engagement de l'U.P.C. dans la subversion s'est fait de manière graduelle, allant de la violence limitée et maîtrisée (maquis), au terrorisme sur le modèle algérien. L'opérationnalisation de ces actions se fera dans le cadre des branches armées : le Comité National d'Organisation (CNO), créé en décembre 1956 d'abord, puis, l'Armée de Libération Nationale du Kamerun (ALNK), créée en septembre 1961.

Stratégiquement parlant, entre 1956 et 1961, les opérations armées de l'UPC via le CNO avaient pour objectif principal d'empêcher la tenue des élections législatives de décembre 1956, organisées en l'absence de l'UPC (interdite le 13 juillet 1955 suite aux émeutes du mois de mai de la même année, réprimés dans le sang par les autorités coloniales françaises). Le CNO agira principalement dans la Sanaga Maritime, région d'origine du Secrétaire Général de l'UPC, Ruben Um Nyobè, où il vivait en clandestinité.

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[11]   André-Hubert Onana Mfege, « L'armée de libération nationale Kamerunaise et sa stratégie 1959-1970 », *Outre-mers*, tome 92(348-349) (2005) : 255-269, https://doi.org/10.3406/outre.2005.4172.

Pour rétablir l'ordre, les autorités coloniales françaises vont, en décembre 1957, instaurer dans ladite région une Zone de Pacification (ZOPAC) ; (en place jusqu'en décembre 1958), et le commandement militaire de ce vaste dispositif civilo-militaire sera confié au lieutenant-colonel Jean Lambertonqui va mettre en pratique la doctrine de guerre révolutionnaire.[12]

Dans cette ZOPAC et selon Thomas Deltombe, on procédait à la villagisation forcée des populations. Toutes celles et ceux qui refusèrent de quitter les maquis et de rejoindre les centres de regroupement militaires furent impitoyablement traqués : les villagesillégaux furent brûlés et les hors-la-loi décimés sans autre forme de procès.

À l'inverse, ceux qui rejoignirent de gré ou de force les villages militaires durent subir la surveillance totale de l'armée et assister, la mort dans l'âme, à d'innombrables séances de désintoxication psychologique.

Après l'assassinat d'UmNyobèen 1958, la guerre s'étendra à toute la région méridionale du Cameroun français, notamment dans la zone allant de Douala au département du Mungo et ensuite, dans la région Bamiléké, après la naissance de l'ALNK sous les cendres du CNO en 1961. Dans cette dernière région, les localités particulièrement concernées furent Bamendjou où fonctionnait un maquis appelé Maquis Bafia ; les unités des Bamboutos et de Bazou ; ainsi que Bafoussam, Dschang et Bangaté. Les combats se déroulaient également avec intensité dans les départements du Wouri, dans le Moungo et le Nkam, notamment les localités de Loum-Chantiers, Nkongsamba, Penja, Njombé, Yabassi, ainsi qu'en pays Bassa.

Comme ces régions jouxtaient le Cameroun britannique, où étaient réfugiés nombre de leaders upécistes, les Français reprochèrent à leurs homologues britanniques de laisser leur territoire servir de zone de repli aux combattants nationalistes. En 1957, ces pressions françaises finirent par pousser les autorités britanniques, à expulser de leur

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[12] Thomas Deltombe, « La guerre du Cameroun, un demi-siècle de censure et d'oubli », publié en 2017, consulté le 12 août 2021, https://visionscarto.net/la-guerre-du-cameroun.

territoire les principaux responsables upécistes qui y avaient trouvé refuge.[13]

D'après Enoh Meyomesse[14], ces affrontements, après avoir gagné toute la ville de Douala, s'était étendus dans d'autres villes du Cameroun : Mbanga, Nkongsamba, Loum, Njombé, et naturellement, Yaoundé. Il précise en outre que l'ALNK avait établi son quartier général à Bandenkop, un village de l'ouest, en pays Bamiléké. Dans ce site, les combats furent rudes entre l'armée française et les combattants nationalistes. L'ALNK connaîtra cependant plusieurs revers entre 1962 et 1964 ; ce qui la laissera dans une situation chaotique, se retrouvant dans l'obligation d'élaborer en urgence une nouvelle stratégie, à partir du Congo-Brazzaville, à la faveur de l'arrivée au pouvoir dans ce pays en août 1963, d'un régime d'obédience communiste dirigé par Massamba Débat.

L'un des principaux artisans de cette tentative de renaissance de la lutte indépendantiste de l'UPC sera OssendéAfanaqui, en 1965, à la tête d'une « unité spéciale baptisée Détachement UM NYOBÈ, va installer une Zone dite Libérée dans la localité de Moloundou à l'Est Cameroun. Toutefois, incapable de pénétrer les populations locales pour faire perdurer l'idéal de la lutte révolutionnaire de l'UPC, Ossendésera trahi et traqué par les forces de l'ordre le 5 mars 1966. Poursuivi dans la forêt, il est finalement rattrapé le 16 mars et exécuté et son Détachement UM NYOBÈ entièrement décimé.

Les tentatives de récupération et de relance par Woungly Massaga, alias Ibrahim Kissamba, en 1967, ne suffiront pas à relever le mouvement de résistance nationale de l'UPC ; et ce, malgré quelques opérations militaires d'envergure en territoire camerounais à partir du Congo-Brazzaville, telle que celle du 3 décembre 1967 dans le village d'Alati, arrondissement de Djoum au Sud Cameroun.

De façon générale donc, la nature de la guerre d'indépendance au Cameroun, conflit asymétrique par excellence, a fait qu'il est aisé d'identifier les lieux ou les zones de confrontation des forces en présence, mieux que des éventuels fronts au sens des guerres inter-

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13   Ibid.
14   Enoh Meyomesse, *Guerre et paix au Kamerun, le rôle de l'armée nationale en question*, (Yaoundé : Les éditions du Kamerun, 2010), 20.

étatiques. L'absence de fronts ne signifiant pas pour autant l'absence de théâtres d'opération.

Les théâtres d'opération: champs non militarisés et espaces militarisés clandestins

Il sera question ici de déterminer ces théâtres d'opération sous deux angles distinctifs : les théâtres d'opération non militarisés (1) et les théâtres d'opération militarisés (2).

Les théâtres d'opération non militarisés

Les théâtres d'opération non militarisés, en tant qu'ensemble de l'espace où le différend naît entre deux groupes opposés au sujet d'une vision du monde ou d'une idéologie politique, renferment plusieurs aspects dans le cas de la guerre d'indépendance au Cameroun. Le différend entre la puissance coloniale française et l'UPC débute au départ sur plusieurs théâtres non militarisés dont il convient de souligner les traits les plus importants.

Sur **le théâtre politique**, le différend naît dès 1948 lorsque le nouveau parti naissant décide d'organiser son programme politique autour de deux axes forts : la réunification des deux Cameroun sous tutelle britannique et français et l'indépendance immédiate et véritable sans possibilité d'intégration à l'Union française. Pour contrecarrer ces exigences, la France créé à son tour un parti rival qui provoque des incidents plus ou moins violents pour fournir un prétexte à la police de tirer sur les manifestants et militants. Il s'en suit dès lors l'interdiction de l'UPC et le début de l'entrée en clandestinité de ses principaux leaders dont Ruben UmNyobè.

Sur **le théâtre diplomatique**, l'UPC, jouissant d'une immense popularité dans la société camerounaise, s'appuie sur les textes onusiens pour rallier des soutiens internationaux et faire entendre sa cause jusqu'à la tribune des Nations-Unies à New-York. Une action qui n'est pas du tout appréciée par la puissance coloniale française qui à son tour se lance dans une propagande internationale de criminalisation de l'UPC à travers ses leaders.

Sur le théâtre idéologique, l'UPC reçoit le soutien du bloc communiste dans un contexte de guerre froide naissante. La France, appartenant au bloc libéral, ne pu tolérer cet affront.

Sur **le théâtre stratégique et économique**, le territoire camerounais apparaissant à la fois comme le pivot stratégique et la brèche de l'édifice colonial français en Afrique équatoriale ; si la France venait, à travers les actes et revendications de l'UPC, à perdre ce territoire, dans l'éventualité d'une indépendance véritable, c'est tout l'empire colonial français d'Afrique qui risquait de tomber.

La cristallisation de tous ces théâtres d'affrontement entre la France et l'UPC a, inévitablement, conduit à une escalade des rivalités débouchant sur un conflit armé sanglant resté longtemps à la fois ignoré par l'opinion publique et nié par la puissance française. La guerre d'indépendance qui en découlera va se dérouler sur des théâtres d'opération à la fois militarisés et clandestins.

Les théâtres d'opération militarisés et clandestins

Des théâtres d'opération militarisés et clandestins de la guerre d'indépendance au Cameroun, en tant que lieux de confrontation ont existé. Ils se sont caractérisés par une violence dirigée essentiellement contre les populations civiles dans un contexte de décolonisation et de revendication du droit à l'autodétermination au sein de nombreuses colonies françaises.

En effet, à la doctrine classique concevant le conflit comme une guerre de positions et de mouvements visant à gagner des batailles et à contrôler militairement la plus grande partie du territoire, les officiers militaires français en service sur le territoire camerounais ont substituer une vision différente, focalisant l'attention non plus sur la dimension géographique, mais sur le contrôle des populations.[15] Cela s'est traduit par des pratiques d'exception utilisées pendant les razzias

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[15] Raphaël Granvaud, « De l'armée coloniale à l'armée néocoloniale (1830-1990) », *Que fait l'armée française en Afrique ?*, « Dossiers noirs » de Survie, No 23, Editions Agone, octobre 2009.

telles que les mutilations, les décapitations, les trophées humains, les chapelets d'oreilles, les viols, les meurtres d'enfants, etc.

L'objectif était de provoquer un choc psychologique auprès des populations camerounaises en y répandant la terreur. C'est pourquoi on peut opiner que la guerre d'indépendance au Cameroun s'est déroulée sur trois échelles de territoire : locale, nationale et internationale

Au niveau local, les régions Bassa et Bamiléké comprenant le Wouri, le Moungo, le Nkam et la Sanaga Maritime, considérées comme les bastions de l'UPC ont fait l'objet d'un quadrillage systématique à travers la création en 1957 de la Zone de Pacification (ZOPAC) dirigée par le Commandant Lamberton, adepte de la guerre psychologique. Ce qui a débouché un an après, le 13 septembre 1958, à la capture et à l'assassinat du leader Ruben Um Nyobè.

À l'échelle nationale, des territoires plus ou moins sécurisés comme Yaoundé et Bafoussam ont connu des soubresauts réprimés dans le sang. C'est d'ailleurs à Bafoussam que fut fusillé publiquement l'un des leaders upécistes Ernest Ouandie.

Au plan international enfin, l'un des théâtres d'opération de la guerre d'indépendance au Cameroun fut constitué par des bases arrière où les leaders de l'UPC trouvaient refuge. C'est dans ce registre que seront exécutés les opérations clandestines contre les leaders de l'UPC vivant à l'étranger. D'où l'élimination à Genève, en 1960, de Félix Moumié.

En somme, les théâtres d'opération de la guerre d'indépendance au Cameroun, du fait de la nature asymétrique de ce conflit, revêtirent un caractère hybride, parfois militarisés et des fois non militarisés.

Batailles et tactiques dans la Guerre d'Indépendance au Cameroun

Après les batailles (A), nous examinerons les tactiques (B) des belligérants dans le cadre de cette guerre d'indépendance.

Les batailles

On a pu dénombrer trois batailles fortes : une première aux Nations Unies, une seconde, qui était la suite logique de la proclamation commune de l'UPC, et une dernière face à l'indépendance factice accordée par la France.

La bataille des indépendantistes à l'ONU : le refus de l'assimilation du Cameroun, la revendication de l'unification et de l'indépendance

La lutte pour l'indépendance a commencé de manière civilisée à l'ONU, par les indépendantistes qu'on retrouvait surtout au sein de l'UPC. En effet, de la création de cette dernière en 1948, jusqu'en 1955 (année de son interdiction par le gouvernement français), l'UPC opéra en toute légalité, même si, à partir de 1953, l'administration française locale pris pour habitude d'interrompre ses réunions au besoin par la force.[16]

En réalité, la France constituait le principal problème des indépendantistes; dans la mesure où elle s'opposait à la restitution de la souveraineté du territoire camerounais placée sous sa responsabilité sous-mandat de la Société des Nations (SDN), puis sous-tutelle de l'ONU. En fait, dès le début de la deuxième guerre mondiale, avec notamment l'annexion de la France par l'Allemagne, des dissensions internes françaises naîtront entre le régime de Vichy, partisan de la collaboration et la résistance gaulliste. Les colons de l'Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF) étant majoritairement favorable au régime de Vichy, le Général Charles De Gaulle qui s'était réfugié à Londres depuis 1940 et suite à son refoulement, décida alors de faire du Cameroun oriental la première étape de sa reconquête de la souveraineté nationale de la France dans les territoires d'outre-mer de l'Afrique Équatoriale Française (AEF).

Dans les faits, cette option masquait des motivations avant tout géopolitique; car le Général DeGaulle cherchait à « casser du nègre » camerounais, en raison de son « amour» pour son ancien colon germanique. En somme, bien que le Cameroun eût un statut

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[16]   Achille Mbembé, *La naissance du maquis dans le sud du Cameroun (1920 – 1960)*, (Paris : Karthala, 1996).

particulier, la France passaient généralement outre quand cela lui convenait. Il s'en suivi dans cette perspective que la conjoncture internationale et nationale française, concourait à ce que le Cameroun soit le meilleur moyen pour la France –notamment les partisans gaullistes– de résister à l'invasion allemande, tout en s'approvisionnant en ressources humaines et économiques auprès de ses colonies de l'AEF, accessibles via le contrôle stratégique du territoire camerounais.

Voilà pourquoi le Colonel Philippe Leclerc sera dépêché à Douala pour la conquête du Cameroun et celle des autres territoires français.[17] Cette politique d'assimilation et d'asservissement des populations par les français va s'accentuer durant les années qui précèdent la création de l'UPC et dopée par la victoire des alliés.

C'est dans ce contexte que l'UPC est créée en 1948, et que Ruben Um Nyobèse rendra pour la première fois à l'ONU, le 17 décembre 1952, où il dénoncera l'assimilation du Cameroun par la France et posera clairement le problème de la réunification des deux Cameroun ainsi que celui d'un échéancier pour l'indépendance du Cameroun. Il s'y rendra encore deux autres fois, en 1953 et en 1954.[18]

Évidemment la France ne se laissera pas faire. Avant le départ du leader de l'UPC pour New York lors de son premier voyage, elle organisera une campagne visant à délégitimer la représentativité d'Um Nyobèet, en 1954, dès son retour de sa dernière intervention à l'ONU, l'administration coloniale s'arrangera à faire ressurgir une vieille plainte contre le leader de l'UPC, dans le but de nuire à ses actions politiques.[19]

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[17] Thomas Deltombe, Manuel Domergue, et Jacob Tatsitsa, *Kamerun ! Une guerre cachée aux origines de la Françafrique (1948-1971)*, (Paris : La Découverte, 2019 [2011]).
[18] Enoh Meyomesse, *Guerre et paix au Kamerun, le rôle de l'armée nationale en question*, (Yaoundé : Les éditions du Kamerun, 2010).
[19] Deltombe, Domergue, et Tatsitsa, Kamerun ! Une guerre cachée…; Meyomesse, Guerre et paix au Cameroun… ; Discours d'Um Nyobè à l'ONU, 1952.

De la « Proclamation Commune » aux assauts du colonisateur français: le début de la résistance armée des indépendantistes ou la guerre de la « France contre le Kamerun »

En 1955, le mouvement nationaliste chapeauté par l'UPC, était à son paroxysme.[20] Pour les indépendantistes, l'enjeu de la bataille n'était plus seulement la réunification des Cameroun francophone et anglophone en un seul Kamerun, mais également l'indépendance immédiate à laquelle elle ne prétendait pas avant, si l'on s'en tient en tout cas aux déclarations d'Um Nyobèaux Nations Unies en 1952.

C'est le sens qu'il faut donner à la « Proclamation commune » d'avril 1955. En effet, le 22 avril de cette année-là, l'UPC, l'Union des syndicats confédérés du Cameroun,l'UDEFEC (Union Démocratique des Femmes Camerounaises), la JDC (Jeunesse Démocratique Camerounaise), en collaboration avec d'autres associations, avaient rendu public un document intitulé « Proclamation commune », qui ressemblait plus à une proclamation unilatérale de l'indépendance par les Camerounais, qu'à autre chose ! Cette proclamation prônait la fin du régime de tutelle et l'édification d'un État souverain. Pour cela elle s'appuyait sur trois points :

1. des élections générales avant le 1er décembre 1955 pour l'installation d'une Assemblée nationale constituante;

2. l'institution immédiate d'un Comité Exécutif sous forme de gouvernement provisoire appelé à organiser des élections générales;

3. l'installation immédiate d'une Commission des Nations Unies pour veiller à la mise en place des organes du nouvel État Camerounais[21].

Le 22 mai 1955, après que le Haut-commissaire Roland Pré eut procédé à l'inauguration du pont sur le Wouri, à Douala, l'UPC, présenta de son côté aux Camerounais, le drapeau qu'il proposait pour le pays, à savoir « un crabe - du nom d'où est issu celui du Cameroun - sur fond rouge - du sang des Camerounais morts pour la

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[20]   Pélagie Chantal Belomo Essono, « Sécurité et ordre politique au Cameroun : entre dynamiques internes et connexions internationales », *Revue africaine des relations internationales*, Vol. 12, Nos. 1 & 2, (2009), 39-80.
[21]   Cf. UPC, Proclamation Commune du 22 avril 1955.

patrie », en lieu et place de celui de la France assimilant le Cameroun à ses colonies.

C'en était pourtant de trop pour Roland Pré, qui sauta sur l'occasion pour traquer tous les manifestants; ce qui provoqua immédiatement, une émeute gigantesque. Ainsi, du 22 au 28 mai 1955, des affrontements opposant la police et l'armée coloniale contre des Camerounais, gagnèrent toute la ville de Douala, ainsi que d'autres villes du pays telles que Mbanga, Nkongsamba, Loum, Njombé et Yaoundé. On distinguait, d'un côté, les forces militaires coloniales, suréquipées avec leurs mitrailleuses et leurs fusils de guerre, et de l'autre, les Camerounais aux mains nues, armés de bâtons, de pierres et de machettes.

Le 13 juillet 1955, l'UPC fut interdite par un décret du gouvernement français et les assauts de la France s'accélérèrent par l'exclusion de ladite formation de la légalité administrative en 1955 et des sanctions vis-à-vis de ses principaux leaders, comme pour apporter une caution ou un soupçon de légitimité à l'offensive militaire qui allait s'accentuer; ce qui poussa l'UPC à rentrer dans la clandestinité. En Sanaga-Maritime, le CNO s'attaquera donc aux symboles du pouvoir colonial français : gendarmeries, subdivisions (sous-préfectures), ainsi que ses collaborateurs locaux, chefs de villages, « dikokon » (traîtres), etc.[22]

Les indépendantistes camerounais, tout comme ceux de France l'avaient fait en 1940, lorsque l'armée hitlérienne avait envahi leur pays, vont donc déclencher une guerre de légitime défense. Ainsi, dès le 18 décembre 1956, ils vont perpétrer leur tout premier sabotage en déboulonnant les rails du chemin de fer entre Douala et Edéa, tout en sectionnant les fils télégraphiques entre Douala et Yaoundé. L'UPC va alors conditionner l'arrêt de ces sabotages organisés, d'une part au retrait des troupes françaises et d'autre part à la promulgation de l'amnistie générale pour tous les résistants.

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[22] Pélagie Chantal Belomo Essono, « Sécurité et ordre politique au Cameroun : entre dynamiques internes et connexions internationales », *Revue africaine des relations internationales*, Vol. 12, Nos. 1 & 2, (2009), 39-80; Meyomesse, *Guerre et paix au Cameroun*.

Il y a cependant lieu de souligner le caractère asymétrique de cette guerre. D'une part on a le CNO, branche armée de l'UPC, qui ne dispose que de quelques fusils artisanaux et de machettes; et d'autre part, une armée française suréquipée (mitraillettes, avions, grenades, canons, etc.) et bien sûr organisée en ordre de bataille. L'issue de la bataille semblait donc connue, mais c'était sans compter sur la pugnacité des nationalistes indépendantistes, même après l'assassinat de leur leader Um Nyobè.

Le décès d'Um Nyobè, le déclin de l'UPC et la résistance finale des indépendantistes face à une indépendance « factice » : les prémices de la lutte contre le néocolonialisme en gestation

La troisième bataille des indépendantistes se situe au niveau de la lutte contre non seulement le colonisateur, mais aussi les « dikokon » (« traîtres » en langue locale Bassa'a). L'objectif pour les nationalistes ici, c'est de résister à la suprématie tactique de l'armée française et empêcher l'octroi d'une indépendance fictive qui se peaufine déjà à l'horizon dans les manœuvres relatives à l'acquisition du statut d'autonomie interne en 1957. Pour les Français par contre, l'enjeu de la bataille c'est, l'anéantissement total de l'UPC, notamment de ses leaders, et la mise en place d'un nouveau système de prédation (Bayart) à travers des accords militaires de défense, secrets pour la plupart.[23] Ainsi, le 13 septembre 1958, Ruben Um Nyobè, le leader des indépendantistes, est assassiné à la suite d'une trahison en plein maquis. Aussitôt après sa mort, un bon nombre de ses compagnons commence à abandonner la lutte. Toutefois le leadership de la résistance se poursuivit d'abord avec Felix Moumié, ensuite avec Ernest Ouandiequi, eux aussi, seront respectivement, pour le premier empoisonné en novembre 1960 par les services secrets français à Genève et pour le second, fusillé en 1971 par l'armée. Au total, les champs de batailles des indépendantistes camerounais se sont démultipliés dans le temps (1940-1971), dans l'espace (ONU, Genève, France, Cameroun, etc.) et à travers ses différents enjeux (géo-politiques, géo-stratégiques, économiques et symboliques).

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[23]   Deltombe, Domergue, et Tatsitsa, *Kamerun ! Une guerre cachée.*

Les tactiques dans la guerre d'indépendance camerounaise

Deux périodes fortes permettent de les observer à l'œuvre. Avant et après la mort de Um Nyobè.

De l'arrivée de Roland Pré à la mort de UmNyobè

Dès son arrivée au Cameroun en décembre 1954, le Haut-Commissaire Roland Pré entreprend de mâter le mouvement nationaliste camerounais organisé autour de l'UPC. Le dispositif tactique mis en place par l'administration coloniale est une combinaison des moyens non militaires (brimades, interdictions de réunions, harcèlement administratif et judiciaire des leaders upécistes…, mobilisés dès 1952) et de moyens coercitifs.Ceci va pousser l'UPC à rentrer dans la clandestinité et à créer l'Armée Nationale de Libération du Kamerun (ANLK).

Pour combattre la rébellion, le Colonel Lamberton,déployé dans la Sanaga Maritime, infiltre les maquisards, provoquant des trahisons et des défections en masse. Par ailleurs, entre décembre 1957 et 1958, il soumet les populations de cette zone à une guerre psychologique, en les regroupant dans des camps de concentration pendant que l'armée et la police traquent les maquisards. Ce dispositif est composé de bataillons d'infanterie des marines, d'un escadron blindé, d'un escadron de chasseurs bombardiers T 26 et d'un dispositif de renseignement civilo-militaire.[24] Sur le plan opérationnel, la traque des « rebelles » dans la forêt se déroulait comme une partie de chasse avec des groupes de quatre à six hommes, un officier et un pisteur local. À cela, il joindra la mobilisation de l'aviation militaire pour des vols de reconnaissance aérienne dans la Sanaga Maritime. Toutes choses qui porteront leurs fruits avec la mort, le 13 septembre 1958, de UmNyobètrahi par l'un de ses proches.

De la mort de Um Nyobèà 1970

Suite à la mort de Um Nyobè, la guerre va connaître des développements plus violents avec l'intensification de la lutte armée.

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[24] Antoine Ondoua, *Sociologie du Corps militaire en Afrique Noire : Le cas du Cameroun*, Thèse de Doctorat en Science Politique, (Université de Rennes 1, 2013).

La mort des leaders politiques et militaires de l'UPC conduit à l'expansion du conflit en « pays Bamiléké ». Aux moyens militaires, les belligérants joignent des actions politiques de propagande et contre propagande. On assistera ainsi, du côté de l'administration coloniale,à la création d'un Plan d'action de la Sanaga Maritime qui, fort de 1,200 hommes, recommande la combinaison d'approches militaires et politiques dans le cadre d'une coopération diligente entre les militaires et l'administration dans la ZOPAC.

Dans son déploiement tactique, l'administration regroupe les populations dans des camps et instaure le laisser-passer afin de mieux contrôler les mouvements des personnes et des biens. Celles-ci n'étaient autorisées à rejoindre leur village pour ravitaillement qu'une fois par semaine accompagnées de militaires. Tous les autres jours de la semaine, l'armée est déployée dans la zone et, tout individu rencontré est considéré comme un rebelle et traité comme tel (Général Pierre Semengué). La guerre psychologique se poursuit également à travers la propagande dans les marchés, les écoles et les carrefours et se traduit par des exécutions publiques, les décapitations et les expositions des corps des rebelles dans le but de « rééduquer les masses populaires ». À ce dispositif opérationnel, il sera adossé un dispositif judiciaire répressif avec la création des tribunaux d'exception, la prolongation de la garde à vue, l'interdiction des réunions et la proclamation de l'état d'alerte dans sept régions du Sud et de l'Ouest.

Face à cette démonstration de force, les rebelles procèdent au réaménagement de leur dispositif avec la création de l'ALNK le 31 mai 1959. Avec les résolutions 1349 fixant la date d'accession à l'indépendance au 1er janvier 1960 et celle 1350 fixant les conditions de la réunification, l'UPC bien qu'affaiblie, tente de reprendre le combat face aux forces françaises et l'armée camerounaise en general. Sur le plan organique, l'ALNK est composée d'un État-Major, d'un quartier général, de districts militaires et de régiments, bataillons et compagnies qui ne sont que des simples regroupements de l'UPC. Cette organisation qui épouse le même fonctionnement que le CNO intensifie les actes de sabotage, de terrorisme, le vol et le pillage;

semant la mort et la désolation selon l'agence de presse officielle de l'État Camerounais.

L'ALNK est organisée en deux branches. Au Cameroun, la branche intérieure se déploie en pays bamiléké avec un Maquis Bafia et des unités dans les Bamboutos et à Bazou. Sur le plan tactique, les maquisards combinent le harcèlement, le repli, l'embuscade, la surprise et même le coup de main. Ils attaquent à coups de fusils de chasse ou de fabrication artisanale, d'armes blanches, les villages, les familles, les isolées ou en groupe, les éléments et les patrouilles des forces de l'ordre, les groupes d'autodéfense, les notables, les étrangers et les hommes politiques. Ils commettent des assassinats, vols, viols, pillages, rançonnement, sabotage des routes, ponts et voies ferrées. À l'opposée, la branche extérieure assure un encadrement idéologique et un soutien logistique au maquis intérieur.

À cela l'administration réagit fermement et l'arrivée du général Max Briand impulsera une nouvelle dynamique à la guerre contre l'ALNK. Le nouveau dispositif tactique qui consiste au renforcement des opérations de ratissage le long de la frontière Sud, empêche la mobilité de part et d'autre des frontières des maquisards, les asphyxiant économiquement et brisant leurs lignes de communication de part et d'autre des frontières.

Conclusion

La guerre d'indépendance au Cameroun fut donc sanglante, longue et éprouvante aussi bien pour l'armée coloniale, l'armée camerounaise que pour les forces rebelles. Les différents schémas tactiques épousés structurés principalement en des opérations de guérilla et de contre guérilla se sont étendus de 1954 à 1971 avec la défaite des forces rebelles. S'il apparaît donc peu discutable de parler d'une guerre d'indépendance, on ne peut cependant pas ne conclure que ce fut une guerre pas tout à fait comme les autres.

Premièrement parce qu'elle n'a pas eu de véritable front. Deuxièmement, parce que son théâtre d'opération fut élargi aux aspects non militaires.Troisièmement enfin, parce que ses tactiques se sont structurées autour de deux périodes : l'avant et l'après mort du leader charismatique : Um Nyobè. En cela et fondamentalement, on

ne peut ne pas parler... d'une guerre asymétrique et totale contre la puissance coloniale française.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Ntuda Ebode (Joseph Vincent), né le 1er Aout 1962 à Okola au Cameroun, est Professeur Titulaire des Universités, Hors échelles. Sur le plan scolaire, il est Licencié en Sociologie de l'Université de Yaoundé, (1987) ; Diplômé de l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Grenoble (1990) ; Détenteur d'un diplôme d'Etudes Approfondies de l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Lyon (1991) et d'un Doctorat en Sciences politiques (option relations internationales et Etudes stratégiques dans le même établissement (1996)), il est également détenteur d'une Habilitation à Diriger les Recherches en Droit et Sciences Politiques de l'Université Jean Moulin (Lyon III), obtenue en 2006.

Sur le plan professionnel, il est recruté à l'Université de Yaoundé II en 1997 au grade d'Assistant, passe chargé de cours en 2000, est consacré Maitre de Conférences en 2006 et Professeur Titulaire des Universités en 2013. Simultanément, il est nommé chef de service de la recherche en 1999 et chef de division de la Recherche et du développement par intérim en 2000 au Rectorat de l'Université de Yaoundé II. En 2002, il devient Vice-doyen à la Faculté des Sciences Juridiques et Politiques de la même université et en 2005 Doyen par intérim. En 2007, il est promu Directeur du Centre de Recherche d'Etudes Politiques et Stratégiques (CREPS), de l'Université de Yaoundé II ; Coordonnateur du Master en Stratégie, Défense, Sécurité, Gestion des Conflits et des Catastrophes et Directeur du Séminaire l'Afrique de la Défense à l'Ecole Internationale de Guerre (ESIG) de Yaoundé. En 2012 il est nommé Directeur des Affaires Académiques et de la Coopération de l'Université de Yaoundé II, tout en étant, depuis 2011, Directeur par intérim de l'Institut de Gouvernance, des Sciences Humaines et Sociales de l'Université panafricaine, dont il a la charge de mettre en œuvre au Cameroun. En mai 2016, il est devenu Directeur plein de cet Institut de Gouvernance des Sciences Sociales et Humaines de l'Université Panafricaine, qu'il va définitivement quitter

en septembre 2020, après 10 ans de bons et loyaux services, pour se consacrer entièrement au Centre de Recherches d'Études Politiques et stratégiques (CREPS); de l Université de Yaounde II-Soa.

Sur le plan de la recherche, il est l'auteur de plus d'une quarantaine de publications, Directeur de plus d'une quarantaine de thèse de doctorat phd et membre de plus d'une cinquantaine de jury en qualité de Président, de rapporteur ou de membre en Afrique, en Europe et en Amérique du Nord. Il est également membre des Comités scientifiques de plusieurs Revues Scientifiques en Afrique, en Europe et en Amérique du Nord et Directeur de Publication du Bulletin du Centre de Recherche d'Etudes Politiques et Stratégiques de l'Université de Yaoundé II-Soa.

Avec plus d'une centaine de prestation dans les medias (Presse écrite, radio ou télévision), il fait partie des intellectuels africains les plus consultés et sollicités par les organes de presse internationaux (RFI, BBC, la Voix de l'Allemagne, la Voix de l'Amérique, France 24, TV5, Afrique 24). C'est un expert de réputation internationale pour tout ce qui concerne les enjeux de paix, de sécurité et de la défense en Afrique et dans le Monde. D'où l'appellation de géostratège qui lui est consacrée dans les milieux de Sécurité et de Défense les plus avisés tant en Afrique qu'ailleurs dans le monde.

36. THE DREAM OF AN INDEPENDENT *EELAM*. THE INSURGENCY OF THE LTTE IN SRI LANKA

Georg Frerks (Netherlands)

Introduction and rationale

In 2021 it was 200 years ago that the Hellenic War of Independence took place ultimately paving the way to the independent state of Greece as we know it today. This is one example of many similar wars of independence and insurgencies that are part of the long history of state formation around the world. Whereas several of those wars succeeded in the formation of an independent state, such as the case of the Netherlands, Bangladesh or more recently Eritrea and South Sudan, other insurgent movements failed to reach their goal or still continue their struggle. Biafra is a case in point and more recently the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who were defeated by the government of Sri Lanka in 2009. Both successful and failed insurgencies are instructive for understanding the process of state formation and historical and current cases thereof.

This paper deals with the origin, course and failure of the independence struggle of the LTTE which purported to represent the Tamil population of the North and East of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual country. The majority of the population is the Sinhalese who largely are Buddhist and speak Sinhalese, while there are Tamil and Muslim minorities who speak Tamil. English was used mainly by the elites. The Tamils are mostly Hindu, and the Muslims follow the Islam. Smaller sections of the Sinhalese and Tamils are Christians. Due to the political and electoral system in Sri Lanka the Sinhalese-Buddhists control Parliament and hence can carry through legislation as they wish, also -as will be shown- against the interests of the minorities.

Background and brief overview of the LTTE struggle for independence[1]

Immediately after independence in 1948 the Sri Lankan government disenfranchised one million Indian Tamils who had been brought from South India in the 19th and early 20st century as plantation laborers by the British and who were now rendered stateless. This created serious anxiety among other minority groups, including the Tamils who lived already in Sri Lanka for over two-thousand years. In 1956 the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) came to power with a Sinhalese ethno-nationalist agenda. On its first day in power the new government declared Sinhalese the sole official national language ("Sinhala-only") to the detriment of Tamil and English, thereby effectively excluding Tamils from government jobs. Tamil voters were deeply alarmed and the (Tamil) Federal Party (FP) demanded a federal state comprising separate Tamil-speaking northern and eastern parts, and a southern Sinhalese part, and that both Sinhala and Tamil be recognized as official languages. It further demanded a stop to state-aided colonization of Tamil areas by Sinhalese farmers.[2] Non-violent demonstrations and protests by the FP against these new policies were targeted by Sinhalese mobs and anti-Tamil violence spread across the country. Tamil shops were attacked and looted, and an estimated 150 Tamils were killed.[3] In 1957 and 1958 there was again communal violence against Tamils. In the 1960s and 1970s again controversial colonization schemes were implemented where Sinhalese farmers were settled in Tamil areas. The so-called "educational standardization" policy hampered Tamil students' access to university. Finally, the 1972 Constitution awarded special protection to Buddhism and an earlier clause protecting ethnic and

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[1]   This section is largely drawn from Niels Terpstra, Georg Frerks, "Governance Practices and Symbolism: De facto sovereignty and public authority in 'Tigerland'", *Modern Asian Studies* 52(3) (2018), 1011-1013. Also elsewhere in this paper I use fragments or insights drawn from this publication.
[2]   International Crisis Group, *Sri Lanka's Eastern Province: Land, Development, Conflict*, Asia Report No 159-15, (Colombo/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2008), 4-6.
[3]   M.R. Narayan Swamy, *Tigers of Lanka. From Boys to Guerrillas*, third edition, (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2002), 11; Nira Wickramasinghe, *Sri Lanka in the Modern Age, A History of Contested Identities*, (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2006), 271-172).

religious minorities was removed. In the meantime there were episodes of violence against Tamils in several parts of the country, often with the connivance or complicity of the state and the police, and impunity of the offenders.

Despite growing resentment and frustration among the Tamils, the FP proved unable to achieve any meaningful results in its negotiations with the government. In 1972 the various Tamil parties joined together to form the Tamil United Front, which was tellingly renamed the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). At its first convention in Vaddukoddai in 1974 the TULF resolved that it wanted to establish a free sovereign state of Tamil Eelam based on the right of self-determination in order to safeguard the very existence of the Tamil nation. From this moment, on Tamil politics took a fundamental and, with the emergence of a militant Tamil separatist nationalism led by dissatisfied youths, ultimately violent turn. From the late 1960s onwards, young Tamils had organized themselves in a variety of radical political groups. Already in 1969 the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) was set up with 15-year old Vellupilai Prabhakaran, the later LTTE leader, as one of its members. On 27 July 1975 the Tamil New Tigers (TNT) under the leadership of Prabhakaran killed Alfred Duriappah, the SLFP's Tamil mayor of Jaffna who was seen by the militants as a collaborator of the government. This marked the first political assassination of their opponents by the militants. On 5 March 1976 Prabhakaran robbed the People's Bank in Puttur and walked away with half a million rupees[4] and two months later, on 5 May 1976, he founded the LTTE. In the years since 1976, Prabhakaran further developed the LTTE, which started training new recruits, gave itself a logo, a central committee and a constitution. The LTTE started to engage in armed skirmishes on a significant scale with the Sri Lankan army from the late seventies onwards. It engaged in a series of (bank) robberies and killings of policemen, for which the organization claimed responsibility. It acquired arms and received military training from, among others, India. The LTTE ultimately succeeded in eliminating all competing

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[4]   Narayan Swamy, op.cit., 31.

militant groups and claimed to be the "sole representative of the Tamil speaking people in Sri Lanka".

After the ambushing of 13 soldiers by the LTTE on 23 July 1983, anti-Tamil riots broke out in Colombo, killing hundreds, if not thousands, of Tamils (estimates go up to 3,000 casualties) and damaging the homes and livelihoods of probably 30,000. An estimated 100,000 Tamils were displaced and 175,000 fled abroad. There is evidence of the government's complicity in organizing those riots.[5] Soon hereafter the conflict escalated into a full-blown war that was to last for 26 years.

In 1987 the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) were sent to the island to stabilize the situation but they were unsuccessful and had to leave in 1990. That year the LTTE forced all Muslims to leave the Jaffna peninsula and the North, so as to create an exclusively Tamil area under their own rule. The LTTE waged in total four major "Eelam wars" against the government, and several times also entered into negotiations with them in an attempt to reach a political solution. These failed – or perhaps were never intended to succeed. On 23 February 2002 a Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA) was brokered by the Norwegian government. During the CFA period, the boundaries between the areas controlled by the government and those by the LTTE were delineated and supervised by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. In its area of control, the LTTE ran its own *de facto* state. However, after a few years, violence increased and numerous violations of the CFA occurred on both sides. In January 2008 the government formally abrogated the CFA with the aim of vanquishing the LTTE militarily. After a swift and massive military campaign it finally defeated the LTTE on 19 May 2009 and extinguished its entire military and political leadership, including LTTE-leader Prabhakaran.

Despite its ultimate failure to gain independence, the question arises why and how the LTTE was able to persist so long and achieve several military successes during its existence for over three decades.

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5   Stanley Jeyaraja Thambiah, *Levelling Crowds. Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), 4-7; William Clarance, *Ethnic Warfare in Sri Lanka and the UN Crisis*, (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2007), 45.

In the remaining sections I shall discuss four crucial factors in this connection: 1) the grievances among the Tamil population against the Sinhalese government and the resulting legitimacy of the LTTE and how these reverberated in western media and politics; 2) the military audacity and ruthlessness of the LTTE and their initial aura of invincibility; 3) their *de facto* sovereignty, governance and control of territory; and 4) a narrative of sacrifice, heroism and liberation.

Grievances and legitimacy

As documented above, subsequent Sinhalese-controlled governments passed laws and implemented programs that were deemed discriminatory and exclusionary by the minorities in Sri Lanka, especially the Tamils. This growing trend of Sinhalese-Buddhist hegemony happened against a background of increasing violence against the Tamil (and Muslim) minority combined with government connivance and impunity for the instigators of that violence. Promises to revoke the controversial laws and measures were broken several times by the government leading to a growing frustration among the Tamils and ultimately a demand for an independent Tamil state on the Island. Even though the LTTE used terrorist means to achieve their goals, the accumulation of grievances over the years and the frustration about the lack of any progress provided legitimacy to their armed struggle in the eyes of significant sections of the Tamil population. Recent research by the author in Tamil areas shows that these grievances continue unabated at present and that many Tamils still admire the LTTE and its leader Prabhakaran, even to the extent that some refuse to admit he has died in the last days of the war in 2009.

Since the 1980s the LTTE and its propaganda machinery among the Tamil diaspora abroad skillfully broadcasted a message of suppression and discrimination of the Tamils by the Sri Lankan state and adopted a narrative about their right of self-determination and the necessity and legitimacy of their political and military struggle. This reverberated in western media and also gained some support among western parliamentarians especially when confronted with the plight of Tamil refugees and asylum seekers who fled Sri Lanka after

the riots of "Black July" in 1983 and who had established political contacts in their host countries. This initial sympathy with the LTTE and its struggle only turned into a more critical international stance after the Al Qaida attacks on the Twin Towers and the killing of Rajiv Gandhi by a LTTE suicide commando in 1991 and the Al Qaida attacks on the Twin Towers. Some countries listed the movement as a terrorist organization limiting their possibilities for international exposure and fundraising.

Military audacity

The use of unconventional tactics and the bravura the young Prabhakaran already showed in the 1970s continued to characterize the LTTE's warfare. The LTTE used a large variety of both conventional and terrorist means, including hit-and-run attacks on Sri Lankan army camps and terrorist bombings in the heart of Colombo, such as the building of the Central Bank and bus stations. It was one of the first movements in the world to use suicide commandos. The LTTE assassinated several Sri Lankan and Tamil politicians that collaborated with the government, including a president, and the ministers of defense and foreign affairs as well as high ranking military officers. On 24 July 2001 fourteen "Black Tiger" suicide commandos carried out a spectacular attack on the heavily protected Katunayake airbase and the adjacent Bandaranaike airport. They blew up or damaged 26 airplanes causing over 350 million dollars in damages and creating a heavy impact on the Sri Lankan military and airline industry. The LTTE also became notorious for its forced recruitment. "The one person per family rule" forced every family in LTTE-controlled areas to contribute at least one cadre to the LTTE fighting force. This included the forced recruitment of child soldiers. Another remarkable feature was the introduction of the cyanide capsule that cadres had to swallow when they fell in enemy hands to prevent them disclosing sensitive information. The LTTE was also among the first insurgent groups to recruit women for its fighting force and already deployed them in combat from 1985 onwards.[6]

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[6]   N. Manoharan, *Tigresses of Sri Lanka: from girls to guerillas*, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, article No 1001, 2003, available at www.ipcs.org.

Women made up till 30% of the Tiger fighting force and took part in all sections, including the suicide squads. In their own territory the LTTE maintained a tight security and ran an extensive intelligence service that left hardly anything unnoticed and compelled the population into compliance. All these factors created the image of a formidable, well-trained and well-equipped, disciplined fighting force that was difficult to engage and for a long time deemed invincible. The top-down nature of the organization, an image of total control and the secrecy and myths surrounding its leadership added to this picture. It has to be remembered in contrast that at independence and also long after, the Sri Lankan army was little more than a parade ground army that only slowly developed into a more professional and full-grown force over the years.

   This image of LTTE invincibility was further strengthened by the failure of a 100,000 soldiers strong Indian Peacekeeping Force that was unable to control or defeat the Tigers. In 1987 the Indian and Sri Lankan governments under leadership of prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and president Jayewardene had concluded the controversial Indo-Lanka Accord that, among others, led to the deployment of an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to enforce a ceasefire. The LTTE was not party to the Accord, and as soon as the Indian forces started attacking and killing LTTE cadres and tried to disarm them, they came to be seen as enemies by the LTTE. The IPKF was ultimately unable to formulate an effective response to the LTTE's forms of guerrilla and asymmetric warfare or to neutralize them. The IPKF ended in failure and the last Indian forces left the country in 1990, allegedly leaving large caches of weapons and ammunition that fell in the hands of the LTTE. A female suicide bomber Dhanu killed Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 at an election rally in Tamil Nadu in South India in a notorious LTTE attack.

De facto sovereignty

The LTTE always has aspired to attain sovereignty in the areas it considered to be the Tamil homeland or *Eelam*. They achieved this at least partially during several episodes by exercising territorial control of the Jaffna Peninsula from 1990 till 1995 and of the Vanni (an

extensive area in the Northeast of Sri Lanka) from 1995 until the end of the war in 2009. In the areas they controlled the LTTE ruled the population by installing their own system of governance. Next to their armed forces, they built initially their own police force and judiciary focusing on rule and order and assuring compliance of their subjects. Within the police force there were different sections: crime prevention, traffic, a technical division, transport, communications, camera/photography, intelligence, and the environmental police.[7] Alongside the expansion of the Tamil Eelam police, the LTTE began establishing a system of courts consisting of District courts, High courts, an Appeals Court, and a Special Bench (similar to a Supreme Court). Unlike the police and courts in Sri Lanka, the LTTE police and court system had a reputation of incorruptibility, but were also known for their harsh punishments and their intrusive nature which instilled fear among the population and forced them into compliance. The LTTE had not only the coercive ability to discipline the population, it also attempted to legitimize its rule by what it deemed to be a righteous order, which included, for example, "decent" and disciplined behavior among those who were being "ruled", but also extended this to their own cadres and staff who were strictly supervised. The LTTE thus tried to foster compliance with the norms it set out.

Apart from securing law and order, the LTTE performed sovereignty through the provision of social services and, more generally, through its ability to carry out various functions usually identified with modern statehood. These varied from health, educational and agricultural services, banks, to LTTE-supervised NGOs, a "peace secretariat" and a planning and development department. They also had a special unit looking after martyrs' families and war veterans. Some services were still delivered and paid by the Sri Lankan government, but operated in essence under LTTE control and instructions.[8]

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[7] "Inside Vanni: expanding Tiger civil service", *Sunday Times* (Sri Lanka), published on 9 June 2002, available at: http://www.sundaytimes.lk/020609/columns/sitrep1.html.

[8] See for more information on these remarkable forms of hybrid governance: Terpstra, Frerks, op.cit., 1020-1031.

It goes without saying that *de facto* sovereignty, territorial control and a functioning governance system are huge assets for a rebel group fighting for independence. It allowed the LTTE a safe base from where to prepare and launch attacks, it provided them a source to recruit fighters from and to raise taxes, and to project their imagined state of *Eelam* by mimicking statehood and providing services to their population, along with coercion and force where deemed necessary. The LTTE was generally known for its discipline and well-functioning organizational structure. The movement functioned in a top-down manner and governed its territories in the North and East through a mixture of coercion, persuasion and compliance by its subjects.

A narrative of sacrifice, heroism and liberation

Apart from the material realities of law and order and service provision, the LTTE also adopted a symbolic repertoire to entice its population and gain legitimacy. As referred to earlier, the narrative of the liberation of the Tamil motherland arguably resonated among much of the Tamil community. The lead narrative consisted of Tamil nationalism, resistance against oppression of the Tamil minority by the Sri Lankan state, the existence of a historical homeland of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, and the demand for Tamil Eelam, based on the right to self-determination.[9] Though these elements *per se* figured in Tamil discourse before the birth of the LTTE, they were reproduced, magnified and extended in the LTTE's representation of its struggle. Its political program showed a peculiar mix of historical, nationalist, socialist, secular, and transformative storylines.[10]

From an insurgent's perspective, the performance of statehood and the symbols associated with it can serve to portray authority and to

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[9]   Georg Frerks, Bart Klem (eds), "Sri Lankan Discourses on Peace and Conflict", in *Dealing with Diversity, Sri Lankan Discourses on Peace and Conflict*, (The Hague: The Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael", 2005), 1-46.
[10]   LTTE, "Socialist Tamil Eelam. Political Programme of the LTTE", in Georg Frerks, Bart Klem (eds), *Dealing with Diversity, Sri Lankan Discourses on Peace and Conflict*, (The Hague: The Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael", 2005), 291-306.

cement claims to legitimacy. As Mampilly[11] points out: "In essence, deploying a symbolic repertoire is an attempt for a rebel government to performatively legitimate its sovereign claim". Symbols are everything that stands for something else: they can be phrases, songs, pictures, logos, flags, stamps, or events like celebrations, ceremonies, memorials, etc. Symbols of the LTTE as a rebel movement, and of the struggle for an independent state with a distinct national identity, continued to evolve over time. This effort was projected towards internal audiences such as the Tamil population living in Sri Lanka, but also to international audiences and the diaspora, as part of the LTTE's pursuit of international recognition for its proposed Tamil Eelam. Prabhakaran himself created the Tiger logo, and reportedly also personally designed the Tiger uniforms. The public space in Jaffna (before 1995) and in the Vanni was dominated by the LTTE through symbols such as posters, flags, and monuments, while buildings with flags and signposts to the various Tamil Eelam institutions covered the streets of the self-declared Eelam capital of Kilinochchi. The Tamil Eelam police force used its own salutes, and there was also a national anthem, a national flag, bird and tree to represent the separate nation. Terpstra and Frerks[12] report on the basis of their field work that "the perception of the Tamil communities regarding the LTTE was indeed that it was similar to a state". In both the North and in the East a majority of the respondents believed that the LTTE had "everything a government should have". Moreover, as one […] respondent [...] from Kinniya puts it, there was "absolute royal respect for the national Tiger flag and the national flower, the November flower. We also saluted and worshipped these", he added.[13]

    Another strong symbolic aspect that gained legitimacy to the LTTE was the preparedness of the cadres to fight and die for the cause. As

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[11] Zachariah Mampilly, "Performing the Nation-State: Rebel Governance and Symbolic Processes", in Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir, Zachariah Mampilly (eds), *Rebel Governance in Civil War*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 82.
[12] Terpstra, Frerks, op.cit., 1001-1042.
[13] Quote based on interview code 27 C1 – Alankerni, Kinniya Division.

Roberts[14] explains: "Martyrdom was a critical factor in drawing popular support among the Sri Lankan Tamil people". The LTTE organized yearly commemorations (on Heroes' Day) of the fallen cadres who were indeed attributed the status of heroes. It is reported that these days attracted large crowds where the LTTE and the public met to mourn and remember the fallen heroes. It needs to be pointed out in this connection that nearly every family had a relative in the movement and nearly everyone personally knew some of the fallen heroes. Next to the sentiments involved, such commemorations were also exercises in building a political community or nation-building, as sharply observed by Hellman-Rajanayagam.[15]

Concluding remarks

It is obviously not easy to simply answer the question why and how an insurgent movement like the LTTE could persist that long and be rather successful before it was finally defeated by the Sri Lankan state. There are many factors involved, historical and contemporary, domestic and international. In my paper I have addressed four factors that were internal to the LTTE's struggle and its perceived legitimacy, but conspired to make them a formidable opponent or enemy. I made the point they had managed to portray a valid cause and serious grievances vis-à-vis the Sri Lankan state and that their narrative of self-determination and liberation reverberated both domestically and, at least initially, in the international arena.

The second factor was their military audacity, the availability of a well-trained, disciplined fighting force that was not only prepared to use unconventional, terrorist tactics, but also to fight and die for their cause which gave them for a long time an aura of invincibility which was augmented by the failure of the IPKF.

The possession of *de facto* sovereignty and territorial control was a big asset for the LTTE as a launching pad for attacks, a base for

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14   Michael Roberts, *Confrontations in Sri Lanka: Sinhalese, LTTE and Others*, (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications, 2009), 222.
15   Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam, "And heroes die: poetry of the Tamil Liberation Movement in Northern Sri Lanka", *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 28(1) (2005), 115.

recruitment and taxation and to gain popular support by a variety of means.

I explained this was done by providing law and order and social services, but also by an extensive symbolic repertoire aimed at enticing and motivating the LTTE's popular base. There is evidence that this was to a significant degree effective.

Despite those factors the tide turned against the LTTE in the early years of the new millennium. One issue was the loss of international sympathy for insurgents in the wake of the Twin Tower attacks. The LTTE had also fallen out with its erstwhile patrons in India, while it also had to face a defection from one of its major commanders (Karuna) to the Sri Lankan government who took part of the LTTE fighting forces with him and divulged sensitive intelligence. Further, it can paradoxically be surmised that the very mimicry of statehood the LTTE aspired and its subsequent "sedentarisation" in the Vanni engendered a greater vulnerability from the Sri Lankan army that had in the meantime grown into a professional force larger than that of the UK. Ultimately the Sri Lankan army managed fairly swiftly, but also with the use of considerable violence against both their enemy and the civilian population, to walk over the LTTE, something it would have found more difficult if the LTTE had still been only a versatile, asymmetric jungle force as in its early years.

Epilogue

The end of the war in Sri Lanka is still shrouded in controversy in terms of human rights violations and war crimes and also the current post-conflict trajectory in Sri Lanka is highly problematic and contentious. In fact, it seems that a winner-takes-all mentality among the victorious government led them to deny any meaningful concessions to alleviate the grievances of the defeated. Hence, there has been no effective post-conflict transformation process that positively changed the situation of the Sri Lankan minorities or the Tamils for that matter, or engendered a process of transitional justice and reconciliation. In this connection the current situation in Sri Lanka cannot be described as reassuring, as shown in the 2020 Report of the Office of the United Nations Commissioner on Human Rights

(OHCHR) regarding the promotion of reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka as envisaged in its original resolution 30/1 and later resolutions and reports, and the continued reporting on Sri Lanka by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG). The OHCHR notes that the inability of the Government to comprehensively address impunity and to reform institutions may cause the recurrence of human rights violations. The report also indicates, next to a range of other observations, there has been no progress towards the development of a more comprehensive truth and reconciliation commission and there has also been no progress towards establishing a judicial mechanism to investigate war-related allegations of violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law.[16] In a similar vein as the OHCHR the International Crisis Group (ICG) states that "the government has done little either to heal the war's wounds or to address the ethno-nationalist dynamics that drove the conflict. […] Failed political reforms, inadequate economic development, heavy militarization of the Tamil-majority [in the] north and government resistance to providing information on disappeared persons have further deepened many Tamils' grievances. Their sense of betrayal, and the absence of spaces to work through the suffering experienced by Muslims and Sinhalese, too, threatens hopes of reconciliation –either between ethno-religious groups and the state or among the groups themselves– and risks further instability. For many Sri Lankans living in the bitterly contested north and east, the war has never quite ended"[17], according to the ICG. Let us hope that better counsel prevails and history does not repeat itself.

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[16] United Nations, Human Rights Council, Forty-third session *Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri* Lanka, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/43/19, 2020.
[17] Source: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/picturing-sri-lankas- undead-war, accessed 15-6-2021.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Prof. Georg Frerks held the chair of Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management at Utrecht University and the chair of International Security Studies at the Netherlands Defence Academy till his retirement in 2021. Till mid 2014 he also held the chair of Disaster Studies at Wageningen University, the Netherlands.

Frerks served for nearly twenty years in the Dutch Foreign Service both at headquarters and abroad. He also was head of the Conflict Research Unit of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael" in the Hague. Frerks focuses on conflict and conflict management as well as on international and national conflict-related policies and interventions, and the international security architecture. During his period at Wageningen University he has worked on natural and man-made disasters and humanitarian emergencies.

Frerks has (co-)authored or (co-)edited 22 academic books, over 90 journal articles and book chapters, and 80 policy reports and monographs in his field of expertise. Frerks has directed or participated in various policy-related studies and evaluations in the field of conflict and peacebuilding and participated on the boards of several national and international conflict and peace related NGOs.

37. AN INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE SEEN FROM THE OUTSIDE: AUSTRIA AND SLOVENIA'S "TEN-DAYS-WAR" IN 1991

Erwin Schmidl (Austria)

Yugoslavia was one of three "composite states" established at the end of the World War I, in 1917-1919. Of the other two, Czechoslovakia split peacefully in 1993, whereas the future of Ukraine, as we all know, is still uncertain.

Yugoslavia

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia, or the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, as it was officially known until 1928, was formed in late 1918. In the south-east, it consisted of the kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro. These areas had been part of the Ottoman Empire for several centuries, attaining independence in 1878. Serbia subsequently acquired other previously Ottoman territories, including present-day North Macedonia and Kosovo, in 1912-13, as well as formerly Hungarian territories such as Vojvodina in 1918-19. Bosnia-Herzegovina had been a part of the Ottoman Empire until 1908, but had been under Austro-Hungarian administration since 1878. Further to the north-west, Croatia had been an autonomous part of Hungary, but the coastal regions of Dalmatia had been Venetian until the Napoleonic Wars, and then became Austrian. Also part of Austria since the Middle Ages was present-day Slovenia – the region around Ljubljana/Laibach forming the Duchy of Carniola, whereas the part around Maribor/Marburg belonged to the Archduchy of Styria. The different regions of Yugoslavia therefore had different histories, but they also differed ethnically and in their economic prosperity, the north-western regions being the most developed ones.

Tensions were aggravated as a result of World War II, when Yugoslavia was conquered by the Axis powers in 1941, and split into various regions. Parts were directly administered by Germany, Italy, Hungary or Bulgaria, whereas Croatia became a nominally independent country, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, being ruled by the Fascist (and vehemently anti-Serb) Ustasha (*Ustaše*). Various

partisan groups fought against the occupiers as well as against each other. Eventually, the Communist partisans under the leadership of a former Austro-Hungarian NCO, Josip Broz (1892–1980), better known by his *nom de guerre* "Tito" gained superiority and became the dominant political element in post-war Yugoslavia which was reformed as a Communist Federal Republic in 1945. Tito's father had been Croat, his mother Slovene, and the administrative organisation of Yugoslavia aimed at a sort of balance between the different regions and ethnic groups. Under the 1974 constitution, the country consisted of six republics and two autonomous entities. Opposition was ruthlessly suppressed in typical Communist fashion, and the country held together by Tito's leadership (Map 1).

Following Tito's death in 1980, a rotating presidency was introduced to balance the increasing tensions between the republics. The lack of strong leadership, coupled with increasing economic problems, led to developments like those in the Warsaw Pact countries at the time. With the general decline of Communist parties after 1989, the "League of Communists of Yugoslavia" split in early 1990. Democratic elections brought nationalist governments to power in Croatia and Slovenia. Slovenia held a referendum on independence in December 1990, and Croatia followed in May 1991, both resulting in clear majorities for separation. One reason for secessionist sentiments was that Slovenia and Croatia, the richest republics of Yugoslavia, had become tired of having to pay for the economic failures of Communist mismanagement in other parts of the country.

In the spring of 1991, in view of increasing tensions, the military leadership considered to declare a state of emergency in the whole of Yugoslavia. The Serb President Slobodan Milošević no longer recognized the authority of the Yugoslav Presidency, and in March, he and his Croatian counterpart, President Franjo Tuđman, allegedly discussed plans to divide Yugoslavia between them. In Serb-inhabited parts of Croatia –actually, the former Habsburg Military Border settled by Orthodox refugees from territories conquered by the Ottomans– armedconfrontations started between Croatian police and Serb paramilitary forces in the Pakrac region.

The "Ten-days-War" in Slovenia

In Slovenia, the secessionists prepared for a coming conflict, acquiring additional arms from various sources abroad. The nascent Slovenian armed forces were based on the "Territorial Organisation" (*Territorialna Obramba* – TO). Similar territorial defence organisations had been created in all Yugoslav republics in 1968, in the wake of the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia, when Tito feared an invasion from the Warsaw Pact. On 25 June 1991, both Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence.

The new Republic of Slovenia immediately ordered police and TO forces to take over the border posts at the Austrian, Italian, and Hungarian borders on 26 June. This was important for symbolic reasons, but also to ensure that customs revenues went to Slovenia. TO forces were also to take control of Ljubljana airport.

On 27 June, Yugoslav troops were ordered to reoccupy the border posts. Mistakenly, the Yugoslav authorities expected that a "show of force" would be sufficient, and the Yugoslav military leadership officially informed the Slovene authorities of these plans. The Slovenian forces tried to prevent Yugoslav troops from reaching the border, using (mainly foreign) trucks as barriers. First clashes occurred. In the Ljubljana region, two Yugoslav helicopters were shot down. On 28 June, the situation escalated. As Slovenian forces attacked Yugoslav troops, Yugoslav airplanes responded with attacks against Slovenian forces and truck barricades (Map 2).

Events in Yugoslavia had surprised the European Communities (EC), just on their way to becoming the European Union (EU). On 29 June, the first EC mission arrived in the area to arrange a cease fire, while Yugoslav air operations against Slovenian forces and truck barricades continued. Some Yugoslav forces encircled at their border posts had to surrender, and increasingly, Yugoslav soldiers started to desert. On 1 July, the Yugoslav National Army command declared that operations had failed so far, and proposed to impose a state of emergency and subdue the Slovenian secession by use of force. To their surprise, this request was denied by the Yugoslav Presidency.

On 3 July, a ceasefire was arranged. The Slovenian authorities were to take over the remaining border posts, and Yugoslav troops returned to their barracks. On 7 July, EC negotiators brokered an agreement signed on the Croatian island of Brioni: Slovenia and Croatia suspended their independence for three months, and Yugoslav forces withdrew from Slovenian territory. A diplomatic observer mission, the EC Monitoring Mission (ECMM), was established to supervise the agreement.

The war in Slovenia had lasted for ten days. Although figures differ slightly, Yugoslav forces lost 44 killed and 146 wounded, while Slovenian losses were lighter, with 18 killed and 182 wounded. Altogether, twelve foreigners lost their lives as well.

What were the reasons for the success of the Slovenian forces? First of all, the secessionists had thoroughly prepared for the conflict, establishing personnel structures and procuring arms for the Territorial Defence. In contrast, the Yugoslav authorities were caught by surprise – they had not expected the Yugoslav army to be attacked by their own citizens.

That Yugoslav leadership eventually "allowed" Slovenia to leave the federation was also due to the solid ethnic structure there: In Slovenia, "ethnic cleansings" had already taken place in 1945, when Germans and Italians (as well as non-Communists) were killed or expelled. This was different from the situation in other parts of Yugoslavia, where the ethnic composition was much more complicated.

During the conflict, the Slovenians made clever use of public relations and the "CNN factor". Half a year after the Gulf War, the power of images had become clear. With images of burning customs houses and airstrikes against apparently civilian targets, the Yugoslavs became the aggressors in the eyes of the world. This changed the original Western intention to preserve Yugoslavia as a unified state. In the West, Yugoslavia had had a positive reputation throughout the Cold War. Being one of the leading nations of the non-aligned movement, it was often imaged as more liberal and seen as "good Communists" – even though the Yugoslav regime proved in reality no less brutal than other Communist dictatorships. Also, in

1991, there were fears that the disintegration of Yugoslavia could serve as a negative model for the Soviet Union, which already started to disintegrate.

Further events in Yugoslavia

After waiting for three months, Slovenia and Croatia reaffirmed their independence on 8 October 1991. In the meantime, Yugoslav forces had left Slovenia, but armed confrontations increased in Croatia. With the sieges of Vukovar and Dubrovnik in the late summer and autumn, public opinion in the West turned increasingly anti-Serb and, in consequence, supportive of the secessionist elements in Slovenia and Croatia. On 19 December 1991, the Serb-populated areas of Croatia claimed independence as the Republic of Serbian Krajina. In February 1992, UN peacekeeping started with the establishment of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia, whose mandate later was extended to include Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia – the latter proclaiming independence in November 1991 (Macedonia) and March 1992 (Bosnia), respectively.

Under German pressure, the EC agreed in December 1991 to recognise Slovenia and Croatia by 15 January 1992. Only a few months later, in May 1992, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina were admitted into the United Nations, barely a year after the start of the war. Incidentally, Austria, then a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, had the (rotating) chairmanship of the Security Council at the time.

Austrian reactions to events in Slovenia

Like many other countries, the Austrian government, dominated by the Social Democrats from 1970 through 2000, held for a long time positive attitudes towards Communist countries in general, and towards Yugoslavia in particular. The Christian Social "People's Party", however, who was a junior member in government from 1987 on, established connections with the opposition groups and reform movements in Communist countries early on, including Slovenia and Croatia. Although no member of the federal government attended, no less than four province governors – three from the People's Party and

one from the Social Democrats – were present at the independence celebrations in Ljubljana on 26 June 1991. The foreign minister, Alois Mock (also from the People's Party), was a strong supporter of Slovenian and Croatian claims to independence.

When the fighting started in Slovenia, Austrian military intelligence confirmed that there was no danger of armed intervention in Austria. Nonetheless, with Yugoslav planes crossing into Austrian air space and occasional shells landing on Austrian territory, local politicians increased pressure to deploy Austrian Armed Forces at the Yugoslav/Slovenian borders (Map 3).

From 28 June on, up to 7,700 soldiers were deployed in the border areas until the end of July 1991. There was no mobilisation of the reserves, however, so often barely trained recruits, who had joined the armed forces only in April, were sent to the border. All went well, but the question of "What if?" remained.

In the end, the operation resulted in positive effects for the armed forces' public standing in Austria, as the local population was reassured by the presence of troops. It had deeply negative effects, however, on the reserve organisation. What for do we need reserves, when they are not called up in time of danger? That for party political reasons the Army High Command was dissolved in the middle of the conflict was an additional factor undermining morale in the armed forces.

Note on the sources

This short piece is based on information gathered in the course of a longer research project at the Austrian National Defence Academy. The author is grateful to Col. Dr. Herwig Jedlaucnik, First Lt. Dr. Georg Hoffmann and Col. Dr. Andreas Scherer for their input, and to the Institute of Military Geography for the provision of the maps. In addition to the literature on Yugoslavia and the wars of the nineties, the reader is referred to the following books in German:

Herwig Jedlaucnik, *Österreichs Sicherheitspolitik am Beispiel der Jugoslawienkrise 1991: interne und externe Akteure,* (MA thesis, University Vienna, 1996);

Manfried Rauchensteiner, *Entschlossenes Zuwarten: Österreich und das Werden Sloweniens 1991*, (Klagenfurt am Wörthersee: Verlag des Geschichtsvereines für Kärnten, 2011).

**Map 1:** Yugoslavia and its six republics and two autonomous regions.
Source: Austrian Armed Forces: Institute of Military Geography.

Map 2: Operations in Slovenia in June 1991.
Source: Austrian Armed Forces: Institute of Military Geography.

Map 3: The deployment of Austrian forces at the Yugoslav/Slovenian border in June and July 1991.

Source: Austrian Armed Forces: Institute of Military Geography.

CURRICULUM VITAE

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Fields of research

Modern military, political, colonial and cultural history; emphasis on the evolution of international peace operations from the 19th century to the present, as well as Cold War history. Numerous publications, including several books as author or editor; lectures and exhibitions. He teaches or has taught at the universities of Innsbruck, Graz, Vienna, and at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna; in 2004, he was guest lecturer at the University of Pretoria (South Africa).

EPILOGUE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
HELLENIC COMMISSION OF MILITARY HISTORY

We have reached the end of the XLVI International Congress of Military History in Athens, Greece. The Congress participants were 86, plus 27 accompanying persons. During these days, we had the pleasure of listening to 37 (in the present volumes) exceptional scholars present their papers and 14 (13 included in the present volumes) sessions on Military History from 27 countries, regarding the Wars of Independence since the 18th century.

I would like to express my sincere thanks to all the participants for their high-level presentations, and to the chairmen for their skillful management of the working sessions.

Furthermore, all those who attended the Congress contributed with their questions, remarks and interventions to the intriguing academic discussions we witnessed.

I would like to thank the International Commission of Military History and especially its President, Professor Dr. Massimo de Leonardis, for their help and contribution to the undertaking of the Congress.

Finally, I would like to thank my classmates at the Hellenic Army Academy, the majority of whom nowadays constitute the leadership of the Hellenic Army, who helped me to a great extent.

Athens	Major General Georgios Rachmanidis
May 2022	President of the HCMH

PAPERS
BY NON-ATTENDING SPEAKERS

38. NATIONALISM, THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE BIRTH OF NEW STATES

Victor Gavrilov (Russia)

Speaking about the complex problems that are in the title of the presentation, it is necessary first of all to conduct a brief comparative analysis of the concepts of "national liberation movement", "nationalism" and "separatism".

National liberation movement aims to give independence to some people (state) who are under the oppression of another people (state). There are many such examples in history. For example, Greece, the Balkan states, the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, wishing to gain independence, waged national liberation struggle.

Nationalism is quite another thing, which is closely linked with separatism. This is when a national elite raises for separation of a part of the state in order to create a sovereign state and make the head of it.

And this elite raises the people of its nation to this struggle.

For example, the Scots want an independent sovereign state. But they are not under the yoke of the British. Scotland is represented in all power structures and all spheres of life in the UK. This is not a national liberation movement, this is nationalism and separatism.

The same thing happened in the USSR. National republics used separatism, although all national elites were equally represented in the central state bodies, not to mention the fact that in their national republics, national elites occupied a dominant position, even sometimes to the detriment of other nationalities.

And now the Ukrainian elites "have decided to justify the independence of their country through the denial of its past, however, with the exception of the issue of borders". And besides, this independence is built on infringing the interests of other nationalities living in Ukraine.

In the sphere of social processes, separatism has been known since ancient times in the form caused by various reasons (economic restrictions, demographic factor, social unrest, clan differences, marital ties, etc.), which may exist in reality, but used in an

exaggerated form by elites to separate a particular national group of persons from the original community.

However the difference between separatism and the national liberation movement is quite subjective (evaluative). Thus, the UN documents (the Declaration on the Principles of International Law of 1970, etc.) declare that each State must refrain from any actions aimed at the complete or partial violation of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other State. However, in the EU, there is a European Free Alliance, which unites parties with a separatist orientation.

One of the main collisions in the international law and international relations is the clash of two paradigms – the principle of territorial integrity of State and the right of nations to self-determination. Most of states in the world are multinational entities, no country is immune from the tensions in this area and accusations of violations of the rights of national minorities living in its territory. In this regard, questions arise: Who has the right to their own national state – the nation or the people? In what cases an ethnic group as a nation has the right to self-determination?

Separatism if used as a solution to ethno political problems is always fraught with a chain reaction. The Yugoslav crisis gives a good example for such case study. The events in Yugoslavia have shown the ambivalent attitude of the international community towards separatism. There was an absolute international legal uncertainty on the question of who can have the right to self-determination –an administrative– territorial unit that was previously part of a common state, or people who express a desire either to separate and create their own state or become part of another? And how does this relate to the principle of the territorial integrity of a certain state?

In this regard, we should consider that the question of national self-determination has two aspects. One concerns the cultural self-realization and self-identification of the individual. The second aspect concerns national self-determination as a political phenomenon and reflects the process of redistribution of power between certain national elites.

In most cases, the conflict revolves around the situation when one of the local groups puts forward ideas and begins to move towards

the formation of a new territorial statehood or territorial autonomy designed to serve the interests of an ethnic community that believes that the existing state neglects its needs. In practice, that is the basis for national separatist movements.

It is also necessary to note such a kind of separatism as irredentism

According to Merriam-Webster, the word "Irredentism" means "a political principle or policy directed toward the incorporation of irredentas within the boundaries of their historically or ethnically related political unit".[1] Irredenta – a territory historically or ethnically related to one political unit but under the political control of another.[2]

In this regard, the conflict over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) can make another case study. These islands, as we know, are claimed by Argentina and Great Britain.

In 1946, these islands were included in the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories, which included 72 Territories. Member States which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of such Territories are called administering Powers.

In 1963, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (also known as the "Special Committee on Decolonization" or the "C-24") approved a preliminary list of Territories to which the Declaration applied. Today, 17 Non-Self-Governing Territories including the Falkland Islands remain on the agenda of the C-24.

It is also necessary to define a "dependent territory"

A dependent territory, dependent area, or dependency is "a territorial unit under the jurisdiction of a nation but not formally annexed by it"[3].

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[1] Irredentism, *Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary*, Merriam-Webster, accessed 18 Aug. 2021, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/irredentism.
[2] Irredenta, *Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary*, Merriam-Webster, accessed 18 Aug. 2021, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/irredenta.
[3] Dependency, *Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary*, Merriam-Webster, accessed 18 Aug. 2021, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dependency.

Historically, most colonies were considered to be dependent territories.

The Falkland Islands Dependencies was the constitutional arrangement from 1843 until 1985 for administering the various British territories in Sub-Antarctica and Antarctica which were governed from the Falkland Islands and its capital Port Stanley.

Between 1962 and 1985 South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands left only as Falkland Islands Dependencies.

The question of the territorial affiliation of the islands arose again in the second half of the XX century. Argentina saw the creation of the UN as an opportunity to declare its rights to the archipelago: when signing the UN Charter in 1945, Argentina declared that it retains the rights to possess the Falkland Islands and the right to get them back.

Argentina renews these claims periodically. [4] It considers the Falkland archipelago to be part of the Tierra del Fuego Province, along with South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. Its claim is included in the transitional provisions of the Constitution of Argentina as amended in 1994.[5]

The UK has always believed that the inhabitants of the islands should vote for secession from the UK in a referendum and that this should be an important condition for the implementation of the UN Declaration on Decolonization. Later, in the 1960s, negotiations were held between British and Argentine representatives, but they did not lead to any clear solution to the Falklands issue. The stumbling block in the negotiations was the fact that the two thousand people of the islands, mostly of British origin, preferred that they remain British territory.

United Nations monitors progress towards self-determination in the Non-Self-Governing Territories. In its resolutions, the UN General Assembly has repeatedly called on the administering States to take all available measures to promote self-determination and independence

4   Dave Gilbert, *Argentina presses claim to Falkland Islands, accusing UK of colonialism*, CNN, 4 January 2013, accessed 18 Aug. 2021, https://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/03/world/europe/argentina-falklands-letter/index.html.
5   Constitution of the Argentine Nation, 22 August 1994, accessed 10 Aug. 2021, http://www.biblioteca.jus.gov.ar/argentina-constitution.pdf.

of Non-Self-Governing Territories as quickly as possible. It also invites them to complete withdrawal of the remaining military bases in these territories and to guarantee that no activity dictated by other people's economic and other interests will interfere with the implementation of the Declaration on Decolonization.

In 1965, Resolution 2065 of the UN General Assembly approved that all forms of colonialism must be finished off on the Falkland Islands, and the question of their future status would be solved during diplomatic negotiations between Great Britain and Argentina, taking into account the interests of local residents.[6]

The vulnerability of the Argentine position initially lay in the fact that the majority of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands are descendants of British colonists, whose identity is based on a close connection with the United Kingdom.

In 1982, a short but bloody war broke out between Great Britain and Argentina over the Falklands, as a result Great Britain completely regained its control over the islands. Since 1985 the Falkland Islands have been a self-governing British Overseas Territory. Under the 2009 Constitution, the islands have full internal self-government; the UK is responsible for foreign affairs, retaining the power "to protect UK interests and to ensure the overall good governance of the territory". After the war, the United Kingdom expanded its military presence, building RAF Mount Pleasant and increasing the size of its garrison.[7]

The United Kingdom and Argentina both assert sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The UK bases its position on its continuous administration of the islands since 1833 and the islanders' "right to self-determination as set out in the UN Charter". Argentina claims that, when it achieved independence in 1816, it acquired the Falklands from Spain.

In March 2013, the Falkland Islands held a referendum on its political status: 99.8% of votes cast (about 3,000 voters) favored remaining a British overseas territory. The press service of the British

6   The United Nations General Assembly, *Resolution 2065*, accessed 14 Aug. 2021, https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/docs/A_RES_2065-Eng.pdf.
7   Daniel Gibran, *The Falklands War: Britain Versus the Past in the South Atlantic*, (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 1998), 130-135.

Prime Minister said after that referendum: "The people of the Falklands choose British citizenship. Its right to self-determination is enshrined in the UN Charter".

Thus, in the question of the Falklands sovereignty, the decisive role is played not by the principle of international law (Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, UN General Assembly resolutions), but by the right of nations to self-determination. At the same time, the factor of cultural proximity or traditions, especially significant in the former possessions of the British Empire, becomes crucial.

And again the views and judgments on this problem is quite subjective (evaluative) and even controversial.

In this regard, a comparative analysis of the problem of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and the problem of Crimea is also of interest.

For example, Mark Harrison, Professor of Economics at the University of Warwick writes: "In resolving the Ukrainian conflict the right thing to do is to observe the principle of the rule of law. In the issue of borders and territorial claims, the rule of law should take precedence over other arguments, including ethnic solidarity, the right to self-determination and the political preferences of a particular government".[8]

What about the Falklands problem, then?

In 2014 in referendum held in Crimea 96.77% residents (1,5mln) voted for joining Russia. However the recent statement by the British Foreign Office says that Crimea was illegally annexed by the Russian Federation, and that vividly illustrates the policy of double standards of the United Kingdom.

In this case Great Britain should return a number of disputed territories – Spanish Gibraltar, the Mauritius archipelago of Chagos in the Indian Ocean, part of Cyprus, as well as the Malvinas Islands

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[8]   Mark Harrison, *Границы силы: возможна ли третья мировая война?* [*The Limits of Power: Is the Third World War Possible*], RBC.ru, 8 May, 2015, accessed 12 Aug. 2021, https://www.rbc.ru/opinions/politics/08/05/2015/554c800c9a79473a8f5d6ee2.

(Falklands) in the South Atlantic, which sovereignty has been constantly disputed since the 19thcentury by Argentina.

Russia in the Crimea only repeated the actions of the British themselves, returning the territory of Crimea as its historically-based possession. At the same time, Russia did that without bloodshed military operations on land, at sea and in the air.

CURRICULUM VITAE

- Born 9 May 1956
- 1979: graduated from the Moscow Defense Language Institute
- 1979-1986: served with the Kiev Infantry School as instructor
- 1986-1992: served with the Moscow Defense Language Institute as instructor
- 1984-1989: completed Postgraduate Courses at the Moscow Military Political Academy, PhD (Psychology)
- 1992 – 2009: served with the Moscow Institute of Military History as Senior Research Fellow, Chief of a research section, Deputy Chief of Modern National Military History Division, Chief of Foreign Mil Hist Division
- 2009 – till present: Leading research fellow in Military History Research Institute, Military Academy of General Staff RF Armed Forces
- 1997: graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, CA), Master's Degree in International Security and Civil-Military Relations
- 1998: completed the Courses at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (Hawaii, Honolulu)
- 2014 – till present Secretary General, Russian Commission of Military History.

Co-Author of the books: *Soviet-Japanese War. The History of the Confrontation between the USSR and Japan in 1930-1940s. Documents and Materials*, (Moscow, 1997); *The Balkan Deadlock. The History of Yugoslavia in the 20th Century*, (Moscow, 2000); *Secrets of the Korean War* (Moscow, 2002); *Operation "Ramsay". A New View of Sorge's Spy Ring in Japan in 1930s*, (Moscow, 2004). Author of the book *Military Intelligence*

Informs. The Documents of the Red Army Intelligence Directorate, January 1939 – June 1941, (Moscow, 2008).

Author of a number of papers on the problems of national and foreign military history, regional problems (Asia Pacific, Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia).

39. THE STRUGGLE OF GREEK PEOPLE FOR INDEPENDENCE AND RUSSIA

Nikolay Nikiforov (Russia)

Numerous documentary studies clearly show that Russia conducted comprehensive foreign policy, provided diplomatic support and direct military assistance to the struggle of the Greek people for liberation. For their part, the Greek population saw Russia as an ally in their struggle for freedom.

In the 18th century, the Greek people began an active struggle for independence. It is documented that of all the foreign states, the Russian Empire became the mainstay in the liberation of Greece, since the common religion was the spiritual basis for the proximity of the Greeks to Russia.

As a result of the Mediterranean campaign of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (1798-1800) under the command of the outstanding naval commander Fedor Ushakov, a number of Ionian Islands were liberated, including the island of Corfu, where the Russian naval base was founded. Under the Russian-Turkish Convention of 1800, the Greek Republic of Seven United Islands was established on the Ionian Islands under the protectorate of Russia and Turkey.

In 1815, in Paris, Prussia, Austria and Russia concluded a Holy Alliance. Its essence was the preservation of borders, the eternal preservation of regimes and thrones in Europe, i.e. the so-called principle of legitimism. Alexander I tried to strictly follow this principle. As a result, this led to serious mistakes and failures in the Turkish and Balkan policy of St. Petersburg.

The Greek Revolution

Meanwhile, under the influence of the French Revolution, the Greek national liberation movement was developing. In 1814, Greek patriots in Odessa founded a secret society "Philike Hetaireia" – "Friendly Society", which aimed to liberate Greece from the Turkish yoke. Russian officers of Greek origin made a core of the society. In 1820, Alexander Ypsilanti became the leader of the organization. Before that he had fought in the Russian army against Napoleon (he lost his arm

in the Battle of Leipzig), since 1816 –was an adjutant of the Russian Emperor, since 1817– made Major General and commander of the Hussar brigade.

On 24 February (8 March) 1821, Ypsilantis (he had previously left the Russian service), having crossed the Russian-Turkish border, from Yass called the Greek people for uprising. Several thousand insurgents gathered around him. In the second half of March, the uprising swept Greece (Greece's Independence Day is celebrated on 25 March). The whole Peloponnese, part of continental Greece and part of the islands in the Aegean Sea rose up. Ypsilantis tried to raise an uprising in the Danubian principalities and from there make his way to Greece. But he was defeated, retreated to Austria, where he was arrested.

The National Assembly, which met in Piada in January 1822, declared the independence of Greece, elected a legislative council and adopted a constitution (statute).

Intervention of the Great Powers

In 1814, Great Britain captured the Ionian Islands, which had previously been occupied by the French. The British wanted to take control of all of Greece. In the "Greek question", London was afraid only of Russia. While the government of Alexander I withdrew from the "Greek question", firmly believing in the principle of legitimism, London decided to intervene. In the spring of 1823, London recognized the Greek insurgents as a belligerent country and began to finance them. European military specialists poured into Greece in a wide stream.

The new Russian tsar Nicholas I decided to pursue an independent policy, and not to bind himself to the interests of Western "partners". In the summer of 1827 in London Russia, Great Britain and France signed the convention on the formation of an autonomous Greek state on the basis of the St. Petersburg Protocol. The proposals of the great Powers for reconciliation were rejected by Turkey. Then the allied fleet was sent to the shores of Greece. In October 1827, the allied fleet burned the Turkish-Egyptian fleet in the Navarino Bay. The Russians took the main blow of the enemy and destroyed most of the enemy's

ships. The naval power of the Ottoman Empire was significantly weakened.

After that, the Western European powers did not take any active actions to further military pressure on Turkey. Great Britain and France even gave apologizes to Istanbul about the Navarino incident. Disputes began over the future of the Osman heritage. The West was afraid of Russia's strengthening in this region. Great Britain wanted to get Greece under its wing and at the same time push Turkey against Russia. Istanbul, taking advantage of the differences among the great powers, declared war on Russia. The Russian-Turkish War of 1828-1829 began.

As a result 18 September 1829 there was concluded the Adrianople Peace Treaty and Greece received broad autonomy.

Peacekeeping operation on the island of Crete

There were constant uprisings on the island of Crete. During the Great Cretan Uprising of 1866-1869 Russia provided all possible assistance to the insurgents.

In the context of the Greek-Turkish clashes on the island in 1896 and the Greek-Turkish war lost by Greece, Russia joined in solving the problem of "pacifying" Crete. Based on the agreement, in early January 1897, the naval forces of Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, as well as Germany and Austria-Hungary arrived in Cretan waters. Russia was one of the active participants in the naval, administrative, economic and other components of this peacekeeping operation.

On 6 March 1897, the Council of admirals of the countries participating in the peacekeeping operation proclaimed an autonomous regime on the island and assumed control of Crete. On the same day, the Turkish governor issued a decree recognizing the autonomous status of the island by the Sultan. In 1909, the People's Assembly of Crete proclaimed the annexation of the island to Greece, and international troops were pulled out from its territory. In 1913 after the First Balkan War, under the London Treaty Crete was finally reunited with Greece. Russia was one of the active participants in this peacekeeping process.

Russians in Greece in the World Wars I-II

During the World War I according to agreement with the Entente
allies in 1916 the Command of Russian Imperial Army sent three
infantry brigades to the Salonika front. In 1917 those brigades made a
Special Russian Infantry Division under the command of General
Dieterichs. In 1917, Russian troops took part in the offensive on
Florina, where they showed mass heroism, suffering losses.

Few people in Russia know the Russian necropolis, which is
located in the huge memorial allied cemetery Zeytinlik on the
outskirts of Thessaloniki. Four hundred Russian soldiers who fell on
the Thessaloniki front are buried there. There are also some Russian
partisans buried in the same cemetery with the Yugoslav partisans
who died in Greece during the World War II.

The Greek Queen Olga, the daughter of Grand Duke Konstantin
Romanov, paid great attention to the sailors and the history of the
Russian Navy. She used considerable funds for the preservation of
marine monuments in Greece. At the end of the 19th century she
founded a naval hospital in Piraeus, where a cemetery was
established, which later received the name of Queen Olga.

During the World War II, some Russian partisans and
underground fighters fought against the Nazis in Greece. The most
famous among them is GeorgyIvanov, who was executed by the
Germans in 1943. There is a monument to him in Thessaloniki on
Langada Street. The location of his grave is unknown.

In the Athens suburb of Kallithea, a monument to Soviet soldiers
who died in the battles for Greece in the ranks of the Greek resistance
was opened in 2005. There is inscription on the pedestal that says: "To
the Soviet soldiers who fell for the freedom and independence of
Hellas in 1941-1944". On a stone block there is a statue of a fallen
Soviet soldier with a rifle in his hand. Next to his body there is a
figure of a Greek woman grieving for a dead soldier. This monument
is a tribute to the memory of Soviet soldiers who fought in a distant
foreign land for the liberation of Hellas.

CURRICULUM VITAE

- Born 20 Dec. 1955, Tambov oblast, Russia
- Nov 1975 – Jan 2010 served with the armed forces, mil rank Colonel
- March 1999 – June 2010 – Deputy Director, Institute of Military History RF MoD
- Since July 2010 – Deputy Director for research studies, Military History Research Institute, Military Academy of General Staff, Russian Federation Armed Forces
- PhD (History). Author of more than 100 works on actual problems of military history
- Has state and public awards
- Member of the State Interdepartmental Commission for POWs, Interned and MIAs
- Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences
- Vise-President of the Russian Commission of Military History.

40. WAR IN SOUTH RHODESIA 1965-1979: SOME FEATURES OF ANTI-GUERRILLA ACTIONS OF THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES

Sergei Poplavskii (Russia)

According to the opinion of many military experts, the victory over guerrillas is possible only by political and diplomatic methods. There are practically no countries where guerrillas could be defeated only by military force. There are many examples when powerful empires could not conquer other states where there was a strong guerilla movement (for example, the Spanish guerilla against France; the guerrilla war in Russia in 1812 against Napoleon; the guerrilla war against Nazi Germany on the occupied territories of the USSR; the actions of the Vietcong against the United States, etc.). A recent example is the victory of irregular Taliban armed groups over government forces in Afghanistan supported by military contingents of the US Army and other NATO countries.

It is well known that only special military formations of "commando" type can fight against guerrilla forces more or less successfully. Their actions are based on intelligence information from different sources. The special operations of the Security Forces of South Rhodesia, carried out by special units during the civil war of 1964-1979, better known as the "War in the Rhodesian Bush", can serve as a model for very successful anti-partisan actions.The events of that time, which took place in the interfluve of Zambezi and Limpopo, are very interesting – both from political-military and philosophical point of view. The territory is now home for the free multinational Republic of Zimbabwe, which has been ruled by President Robert Mugabe for more than 35 years.[1]

In South Rhodesia, in 1964, a party of Rhodesian nationalists from the white minority "The Rhodesian Front", led by the hero of World War II, former British Royal Air Force pilot Ian Smith, came to power as a result of the elections. On 11 November 1965, timed to coincide

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[1] S. Panov, *War in the Rhodesian bush* (in Russian), accessed 19 July 2021, http://klimat.ucoz.ru/publ/istoricheskie_stati/vojna_v_rodezijskom_bushe_chast_i /5-1-0-31).

with the anniversary of the end of World War I, the government of Jan Smith unilaterally announced the declaration of independence. The proclaimed state received the name of Rhodesia. The British government, like other governments, did not recognize the independence of Rhodesia.

In Rhodesia, the Union of the African People of Zimbabwe (ZAPU) Party was formed in 1961, declaring a course to overthrow the existing ruling regime. In 1963, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) Party was formed, calling for the armed struggle against the existing Rhodesian government.

From the very first days, Rhodesia was attacked both inside and outside the country. At first, there were attacks, robberies and murders. But as the nationalist movement expanded, fueled by the help of other states, terrorist attacks began to resemble a full-scale war.

The USSR, China and North Korea entered the game. Naturally, Britain also had its own interest, which could not come to terms with the fact that the "former colony rebelled", and therefore the British leadership secretly supported nationalist movements. Socialist countries had their own interest: Rhodesia, although it was a rich country, was considered primarily as a springboard to attack and destroy South African apartheid regime.

As is often the case with Africa, a tribal issue was imposed on geopolitics. The national ZANU movement and its combat wing ZANLA (People's Liberation Army), led by Ndabaninga Sithole, and later Robert Mugabe, a former school teacher, consisted of Shona people. ZAPU and its ZIPRA (People's Revolutionary Army) combat units were the Matabele party led by Joshua Nkomo.

These fractions were strongly hostile to each other –affected by the long-standing tribal enmity of Matebele and Shona– but were forced to maintain a kind of friendly alliance in the face of their common enemy – the white government of Rhodesia. In Moscow, it was decided to support Joshua Nkomo – he was considered in Kremlin as the most likely leader of the new Rhodesian government. Therefore, weapons, uniforms, medicines were sent from the USSR for ZIPRA, and ZAPU-ZIPRA leadership personnel were trained in Soviet

educational institutions and special training camps in order to return to Africa and apply the acquired skills in practice.

China, in its turn, began to provide comprehensive assistance to ZANU-ZANLA. ZANU personnel were trained in special camps in the PRC, and boxes with AK-47 went from Beijing in significant volumes to Africa. Instructors from the special forces of North Korea also trained the fighters of the People's Liberation Army.

ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas attacked farms and border villages from neighbouring states – Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia, and those attacks were becoming ever more decisive and bloody. Black guerillas, with the help of the media sympathizing with them, tried to convey to everyone that there was a Chimurenga in the country, a liberation war similar to the one conducted by their ancestors at the end of the 19th century against the white invaders.The fact that the so-called "white invaders" turned the territory into a developed country, the fact that thanks to them the vast majority of the black population had jobs, and the fact that in this "liberation war" the victims were primarily old people, women and children, as well as ordinary farmers, pastoralists, priests and doctors, did not bother anyone. Sacrifices are inevitable (collateral damage) – with a hypocritical-crushed look, European and American politicians sighed, being thousands of miles from the warring country.[2]

In opposition to the guerrillas, Rhodesia formed a well-trained, moderately equipped, and integrated armed force. In 1976, the regular Rhodesian Forces consisted of three infantry battalions, supported by one Special Air Services Squadron, and several special units. By 1979, the country's reserves were mobilized, and the Security Force included additional 8 infantry battalions. These units were composed of 10,800 regulars and approximately 15,000 territorial reserves. The air service unit was composed of approximately 1,300 personnel. The British South Africa Police, a supporting force with military training had approximately 8,000 active members and 19,000 reservists. Although the Rhodesian Security Forces were small and its Air Force was supported by well-worn equipment, it was one of the finest counter-insurgency units in the world. The lack of sophisticated

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[2]   Panov, op.cit.

weaponry and equipment was the basis for its success. It was an army which dealt with the insurgents on their own level. It lacked extensive lines of logistic support, and the Air Force was incapable of dropping tremendous quantities of bombs. Yet it was very adept at small-scale operations throughout a broken and ragged countryside. In order to compensate for its small numbers, the Rhodesian combatants had to rely upon the basic ingredients of victory – professionalism, training and an intimate knowledge of the terrain. They operated in small units, and relied upon mobility, surprise, flexibility, and tactical dispersion for success. The Army tended to confront the insurgent on his own ground in a man-to-man fashion of combat. The Security Forces also reflected the spirit of the Rhodesian culture. It was a highly efficient organization. The tight bonds within the Rhodesian society reduced the elements of traditional friction between soldiers, civil servants and politicians. The Army and Police Forces were not plagued by a sense of social isolation. The European population was ready to endure the necessary taxation, and the required conscription of its children in order to achieve a gradual and moderate transition of power to black majority which would tolerate a privileged European minority.[3]

During the period 1965-1968 ZAPU and ZANU conducted a series of uncoordinated and rather amateurish raids across the border from Zambia. The two problems guerrillas faced have already been described – lack of coordination between the two major factions, and lack of a real plan of how to conduct a campaign. A third problem was the terrain. After crossing the Tsetse-fly and crocodile infested Zambezi river valley, the infiltrators faced relatively open, rolling countryside which exposed them to observation by Rhodesian forces. Yet another obstacle faced by the guerrillas was lack of standardized training.[4]

The leadership of ZAPU and ZANU, conversely, blamed the Rhodesian forces with brutality, intimidation and torture of the

3   Major Charles M. Lohman, USMC, Major Robert I. MacPherson, USMC, *Rhodesia. Tactical victory, strategic defeat. War Since 1945. Seminar and Symposium*, (Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia, 7 June 1983), 3–5.
4   Ibid., 15.

populace. That was probably true. In most campaigns of this sort, the peasants in the field simply want to be left alone. Terrorised by guerrillas at night and intimidated by police during daylight, they can only hope to survive until one side or the other wins. In any case, that was one of the primary weaknesses of the efforts of ZAPU and ZANU during the early years of their campaign. They did not make any significant effort to prepare the population for liberation. The guerrilla actions were limited to ambushes and attacks on isolated farms. Reaction by Rhodesian forces was usually swift and fatal. By 1968 the guerrilla campaign had come to a standstill.

From 1973-1975 both sides of this conflict began to learn the lessons of unconventional warfare. The guerrillas received a higher degree of training, and demonstrated the discipline required to wage an effective campaign. The Rhodesian Security Forces developed the counter insurgency tactics which would bring it so much positive recognition in the following years. The withdrawal of the Portuguese from Mozambique in 1975 allowed the "Front line" nations to form a loose confederation in order to direct their support and some limited resources to the overthrow of the white minority government in Salisbury. Rhodesia's position worsened when South Africa bowed to US President Carter's pressure; Pretoria withdrew its auxiliary forces from combat and eventually from Rhodesia. As a result of greater Chinese and Soviet support, the numbers of insurgents began to increase, and units in excess of 100 men moved through the northern and eastern border regions. By 1976, the pressure on the Rhodesian military began to intensify. Insurgent attacks were initiated from Botswana. The joining of Botswana to the guerrilla sanctuary had a noticeable impact on white Rhodesia. The main railway from Rhodesia to South Africa passed through this country. Salisbury could no longer depend upon a secure line of communications with its only ally. That resulted in the construction of the Beit Bridge-Rutenga railway line. Throughout the war, this route served as Rhodesia's only direct link with the international community. In order to counter the escalation of insurgent movement into the country virtually from everywhere, the Security Forces separated the country into five military districts. The northern district was identified as **Hurricane**; **Thrasher** covered the Eastern Highlands; **Repulse** included Fort

Victoria and the majority of the Beit Bridge-Rutenga railway; **Tangent** was established in the area adjacent to Botswana, and **Grapple** occupied the centre of the country.

The immediate result of intensification of the guerrilla war was that the Rhodesian Armed Forces lost control of the African Trust Lands in the northeast, and most of the rural areas of the country. As in the United States' experience in Vietnam, the Security Forces controlled the rural areas daytime, and the guerrillas held the territory at night. That increase in strength and capabilities of the nationalist movement resulted in an increased popular support from the indigenous black population (the tribesmen). That gave the insurgent local source of food and shelter, but, of more importance – indigenous recruits. In the face of these realities, and provided with only a relatively small force and equipment, sometimes both obsolete and elderly, General Peter Walls, first as Army Commander, and then as Commander Combined Operations, waged a campaign of extreme professional competence that can deserve a place in the world's military Staff Colleges for many years to come.

Under Walls, the Rhodesian forces accepted their inability to control the terrain, and directed their operational planning toward limiting and reducing the growth of the insurgent forces within Rhodesia. The tactics developed to accomplish this mission were based upon an accurate evaluation and the dissemination of intelligence, ambushes, ground and aerial reconnaissance, the rapid deployment of forces in order to gain and maintain contact with confirmed enemy movement, and the development and use of a unique military organization known as a "Pseudo-Gang" to disrupt enemy forces in a particular area.

In addition, the Rhodesians tended to disregard the international boundaries of the five black nations that had proclaimed themselves as "Front line" states: Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania and Angola. The insurgents countered these incursions by the skillful use of media. The publicised violation of these borders greatly tempered the military benefits the Rhodesians derived from such operations. The international reaction was intensified by the number of non-hostile Blacks who were killed and wounded during those raids. The

guerrilla base camp served as the living compound for its soldiers. Inevitably, a large number of women and children became casualties of Rhodesian attacks.

As compared to the US experience in Vietnam, at the height of the Vietnam War, Washington had over 500,000 troops there. In contrast, the Rhodesian Security Forces in 1978-1979 consisted of 10,800 regulars, 15,000 territorials (reserves), plus 8,000 regular BSAP (British South African Police), with a 19,000 police reserve. This force was taken from the British model, with a separation of the Army into branches or "arms". The Air Force was a separate service, but closely linked to the ground element by its primary role: close air support and helicopter operations. The command and control of all combat operations was centred in the Combined Operations Headquarters in Salisbury under the direction of General Peter Walls. The five military districts in Rhodesia were controlled by Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) which were linked directly to Salisbury. The individual JOC was a combined operations centre with representatives from the Army, Air Force, Police, Central Intelligence Organization, and Internal Affairs. The Army commander was the senior service representative. The operational units assigned to a military district were task organized in accordance to specific mission and terrain, and remained under the tactical control of the JOC commander of that district. Although the combat elements in each Joint Operations Area were task organized, the Air Force remained the most structured of all components of the Rhodesian Security Forces.

In order to check the insurgents' use of the indigenous population and to counter the refugee flow from the bush to the cities, Rhodesia began its most controversial policy of the war, the Protected Village concept. That policy was initiated and administered through the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and monitored/enforced by the IANS (Internal Affairs National Servicemen). That idea was not an original strategy of the Rhodesian Government. It evolved as a result of Rhodesia's participation with Commonwealth Forces during the British crisis in Malaya. That concept served as the basis for the British pacification effort. The Salisbury government attempted to reinforce British success by incorporating tribal heritage with the village

concept. The Tribal Trustlands were divided into existing communities. The denominator consisted of a formula based upon arable land, traditional grazing areas and water supplies. On the strategic ground within this area the government established the village. The intent was to ensure that the tribesmen would be able to continue their normal pattern of existence. The protected village was to place an additional strain on the guerrillas' supply source.

Rhodesian War has been classified as an unconventional conflict. Our examination of the Rhodesian Security Forces demonstrated that the Army was structured in a conventional fashion, but task-organized to counter guerrilla insurgency. The majority of combat occurred at a low level of intensity: small groups of Rhodesian soldiers making contact with the insurgents, a brief episode of combat and an extended period of tracking. Throughout the war there were very few large-scale battles such as Americans waged in Vietnam in 1965-1970.[5]

Effective utilization of the principles of counter insurgency warfare

1. *Requirement for good Intelligence*: The Rhodesians generally received high marks in this area. Their collection agencies were divided into three groups – The Central Intelligence Organization, Military Intelligence, and the Special Branch of the BSAP. Although some rivalry existed, the Security Force received timely and good intelligence. The majority of their collection means involved prisoner interrogation, aerial photography, and ground reconnaissance missions. Once the Supreme Commander established unity of command with the Headquarters for Combined Operations, the dissemination of this material became much more efficient.

2. *Co-location of Military and Police Headquarters, and areas of responsibility*: The Rhodesian government had recognized the necessity of that from the early days of the war. When they implemented the concept, they failed to include its most important

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5   Ibid., 23–33.

ingredient – the necessity to ensure unity of command. That was not accomplished until 1977.

3. ***The use of minimum force to accomplish the mission***: That was the Rhodesians' finest trait. They had the ability to gather the facts, plan a mission, organize a task force, and strike. Much of that was driven by the nature of the war and their lack of sophisticated equipment. Yet they had developed a unique capacity to examine a situation, and tailor a force to counter or eliminate its threat.

4. *Adequate mobile reserves*: They utilized the American doctrine of a helicopter-borne reserve element (SPARROW HAWK) which was developed in Vietnam. Due to their inability to obtain parts and equipment, this reserve was used in a sparing fashion. Their assault elements developed the mentality that the reserve would only be committed as an absolute last resort.

5. *Adequate training*: The Rhodesian soldier was a much more well trained fighter than his European counterpart. He was driven by the knowledge that the enemy was "on his door step". Consequently, he was a much more willing participant in the training. On an average, the minimum instruction he received was 16 weeks. After being posted to an operational unit, the entire unit would "stand down" for periods of retraining. Because the European population carried the major share of the fighting, the system of national reserve training ensured that the soldier stayed proficient in his skills.

6. *Good communications*: Although the Security Forces never enjoyed the advantage of satellite communications, they developed an effective system of tactical and strategic communications utilizing British, American, South African, and Israeli equipment.

7. *Public relations*: Rhodesia was an international outlaw. It was a nation attempting to justify a system which had been by-passed by the 20th century. The advantage of modern communications brought this war to the forefront of international attention. When the British crushed the Malayan Insurgency, it was during a period when the world still accepted the vestiges of imperial dominion. Rhodesia attempted to prolong this status in an era and a geographic location dominated by the people who had shouldered the burden of

colonialism for centuries. They made a good attempt to justify their existence, but it was doomed from the beginning.

8. *Established tactical areas of responsibility*: The Security Forces recognized the necessity of that principle, but they were unable to utilize it because of their lack of strength. As the insurgents increased in numbers, the Rhodesians were forced to accept a defensive posture. They exercised the ability to strike at the enemy in force, but they were unable to control the terrain.

9. *Continuity*: Because of the size of the Security Force, continuity was a major advantage. The members were familiar with one another, and able to communicate in a very efficient fashion. The National Reserve System also helped to ensure the continuity of the force.

Although the Rhodesian government and its Security Force were basically successful in their adherence to these principles, they were simply unable to resist the flow of the 20th century.[6] *The army of Rhodesia went down in the history of armed conflicts as vanished, but not defeated.*

CURRICULUM VITAE

- **Born:** 30.09.1958
- **Current position:** Research fellow, Military History Research Institute, Military Academy of the General Staff, RF Armed Forces
- **Academic degree:** Master in military science from the Madras University (Republic of India)
- **Education:** Higher Military Command School, Omsk, 1979; Frunze Military Academy, Moscow, 1988; Defense Services Staff College, Wellington (Republic of India), 1991
- **Military service experience:** 34 years including various command and staff positions in the Army, service as assistant of the Defense attaché of the Russian Federation in Austria and Defense attaché of the Russian Federation in Germany
- **Scientific competencies:** Local wars and armed conflicts of the second half of the 20th century, Cold War, Soviet Army Military Science, Army Military Art.

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6   Ibid., 45–46.

41. STRUGGLE OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE FOR INDEPENDENCE DURING ANGLO-AFGHAN WARS

Vladimir Priamitsyn, Nikolay Leontiev (Russia)

In the history of many nations and peoples there are pages related to the struggle for independence. As for Afghanistan, its entire past is permeated with fightagainst invasion of external forces and the struggle for independence. That struggle took its greatest scope and pronounced result during the three Anglo-Afghan wars. Victory in those wars brought long-awaited independence for Afghanistan.

The 19th century was characterized by the confrontation between the British Empire and the Russian Empire for influence in Central Asia. That confrontation went down in history as "The Great Game".[1] Great Britain, which had already turned India into a colony, prepared the same destiny for Afghanistan.[2]

The colonial authorities put forward demands to the Kabul Emir Dost Mohammed Khan to open the country's markets for British trade on unfavorable terms, to recognize the independence of Peshawar and Kandahar, and to stop any relations with the Russian Empire. In order to make the Afghan leader more cooperative, the British established economic blockade of the country. In addition, they began to support separatism of local feudal lords, seeking to split the country. The actions of the British threatened the integrity of Afghanistan. Their demands actually violated the country's sovereignty, that's why they were rejected by the Emir.[3] In October 1835, Dost Mohammed Khan turned to the Russian Emperor Nicholas I for political support.[4] Refusal to comply with the requirements of the British, and an attempt to rapprochement with Russia served as a pretext for declaring war.

[1]   A.A. Lyakhovsky, S.J. Davitaya, *Игра в Афганистан*, [*The Game in Afghanistan*], (Moscow: Nauka, 2009), 18.
[2]   *Страны Ближнего и Среднего Востока*, [*Countries of the Near and Middle East*], (Moscow: OGIZ, 1944), 7.
[3]   *История Афганистана*, [*History of Afghanistan*], (Moscow: Mysl, 1982), 141.
[4]   N.A. Khalfin, *Провал британской агресси в Афганистане* [*Failure of British aggression in Afghanistan*], (Moscow: Publishing House of socio-economic literature, 1959), 22.

At the end of 1838, a well-armed Anglo-Indian army under the command of Lieutenant General John Kean entered Afghanistan. Troops numbering 22 thousand men delivered the main blow through the Bolan Pass to Kandahar, Ghazni and Kabul. An auxiliary blow by forces of about 10 thousand men was made along the Khyber Pass through Peshawar to Jalalabad and Kabul.[5] The Afghan army totaled about 15 thousand men, and was significantly inferior to the enemy in numbers and weapons. As a result, in 1839 the invaders easily captured Kandahar, Ghazni, Kabul, Jalalabad, and important mountain passes.Dost Mohammad first fled to the emir of Bukhara and then was exiled to India in late 1840.

In the capital, there was staged a performance on coronation of the English protégé Shuja Shah Durrani. On 7 May 1839 he signed an agreement under which British troops were stationed in the country on a permanent basis, and Afghanistan's foreign policy became dependent on the British.[6] After capturing Afghan cities, the colonial troops began to plunder and oppress the population. Resentment was growing among the Afghan tribes, which began to turn into armed struggle. The city of Ghazni became the stronghold of the rebels. They stubbornly resisted, but due to the technical and numerical superiority of the invaders, the city was taken and ruined, the inhabitants were subject to reprisals.[7]

The Afghans refused to recognize the puppet king. Soon a large-scale guerrilla war broke out in Afghanistan. Attacks on British troops began everywhere. The Afghans smashed the British garrisons, attacked their columns, killed representatives and accomplices, and lured away forces loyal to the British to their side. In April 1840, the Pashtuns cut off the communications connecting Kandahar and Jalalabad with the capital. Some of the British troops were cut off from the main forces. By the end of 1840, the liberation movement had gained such a scope that it became possible to move from guerilla warfare to open battles. So, on 2 November 1840, in the vicinity of

5   *История Афганистана* [*History of Afghanistan*], op.cit., 146.

6   I.M. Reisner, *Развитие феодализма и образование государства у афганцев*, [*The development of feudalism and the formation of the state among the Afghans*], (Moscow: Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1954), 50-54, 65-73.

7   *История Афганистана* [*History of Afghanistan*], op.cit., 147.

Parvan, a battle took place between the militia forces and the English brigade, in which the British were defeated.[8]

In the fall of 1841, there was the final rallying of all Afghan forces opposing the invasion. In the course of hard fights, the Afghans captured the Charikar fortress, destroying the garrison and British viceroys. The Afghan tribes holding the Khyber Pass began an open struggle with the invaders. The British were isolated not only in fortresses, but also in Afghanistan as a whole, without communications with the outside world. They were exhausted by the constant grueling fights against the rebels and demoralized. The remnants of the troops, trapped in a few garrisons, faced the threat of starvation and total annihilation.[9]

On 2 November 1841, an uprising broke out in Kabul, East India Company's political officers Alexander Burnes and William Macnaughten that played the role of Envoys were killed, the British garrison of the city capitulated. Major General William Elphinstone who was in command of the British garrison in Kabul, was captured and died as a captive in Afghanistan some months later. That caused panic among the expeditionary force. On 6 January 1842, having abandoned all the artillery and part of the treasury, the remnants of the defeated Anglo-Indian army that totaled 15,000 including 12,000 soldiers' families and camp followers moved to Jalalabad. Along the way, they were continuously attacked by the Afghans. Three weeks later, only one man came back to Jalalabad, where a large combat-ready garrison of British troops was located. It was assistant surgeon William Brydon.[10]

In August 1842, the colonial authorities undertook a punitive expedition to Afghanistan under the command of Major General George Pollock. Its goal was no longer to turn the country into a colony, but to save the remnants of the British expeditionary force. The actions of the invaders in that campaign were characterized by extreme cruelty. Having occupied the capital of Afghanistan, the colonial troops destroyed it, burned the surrounding countryside, and

8   Khalfin, op.cit., 47.
9   *История Афганистана* [*History of Afghanistan*], op.cit., 149.
10   Ibid., 151.

killed thousands of civilians. However, those looting and atrocities only consolidated Afghan society. The non-stop popular resistance forced the British, who lost more than 18 thousand men in Afghanistan, to withdraw their troops in late 1842. The puppet Emir Shuja was shot dead.[11]

Dost Muhammad was released and re-established his authority in Kabul. He died on 9 June 1863. He is reported to have said about the British: "I have been struck by the magnitude of your resources, your ships, your arsenals, but what I cannot understand is why the rulers of so vast and flourishing an empire should have gone across the Indus to deprive me of my poor and barren country".[12]

In 1868, Sher Ali Khan took the throne in Kabul. He was objectionable to the British, because he continued his father's policy aimed at uniting the Afghan tribes. But the British, after an unfortunate experience of military clashes with the Afghans, stepped up their diplomatic efforts. On 30 March 1855, they imposed a treaty on Afghanistan that significantly limited its sovereignty and tore away part of its ancestral territories. The British adopted the doctrine of the so-called "offensive policy" to Afghanistan, according to which the border of British India was to pass along the ridges of the Hindu Kush. Realizing the danger posed by relations with the British, the Emir distanced himself from them and began to draw closer to the Russian Empire. In the spring of 1878, Russia sent an embassy to Afghanistan, which was received with great honors.[13] Sher Ali Khan also refused to receive the British embassy. That was used as a pretext for a new war.[14]

In November 1878, the Anglo-Indian army of about 35 thousand men under the command of Lieutenant General Samuel Browne invaded the territory of Afghanistan in three columns. The British bribed the warrior frontier tribes and persuaded them to keep neutral.

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[11]   Khalfin, op.cit., 60.
[12]   Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics*, (New York: Harper Collins, 2002), 70.
[13]   I.L. Jaworski, *Путешествие русского посольства по Афганистану и Бухарскому ханству 1878–1879* [*Journey of the Russian Embassy in Afghanistan and Bukhara khanate 1878-1879*], vol. 1, (SPb: Printing house of Dr. M. A. Khan, 1883), 307.
[14]   Khalfin, op.cit., 102.

The Afghan army and militia stubbornly defended the mountain passes, but without the help of the border tribes, they could not hold back the superior forces of the enemy. The invaders began to burn cities, loot and kill the Afghans. Jalalabad and Kandahar were soon captured.[15] The success of the British was facilitated by a significant superiority over the Afghans in weapons and equipment.

The new Emir of Afghanistan, Mohammad Yakub Khan, known for his pro-British sympathies, concluded a peace treaty in the village of Gandamak in February 1879. According to it, Afghanistan turned into a dependency of Great Britain, was deprived of a number of territories, including important mountain passes, and was deprived of the right to independently conduct foreign policy. In Kabul, a British residence was established, the head of which was given the right to dispose of the state treasury, judge Afghans, pass sentences and carry them out.[16]

The Afghans did not accept the terms of the Gandamak peace, began to create militia units again, which attacked British troops using guerrilla warfare. Those units were pulled to Kabul and on 3 November 1879 they raised an armed uprising, led by Ayub Khan. The Afghans captured weapons and destroyed the British embassy. By the end of the day, all the British in the capital, including Ambassador Pierre Cavagnari, were killed.[17]

Britain was shocked by these events, because the scenario of the First Anglo-Afghan War was repeated in detail. To restore the situation Major General Frederick Roberts led the Kabul Field Force of 26 thousand men with 25 guns over the Shutargardan Pass into central Afghanistan and defeated the Afghan Army at Charasiab on 6 October 1879.[18]

The invaders were constantly attacked by the Afghans. The British mercilessly shot the prisoners of war and finished off the wounded.

15 История Вооруженных сил Афганистана (1747–1977) [History of Afghanistan Armed Forces (1747-1977], (Moscow:Nauka, 1985), 22.
16 Khalfin, op.cit., 110.
17 S. Tanner, Афганистан: история войн [Afghanistan: History of Wars], (Moscow: EKSMO, 2004),274.
18 Michael Barthorp, Afghan Wars and the North-West Frontier 1839–1947, (London: Cassell, 2002), 77–79.

That was supposed to frighten the Afghans and break their will to resist, but on the contrary, that involved more and more forces to the guerrilla ranks. The British managed to break through to Kabul and regain control over it with great difficulty.[19]

By the end of 1879, the uprising had spread throughout Afghanistan. The number of the militia units totaled over 100 thousand people. The invaders were blocked at several fortified points. Fighting broke out in the Kabul region, the city changed hands several times. As a result, the British left the capital so as not to repeat the fate of their predecessors.[20] On 27 July 1880 near the village of Maiwand, 55 km from Kandahar, a battle broke out between the Afghan army, reinforced by the people's militia, and a brigade of British regular troops. The invaders could not withstand the onslaught and fled.[21]

Under the new Emir of Afghanistan, Abdurrahman Khan, the British residence in Kabul was liquidated and the colonial troops left the country. However, Afghanistan, as before, remained under British protectorate. Using an economic blockade, in 1893 the British imposed an agreement on the so-called Durand Line on Afghanistan. It deprived the country of some of its ancestral territories, divided the lands of the Pashtuns into two parts and gave Great Britain a safe way to invade Afghanistan in case of war.[22]

Habibullah Khan, the son of Abdurrahman Khan continued the struggle for the independence. In order to free from colonial oppression, he sought rapprochement with Russia, but it was not possible at that time. Russia was defeated in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). It sought to improve relations with Great Britain because of the threat of war with Germany. Therefore, Russia made concessions on the Afghan issue and recognized the protectorate.[23]

Then, with the outbreak of the World War I, Afghanistan decided to get rid of the British protectorate, and began rapprochement with

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[19] Lyakhovsky, Davitaya, op.cit., 38.
[20] *Военная энциклопедия* [*Military Encyclopedia*], vol. 1, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1997), 158-159.
[21] *История Афганистана* [*History of Afghanistan*], op.cit., 170.
[22] Ibid., 173, 179.
[23] Lyakhovsky, Davitaya, op.cit., 49.

Germany and Turkey. German authorities hoped to persuade Habibullah Khan to make an alliance against Great Britain, guaranteeing him the return of all Pashtun lands. However, the allies in the Entente prevented the rapprochement between Afghanistan and Germany. Asaresult, Afghanistan declared its neutrality.[24]

After World War I Habibullah Khan refused to join the anti-Soviet intervention and rejected the UK's demand to allow its troops to pass from India to Turkestan. In his turn he demanded from the British to recognize the independence of Afghanistan and to return the Pashtun lands. Soon after, on 20 February 1919, he was shot dead on a hunting trip, as it is believed, by a pro-British group on his brother Nasrullah Khan. Nasrullah Khan briefly succeeded Habibullah as Emir and held power for a week between 21 February and 28 February 1919, before being ousted and imprisoned by Amanullah Khan, Habibullah's third son.[25]

The Kabul garrison and the people supported Amanullah Khan, who was declared the new Emir. On 28 February 1919, he proclaimed the country's independence. A month later, Soviet Russia was the first foreign country to recognize Afghanistan. In response, Afghanistan was the first country to recognize Soviet Russia.The two states began to get closer to each other.[26] Unwilling to recognize the independence of Afghanistan, and seeking to prevent its rapprochement with Russia, the British began a new war on 6 May 1919.

The Anglo-Indian army of more than 300 thousand people invaded the country. It had artillery, armored vehicles, machine guns and aviation.[27] Air strikes on Jalalabad and Kabul shocked Afghans and contributed to the British success. However the invaders received a sudden blow from the Pashtun tribes, which the British for the previous several years had armed and trained to fight against Kabul government. Those units went over to the side of Amanullah Khan

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[24] *Страны Ближнего и Среднего Востока* [*Countries of the Near and Middle East*], op.cit., 8.

[25] *История Афганистана* [*History of Afghanistan*], op.cit., 225.

[26] *Россия и Афганистан* [*Russia and Afghanistan*], (Moscow: Nauka, 1989), 173.

[27] *История Вооруженных сил Афганистана (1747–1977)* [*History of Afghanistan Armed Forces (1747-1977)*], op.cit., 88.

and cut off the communications of the invaders who advanced deep into the Afghan territory.

To save the garrisons of distant forts from destruction, the British command issued an order for a retreat, which soon turned into a stampede.[28] On 27 May 1919, Afghan troops began a siege of the Tal fortress. The numerous garrison was cut off from water sources and was under a constant artillery fire. The British command managed to unblock the fortress with great difficulty. It should be noted that in 1919 the Afghan army was better organized and armed than in previous Anglo-Afghan wars.

As a result, Great Britain and Afghanistan signed a truce, which marked the end of the Third Anglo-Afghan War. It took place in a different international political environment than the previous two wars. In 1919, the British were forced to withdraw from Transcaucasia and Central Asia. At the same time, the liberation movement in India intensified. Many intra-Afghan forces, which were still loyal to the British, finally went over to the side of freedom fighters. In such conditions, Great Britain was forced to give up further claims on Afghanistan. At the end of 1921, an Anglo-Afghan peace treaty was concluded. Great Britain recognized the complete independence of Afghanistan. Between the two countries there were established regular diplomatic relations.[29]

The history of the struggle of the Afghan people for independence during the Anglo-Afghan wars allows us to draw the following brief conclusions:

1. The struggle of the Afghan people for independence took place against the background of the confrontation between the two great powers –the Russian and British Empires– for influence in Central Asia.The influence of Russia extended to the north of the Amu Darya River, and Britain to the south.

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[28] L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya, "Война Афганистана за независимость и участие в ней пограничных пуштунских племен (1919–1921)" ["War of Afghanistan for independence and participation of frontier Pashtun tribes in it (1919-1921)"], in *Независимый Афганистан* [*Nezavisimiy Afghanistan*], (Moscow, 1958, 256-258).
[29] Khalfin, op.cit., 180.

2. Great Britain made a wide range of demands on Afghanistan of a political, military and economic nature that were incompatible with the country's sovereignty. The emphasis in achieving the goals of colonial policy was placed on diplomatic and economic instruments. However, three times Great Britain unleashed wars against Afghanistan in an attempt to turn it into a colony.

3. Each time well-organized, trained and armed Anglo-Indian troops quickly captured the capital and the largest cities of the country. That was facilitated by the superiority of the invaders in manpower, weapons and training, the use of separatist sentiments and bribery of the feudal elites, the isolation of Afghanistan.

4. In response to the invasion of Afghanistan, a national liberation movement arose, which used guerrilla warfare, achieved success in the armed struggle and expelled the invaders from the country. Its success was facilitated by the consolidation of society on the basis of a common ethnos, a code of honor, Islam, rejection of the invaders' behavior, and specific physical and geographical conditions of the country. They favored the conduct of combat operations by guerrilla methods that were familiar to the Afghans. At the same time, they were unusual for the British and complicated the conduct of hostilities by the regular army.

5. It is necessary to note the role of the leaders of the Afghan struggle for independence. Afghan emirs skillfully maneuvered between the interests of superpowers, consolidated society, and showed personal courage on the battlefield.

6. During the Third Anglo-Afghan War, the victory of the freedom fighters was facilitated by the beginning of the liberation movement in India, the recognition of independence by Soviet Russia, and Great Britain's withdrawal from Transcaucasia and Central Asia.

7. The wars imposed by Great Britain on Afghanistan cost it huge human and material losses, undermined the productive forces, damaged agriculture, crafts, trade, culture, and slowed down the development of the country. At the same time they provided valuable lessons on the tactical and strategic level, relevant to all states that subsequently tried to control the territory of Afghanistan with the help of military power.

Recent events have once again confirmed the truth formulated by an outstanding Russian and Soviet orientalist and geographer Andrey Snesarev: a country like Afghanistan is easy enough to capture, but it is impossible to hold it.[30]

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[30]   A.E. Snesarev, *Афганистан* [*Afghanistan*], (Moscow:Russian panorama, 2002), 199.

42. RUSSIA AS DEFENDER OF INTERESTS OF SLAVIC PEOPLES: MILITARY AND POLITICAL RESULTS OF THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR (1877-1878)

Andrey Shagov (Russia)

Russia spent almost the entire 19th century under the sign of the Eastern Question, connected with the liberation of the Balkan Orthodox peoples from the power of Turkey.

For centuries, the Balkans have occupied a special place in the system of Russia's foreign policy interests, that was because of not only Russia's geopolitical position, vital need to ensure the security of the Russian borders, but also because of the cultural and civilizational community, ethnic, linguistic, spiritual proximity of the Slavic peoples in the Balkans. To a large extent, these factors determined the Balkan vector of Russia's policy.

As we know, the Eastern crisis of 1875-1877 was caused by the rise of the national liberation movement of the Balkan peoples. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then Bulgaria, anti-Turkish uprisings broke out, which were brutally suppressed. The only country that provided assistance to the national liberation movement of the Slavic peoples was Russia.

A broad movement in support of Bulgarians began in the country. At the same time, the Russian Empire made efforts to resolve the Balkan issue by diplomatic methods.

On 30 June 1876, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire. An active campaign in defense of the "co-religion Slav brothers" was launched in the Russian media. Up to 5 thousand volunteers went from Russia to Serbia and Montenegro. Significant financial resources were collected for the purchase of weapons and equipment.

In early October of 1876, the six-fold superior forces of the Turks launched an offensive, the Serbian position quickly became desperate, and the Serbs and Russian volunteers were put on the verge of defeat.

On 12 April 1877, under the pressure of the public inside the country, Emperor Alexander II declared war on the Ottoman Porte

and created the Eastern Orthodox coalition led by the Russian Empire and composed of Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro.

The beginning of the war caused a powerful surge of patriotism in Russia. The idea of "Slavic unity" and the need for military assistance to the "Slavic brothers" revived with a new force in the Russian society.

The fighting unfolded on 2 theaters: in the Balkans and Transcaucasia. In comparison with the Crimean War, the Russian army was more prepared for combat operations. The reform of the 1870s gave positive results.

The Russian-led coalition won the war, pushing the Ottomans back all the way to the gates of Constantinople but for the timely intervention of the western European great powers. Under the threat of complete defeat, the Ottoman Empire offered to hold peace talks.

Under pressure from the British, Russia accepted the truce offered by the Ottoman Empire on 31 January 1878, but continued to move towards Constantinople.

The British sent a fleet of battleships to intimidate Russia from entering the city, and Russian forces stopped at San Stefano.

On 3 March 1878, a preliminary peace treaty was concluded in the town of San Stefano. According to this treaty, the full independence of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania was proclaimed, which received significant territorial increments. The Peace of San Stefano was of great importance for the liberation of Bulgaria, which had been under the Ottoman yoke for 500 years. The whole of Bulgaria (with the inclusion of Macedonia) from the Danube to the Aegean Sea and from the Black Sea to Lake Ohrid was proclaimed an independent principality, although nominally vassal of the Turkish Sultan, with its own government and people's militia.

Alarmed by the extension of Russian power into the Balkans, the Great Powers later forced modifications of the treaty in the Congress of Berlin. The Congress of Berlin (13 June – 13 July 1878) was a meeting of the representatives of the era's six great powers in Europe (Russia, Great Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Italy and Germany).

The successes achieved on the battlefields were largely lost during the diplomatic struggle. On 1 July 1878, the Berlin Treaty was signed, which radically changed the Treaty of San Stefano, mainly in favor of Austria-Hungary and to the detriment of the interests of the Balkan Slavs: the size of the Bulgarian state, which gained independence from Turkey, was reduced by 3 times, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were transferred to Austria.

Russia spent huge material and human resources to wage war with the Ottoman Empire. According to the official source –"Military medical report for the war with Turkey in 1877-1878 (Final data. St. Petersburg, 1886)"– the Russian army lost 15,567 people killed in action (of which: in the Danube army –11,905 people; in the Caucasian army– 3,662 people); 6824 people died of wounds; 57,652 people were wounded, 81,363 died of diseases. Excess of non-combat losses (from diseases) over the actual combat is not surprising, such a picture was typical for that era.

Other numbers of Russian losses are cited by Western European sources. So German scholar Emil Knorr reports about 30 thousand killed,[1] and French scholar Dr. GeorgesMorash – 36,455 killed and died from wounds.[2]

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[1]   Emil Knorr, *Das russische Heeres-Sanitätswesen während des Feldzugs: 1877–78*, (Hannover: Helwing, 1883), 183-184.
[2]   Georges A. Morache, *Traité d'hygiène militaire*, (P.: J.-B. Baillière et fils, 1886), 903.

CONGRESS
PHOTOS

Figure 1: Acropolis Museum (29.8.2021).

Figure 2: Acropolis Museum (29.8.2021).

Figure 3: Acropolis Museum (29.8.2021).

Figure 4: Museum Battleship Georgios Averof (29.8.2021).

Figure 5: Opening Session (30.8.2021).

Figure 6: Opening Session (30.8.2021).

Figure 7: Opening Session (30.8.2021).

Figure 8: Opening Session (30.8.2021).

Figure 9: Opening Session (30.8.2021).

Figure 10: Opening Session (30.8.2021).

Figure 11: Visit to the Marathon Tomb Warriors (30.8.2021).

Figure 12: Visit to the 747 Special Engineer Battalion (31.8.2021).

Figure 13: Visit to the 747 Special Engineer Battalion (31.8.2021).

Figure 14: Visit to the War Museum of Athens (2.9.2021).

Figure 15: Visit to the War Museum of Athens (2.9.2021).

Figure 16: Farewell Dinner (3.9.2021).

Hellenic Commission
of Military History